El  15 

W3 


COPYRIGHT  1898 

BY 
THE  WERNER  COMPANY 


IN  Pious  HOMAGE 

TO  THE 

memory  of  the  heroic  Dead 

WHO  FELL  IN  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN,  THIS 
VOLUME  is  INSCRIBED 

TO 

THEIR  LIVING  KINDRED 
AS  SOME  RECOGNITION  OF  THE  SACRIFICES  MADE  BY  THEM 

UPON  THE 

ALTARS  OF  FREEDOM  AND  HUMANITY. 


PREFACE 


HE  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  was 
like  no  other  war  of  ancient  or  modern  times. 
Begun  at  once  as  a  protest  of  civilization  and  as 


iiKMlitattMl  national  expansion;  and,  from  first  to 
last,  it  abounded  in  surprises.  In  its  inception, 
the  public  men  of  America  were  generally  opposed 
to  it,  as  they  are  apt  to  be  opposed  to  everything 
either  very  original  or  very  decisive  ;  and,  if  the 
controlling  members  of  the  cabinet  at  Madrid  favored  it  —  as  there 
are  some  reasons  for  believing  that  they  did  —  theirs  was  rather  a 
choice  between  two  dangers,  foreign  and  domestic,  which  menaced 
them,  than  any  deliberate  preference  for  war.  In  Spain  all  popular 
impulse  seems  to  have  been  wranting.  In  the  United  States  the 
declaration  of  war  was  forced  upon  the  President  and  the  Congress 
by  the  people. 

Thus,  the  war  with  Spain  was  essentially  a  people's  war.  The 
destruction  of  the  Maine  in  the  harbor  of  Havana  undoubtedly  quick 
ened  the  pulse  of  the  nation  and  hurried  the  action  of  its  official 
representatives.  But,  long  before,  the  patience  of  public  opinion  in 
the  United  States  had  been  exhausted  by  Spanish  misrule  in  Cuba. 
The  time  was  come  to  make  an  end  of  an  intolerable  situation.  When 
we  consider  not  merely  the  oppression  and  corruption  which  had 
marked  a  cruel  despotism  existing  in  sight  of  us,  and  exploiting  itself 
in  spite  of  us,  but  its  actual  cost  to  us  in  the  treaty  obligation  of 
policing  our  coasts  against  the  filibusters  and  in  its  consequent  and 
constant  injury  to  our  commerce,  it  seems  a  matter  of  wonder  that 
the  day  of  reckoning  should  have  been  delayed  so  long. 

(v) 


vi  PREFACE 

From  the  coming  of  Cortes  and  Pizarro  to  the  going  of  Weyler, 
the  flag  of  the  Spaniard  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  was  the  emblem 
solely  of  rapine  and  pillage.  The  discovery  of  Columbus  seemed  to 
act  upon  the  Spanish  imagination  as  a  magic  philter,  distorting  all 
its  evil  propensities  and  filling  it  with  desires  impossible  of  fulfill 
ment.  Under  its  spell  the  phantoms  of  the  soothsayer  and  the  fancies 
of  the  poet  took  definite  shape.  With  some  it  was  the  dream  of 
eternal  life;  with  others  a  vision  of  untold  riches;  but,  with  all,  the 
perversion  of  nature.  Cut  loose  from  the  moorings  of  common  sense, 
the  standards  of  morality  were  lost.  Incalculable  rapacity  begot  incon 
ceivable  brutality,  and,  as  a  result,  Spain,  from  the  first,  became  the 
last  of  the  great  European  powers.  The  demon  of  gold  had  taken 
hold  of  the  greatest  and  noblest  of  the  nations  by  its  very  vitals.  The 
craze  for  lucre,  which  so  often  makes  of  good  men  bad  men,  under 
the  most  civilizing  influences,  had,  under  the  most  barbaric,  diverted 
the  courageous  and  enlightened  Spaniard  from  the  love  of  poetry 
and  art  to  the  love  of  money;  and,  after  Columbus  and  his  wondrous 
New  World,  Cortes  and  Pizarro,  and  the  other  minor  tyrants  and 
robbers,  down  to  Weyler,  came  in  a  kind  of  geometric  progression, 
as  simple  matters  of  course. 

The  flag,  as  the  saying  is,  had  finally  dropped  upon  the  dominion 
of  the  Spaniard  in  America.  One  after  another,  Spain  had  been  de 
spoiled  of  her  American  possessions.  It  was  the  moderation  of  the 
Great  Republic  which  saved  her  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  so  long.  If 
any  other  power  except  the  United  States  had  been  concerned,  she 
would  have  lost  them  fifty  years  earlier. 

In  the  nature  of  the  case,  there  could  be  no  spirit  of  territorial 
aggrandizement  disturbing  the  serenity  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  With  the  vast  area  of  unoccupied  land  in  the  west  of  their 
continent,  the  Americans  took  little,  if  any,  account  of  Cuba,  whilst 
Porto  Rico  was  undreamed  of.  They  had  no  quarrel  with  Spain.  On 
the  contrary,  there  was  a  sentimental  regard  for  the  Spaniard,  an 
honorable  gratitude,  as  it  were,  manifested  during  our  great  Fair  by 
the  honors  paid  the  Duke  of  Veragua,  and  the  cordial  reception  given 


PREFACE  vii 

to  the  Infanta  Eulalia;  and  the  idea  of  going  to  war  with  a  nation  so 
weak  as  we  knew  Spain  to  be,  was  repugnant  to  every  brave  and 
honorable  man.  There  were  two  circumstances  that,  among  intelli 
gent  Americans,  weighed  far  more  than  the  world  will  ever  give  us 
credit  even  for  conceiving.  As  no  orator  since  Patrick  Henry,  not 
excepting  Gambetta,  Senor  Castelar  had  delivered  those  principles  of 
civil  liberty  which  are  dear  to  all  our  hearts.  That  meant  a  great 
deal.  It  alternately  appealed  to  our  republicanism  and  stirred  our 
enthusiastic  admiration.  Then  there  was  set  before  our  eyes  the  figure 
of  a  noble  woman,  with  her  boy  king,  in  spite  of  our  republicanism, 
appealing  to  our  manhood.  All  in  all,  it  cost  us  a  great  sacrifice  of 
sensibilities  to  go  to  war  with  Spain. 

But  what  could  we  do  ?  The  situation  was  inexorable.  It  was 
either  ruthlessly  to  beat  down,  or  be  ignominiously  humiliated.  When 
nations  can  do  nothing  they  can  fight,  and  fight  we  did.  And  so  did 
the  Spaniard.  But  centuries  of  moral  poison,  percolating  through  the 
veins  of  the  body  politic  of  Spain,  had  done  their  work.  The  obso 
lete  Spaniard  was  no  match  for  the  alert  and  enterprising  American. 
The  war  was  quickly  over.  It  might  not  have  been  so  quickly  over 
in  the  case  of  Germany  and  France ;  but  its  end  would  have  been  the 
same.  Spain  has  no  reason  to  be  ashamed  of  her  part  in  it.  Through 
out  the  United  States,  at  least,  the  Spanish  character  stands  higher 
to-day  than  it  did  before  the  war,  though  the  Spaniards  have  Admirals 
Montejo  and  Cervera  and  General  Toral  to  thank  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  national  credit. 

On  our  own  side,  the  war  has  surely  paid  us  back  far  more  than 
it  cost  us,  at  the  same  time  that  it  has  brought  us  many  things  not 
contemplated  in  the  beginning. 

It  annihilated  sectional  lines  and  solidified  the  Union.  It  pro 
claimed  us  a  nation  among  the  nations  of  the  earth ;  no  longer  a 
huddle  of  petty  sovereignties  held  together  by  a  rope  of  sand.  It 
dissipated  at  once  and  forever  the  notion  that  we  are  a  race  of  mer 
cenary  shopkeepers,  worshipping  rather  the  brand  upon  the  dollar 
than  the  eagle  on  the  shield.  It  announced  the  arrival  upon  the 


viii  PREFACE 

scene  of  the  world's  action  of  a  power  which  would  have  to  be  reckoned 
with  by  the  older  powers  in  determining  the  future  of  civilization. 
It  rescued  us  from  the  turbulent  discussion  of  many  misleading  ques 
tions  of  domestic  economy,  uplifting  and  enlarging  all  our  national 
perspectives.  Above  all,  it  elevated,  broadened,  and  vitalized  the  man 
hood  of  the  rising  generation  of  Americans.  In  the  heroes  who  fell  in 
battle,  as  in  those  who  survived  to  tell  the  tale  of  surpassing  endurance 
and  valor,  examples  of  priceless  value  were  set  before  it ;  and  in  such 
illustrations  as  Dewey  and  Hobson,  Shafter  and  Wheeler,  coming  from 
extremes  of  North  and  South,  notice  was  served  upon  Christendom  of 
the  existence  of  a  homogeneous  race  of  soldiers  and  sailors  destined 
to  carry  the  flag  of  the  Great  Republic  to  lands  perhaps  as  yet  un 
known,  and  certainly  able  to  hold  it  against  all  who  might  dispute 
its  right  of  way. 

The  United  States  engaged  in  the  war  with  Spain  under  many 
disadvantages.  It  was  supposed  that  the  Spanish  navy  outclassed  our 
navy.  It  was  known  that  we  had  no  organized  army.  Europe  was 
rife  with  evil  prognostications.  Although  the  continental  nations  offi 
cially  declared  their  neutrality,  the  ruling  elements,  social  and  political, 
were  all  against  us.  In  spite  of  the  millions  of  Germans  among  us, 
the  trend  of  German  opinion  as  delivered  by  the  newspapers  of  Berlin 
and  Frankfurt  and  Koln  was  surprisingly  hostile.  Though  France  is 
a  Republic,  and  our  ancient  ally  besides,  the  Parisian  journals,  reflect 
ing  on  the  one  hand  the  interests  of  the  Spanish  bondholders  and  on 
the  other  hand  the  prejudices  of  polite  society, — perhaps  also  goaded 
by  the  avowed  friendship  of  the  English,  —  made  haste  to  open  upon 
us  a  cross-fire  of  the  most  fantastic  billingsgate.  It  was  on  all  sides 
freely  predicted  that  the  raw  militia  of  America  could  not  stand  against 
the  trained  veterans  of  Europe,  and  that  the  American  navy,  over 
matched  in  ships  by  the  navy  of  Spain,  and  manned  by  a  riff-raff  of 
foreign  adventurers,  would  become  the  easy  prey  of  such  Admirals 
as  Cervera,  Montejo,  and  Camara.  There  were  admissions  in  some 
quarters  that  the  superior  resources  and  power  of  the  United  States 
would  in  the  end  prevail;  but  nothing  was  allowed  the  Yankees  except 


PREFACE  ix 

grudgingly,  and  even  then  rendered  in  a  tone  of  apology.  In  Spain 
it  was  given  out  that  the  South,  still  mourning  the  loss  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  was  ripe  for  revolt,  and  that  the  landing  of  a  Spanish 
army  somewhere  on  the  Gulf  coast  was  only  necessary  to  draw  to  it 
a  host  of  rebels  waiting  for  a  chance  to  rise  and  eager  for  revenge. 

The  war  dispelled  all  these  illusions.  The  United  States  went  into 
it  even  in  its  own  eyes  something  of  a  riddle  as  to  the  matter  of  martial 
equipment,  resources,  and  capacity.  It  came  out  of  it  a  conceded,  self- 
confident  world  power.  The  victories  of  Dewey  and  Sampson  settled 
forever  all  question  as  to  the  navy.  The  rapid  mobilization  of  the 
army  proved  the  wonder  of  mankind;  a/nd,  although  the  army  had 
less  opportunity  than  the  navy  to  show  the  stuff  it  was  made  of,  the 
operations  in  front  of  Santiago  were  sufficient  to  establish  its  claim 
to  the  respect  of  the  military  establishments  of  Europe  and  to  earn 
for  it  and  its  leaders  the  admiration  of  their  own  countrymen.  From 
Miles,  the  able  and  gallant  commanding  General,  to  the  humblest  sub 
altern,  the  exhibitions  of  intrepidity  and  fortitude  and  skill  were  never 
exceeded  by  any  band  of  officers  or  any  body  of  troops  of  which  the 
history  of  warfare  gives  us  an  account. 

The  purpose  of  the  pages  which  follow  is  to  tell  the  story  of  these 
soldiers  and  these  sailors  as  they  themselves  revealed  it  from  time 
to  time  during  the  war  with  Spain.  No  notice  is  here  taken  of  any 
controversy  incident  to  or  growing  out  of  the  events  attempted  to  be 
impartially  set  forth.  This  history  has  nought  to  do  with  disputing 
or  disputed  claims  among  ambitious  rivals.  As  Admiral  Schley  ob 
served,  there  was  "glory  enough  to  go  round."  Having  no  other  aim 
than  to  render  to  Caesar  the  things  which  are  Caesar's,  its  author  has 
sought  to  make  a  simple,  lucid  narrative  of  an  episode,  short  indeed, 
but  not  too  short  to  glorify  American  arts  and  arms.  Although  written 
concurrently  with  the  progress  of  the  events  it  describes,  sufficient  time 
was  allowed  in  every  instance  to  ascertain  from  official  and  other 
sources  the  actual  facts  of  every  transaction;  and  it  is  believed  that 
it  has  omitted  no  essential  feature  of  the  operations  on  land  and  sea, 
or  failed  to  give  to  each  of  them  its  fair  proportion.  An  abundance 


X  PREFACE 

rather  than  a  scarcity  of  material  for  its  composition,  ready-made  by 
the  newspaper  correspondents,  to  whom  the  author's  first  and  chief 
acknowledgments  are  due,  has  attended  its  progress  toward  comple 
tion  ;  and  his  would  be  but  an  imperfect  account  if  it  failed  to  mark 
the  daring,  energy,  and  skill,  along  with  entire  fidelity  to  justice  and 
truth,  which  characterized  the  part  played  by  these  important  and 
inseparable  companions  of  the  soldiers  in  the  field.  Assuredly  nothing 
has  been  set  down  either  in  wanton  praise  or  blame,  so  that  the  whole 
is  submitted  to  the  public  with  the  confident  belief  that  it  embraces 
what,  indeed,  it  purports  to  be,  a  complete  and  authentic  account  of 
the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain. 

HENRY  WATTERSON. 

COURIER-JOURNAL,  LOUISVILLE. 
October  1,  1898. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE    CAUSES    AND    THK    DECLARATION    OF    \VAU. 

PAGES 

Strained  Relations  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  — The  Visit  of  Courtesy 
by  the  American  Battleship  to  Havana  —  Destruction  of  the  Maine  in 
Havana  Harbor  — Indignation  and  Excitement  among  the  People  — The 
Naval  Board  of  Investigation  — Its  Report  —  Senator  Proctor's  Speech  and 
Its  Effect  upon  the  Country —  Messages  of  the  President  and  Action  of 
Congress  —  The  American  Ultimatum  —  Minister  Barnabe  Demands  His 
Passports  — Spain  Refuses  to  Receive  the  Ultimatum  and  Sends  His  Pass 
ports  to  Minister  Wood  ford — The  Queen-Regent  before  the  Cortes  — A 
Simultaneous  Appeal  to  Arms  —  The  Final  Declaration  of  War 1-24 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE    MAKING    OF    ARMIES    AND    NAVIES. 

First  Acts  of  the  War  and  a  Comparison  of  the  Combatants  —  The  Organization  of 
the  United  States  Army  and  the  Strengthening  of  the  Navy  —  The  Presi 
dent  Calls  for  125,000  Volunteers,  and  the  Country  Answers  with  750,000 
Applications  for  Enlistment  —  Appointment  of  the  General  Staff,  Including 
ex-Federals  and  ex-Confederates  —  Outburst  of  Patriotic  Rivalry  and  Fra 
ternization  between  Y.orth  and  South  — Unification  of  National  Sentiment  25-36 


CHAPTER   III. 

DEWEY    AND    MANILA. 

Extent  and  Condition  of  the  Spanish  Colonies  of  the  Philippines  —  The  Naval 
Problems  of  Offense  and  Defense  in  the  Pacific  —  The  Movements  Preced 
ing  the  Battle  of  Manila  —  Extraordinary  Appeal  of  the  Governor-General 
to  Resist  the  Americans  —  Commodore  Dewey  Sails  to  <(Find  the  Spaniard 
and  Smash  Him"  —  The  Extraordinary  Battle  in  Manila  Bay  in  which  the 
Spaniards  Were  Annihilated  li^-€?omm<xlore  Dewey's  Squadron — The  Effect 

of  the  Victory  upon  the  United  States,  Spain,  and  All  Europe 37-61 

(xi) 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER    IV. 

THE    BLOCKADE    OF    CUBA. 

PAGES 

First  Work  of  Admiral  Sampson's  Squadron  — How  the  Blockade  of  Havana  Was 
Received  by  the  Two  Warring  Nations  and  in  Havana — The  Problems  of 
War  in  the  Atlantic  —  Spanish  Spies  Discovered  and  Captured  —  The  Bom 
bardment  of  Matanzas  —  (<The  Matanzas  Mule0  Enters  into  History  — The 
American  Baptism  of  Blood  at  Cardenas— Death  of  Ensign  Bagley  and 
the  Repulse  of  the  Winslow  —  Unimportant  Events  of  the  War  ....  62-75 

CHAPTER   V. 
<(  BOTTLING  UPW  CERVERA'S  SQUADRON. 

The  Chase  of  the  Spanish  Squadron  of  Admiral  Cervera  —  Its  Mysterious  Dis 
appearance  and  Final  Appearance  in  the  West  Indies  —  The  Battleship 
Oregon's  Wonderful  Race  of  15,000  Miles  against  Time  —  A  War  Ship's  Un 
paralleled  Record  of  Endurance  and  Condition  —  Cervera's  Fleet  <(  Bottled 
Up»  in  Santiago  Harbor — The  Heroic  Deed  of  Lieutenant  Hobson  and 
His  Volunteer  Crew  — The  Merrimac  Sunk  in  the  Harbor  Entrance  — « The 
Cork  in  the  Bottle »  .  76-92 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE    INVASION    OF    CUBA. 

Landing  of  the  Marines  at  Caimanera  — Five  Days  of  Almost  Sleepless  Fighting 
with  Spanish  Fighters— First  of  the  Cubans  —  The  Mauser  Rifle  in  Action 
— Landing  of  Shafter's  Division  at  Baiquiri,  and  of  Wheeler's  at  Siboney 
—  United  States  Soldiers  and  Their  Torments  while  Marching  —  The 
Enemy  Vanishes  in  Retreat  — First  Use  of  the  Dynamite  Cruiser  Vesuvius 
in  Warfare  —  Result  of  the  Experiments 


CHAPTER    VII. 

HEROES    AT    LAS    GUASIMAS. 

First  Military  Battle  of  the  War  — Story  of  the  « Rough  Riders »  Volunteers,  the 
Officers  and  Men  — With  Battalions  of  the  First  and  Tenth  Cavalry  They 
Carry  an  Impregnable  Position  at  Las  Guasimas  against  Four  Times  Their 
Force  — The  Gallantry  of  Volunteers  and  Regulars  —  First  Military  Deaths 
in  the  Field  — Humors  and  Tragedies  under  Fire  .  .  107-117 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

CLOSING    IN    ON    SANTIAGO. 

PAGES 

The  Terrible  Hardships  of  the  Troops  Moving  from  Baiquiri  to  Attack  —  Spaniards 
Terrorize  Citizens  and  Soldiers  with  Tales  of  "Yankee"  Cruelty  — Prepar 
ing  the  Line  of  Assault  and  Cutting  Off  the  Enemy's  Supplies  — The  Feint 
on  Aguadores  and  Santiago  by  the  American  Fleet  and  Duffield's  Troops 

—  Two  Days  of  Murderous  Gun-Firing 118-127 

CHAPTER    IX. 

SAN    JUAN    AND    EL   CANKY. 

The  Terrible  Struggles  Outside  of  Santiago — Wheeler  and  Kent's  Advance  from 
El  Pozo  Up  the  Valley  to  San  Juan  — "The  Bloody  Corner",  and  the 
Heroism  of  Our  Troops — Hawkins's  and  Roosevelt's  Charges  on  the  Hill 

—  Chaffee's   Great    Fight    at   El   Caney  and   the   Dearly  Bought    Victory  — 
Scenes  and  Incidents  of  the  Battles  —  A  Foreign   Opinion 128-149 

CHAPTER   X. 

DESTRUCTION    OF    CERVERA's    SQUADRON. 

The  Dash  of  the  Spanish  Ships  Out  of  the  Harbor  of  Santiago— The  Greatest  Naval 
Duel  in  the  World's  History  —  All  the  Enemy's  Ships  and  Destroyers  but 
One  Annihilated  by  Our  War  Ships  in  Fifty-five  Minutes  — The  Long  Chase 
after  the  Cristobal  Colon,  and  Her  Capture  after  a  Race  of  Fifty  Miles  — 
The  Glory  of  the  Brooklyn,  Oregon,  Texas,  and  Gloucester 150-162 

CHAPTER    XI. 

DESTRUCTION    OK    CERVERA?S    SQUADRON     (Continued). 

Dreadful  Scenes  Attending  the  Rescue  of  Survivors  and  the  Capture  of  Prisoners 

—  Incidents  of  the   Surrender  of  Admiral   Cervera   and   Captain    Eulate  — 
Spanish   Ships   Reduced  to  Worthless   Hulks   by  the   Fury  of  Our  Attack 

—  Treacherous  Destruction  of  the  Colon  —  Anecdotes  of  the  Engagement- 
Contrast  of  American  and  Spanish  Men  and    Methods  —  The   Effect   of  the 
Victory  and  the  Credit  of  It 163-174 

CHAPTER    XII. 

DESTRUCTION    OF    CERVERA*S    SQUADRON    (Concluded  ). 

Spanish  Story  of  the  Battle  as  Told  by  Surviving  Officers  —  It  Does  Not  Differ  in 
Substance  from  the  American  Account  —  Incidents  and  Anecdotes  of  the 
Engagement  —  How  the  Battle  Looked  to  Observers — To  Whom  Does  the 
Credit  of  Victory  Belong? 175-186 


xiv  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   XIII. 

PROGRESS    OF    OUR    ARMY    AND    NAVY. 

PAGES 

General  Shafter  Surrounds  Santiago  and  Demands  Its  Surrender  —  Singular  Prog 
ress  of  the  Negotiations  —  Exchange  of  Hobson  and  His  Men,  an  Exciting 
Incident— The  St.  Paul  Sinks  the  Torpedo  Boat  Terror  at  San  Juan  — 
The  Texas  Sinks  the  Reina  Mercedes  in  Santiago  Harbor  —  A Ifonso  XII. 
Sunk  at  Mariel  — The  Ludicrous  Voyage  of  Admiral  Camara's  Fleet 
through  the  Suez  Canal  and  Back  Again 187-200 

CHAPTER    XIV. 

THE    DEATH     GRIP     AT     SANTIAGO. 

An  Ominous  Pause  on  Both  Sides  —  The  Spanish  Reinforcements  of  Pestilence  and 
Famine  —  The  Sinister  Meaning  and  History  of  <(the  Honor  of  Spain M  — 
Twenty  Thousand  Starving  Refugees  to  Support,  and  Yellow  Fever  to 
Combat— Spanish  Troops  Loot  Their  Own  City  with  Atrocity  —  Shafter 
Sends  a  Sharp  Demand  to  Toral  —  Personal  Conference  between  the  Gen 
erals— (<It's  a  D — d  Poor  Sort  of  Honor  that  Makes  Soldiers  Die  for  Noth 
ing w —  Toral  Agrees  to  Surrender  the  City  —  Wild  Rejoicing  in  the  Ameri 
can  Army 201-212 

CHAPTER    XV. 

SURRENDER     OF     SANTIAGO. 

Toral  Makes  a  Despairing  Effort  to  Fight  off  Surrender  by  Delay— The  Terms 
Enforced  with  Courteous  Firmness  —  Occupation  of  the  City  on  Sunday, 
July  17,  with  Impressive  Ceremonial  and  amidst  Wild  Enthusiasm  by  Our 
Troops  and  the  Population  —  Fraternization  of  Spanish  and  American 
Troops  — Dreadful  Conditions  Prevailing  in  Santiago  — Sickness,  Infection, 
Hunger,  Anarchy  — Work  of  the  Authorities  and  the  Red  Cross  —  Sketches 
of  Generals  Shafter  and  Wheeler,  Leaders  of  Our  Army 213-232 


CHAPTER   XVI. 
GARCIA'S  DISAFFECTION  AND  MANZANILLO. 

Disappointment  of  the  Cuban  Allies  when  Santiago  Was  Not  Given  into  Their  Con 
trol—The  Story  of  the  Correspondence  between  Generals  Garcia  and  Shafter, 
and  the  Withdrawal  of  Cuban  Forces  into  the  Interior  — Character  of  the 
Services  Rendered  by  the  Cubans  in  the  Santiago  Campaign  — Our  Wai- 
Ships  under  Todd  Sink  and  Destroy  Five  Spanish  Gunboats  and  Three 
Transports,  Killing  a  Hundred  of  the  Enemy  — Not  a  Man  or  Ship  of  the 
Americans  Hurt .  233-240 


CONTENTS  xv 


xvu. 

SIGNIFICANCE     OK     THK     FALL     OF     SANTIAGO. 

PAGES 

Extraordinary  Test  of  the  Fighting  Dualities  of  Americans  before  the  Surrender  — 
The  Endurance,  Courage,  and  Individual  Skill  of  Our  Troops  Amazed  All 
Foreign  Military  Observers  —  Opinions  Expressed  by  Some  of  the  Experts  — 
The  Storming  of  San  Juan  Considered  an  Impossibility  in  Advance  —  What 
the  Naval  Engagements  Demonstrated  to  the  World  —  Effect  of  the  Com 
bined  Operations  — Greater  in  Significance  than  Any  Battle  of  the  Century.  241-251 


CHAPTER   XVIII. 

DEFEAT     OF     FOREIGN     INTERVENTION. 

Effect  of  England's  Attitude  on  Continental  Europe  —  New  Cuban  Policy  and  Its 
Complete  Reversal  in  Our  Favor  —  The  Concert  of  Europe  Accepted  It  as 
Proof  of  an  Alliance  —  Character  of  the  Governmental  Diplomacies  and  the 
Methods  of  Their  Procedure  —  Action  and  Attitude  of  All  the  Nations  when 
War  Began  — Effect  of  Devvey's  Victory  at  Manila 252-2<>2 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

THE     PHILIPPINES     QUESTION. 

Dewey's  Victory  and  Its  Effect  upon  the  Eastern  Question  in  International  Poli 
tics—Lord  Salisbury's  Speech  on  Living  and  Dead  Nations  —  Explanation 
of  the  Eastern  Question  Developed  since  the  Chinese-Japanese  War  — Mr. 
Chamberlain's  Startling  Speech  Suggesting  an  Anglo-American  Alliance  on 
the  Lines  of  Common  Purposes  — The  Sensation  Caused  in  the  World  by 
His  Unexpected  Freedom  of  Speech,  against  All  Cabinet  Precedents  .  .  263-274 


CHAPTER   XX. 

<(  IMPERIALISM  n  —  <(  EXPANSION  w  ANNEXATION. 

The  Uneasiness  in  the  United  States  Caused  by  the  Movement  towards  « Imperial 
ism  B  and  (<  Expansion  w  —  The  Course  of  the  Discussion  and  a  Comparison 
with  European  Dread  of  Our  Appearance  in  Asiatic  Waters  —  The  Imme 
diate  Extent  of  New  Measures  Proposed  —  The  Nicaragua  Canal,  Hawaii, 
Naval  and  Army  Enlargement —The  Annexation  of  Hawaii,  and  the  His 
tory  of  the  Measure  in  Congress  —  The  Capture  of  Guam  in  the  Ladrone 
Islands  — A  Comedy  of  War 275-291 


xvi  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

ANGLO-AMEKICAN     ALLIANCE. 

PAGES 

Remarkable  Reversal  of  the  Old  Attitude  of  Aversion  between  Americans  and 
Britons  —  Continuation  of  the  Response  to  Mr.  Chamberlain's  Speech  — 
Utterances  at  the  Anglo-American  Dinner  in  London — Party  Leaders  on 
Both  Sides  in  Parliament  Commit  Themselves  to  Friendship  and  Union 
with  United  States  Interests  in  a  Memorable  Debate  —  Remarkable  Fourth 
of  July  Celebration  in  London 292-300 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

ATTITUDE     OF     FRANCE    AND     RUSSIA. 

The  Curious  Relations  between  France  and  the  United  States  —  The  Desperate 
Causes  of  Her  Unfriendly  Attitude  towards  Us  at  the  Outbreak  of  AVar  — 
Mistakes  and  Follies  of  the  Parisian  Press  and  Parisian  Populace  — Absurd 
Comparisons  of  Spain  and  America — Reprisals  Proposed  in  the  United 
States  that  Caused  a  Swift  Change  of  Attitude  —  Russia  and  Her  Connec 
tion  with  the  Anti-American  Concert — A  Negative  Act  Atoned  for  by  Long, 
Unbroken  Friendship  and  Fresh  Manifestations  of  Good  Feeling  ....  301-314 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 

DEWEY     AND     THE     GERMANS. 

Very  Unfriendly  and  Hostile  Opposition  to  America  by  the  Emperor  and  the 
Agrarian  Party  —  The  Commercial  Antagonisms  that  Produced  It  — Admiral 
Dewey  Receives  an  Apology  from  Prince  Henry,  the  Emperor's  Brother  — 
The  Irritating  Interference  of  the  German  War  Ships  at  Manila — Dewey 
Demands  that  Admiral  von  Diederichs  Shall  Answer  Whether  He  Wants 
Peace  or  War  — The  Germans  « Called  Down  »  at  Last  — Diplomatic  Expla 
nations  and  Assurances  — Change  of  Tone  of  the  German  Press  ....  315-327 


CHAPTER    XXIV. 

DEWEY,    AGUINALDO,    AND    AUGUSTI. 

The  Remarkable  Story  of  Young  Aguinaldo,  Leader  of  the  Revolution  in  the 
Philippines  — Rising  from  a  Servant  to  Be  the  Popular  Idol,  and  Ambitious 
of  Imperial  Power  and  Honors  —  Account  of  His  Crafty  Proceedings  with 
the  Americans  and  Spaniards  —  Proclaims  Himself  President-General  of  the 
Provisional  Government  of  the  Philippine  Republic  —  Augusti  and  His  In 
trigues  and  Deposition  from  Office  — Dewey  and  His  Careful  Diplomacy 
and  Reserve  —  The  Decline  of  Aguinaldo's  Power — General  Merritt's  Arrival 
and  Preparations  for  Assault 328-345 


CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

THE    INVASION    OF    PORTO    RICO. 

PAGES 

Yellow  and  Malarial  Fevers  Invade  the  Camps  of  the  United  States  Troops  near 
Santiago  — A  « Round  Robin  »  and  the  Protest  that  Caused  the  Fighters  to 
Be  Brought  Home  —  General  Miles,  with  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  Invades 
Porto  Rico,  Landing  at  Guanica — Yauco  and  Ponce  Welcome  Our  Soldiers 
and  Are  Glad  to  Be  in  the  United  States  — The  Two  Movements  that  Were 
to  Unite  and  Capture  San  Juan,  the  Capital  —  Interrupted  by  the  Peace 
Protocol,  but  Very  Successfully  under  Way  —  General  Miles  Regards  the 
People  Favorably — Significance  of  Porto  Rico's  Ready  Surrender  ....  34H-356 

CHAPTER   XXVI. 

PEACE. 

Spain  at  Last  Begs  for  Terms  upon  which  Peace  May  Be  Reached  —  The  United 
States  Demands  the  Freedom  of  Cuba,  Cession  of  Porto  Rico  and  All 
Spanish  Islands  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  One  of  the  Ladrones,  and 
Reserves  the  Right  to  Decide  what  Shall  Be  Done  with  the  Philippines  — 
Spain  Requires  Delay,  of  Course,  but  Accepts  the  Terms  —  Peace  Protocol 
Signed  August  12  — Manzanillo,  Cuba,  Bombarded  the  Same  Day,  and  a 
Skirmish  in  Porto  Rico 357-365 

CHAPTER   XXVII. 

ASSAULT    AND    CAPTURE    OF    MANILA. 

Electricity  Not  Quick  Enough  to  Stop  Admiral  Dewey  from  Taking  Manila- 
Military  Advances  upon  the  City  Walls  —  Three.  Nights'  Battle  before 
Malate,  in  which  Spaniards  Are  Repulsed  with  Heavy  Losses,  by  Our 
Volunteers  —  Dewey  and  Merritt  Demand  Its  Surrender  and  Make  a  The 
atrical  Assault  on  August  13,  in  Order  to  Appease  the  <( Honor  of  Spain" 

—  The  Authorities  Anxious  to  Surrender  —  Escape  of  General  Augusti  on  a 
German  Ship — Americans  Occupy  the  City  —  The  Articles  of  Capitulation 

—  The  Glorious   Record   of  Admiral  Dewey  Reviewed  —  Death  of  Captain 
Gridley  of  the  Olympia 366-379 

CHAPTER   XXVIII. 

FIGHTING     LEADERS    OF    THE    WAR. 

Anecdotes  of  Dewey  from  Boyhood  to  Immortality  at  Manilla  — The  School-teacher 
that  Rawhided  Him  into  Good  Behavior — What  the  Sailors  Thought  of 
Him  on  All  Occasions  —  Sampson,  the  Most  Unassuming  Officer  in  the  Serv 
ice— Schley  and  His  Fighting  Record — The  Meeting  He  Had  with  a  Ger 
man  at  Valparaiso — A  Story  of  "Fighting  Bobw  Evans  — American  Gunners 
and  Sailors  — Target  Practice  Makes  Them  Perfect 380-393 


xviii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   XXIX. 

FIGHTING    LEADERS    OF    THE    AKMY. 

PAGES 

The  Almost  Romantic  Career  of  General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  Commanding  the  Army  — 
From  a  Lieutenant  at  Twenty-two  to  a  Major-General  at  Twenty-five  — 
General  Merritt's  Rapid  Rise  in  the  Cavalry  Arm  at  the  Same  Time  — The 
Soldiers  of  the  Army  as  Described  by  Foreigners  — A  Vivid  Description  of 
the  Charge  at  San  Juan  — The  London  Times' s  Description  of  Our  Men.  .  394-401 

CHAPTER    XXX. 

INTERESTING    FACTS    ABOUT    AVAR. 

The  Naval  Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain,  as  Summed  Up  by  a  Naval  Expert —  Value 
of  Armor  and  Guns,  and  the  Danger  of  Wood  —  Torpedo  Boats  Proved  to  Be 
of  Much  Less  Efficiency  than  Expected  —  Above  All,  Only  the  Best  of  Men 
Must  Form  Fighting  Crews  —  Cost  of  Many  Modern  Wars  in  Treasure  and 
Blood  —  Indemnities  Paid  by  the  Conquered  Nation 402-418 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

ASPECTS    AND    INCIDENTS. 

The  Work  of  War  Correspondents  and  Reporters  —  Enormous  Cost  of  the  Service  — 
No  War  in  History  Ever  so  Promptly  and  Fully  Described — Material  for 
Historians  —  Incidents  and  Anecdotes  of  Soldiers  in  the  Camp,  in  Battle, 
and  in  Hospitals  —  How  Some  Heroes  Died  and  Others  Suffered  —  Naval 
Anecdotes  —  Acts  of  Great  Bravery  —  Bowery  Music  at  Guam  — Aguinaldo's 
Fine  Band  — Spanish  and  American  Sailors  Contrasted  — Conclusion  .  .  .419-442 


APPENDIX. 

REPORT  OF  THE   NAVAL  COMMANDERS:  — 

Admiral    Sampson's    Report 445-450 

Commodore  Schley's  Report 451-454 

Report   of   Captain    Clark 454-455 

Report  of  Captain   Evans 456-459 

CORRESPONDENCE   BETWEEN   ADMIRAL   SAMPSON   AND   CAPTAIN  TAYLOR 459-463 

LETTER    OF  CAPTAIN   MAHAN    (Retired) 463-466 

LETTER  OF  TITE   SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY 467-469 

THE   LONG  CRUISE   OF   THE   w  OREGON® 470-474 

Account  Written  by  Her  Chief  Engineer     .......          470-474 


LLUSTRATIONS 


THE  WAR  CABINET       .....  .....         Frontispiece 

U.  S.  BATTLESHIP  w  MAINE,*  DESTROYED  IN  HAVANA  HARBOR,  FEBRUARY  15th,  1898  .         .  2 
CIIARI.KS   D.    SIGSBEE,   IN   COMMAND   OF  THE   *  MAINE*  WHEN    DESTROYED    IN    HAVANA 

HARBOR             ..............  4 

CENTRAL  PARK.  ENGLAND  HOTEL,  AND  TACON  THEATRE,  HAVANA        .....  6 

LA  FUERZA,  HAVANA,  ERECTED  1573 8 

THE  TACON  MARKET,  HAVANA 10 

FRUIT  STAND  IN  HAVANA      .                   12 

NATIVE  FRUIT-SELLER,  HAVANA    ............  14 

AVENUE  OF  PALMS,  HAVANA 16 

BLANCO,  GOVERNOR-GENERAL  OF  CUBA         ..........  18 

INTERIOR  OF  THE  GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S  PALACE,  HAVANA  .......  20 

VILLAGE  SCENE  IN  HAVANA  PROVINCE 22 

ALPHONSE  XIII.,  KING  OF  SPAIN          ...........  24 

U.  S.  ARMORED  CRUISER  (<NEW  YORK*       ..........  26 

NATIVE  HOUSES  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES 38 

GENERAL   VIEW  OF   MANILA         ............  40 

VIEW  OF  MANILA,  SHOWING  CATHEDRAL      ..........  42 

REAR-ADMIRAL  GEORGE  DEWEY,  U.  S.  N.    .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .44 

U.  S.  CRUISER  «OLYMPIA»             4<> 

ADMIRAL  MONTEJO.  COMMANDING  SPANISH  SQUADRON  DESTROYED  IN  MANILA  BAY     .         .  48 
PASIG  RIVER  AT  MANILA      ...........                   .50 

NAVAL  BATTLE  OF  MANILA,  MAY  1st,  1808   (in  color*)          .......  52 

DEPARTURE  OF  UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  FOR  MANILA   ........  60 

HAVANA,  PANORAMA  FROM  ACROSS  THE  BAY 62 

MORRO  CASTLE,  COMMANDING  THE  ENTRANCE  TO  HAVANA  HARBOR 64 

TOMB  OF  COLUMBUS  IN  THE  CATHEDRAL,  HAVANA        ........  66 

EL  TEMPLETE,  HAVANA 68 

TIIK  INDIAN  STATUE  IN  THE  PRADO,  HAVANA 70 

CORRIDOR  IN  THE  CASINO,  HAVANA 72 

THE  PRADO,  FROM  CENTRAL  PARK,  HAVANA m  74 

ADMIRAL  CERVERA,  COMMANDING  THE  SPANISH  SQUADRON  DESTROYED  NEAR  SANTIAGO       .  7<'> 

MORRO  CASTLE,  COMMANDING  THE  ENTRANCE  TO  SANTIAGO  HARBOR  .....  78 

(xix) 


xx  ILLUSTRATIONS 

U.  S.  BATTLESHIP  «  OREGON  » 

MAJOR-GENERAL  WILLIAM  R.  SHAFTER         .......... 

NAVAL  CONSTRUCTOR   RICHMOND   P.  HOBSON,  U.  S.  N 

SINKING  OF  THE  «MERRIMAC  *  IN  FRONT  OF  THE  ESTRELLA  BATTERY,  SANTIAGO  HARBOR,  CUBA 

SHAFTER'S  ARMY  EMBARKING  AT  PORT  TAMPA,  FOR  SANTIAGO 

FIRST  HOISTING  OF  THE  STARS  AND  STRIPES  ON  CUBAN  SOIL,  JUNE  10th,  1898  (in  colors)  . 
THE  NIGHT  ATTACK  ON  THE  MARINES  AT  GUANTANAMO       ....... 

THE  CRUISER  "MARBLEHEAD"  SHELLING  SPANISH  GUERRILLAS  OUT  OF  UNDERGROWTH  NEAR 

GUANTANAMO   .............. 

U.  S.  DYNAMITE  GUNBOAT  ((  VESUVIUS  *        .....  .... 

LlEUTENANT-COLONEL  THEODORE   ROOSEVELT,  OF  THE   ROUGH   RlDERS,  U.  S.  A. 
AMERICAN  TRENCHES  SURROUNDING  SANTIAGO      ......... 

U.  S.  ARMORED  CRUISER  «  BROOKLYN  » 

THE  SPANISH  WAR  VESSEL  «  MARIA  TERESA  w 

NAVAL  BATTLE  OF  SANTIAGO,  JULY  3rd,  1898  (in  colors)       ....... 

THE  <( MARIA  TERESA*  AS  SHE  APPEARED  AFTER   THE  BATTLE   NEAR   SANTIAGO 
THE  <(ALMIRANTE  OQUENDO*  AS  SHE  APPEARED  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  NEAR  SANTIAGO 

U.  S.  BATTLESHIP   «  TEXAS  » 

THE  FLAGSHIP  <(NEW  YORK*  UNDER  FULL  SPEED       ........ 

U.  S.  BATTLESHIP  «  IOWA  » 

MARKET  IN  SANTIAGO  .............. 

GENERAL  TORAL'S   SURRENDER   OF   SANTIAGO   TO   GENERAL  SHAFTER   ON  JULY  17th,  1898 

(in  colors)         .............. 

STREET  SCENE  —  SANTIAGO    ............. 

CHRISTINA  STREET,  SANTiAgo        ............ 

GENERAL  JOSEPH  C.  WHEELER 

AUGUSTI,  GOVERNOR-GENERAL  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES     .         .         . 

WEAVING  IN  THF  PHILIPPINES      ............ 

SUGAR  CANE  GRINDING  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES         ......... 

FORTIFICATION,  SAN  JUAN,  PORTO  Rico 

THE  PLAZA,  SAN  JUAN,  PORTO  Rico     ........... 

STREET  SCENE,  SAN  JUAN,  PoRT9  Rico 

STREET  SCENE  IN  MAYAGUEZ,  PORTO  Rico  .......... 

CALLE  DE  SUAN,  MAYAGUEZ,  PORTO  Rico 

M.  JULES  C  AMBON,  THE  FRENCH  MINISTER  WHO  CONDUCTED  THE   PEACE   NEGOTIATIONS 

FOR  SPAIN         •••........... 

REAR-ADMIRAL  W.  T.  SAMPSON,  U.  S.  N. 

REAR-ADMIRAL  W.  S.  SCHLEY,  U.  S.  N 

MAJOR-GENERAL  NELSON  A.  MILES 

MAJOR-GENERAL  WESLEY  MERRITT,  COMMANDING  THE  U.  S.  FORCES  AT  MANILA 

MAJOR-GENERAL  FITZHUGH  LEE 


CHAPTER  THE   FIRST. 
THE  CAUSES  AND  THE  DECLARATION  OF  WAR. 

STRAINED  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  SPAIN  — THE  VISIT  OF  COURTESY  BY 
THE  AMERICAN    BATTLE-SHIP   TO    HAVANA  — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE   "MAINE"    IN    HAVANA 
HARBOR  —  INDIGNATION  AND  EXCITEMENT  AMONG  THE  PEOPLE — THE  NAVAL  BOARD 
OK  INVESTIGATION  —  ITS  REPORT  —  SENATOR  PROCTOR'S  SPEECH  AND  ITS  EFFECT 
UPON  THE  COUNTRY  —  MESSAGES  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  AND  ACTION  OF  CON 
GRESS —  THE  AMERICAN  ULTIMATUM  —  MINISTER  BARNABE  DEMANDS 
HIS  PASSPORTS  —  SPAIN  REFUSES  TO  RECEIVE  THE  ULTIMATUM 
AND  SENDS  HIS   PASSPORTS   TO   MINISTER   WOODFORD  — 
THE    QUEEN-REGENT    BEFORE    THE    CORTES  —  A 


T 


SIMULTANEOUS    APPEAL    TO    ARMS  —  THE 
FINAL    DECLARATION    OF    WAR. 

HE  morning  of  Wednesday,  the  16th  of  February,  1898,  the 
world  was  startled  by  the  report  that  an  American  battle 
ship  had  been  destroyed  in  the  harbor  of  Ha-  TH£  DESTRUC. 
vana.  This  proved  to  be  the  Maine,  an  armored  TION  OF  THE 
cruiser  of  the  second-class,  but  one  of  the  staunchest 
afloat,  and  often  described  as  "the  pride  of  the  navy  of  the  United 
States."  Under  orders  from  Washington,  the  Maine  had  proceeded  to 
Havana  upon  "a  visit  of  courtesy."  Of  this  visit  it  was  officially 
stated  that  it  meant  "simply  the  resumption  of  friendly  naval  rela 
tions  with  Spain,"  and  was  known  and  approved  by  the  Spanish 
authorities.  The  Maine  steamed  out  of  Key  West  the  evening  of  the 
24th  of  January,  and  entered  Havana  harbor  the  morning  of  the  25th, 
being  saluted  by  all  the  forts  and  war  vessels,  and  conducted  to  her 
place  of  mooring  by  the  regular  pilot  of  the  port.  She  was  com 
manded  by  Captain  Charles  D.  Sigsbee,  an  officer  of  experience,  upon 
whose  discretion  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  placed 
entire  confidence.  This  confidence  was  fully  vindicated  by  succeed 
ing  events. 

The  relations  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  had  been  much 

disturbed  by  the  state  of  affairs  in  Cuba,     For  the  most  part  during 

in 


:;\\t^  HISTORY   OF   THE 

quite  thirty  years  an  insurrection,  sporadic  in  character,  and  more  or 
less  active,  had  been  going  on  in  the  island.  As  a  general  thing, 
and  in  a  general  way,  the  people  of  the  United  States  sympathized 
with  those  uprisings  of  the  Cubans,  and  not  infrequently  filibustering 
expeditions  eluded  the  vigilance  of  our  coast  guards.  Naturally  the 
Spaniards  were  kept  in  constant  irritation,  although  it  does  not  ap 
pear  that  there  was  any  lack  of  energy  or  of  good  faith  on  the  part 
of  the  American  Government  in  repressing  overt  manifestations  of 
friendship  for  the  insurrectionists.  Finally,  however,  public  opinion 
in  the  United  States,  grown  more  concentrated  and  intense,  had  forced 
the  McKinley  administration  to  take  official  cognizance  of  Cuban  affairs 
and  to  open  diplomatic  negotiations  with  Madrid,  looking  to  the  ces 
sation  of  what  had  become  a  war  of  extermination,  ruinous  to  Cuba 
and  injurious  to  American  interests.  As  an  incident  to  these  negoti 
ations  a  private  letter  of  the  Spanish  minister,  De  Lome,  at  Wash 
ington,  had  been  intercepted  by  a  secret  agent  of  the  Cuban  Junta 
and  had  not  only  found  its  way  into  the  newspapers,  but  was  placed 
in  possession  of  the  State  Department.  This  letter  grossly  reflected 
upon  the  President  of  the  United  States.  Senor  De  Lome,  having 
acknowledged  its  genuineness,  was  promptly  given  his  passports,  and, 
as  promptly,  a  disavowal  was  demanded  from  the  Spanish  Govern 
ment,  which,  in  spite  of  the  strained  relations  then  existing,  the  Cabi 
net  at  Madrid  was  not  slow  to  make,  first  personally  and  then 
officially,  in  very  emphatic  terms. 

Thus  far  all  seemed  well.  It  was  known  that  the  administration 
at  Washington  sincerely  desired  peace  with  Spain,  and,  as  there  could 
not  be  two  opinions  touching  the  character  of  the  De  Lome  letter  and 
the  warrant  of  the  Department  of  State  in  requiring  a  public  apology, 
there  was  no  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  affair,  being  amicably 
closed,  would,  however  disagreeable  in  itself,  have  any  further  conse 
quences.  Hence  it  was  that  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  following 
quickly  upon  the  enforced  exit  of  the  Spanish  minister,  and  the  con 
troversy  which  had  led  up  to  that  exit,  not  merely  came  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States  like  a  flash  of  lightning  out  of  a  clear 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  3 

sky,  but  fell  upon  a  public  opinion  already  sensitive  to  ill  impres 
sions  from  that  particular  quarter,  and  prepared  to  believe  almost 
any  evil  of  Spain  and  the  Spaniards. 

There  was  nothing  in  the  circumstances  attending  the  destruction 
of  the  Maine  calculated  to  diminish  the  prejudice  thus  preconceived. 
On  the  contrary  everything  tended  to  increase  it.  In  spite  of  Captain 
Sigsbee's  plea  for  a  suspension  of  judgment,  the  people,  with  few  ex 
ceptions,  leaped  at  the  conclusion  of  treachery.  This  did  not  fix  any 
direct  responsibility  upon  the  Spanish  Government,  but  it  did  arraign 
the  Havana  authorities,  accusing  them  at  the  very  least  of  gross  neg 
lect  of  duty.  As  will  be  seen  from  the  sequel  there  is  reason  to 
suspect  a  yet  greater  crime  and  to  trace  this  to  agencies  which  could 
not  have  existed  outside  the  military  establishment  at  Havana. 

At  exactly  forty  minutes  after  nine  o'clock  the  evening  of  Tues 
day,  the  15th  day  of  February,  1898,  without  any  warning,  the 
battleship  Maine  was  blown  out  of  the  water  and  totally  wrecked  by 
appliances  the  exact  nature  of  which  yet  remains  a  mystery.  All  ac 
counts  agree  that  there  were  two  distinct  explosions,  followed  as  some 
declare,  by  several  additional  detonations.  "On  that  dreadful  night," 
says  Captain  Sigsbee,  "I  had  not  retired.  I  was  writing  letters.  I 
find  it  impossible  to  describe  the  sound  or  shock,  but  the  impression 
remains  of  something  awe-inspiring,  terrifying,  of  noise-rending,  vibra 
ting,  all-pervading.  There  is  nothing  in  the  former  experience  of  any 
one  on  board  to  measure  the  explosion  by.  ...  After  the  first 
great  shock  — I  cannot  myself  recall  how  many  sharper  detonations 
I  heard,  not  more  than  two  or  three  —  I  knew  my  ship  was  gone. 
In  a  structure  like  the  Maine,  the  effects  of  such  an  explosion  are 
not  for  a  moment  in  doubt.  ...  I  made  my  way  through  the 
long  passage  in  the  dark,  groping  from  side  to  side,  to  the  hatchway 
and  thence  to  the  poop,  being  among  the  earliest  to  reach  that  spot. 
As  soon  as  I  recognized  the  officers,  I  ordered  the  high  explosives 
to  be  flooded,  and  then  directed  that  the  boats  available  be  low 
ered  to  the  rescue  of  the  wrounded  or  drowning.  .  .  .  Discipline 
in  a  perfect  measure  prevailed.  There  was  no  more  confusion  than 


4  HISTORY   OF    THE 

a  call  to  general  quarters  would  produce  —  not  as  much.  ...  I 
soon  saw,  by  the  light  of  the  flames,  that  all  my  officers  and  crew 
left  alive  and  on  board  surrounded  me.  I  cannot  form  any  idea  of 
the  time,  but  it  seemed  five  minutes  from  the  moment  I  reached 
the  poop  until  I  left,  the  last  man  it  was  possible  to  reach  having 
been  saved.  It  must  have  been  three-quarters  of  an  hour  or  more, 
however,  from  the  amount  of  work  done.  ...  I  remember  the 
officers  and  men  worked  together  lowering  the  boats,  and  that  the 
gig  took  some  time  to  lower.  I  did  not  notice  the  rain  of  debris 
described  by  Lieutenant  Blandin  or  others  who  were  on  deck  at  the 
time  of  the  first  explosion,  but  I  did  observe  the  explosion  of  the 
fixed  ammunition,  and  wonder  that  more  were  not  hurt  thereby. 
.  .  .  Without  going  beyond  the  limits  of  what  was  proper  in  the 
harbor  of  a  friendly  Power,  1  always  maintain  precautions  against 
attack,  and  the  quarter-watch  was  ordered  to  have  ammunition  for 
the  smaller  guns  ready  so  that  in  the  improbable  event  of  an  attack 
on  the  ship  it  would  have  been  found  ready.  It  was  this  ammuni 
tion  which  exploded  as  the  heat  reached  it." 

Captain  Sigsbee's  story  is  supplemented  by  many  others,  varying 
in  personal  experience,  but  agreeing  in  all  the  essential  features  of 
the  catastrophe.  The  narrative  of  Lieutenant  Blandin  is  especially 
graphic.  "I  was  on  the  watch,"  the  Lieutenant  tells  us,  "and  when 
the  men  had  been  piped  below  I  looked  down  the  main  hatches  and 
over  the  side  of  the  ship.  Everything  was  absolutely  normal.  I 
walked  aft  to  the  quarter  deck  behind  the  rear  turret,  as  is  allowed 
after  8  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  sat  down  on  the  port  side,  where 
I  remained  for  a  few  minutes.  Then  for  some  reason  I  cannot  ex 
plain  to  myself,  1  moved  to  the  starboard  side  and  sat  down  there. 
I  was  feeling  a  bit  glum,  and,  in  fact,  was  so  quiet  that  Lieutenant 
Hood  came  up  and  asked  laughingly  if  I  was  asleep.  I  said:  'No; 
I  am  on  watch.'  .  .  .  Scarcely  had  I  spoken  when  there  came  a 
dull,  sullen  roar.  Then  succeeded  a  sharp  explosion,  some  say  numer 
ous  explosions.  I  remember  only  one.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the 
sound  issued  from  the  port  side  forward.  Then  followed  a  perfect 


CHARLES   D.  SIGSBEE 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  5 

rain  of  missiles  of  all  kinds,  from  huge  pieces  of  cement  to  blocks  of 
wood,  steel  railings,  fragments  of  gratings  and  all  the  debris  that 
would  be  detachable  in  an  explosion.  ...  I  was  struck  on  the 
head  by  a  piece  of  cement  and  knocked  down,  but  not  hurt,  and  got 
to  my  feet  in  a  moment.  Lieutenant  Hood  had  run  to  the  poop  and 
I  supposed,  as  I  followed,  he  was  dazed  by  the  shock  and  about  to 
jump  overboard.  I  hailed  him  and  he  answered  that  he  had  run  to 
help  lower  the  boats.  When  I  got  there,  though  scarce  a  minute  had 
elapsed,  I  had  to  wade  in  water  to  my  knees,  and  almost  instantly 
the  quarter  deck  was  awash.  On  the  poop  I  found  Captain  Sigsbee, 
as  cool  as  if  at  a  ball,  and  soon  all  the  officers  except  Jenkins  and 
Merritt  joined  us.  The  poop  was  above  water  after  the  Maine  set 
tled  to  the  bottom.  Captain  Sigsbee  ordered  the  launch  and  barge 
lowered  and  the  officers  and  men,  who  by  this  time  had  assembled, 
got  the  boats  out  and  rescued  a  number  in  the  water.  Captain  Sigs 
bee  ordered  Lieutenant  Commander  Wainwright  forward  to  see  the 
extent  of  the  damage  and  if  anything  could  be  done  to  rescue  those 
forward  or  to  extinguish  the  flames  which  followed  close  upon  the 
explosion  and  burned  fiercely  as  long  as  there  was  any  combustible 
above  water  to  feed  them.  .  .  .  Lieutenant  Commander  Wain 
wright  on  his  return  reported  the  total  and  awful  character  of  the 
calamity,  and  Captain  Sigsbee  gave  the  last  sad  order,  'Abandon  ship,' 
to  men  overwhelmed  with  grief  indeed,  but  calm  and  apparently  un- 
excited.  .  .  .  Meantime,  four  boats  from  the  Spanish  cruiser  Al 
fonso  XII.  arrived,  to  be  followed  soon  by  the  two  from  the  Ward 
Line  steamer  City  of  Washington.  The  two  boats  lowered  from  the 
City  of  Washington  were  found  to  be  riddled  with  flying  debris  from 
the  Maine  and  unfit  for  use.  Captain  Sigsbee  was  the  last  man  to 
leave  his  vessel  and  left  in  his  own  gig." 

Whilst  these  dreadful  scenes  were  passing  upon  the  ill-fated  battle 
ship,  the  city  of  Havana,  not  yet  gone  to  bed,  was  roused  as  it  had 
never  been  roused  before.  The  shock  and  flash,  coming  almost  in 
stantaneously  the  one  upon  the  other,  admonished  every  one  of  some 
dire  calamity.  Quickly  the  streets  were  filled  with  excited  people. 


6  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Naturally,  the  first  impression  of  these  was  that  the  rebels  had 
effected  a  successful  descent  and  were  entering  through  some  break 
they  had  made  in  the  fortifications.  The  next  was  that  Morro  Castle 
had  been  blown  up.  All  doubt,  however,  was  soon  dispelled  by  the 
direction  from  which  the  reverberation  came,  as  well  as  the  flames 
that  began  to  rise  above  the  sinking  and  burning  ship,  lighting  the 
heavens  far  and  near,  and  the  eager  multitude  rushed  en  masse  to  the 
water's  edge,  where  the  character  and  extent  of  the  tragedy  was  at 
once  apparent.  "  On  Tuesday  evening,"  says  an  eye  witness  of  the 
explosion,  "  I  strolled  down  to  the  river  front  for  a  breath  of  fresh  air. 
I  was  about  two  or  three  hundred  yards  from  the  Maine.  The  first  inti 
mation  I  had  of  an  explosion  was  a  crunching  sound.  Then  there  came 
a  terrible  roar,  and  immense  pieces  of  debris  flew  skyward  from  the 
Maine.  Some  of  them  must  have  been  thrown  at  least  three  hundred 
feet.  It  looked  as  though  the  whole  inside  of  the  ship  had  been  blown 
out.  Many  persons  on  the  pier  were  nearly  thrown  from  their  feet  by 
the  force  of  the  explosion.  The  air  became  stifling  with  smoke." 

Another  account  contributed  to  the  history  of  this  tragic  night 
by  a  guest  of  the  Grand  Hotel,  related  how,  sitting  in  front  of  that 
hostelry,  he  was  startled  by  a  peculiar  noise,  as  of  the  fall  of  some 
gigantic  edifice,  followed  by  another  and  a  much  louder  and  more 
distinct  report.  "We  thought  the  whole  city  had  been  blown  to 
pieces,"  says  this  authority.  "Some  said  the  insurgents  were  enter 
ing  Havana.  Others  cried  out  that  Morro  Castle  was  blown  up." 
Continuing  his  description  of  the  panic  which  followed  the  explosion, 
he  said  :  "  On  the  Prado  is  a  large  cab-stand.  The  minute  after  the 
explosion  was  heard  the  cabmen  cracked  their  whips  and  went  rat 
tling  over  the  cobblestones  like  crazy  men.  The  fire  department 
turned  out  and  bodies  of  cavalry  and  infantry  rushed  through  the 
streets.  There  was  no  sleep  in  Havana  that  night.  The  Spanish  of 
ficials  were  quick  to  express  their  sympathy  and  acted  very  well  as 
a  whole,  but  I  think  their  expressions  of  regret  lacked  the  warmth 
which  would  have  been  characteristic  of  an  American  city,  had  such 
a  disaster  occurred  under  similar  circumstances." 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  7 

As  has  been  stated  the  Ward  Line  steamer  City  of  Washington  was 
moored  near  the  battle-ship  Maine  the  night  of  the  disaster.  One  of 
the  passengers  on  board  the  City  of  Washington  tells  this  story:  "A 
party  of  us,"  says  he,  "  were  sitting  in  the  cabin  engaged  in  idle  con 
versation.  It  was,  as  nearly  as  I  can  recall,  between  nine  and  ten 
o'clock.  Suddenly  we  were  startled  by  a  loud  report.  As  by  a  single 
impulse  our  little  group  rushed  to  the  port  holes  and  saw  an  im 
mense  flash  shoot  up  in  the  air  with  a  horrible,  grinding,  hissing  noise 
that  might  have  been  an  earthquake  or  a  cyclone.  Debris  of  all  kinds 
and  a  large  number  of  bodies  were  thrown  upward.  It  was  at  first 
believed  that  the  Maine  was  being  fired  upon,  but  afterward,  as  the 
City  of  Washington  was  struck  by  what  turned  out  to  be  falling  debris 
and  she  careened,  it  was  thought  she  was  being  fired  upon.  A  second 
explosion  took  place,  and  following  it  we  heard  groans  and  cries  of 
'Help,'  "Help  us.'  The  boats  of  the  City  of  Washington  and  those 
of  the  Spanish  cruiser  Alfonso  XIL  were  hurriedly  launched  and 
went  to  the  rescue.  I  went  into  one  of  the  boats  of  the  City  of 
Washington,  and  the  scenes  I  witnessed  were  heartrending  beyond 
description.  .  .  .  Two  of  the  small  boats  on  board  the  City  of 
Washington  were  stove  in  by  the  debris  from  the  Maine.  The 
battle-ship  sank  even  with  the  water  in  about  thirty  minutes  after 
the  explosion.  The  City  of  Washington  was  converted  into  a  hos 
pital.  Many  of  the  rescued  men  were  brought  on  board  almost  nude, 
and  the  passengers  gave  them  clothing.  The  officers  of  the  City  of 
Washington  did  all  in  their  power  to  make  the  rescued  men  comfort 
able.  .  .  .  About  half  an  hour  after  the  explosion  Consul-General 
Lee,  the  Civil  Governor  of  Havana,  and  Captain-General  Blanco's 
chief  of  staff  came  on  board.  General  Lee  remained  with  us  all 
night. 

When  all  was  over,  and  the  casualties  were  estimated,  it  was 
found  that  266  seamen,  including  two  commissioned  officers,  had  lost 
their  lives. 

In  the  beginning  there  was  some  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish 
authorities  at  an  ostentatious  display  of  sympathy;  but  soon  this  gave 


8  HISTORY   OF   THE 

way  to  a  kind  of  official  indifference.  Sad,  indeed,  was  the  funeral  of 
those  of  our  brave  men  whose  bodies  were  recovered  from  the  wreck. 
With  every  mark  of  honor  they  were  laid  to  rest  in  the  beautiful  ceme 
tery  of  the  Cuban  capital.  But  there  was  a  striking  contrast  between 
the  conduct  of  the  native  Cubans  and  the  Spaniards  on  this  mourn 
ful  occasion.  The  Cuban  women  in  the  streets  were  almost  all  dressed 
in  mourning,  while  the  Spanish  women  wore  colors.  "The  only  flags 
I  saw  in  the  procession,"  says  one  who  witnessed  the  pageant,  "were 
two  small  ones  about  three  by  six  inches."  This  writer  continues: 
"I  went  aboard  the  Alfonso  XIL,  and  was  received  politely.  The  single 
expression  of  regret  I  heard  there  was  from  an  officer  who  complained 
that  the  force  of  the  Maine  explosion  had  broken  his  toilet  bottles. 
There  can  be  no  mistaking  the  indifference  of  the  Spaniards  in  Havana 
over  the  loss  of  the  war-ship  and  those  aboard.  On  Thursday,  while 
driving  to  the  cemetery  with  two  American  friends,  I  was  assailed  with 
jeers  and  some  one  threw  a  large  stone  at  our  carriage.  In  fact,  one 
or  two  children  yelled  after  us  that  they  had  blown  up  the  'Ameri 
cano/  and  that  they  were  glad  of  it.  I  did  not  hear  one  expression 
of  regret  for  the  terrible  loss  of  life  from  any  Spaniard  during  the 
time  I  was  in  Havana." 

There  is  ample  testimony  to  the  truth  of  this  lack  of  general  or 
spontaneous  feeling  among  the  Spaniards,  and  some  evidence  that 
the  under-currents  of  popular  sentiment  were  those  of  rejoicing. 
Meanwhile,  in  spite  of  the  complete  annihilation  of  the  battle-ship, 
there  remained  in  the  harbor  a  ghastly  and  constant  reminder  of  the 
tragedy,  in  the  heap  of  flame-charred  wreckage  that  still  showed  above 
the  surface  of  the  water.  "  The  huge  mast,"  writes  one  who  reached 
the  scene  next  day,  "looks  as  if  it  had  been  thrown  up  from  a  subter 
ranean  storehouse  of  fused  cement,  steel,  wood,  and  iron.  Further 
aft,  one  military  mast  protrudes  at  a  slight  angle  from  the  perpen 
dicular,  while  the  poop,  on  which  gathered  the  band,  offers  a  resting 
place  for  the  workmen  or  divers.  Of  the  predominant  white  which 
marks  our  vessels  not  a  vestige  remains.  In  its  place  is  the  black 
ness  of  desolation  and  death." 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  9 

Such  is,  in  brief,  a  resum6  of  the  events  of  the  night  of  Tuesday 
the  15th  of  February,  1898,  destined  to  play  so  momentous  a  part  in 
the  record  of  the  world's  progress.  They  constitute  a  fitting  prelude 
to  the  imperial  theme  of  war  which  they  foreshadowed,  for  nothing  in 
marine  history  during  peaceful  times,  not  even  the  famous  catastrophe 
to  the  Royal  Georye  in  Spithead  roadstead  toward  the  close  of  the  last 
century,  nor  the  Samoan  disaster,  nor  the  running  down  of  the  Vic 
toria  by  the  Camperdown  in  the  latter  part  of  this,—  though  resulting  in 
greater  loss  of  life,  —  can  be  brought  into  comparison,  in  point  of 
horror  and  of  far-reaching  consequences,  with  the  destruction  of  the 
Maine. 

The  first  intelligence  received  in  the  United  States  seemed  to  daze 
the  public  mind.  But  the  civil  and  naval  authorities  acted  with  rare 
prudence.  Immediately  upon  reaching  shore,  and  with  all  the  dread 
reality  of  an  untoward  calamity  cruelly  palpable  on  every  hand.  Cap 
tain  Sigsbee  cabled  the  following  message  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy:  — 

"  Maine  blown  up  in  Havana  harbor  at  9:  40  and  destroyed.  Many  wounded 
and  doubtless  more  killed  and  drowned.  Wounded  and  others  on  board  Spanish 
man-of-war  and  Ward  Line  steamer.  Send  lighthouse  tenders  from  Key  West  for 
crew  and  few  pieces  of  equipment  still  above  water.  No  one  had  other  clothes  than 
those  upon  him.  .  .  .  Public  opinion  should  be  suspended  till  further  report. 
All  officers  are  believed  to  be  saved.  Jenkins  and  Merritt  not  yet  accounted  for. 
Many  Spanish  officers,  including  representatives  of  General  Blanco,  are  now  with  me 
and  express  sympathy." 

II. 

THE  appeal  of  Captain  Sigsbee  for  a  suspension  of  judgment  did 
not  fall  upon  deaf  ears.  Whilst  the  trend  of  public  opinion  was  not 
long  shaping  itself,  and  falling  into  the  theory  of  treach- 

.      THE  OFFICIAL 

ery,  the  more  thoughtful  among  the  people  of  the  United      REPORT  OF  THE 


States  could  not  bring  themselves  to  believe  this  pos- 
sible.    That  murder  upon  such  a  scale,  and  at  once  so 
cold-blooded  and  wanton,  could  be  deliberately  planned  and  executed 
at  the  very  high-noon  of  modern  civilization  and  during  a  period  of 


10  HISTORY   OF   THE 

profound  peace  seemed  inconceivable.  The  Government  at  Washing 
ton  took  its  cue  from  the  self-respecting  and  at  the  same  time  the 
wise  and  heroic  moderation  of  Captain  Sigsbee.  It  refused  to  enter 
tain  the  idea  of  conspiracy,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  going  the 
length  of  publicly  rejecting  it.  But  it  was  at  once  resolved  by  the 
President  and  Cabinet  that  there  should  be  investigation  prompt  and 
thorough,  and  that  this  investigation  should  be  conducted  exclusively 
by  United  States  officials.  To  the  proposal  of  the  Spanish  authorities 
to  unite  in  the  work  of  fathoming  the  mystery,  a  polite  negative 
was  returned,  and,  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  tragedy  in 
Havana  harbor,  a  commission,  under  the  presidency  of  Captain  W.  T. 
Sampson,  with  Lieutenant  Commander  Adolphe  Marix  as  judge  advocate, 
both  naval  officers  of  distinction,  were  named  to  proceed  to  the  scene 
of  the  disaster  and  to  investigate  all  the  facts,  with  the  purpose  of  reach 
ing  an  impartial  conclusion  and  reporting  this  to  the  Government. 

No  limit  was  set  upon  the  powers  of  this  commission  and  its 
investigation  was  exhaustless.  It  began  its  siftings  first  at  Havana 
and  afterward  at  Key  West,  but  it  did  not  complete  its  report  until 
the  21st  of  March,  embracing  twenty-three  days  of  continuous  labor 
from  the  date  of  its  organization.  Through  every  means  at  its  com 
mand,  by  the  aid  of  expert  divers  and  wreckers,  and  innumerable  wit 
nesses  among  the  survivors  of  the  tragedy,  as  well  as  eye-witnesses  of  the 
disaster,  and  all  persons  who  could  throw  any  light  upon  the  affair, 
Captain  Sampson  and  his  associates  sought  to  penetrate  and  to  bring 
to  light  the  truth  concerning  it.  But  one  conclusion  stared  them  in 
the  face  from  the  very  outset  of  their  inquiry.  The  Maine  was 
destroyed  by  means  of  some  explosive  outwardly  applied  by  parties 
unknown.  The  report  declares  that  the  state  of  discipline  on  board 
and  the  condition  of  the  magazines,  boilers,  coal  bunkers,  and  storage 
compartments  were  excellent,  and  that  no  indication  of  any  cause  for 
an  internal  explosion  existed  in  any  quarter.  At  8  o'clock  in  the 
evening  of  February  15  everything  had  been  reported  secure  and  all 
was  quiet.  At  forty  minutes  past  9  o'clock  the  vessel  was  suddenly 
destroyed.  The  report  goes  on  to  say :  "  There  were  two  distinct 


- 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  H 

explosions,  with  a  brief  interval  between  them.  The  first  lifted  the 
forward  part  of  the  ship  very  perceptibly ;  the  second,  which  was  more 
open,  prolonged,  and  of  greater  volume,  is  attributed  by  the  court  to 
the  partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  the  forward  magazines.  The 
evidence  of  the  divers  establishes  that  the  after-part  of  the  ship  was 
practically  intact  and  sank  in  that  condition  a  very  few  minutes  after 
the  explosion.  The  forward  part  was  completely  demolished."  Then 
the  report  continues:  "At  frame  17  the  outer  shell  of  the  ship,  from  a 
point  eleven  and  one-half  feet  from  the  middle  line  of  the  ship  and 
six  feet  above  the  keel  when  in  its  normal  position,  has  been  forced  up 
so  as  to  be  now  about  four  feet  above  the  surface  of  the  water;  there 
fore,  about  thirty-four  feet  above  where  it  would  be  had  the  ship 
sunk  uninjured. 

"The  outside  bottom  plating  is  bent  into  a  reverse  V-shape,  the 
after  wing  of  which,  about  fifteen  feet  broad  and  thirty-two  feet  in 
length  (from  frame  17  to  frame  25),  is  doubled  back  upon  itself  against 
the  continuation  of  the  same  plating  extending  forward. 

"At  frame  18  the  vertical  keel  is  broken  in  two  and  the  flat  keel  is 
bent  into  an  angle  similar  to  the  angle  formed  by  the  outside  bottom 
plates.  The  break  is  now  about  six  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  water 
and  about  thirty  feet  above  its  normal  position. 

"In  the  opinion  of  the  court,  this  effect  could  have  been  produced 
only  by  the  explosion  of  a  mine  situated  under  the  bottom  of  the  ship 
at  about  frame  18  and  somewhat  on  the  port  side  of  the  ship." 

These  are  the  conclusions  of  the  court:  — 

"That  the  loss  of  the  Maine  was  not  due  in  any  respect  to  negli 
gence  on  the  part  of  any  of  the  officers  or  members  of  the  crew. 

"That  she  was  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of  a  submarine  mine, 
which  caused  the  partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  her  forward  mag 
azines  and  that  no  evidence  has  been  obtainable  fixing  the  responsi 
bility  for  the  destruction  of  the  Maine  upon  any  person  or  persons." 

Without  any  comment,  or  the  expression  of  any  sentiment  calcu 
lated  to  arouse  public  feeling,  President  McKinley  submitted  this  report 
to  Congress  as  late  as  the  29th  of  March,  a  week  after  it  was  completed 


12  HISTORY    OF    THE 

at  Key  West  and  returned  to  Rear-Admiral  Sicard,  in  command  of  the 
Gulf  squadron.  Every  means  was  employed  to  procure  delay  and  to 
prevent  rash  judgment  in  the  public  mind  and  precipitate  action  by 
Congress.  The  President  had  been  employing  the  intervening  time 
with  a  most  persistent  and  earnest  attempt  to  arrive  at  some  ami 
cable  adjustment  of  all  the  questions  at  issue  with  Spain  through  the 
medium  of  diplomatic  negotiation.  The  Spanish  Cabinet  at  Madrid 
seemed  to  be  playing  a  waiting  game,  a  game  for  time,  holding  our 
minister,  General  Stuart  L.  Woodford,  in  a  state  of  helpless  abeyance 
with  all  sorts  of  subterfuges,  whilst  casting  about  amongst  European 
Powers  for  help  in  the  event  of  war,  which  it  anticipated,  and  otherwise 
seeking  to  embarrass  the  United  States  and  to  compromise  us  in  the 
estimation  of  other  nations.  These  things,  however  secretly  done,  had 
not  escaped  the  rapt  attention  of  the  American  people.  They  had 
waited  patiently  the  report  of  their  commission.  No  more  than  the 
President  did  they  wish  to  perpetrate  any  injustice  against  Spain. 
But  the  public  mind  was  made  up  that,  if  it  should  be  clearly  shown 
that  the  Maine  was  destroyed  by  external  agencies,  nothing  short  of 
war  should  be  the  forfeit.  Within  an  hour  after  the  finding  of  the 
report  was  known  to  our  country,  no  one  doubted  that  war  was  inevi 
table.  All  well-meaning  sophistries  were  brushed  aside  by  the  rude 
hand  of  a  popular  demand  for  reprisal,  and  Congress  was  admonished 
that  it  disobeyed  the  summons  at  its  peril. 


in. 

WHILST  the  country  waited  upon  the  investigation   of  the   Naval 

Commission,  the  course  of  events  was  slowly,  but,  as   we  now  know, 

surely,  drifting  toward  war.     The   unanimous  adoption 

SENATOR  i  j_i          j_  i  p     /~i 

PROCTOR'S  by    the   two   houses   of   Congress   of  a  joint   resolution 

REvSSoNs       creating  an  emergency  fund  of  fifty  millions  of  dollars, 

and  placing  this  enormous  sum  at  the  absolute  discretion 

of  the  President,  was  significant  as  an  exhibition  both  of  national  unity 

and  of  warlike  purpose.     The  rapid  completion  of   unfinished   battle- 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  13 

ships  in  our  own  ship-yards,  and  the  purchase  of  others  from  foreign 
governments,  pointed  in  the  same  direction.  So,  too,  did  the  passage 
by  Congress  of  an  act  increasing  the  artillery  arm  of  the  regular  serv 
ice.  On  the  other  hand,  the  demand  by  Spain  for  the  recall  of  Gen 
eral  Fitzhugh  Lee,  our  Consul-General  at  Havana,  greatly  incensed 
the  American  idea  of  fair  play,  and,  although  this  demand  was  with 
drawn,  it  left  a  sting  in  the  popular  mind.  But  a  circumstance  at 
tirst  rather  private  than  public  in  its  character,  and  little  noted  at 
the  time,  was  destined  to  cut  a  very  great  figure,  indeed,  in  the  ulti 
mate  disposition  of  the  event  of  peace  or  war.  This  was  the  visit  of 
Senator  Kedlield  Proctor,  of  Vermont,  to  the  island  of  Cuba. 

It  was  said  by  the  newspapers  that  the  Senator  went  at  the  request 
of  the  President.  Be  this  as  it  may,  Senator  Proctor  disclaimed  official 
character,  and  gave  out  that  he  was  merely  seeking,  as  a  Senator  and  a 
private  gentleman,  the  satisfaction  of  his  own  judgment  as  to  the  real 
state  of  affairs  in  Cuba.  He  went  about  freely,  and,  as  was  thought, 
incautiously,  over  the  island,  and  on  his  return  he  made  a  statement 
in  open  Senate  which  created  the  widest  and  profoundest  impression 
both  upon  those  who  heard  it  and  upon  the  people  at  large. 

Senator  Proctor  was  known  to  be  one  of  the  least  imaginative  and 
most  just-minded  of  men,  a  hard-headed  Yankee,  who,  all  his  life  had 
shown  himself  incapable  of  being  lured  or  bullied  out  of  any  purpose  to 
which  he  had  once  enlisted  his  interest  and  energies.  He  rose  from 
his  place  in  the  Senate  Chamber  the  16th  of  March,  and,  reading  from 
manuscript,  with  no  attempt  at  display,  delivered  a  speech,  which, 
for  its  effect  upon  results,  has  never  been  surpassed  in  that  or  in  any 
other  deliberative  body.  From  every  point  of  view  the  statements 
embraced  by  this  speech  were  remarkable.  It  had  been  most  care 
fully  prepared.  Every  element  of  sensationalism  had  been  eliminated 
from  it,  and,  except  as  far  as  the  facts  recited  were  sensational,  it  bore 
not  the  slightest  evidence  of  an  effort  to  arouse  the  public  mind, 
already  keenly  alive  to  the  condition  of  affairs  on  the  island  of  Cuba. 
Every  statement  was  made  with  the  clearness  and  precision  which 
characterize  the  accurate  demonstration  of  a  problem  in  mathematics. 


14  HISTORY   OF    THE 

Calm  and  dispassionate,  the  utterances  of  the  Senator  aroused  breath 
less  interest.  Every  person  who  heard  him  was  convinced  that  he  was 
putting  his  observations  into  exact  terms,  lest  lie  might  subject  him 
self  to  the  charge  of  being  emotional.  One  of  the  best  characteriza 
tions  of  the  speech  was  made  by  Senator  Frye,  of  Maine,  a  few  minutes 
after  its  delivery.  "It  is,"  said  he,  "just  as  if  Proctor  had  held  up  his 
right  hand  and  sworn  to  it."  That,  indeed,  was  the  impression  it 
made  upon  the  Senate.  But  it  made  a  still  greater  impression  upon 
the  country.  It  constituted  America's  highest  and  best  justification  for 
going  to  war  and  had  more  influence  in  determining  public  opinion 
than  any  other  single  agency. 

The  limits  of  a  narrative  such  as  this  do  not  admit  of  the  incor 
poration  of  the  speech  of  Senator  Proctor  entire.  But  a  few  salient 
extracts  will  serve  to  show  its  character  and  to  account  for  its 
effect.  Having  described  the  city  of  Havana  as  showing  little  evi 
dence  of  a  state  of  war  the  Senator  said:  — 

"  Outside  Havana  all  is  changed.  It  is  not  peace,  nor  is  it  war.  It  is  desolation 
and  distress,  misery  and  starvation.  Every  town  and  village  is  surrounded  by  a  trocha 
(trench),  a  sort  of  rifle-pit,  but  constructed  on  a  plan  new  to  me,  the  dirt  being  thrown 
upon  the  inside  and  a  barb  wire  fence  on  the  outer  side  of  the  trench.  These  trochas 
have  at  every  corner  and  at  frequent  intervals  along  the  sides  what  are  there  called 
forts,  but  which  are  really  small  block-houses,  many  of  them  more  like  a  large  sentry- 
box,  loop-holed  for  musketry,  and  with  a  guard  of  from  two  to  ten  soldiers  in  each. 
The  purpose  of  these  trochas  is  to  keep  the  reconcentrados  in  as  well  as  to  keep 
the  insurgents  out.  From  all  the  surrounding  country  the  people  have  been  driven 
into  these  fortified  towns,  and  held  there  to  subsist  as  they  can.  They  are  virtu 
ally  prison-yards  and  not  unlike  one  in  general  appearance,  except  the  walls  are 
not  so  high  and  strong,  but  they  suffice,  where  every  point  is  in  range  of  a  sol 
dier's  rifle,  to  keep  in  the  poor  reconcentrado  women  and  children.  Every  rail 
road  station  is  within  one  of  these  trochas  and  has  an  armed  guard.  Every  train 
has  an  armored  freight  car,  loop-holed  for  musketry,  and  filled  with  soldiers  and 
with,  as  I  observed  usually  and  was  informed  is  always  the  case,  a  pilot  engine  a 
mile  or  so  in  advance.  There  are  frequent  block-houses  inclosed  by  a  trocha,  and 
with  a  guard  along  the  railroad  track.  .  .  .  With  this  exception  there  is  no 
human  life  or  habitation  between  these  fortified  towns  and  villages,  and  throughout 
the  whole  of  the  four  western  provinces,  except  to  a  very  limited  extent  among 
the  hills,  where  the  Spaniards  have  not  been  able  to  go  and  drive  the  people  to 
the  towns  and  burn  their  dwellings,  I  saw  no  house  or  hut  in  the  400  miles  of 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  15 

railroad  rides  from  Pinar  del  Rio  province  in  the  west  across  the  full  width  of 
Havana  and  Matanza  provinces,  and  to  Sagua  La  Grande,  on  tin-  north  shore,  and 
to  Cienfuegos,  on  the  south  shore  of  Santa  Clara,  except  within  the  Spanish  trochas. 
There  are  no  domestic  animals  or  crops  on  the  rich  fields  and  pastures  except  such 
as  are  under  guard  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  towns.  In  other  words,  the 
Spaniards  hold  in  these  four  western  provinces  just  what  their  army  sits  on. 
Every  man,  woman,  and  child,  and  every  domestic  animal,  wherever  their  columns 
have  reached,  is  under  guard  and  within  their  so-called  fortifications.  To  describe 
one  place  is  to  describe  all.  To  repeat,  it  is  neither  peace  nor  war.  It  is  con 
centration  and  desolation." 

These  dreadful  conditions  were  brought  about  by  the  famous  and 
brutal  order  of  Captain-General  Weyler,  the  first  clause  of  which  Sen 
ator  Proctor  quoted  and  which  is  here  repeated.  It  reads:  — 

"I  order  and  command  first,  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  or  outside  of  the 
line  of  fortification  of  the  towrns,  shall,  within  the  period  of  eight  days,  concentrate 
themselves  in  the  town  so  occupied  by  the  troops.  Any  individual  who,  after  the 
expiration  of  this  period,  is  found  in  the  uninhabited  parts  will  be  considered  a 
rebel,  and  tried  as  such." 

The  other  three  sections  forbid  the  transportation  of  provisions 
from  one  town  to  another  without  permission  of  the  military  author 
ity,  direct  the  owners  of  cattle  to  bring  them  into  the  towns,  pre 
scribe  that  the  eight  days  shall  be  counted  from  the  publication  of 
the  proclamation  in  the  principal  town  of  the  municipal  districts,  and 
state  that  if  news  is  furnished  of  the  enemy  which  can  be  made  use 
of  it  will  serve  as  a  "recommendation." 

This  was  nothing  less  than  an  artfully  planned  scheme  to  exter 
minate  by  starvation  and  disease  the  native  population.  As  a  conse 
quence,  within  a  single  year  over  four  hundred  thousand  innocent 
human  beings,  mostly  old  men,  women,  and  children,  actually  per 
ished.  Of  its  operations  Senator  Proctor  gives  us  this  picture.  Again 
we  quote:  — 

"  Many,  doubtless,  did  not  learn  of  this  order.  Others  failed  to  grasp  its  terrible 
meaning.  Its  execution  was  left  largely  to  the  guerillas  to  drive  in  all  that  had  not 
obeyed,  and  I  was  informed  that  in  many  cases  a  torch  was  applied  to  their  homes  with 
no  notice  and  the  inmates  fled  with  such  clothing  as  they  might  have  on,  their  stock 
and  other  belongings  being  appropriated  by  the  guerillas.  When  they  reached  the 


16  HISTORY   OF   THE 

towns  they  were  allowed  to  build  huts  of  palm  leaves  in  the  suburbs  and  vacant 
places  within  the  trochas  and  left  to  live  if  they  could.  Their  huts  are  about  ten 
by  fifteen  feet  in  size,  and  for  want  of  space  are  usually  crowded  together  very 
closely.  They  have  no  floor  but  the  ground,  and  no  furniture,  and  after  a  year's 
wear  but  little  clothing  except  such  stray  substitutes  as  they  can  extemporize. 
With  large  families  or  with  more  than  one  in  this  little  space  the  commonest  sanitary 
provisions  are  impossible.  .  .  .  Conditions  are  unmentionable  in  this  respect. 
Torn  from  their  homes,  with  foul  earth,  foul  air,  foul  water,  and  foul  food  or  none, 
what  wonder  that  one-half  have  died,  and  that  one-quarter  of  the  living  are  so  dis 
eased  that  they  cannot  be  saved.  A  form  of  dropsy  is  a  common  disorder  result 
ing  from  these  conditions.  Little  children  are  still  walking  about  with  arms  and 
chest  terribly  emaciated,  eyes  swollen,  and  abdomen  bloated  to  three  times  the  nat 
ural  size.  The  physicians  say  these  cases  are  hopeless.  .  .  .  Deaths  in  the 
streets  have  not  been  uncommon.  I  was  told  by  one  of  our  consuls  that  they  have 
been  found  dead  about  the  markets  in  the  morning,  where  they  had  crawled,  hoping 
to  get  some  stray  bits  of  food  from  the  early  hucksters  and  that  there  had  been  cases 
where  they  had  dropped  dead  inside  the  market  surrounded  by  food.  These  people 
were  independent  and  self-supporting  before  Weyler's  order.  They  are  not  beggars 
even  now." 

Later  on,  that  is  the  24th  of  March,  another  notable  speech  was 
made  in  the  Senate  by  Senator  Thurston,  of  Nebraska,  who,  like 
Senator  Proctor,  had  gone  to  Cuba  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  and  judg 
ing  for  himself.  Senator  Thurston's  speech  differed  from  that  of  Sena 
tor  Proctor  in  being  considerably  more  rhetorical  and  emotional.  The 
Senator  from  Nebraska  is  a  finished  orator  and  a  man  of  culture  and 
fancy,  and  on  this  occasion  his  appearance  was  attended  by  the  in 
cident  of  a  most  grievous  personal  bereavement,  which  had  touched 
all  hearts  and  was  still  fresh  in  the  memory  of  those  who  listened  to 
him.  Mrs.  Thurston  had  accompanied  her  husband  on  his  voyage,  and, 
although  apparently  in  the  best  of  health,  she  had  suddenly  died  on 
ship-board.  She  was  deeply  enlisted  in  the  cause  of  Cuba,  and  it  was  in 
answer  to  her  last  wishes  that  the  Senator  delivered  this  speech. 
Despite  its  eloquent  and  glowing  words,  however,  it  could  add  nothing 
to  the  stubborn  facts  given  out  with  mathematical  precision  by  Sena 
tor  Proctor,  and  served  rather  as  oil  to  keep  the  lamp  which  the 
Vermonter  had  lighted  burning  bright  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of 
the  people.  Indeed,  although  Senator  Gallinger,  of  New  Hampshire, 


AVENUE   OF   PALMS,  HAVANA 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  17 

another  senatorial  excursionist  to  Cuba,  had  preceded  Senator  Proctor 
with  a  narrative  hardly  less  vivid,  it  was  the  statement  of  the  ex-Secre 
tary  of  War,  which,  coming  at  the  opportune  moment,  riveted  the 
public  attention  and  gave  it  definite  direction  and  purpose.  It  awak 
ened  the  conscience  of  the  nation  and  formulated  in  the  popular  mind 
a  proclamation  of  war. 


IV. 

As  A  means  of  obtaining  some  stay  of  warlike  proceedings,  the 
Spanish  Cortes  had  adopted  an  alleged  measure  of  autonomy  for  the 
Cubans  and  a  pretended  election  had  been  held  in  those 
parts  of  the  island  of  Cuba  still  controlled  by  Spain.  OF  THE  PRESI- 
The  farce  deceived  no  one.  It  failed  wholly  to  arrest  ^0™pTHE 
the  course  of  events.  Seeing  its  futility,  the  Cabinet  CONGRESS  AS 

TO  CUBA 

at  Madrid  proposed  to  the  insurgents  an  armistice, 
which  it  had  refused  when  proposed  by  us.  The  insurgents  would 
not  listen  to  this.  With  them  it  was  independence  or  nothing.  All 
that  came  of  Spain's  attempt  to  enlist  the  Powers  of  Europe  in  her 
scheme  to  hold  the  United  States,  while  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba  continued 
intact  and  unabated,  was  an  offer  of  mediation  simultaneously  made  at 
Washington  and  Madrid  by  the  embassadors  of  England,  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and  in  both  capitals  dismissed  with 
polite  common-places,  neither  Government  feeling  itself  in  a  position 
to  assume  publicly  any  positive  attitude.  Recourse  was  had  by  the 
Queen-Regent  to  the  Pope  of  Rome.  But  his  Holiness,  having  no 
temporal  power,  could  only  throw  the  influence  of  his  prayers  upon 
the  side  of  humanity  and  peace. 

Throughout  this  prolonged  tension,  the  Minister  of  the  United 
States  at  Madrid,  General  Woodford,  was  making  concessions  to  Spain 
which  the  public  temper  in  America  would  hardly  have  confirmed, 
whilst  Seiior  Sagasta,  the  head  of  the  Spanish  Cabinet,  was  temporiz 
ing,  if  not  double-dealing,  with  our  representative.  Congress,  feeling 
the  spur  of  the  popular  impulse,  was  restive  and  at  times  turbulent, 


18  HISTORY   OF   THE 

held  in  check  only  by  the  hands  of  the  President  and  the  Speaker  of 
the  House.  The  two  weeks  intervening  between  the  29th  of  March, 
when  the  report  of  the  Maine  investigation  was  submitted  to  Congress, 
and  the  12th  of  April,  when  the  President  sent  in  a  message  relegat 
ing  to  the  two  Houses  the  final  responsibility  of  the  issue  of  peace  or 
war,  the  country  was  kept  in  a  state  of  excitement,  not  merely  by  the 
uncertainties  of  the  situation,  but  by  the  harassing  character  of 
passing  events. 

Under  the  order  of  his  Government,  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Consul- 
General  of  the  United  States  at  Havana,  had,  the  9th  of  April,  closed  his 
office,  turned  over  to  the  English  consul  the  care  of  American  interests 
and,  with  a  number  of  other  Americans,  had  embarked  for  Key  West, 
reaching  there  the  next  day.  The  withdrawal  of  the  Consul-General 
was  the  signal  for  some  explosions  of  popular  feeling  among  the  Span 
ish  citizens  of  Havana,  but  barring  these  expressions  of  ill-will,  and  the 
refusal  of  Captain-General  Blanco  personally  to  receive  the  farewell 
visit  of  General  Lee,  the  exodus  of  the  Americans  was  uneventful. 
By  this  time,  however,  Congress  would  brook  no  further  delay  and  on 
the  Tuesday  following  the  safe  arrival  of  General  Lee  on  American 
soil,  that  is  the  12th  of  April,  Mr.  McKinley  sent  in  his  message.  It 
reviewed  the  situation  with  minute  particularity,  but  with  exceed 
ing  forbearance.  The  President  repeated  the  thrice-told  tale  of  Span 
ish  barbarism  in  Cuba ;  recounted  the  friendly  efforts  of  the  United 
States  to  attain  a  better  state  of  affairs  in  the  island ;  related  the  tor 
tuous  course  of  Spanish  diplomacy ;  cited  precedents  of  international 
law,  with  liberal  quotations  from  Presidents  Jackson,  Grant,  and  Cleve 
land  in  support  of  his  present  position;  and  ended  a  very  able  and 
admirable  document,  which  yet  failed  to  meet  the  exactions  of  public 
opinion,  by  asking  Congress  "to  authorize  and  empower  the  President 
to  take  measures  to  secure  a  full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities 
between  the  Government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure 
in  the  island  the  establishment  of  a  stable  government  capable  of 
maintaining  order  and  observing  its  international  obligations,  insuring 
peace  and  tranquillity  and  the  security  of  its  citizens,  as  well  as  our 


GOVERNOR-GENERAL   BLANCO  ' 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  11) 

own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  as 
may  be  necessary  for  these  purposes." 

As  justification  for  this  demand,  the  President,  with  clearness  and 
precision,  rested  the  case  of  the  United  States  upon  the  following  four 
propositions:  — 

First  —  In  the  cause  of  humanity  and  to  put  an  end  to  the  barbarities, 
bloodshed,  starvation,  and  horrible  miseries  now  existing1  there,  and  which  the  par 
ties  to  the  conflict  are  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  stop  or  mitigate.  It  is  no 
answer  to  say  this  is  all  in  another  country,  belonging  to  another  nation,  and  is 
therefore  none  of  our  business.  It  is  especially  our  duty  —  for  it  is  right  at  our 
door. 

Second — We  owe  it  to  our  citizens  in  Cuba  to  afford  them  that  protection  — 
and  indefinitely  —  for  life  and  property  which  no  government  there  can  or  will 
afford,  and  to  that  end  to  terminate  the  conditions  that  deprive  them  of  legal  pro 
tection. 

Third — The  right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the  very  serious  injury  to 
the  commerce,  trade,  and  business  of  our  people,  and  by  the  wanton  destruction  of 
property  and  devastation  of  the  island. 

fourth  — And  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  the  present  condition  of  affairs 
in  Cuba  is  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace,  and  entails  upon  this  Government 
enormous  expense.  With  such  a  conflict  waged  for  years  in  an  island  so  near  us 
and  with  which  our  people  have  such  trade  and  business  relations  —  when  the  lives 
and  liberty  of  our  citizens  are  in  constant  danger  and  their  property  destroyed 
and  themselves  ruined  —  when  our  trading  vessels  are  liable  to  seizure  and  are 
seized  at  our  very  door  by  warships  of  a  foreign  nation,  the  expeditions  of  filibuster 
ing  that  we  are  powerless  to  repress  altogether  and  the  irritating  questions  and 
entanglements  thus  arising  —  all  these  and  others  that  I  need  not  mention,  with  the 
resulting  strained  relations,  are  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace  and  compel  us  to 
keep  on  a  semi-war  footing  with  a  nation  with  which  we  are  at  peace. 

The  war  party  in  Congress  was  in  all  overwhelming  majority,  and 
to  this  majority  the  message  of  the  President  proved  a  disappoint 
ment.  The  efforts  of  Mr.  McKinley  at  delay  had  been  received  with 
undisguised  impatience,  and,  joined  to  his  pacific  intentions,  which 
were  well  known,  had  created  a  question  in  the  public  mind  whether 
in  case  the  decision  should  be  left  with  him,  he  could  be  relied  on 
to  carry  out  the  now  set  purpose  of  the  people  to  allow  no  further 
equivocation,  but  to  proceed  at  once  by  force  of  arms  to  compel 
Spain  to  withdraw  from  Cuba.  Without  debate  the  message  was 


20  HISTORY   OF   THE 

referred  to  the  appropriate  committees;  but,  when  Congress  adjourned 
that  afternoon,  no  doubt  was  anywhere  entertained  that  —  a  state  of 
war  already  existing — a  formal  declaration  of  war  was  but  the  matter 
of  a  few  days  or  hours. 

The  very  next  day,  the  13th  of  April,  Congress  began  to  act.  Each 
of  the  two  committees,  to  which  the  President's  message  had  been 
referred  made  its  returns,  each  consisting  of  two  reports,  one  of  the 
majority  and  the  other  of  the  minority.  Objections  from  a  senator 
carried  the  two  reports  of  the  Senate  Committee  over  for  a  day ;  but 
in  the  House  immediate  consideration  was  had.  The  minority  report, 
offered  by  the  Democrats  and  recognizing  the  insurrectionary  Cuban 
government,  was  voted  down,  147  to  190.  Then  the  House  by  a  vote 
of  322  to  19  adopted  the  resolutions  reported  by  the  majority  of  its 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  denouncing  Spain's  methods  in  Cuba  as 
inhuman  and  uncivilized,  holding  Spain  responsible  for  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Maine,  and  directing  the  President  "  to  intervene  at  once  " 
for  the  restoration  of  order  in  Cuba,  and  for  the  establishment  of  "  a 
stable  and  independent  government"  in  the  island,  for  which  inter 
vention  "  he  is  empowered  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States."  In  the  Senate,  where  objection  delayed  immediate 
consideration,  a  majority  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  re 
ported  resolutions  declaring  that  the  people  of  Cuba  are  and  of  right 
ought  to  be  free  and  independent,  denouncing  Spanish  misrule  in  the 
island  as  "cruel,  barbarous,  and  inhuman,"  demanding  that  Spain  at 
once  withdraw  her  forces  from  the  island  and  empowering  and  direct 
ing  the  President  to  intervene  with  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United 
States  to  drive  Spain  from  Cuba.  The  minority  of  the  Senate  Com 
mittee,  consisting  of  the  Democratic  members  and  Senator  Foraker, 
brought  in  resolutions  definitely  recognizing  the  independence  of 
the  insurgent  Cuban  government.  On  the  16th,  after  a  debate  of 
three  days,  the  Senate  adopted  resolutions  similar  to  those  adopted 
by  the  House,  but  embracing  a  recognition  of  the  insurgent  gov 
ernment.  Thus  matters  rested  over  Sunday  the  17th,  when,  after 
many  and  prolonged  consultations  beginning  the  morning  of  the 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  -Jl 

18th  and  extending  far  into  the  night  of  the  19th,  the  Conference 
Committee  agreed  upon  a  final  report.  This  declared  that  the  people 
of  Cuba  "are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent,"  de 
manded  that  Spain  at  once  withdraw  from  Cuba,  directed  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  to  use  the  army  and  navy  if  necessary  to 
enforce  this  demand,  and  pledged  the  United  States  to  leave  the  peo 
ple  of  Cuba  free,  after  the  expulsion  of  Spain,  to  establish  their  own 
form  of  government.  Concessions  were  made  by  both  House  and 
Senate  to  this  agreement,  though  as  the  resolutions  were  at  last 
adopted  they  proved  to  be  those  reported  to  the  Senate  by  the  ma 
jority  of  its  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  with  the  addition  of  the 
amendment  pledging  liberty  to  Cuba  to  establish  its  own  government. 
The  conference  reported  was  promptly  adopted  by  the  Senate  by  a 
vote  of  42  to  35.  The  House,  however,  did  not  get  through  its  roll 
call  for  more  than  an  hour  later,  finally  adopting  the  report  by  a  vote 
of  310  to  6. 

Thus  was  the  Congress  a  unit;   and  behind   it  an   overwhelming 
majority  of  the  people. 


v. 

THE  Joint  Resolution,  as  it  was  finally  adopted  by  the  two  Houses 
of  Congress  and  was  signed  by  the  President,  read  as  follows:  — 


WHEREAS,  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed  for  more        FINAL 

DECL 
OF  WAR 


than    three  years  in   the   island   of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own   borders,  ECLARATK 


have  shocked  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
have  been  a  disgrace  to  Christian  civilization,  culminating,  as  they  have,  in  the 
destruction  of  a  United  States  battleship,  with  two  hundred  and  sixty-six  of  its 
officers  and  crew,  while  on  a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  cannot 
longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in 
his  message  to  Congress  of  April  11,  1898,  upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was 
invited;  therefore, 

Resolved,  By  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 

1.  That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  a  right  ought  to  be.  free 
and  independent. 


22  HISTORY    OF    THE 

2.  That   it  is  the  duty  of   the  United   States  to  demand,  and  the  Government  of 
the    United    States    does    hereby    demand,   that    the    Government    of   Spain    at    once 
relinquish  its  authority  and   government  in  the  island   of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land 
and   naval   forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban,  waters. 

3.  That   the    President  of    the   United   States  be,  and   he   hereby  is,   directed  and 
empowered   to   use   the   entire    land  and   naval    forces   of    the   United    States,  and    to 
call  into   the   actual   service   of    the    United   States   the   militia   of   the   several   States 
to   such  an  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 

4.  That    the    United    States    hereby    disclaims    any    disposition    or    intention    to 
exercise  sovereignty,    jurisdiction    or    control   over   said  island,  except    for  the  pacifi 
cation    thereof,  and    asserts    its    determination,   when    that    is    accomplished,  to    leave 
the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people. 

The  discretion  asked  by  the  President  was  withheld  partly  because, 
as  was  claimed,  Congress  should  not  surrender  to  the  Executive  its 
war-making  prerogative,  and  partly  because  the  war  party  thought 
the  President  was  not  sufficiently  aggressive  in  temper  and  purpose. 
There  appeared,  however,  no  reason  to  find  fault  with  the  conduct  of 
the  President  in  the  emergency  created  by  the  action  of  Congress. 
Minister  Woodford,  at  Madrid,  was  promptly  instructed  to  lay  the 
ultimatum  of  the  United  States  before  the  Government  of  Spain  and 
to  demand  an  answer  by  the  following  Saturday,  the  23rd  of  April,  it 
being  now  Wednesday  the  20th.  Spain,  however,  did  not  wait  to  be 
officially  advised.  Senor  Barnabe,  who  had  succeeded  Signor  De  Lome 
as  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  demanded  and  received  his  pass 
ports  at  once,  taking  the  train  that  same  evening  and,  without  event 
of  any  kind,  going  through  to  Toronto,  Canada.  The  instructions 
from  the  State  Department,  sent  in  cypher,  did  not  reach  Minister 
Woodford  at  Madrid  in  time  to  be  translated  and  delivered  to  the 
Spanish  premier,  Senor  Sagasta,  that  same  Wednesday  evening,  and 
the  action  of  Congress,  being  already  known,  was  deemed  by  the 
Premier  all-sufficient,  so  that  before  Minister  Woodford  had  time  to 
present  the  ultimatum  of  his  Government  next  day,  he  was  given  his 
passports  and  told  that  Spain  considered  the  congressional  proceeding 
of  the  previous  day  a  declaration  of  war.  Minister  Woodford,  al 
though  furnished  an  escort  to  the  Spanish  frontier,  was  not  so  fortu 
nate  in  the  circumstances  of  his  departure  from  Madrid  as  Signor 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  23 

Barnabe  had  been  in  his  departure  from  Washington.  There  was  much 
excitement  among  the  populace,  who  assembled  in  noisy  crowds  about 
the  railway  stations,  and  at  Valladolid  a  mob  collected,  demanding  the 
surrender  of  a  member  of  the  Minister's  official  staff  and  otherwise 
menacing  General  Woodford  and  his  party.  Without  serious  accident, 
however,  the  frontier  was  reached,  and  on  Friday  evening  the  Ameri 
cans  arrived  in  Paris.  Thus,  although  there  had  been  no  formal 
declaration  of  war  on  either  side,  actual  war  was  at  hand,  a  tension 
little  short  of  a  state  of  war  having  existed  from  the  day  when  the 
Maine  report  had  been  submitted  to  Congress. 

In  the  United  States  the  tone  of  public  sentiment  was  resolute 
rather  than  turbulent  or  embittered.  Conscious  of  their  power,  and 
sustained  by  a  sense  of  intolerable  outrage,  the  people  had  taken 
matters  into  their  own  hands  and  had  freed  the  hands  both  of  the 
Congress  and  the  President.  Except  upon  the  immediate  seaboard, 
and  in  the  leading  centres  of  commerce,  there  had  been  little  thought 
of  a  peaceful  solution  or  desire  for  it.  The  manhood,  as  well  as  the 
humanity,  of  the  country  was  thoroughly  aroused,  and  for  the  mo 
ment  even  party  rancor  was  silenced. 

In  Spain  the  response  of  the  ruling  classes  was,  if  possible,  still 
more  animated.  It  was  vehement  and  defiant.  The  Cortes  had  been 
assembled  in  extraordinary  session.  Even  whilst  the  Congress  at 
Washington  was  framing  the  ultimatum  to  Spain,  a  scene,  both  im 
pressive  and  pathetic,  was  passing  at  Madrid.  The  Queen-Regent 
with  her  son,  the  youthful  King  of  Spain,  appeared  in  the  Spanish 
Senate  Chamber,  where  were  assembled  not  only  the  Legislative  Bod 
ies,  the  Cabinet,  and  the  great  officials,  civil  and  military,  but  all  the 
wealth  and  beauty  of  the  capital,  gorgeously  attired  and  arrayed. 
The  spectacle  was  truly  magnificent.  When  Queen  Christina  and  the 
little  King  Alfonso  appeared,  the  enthusiasm  knew  no  bounds; 
though  there  must  have  been  many  among  that  brilliant  throng, 
who,  seeing  this  stately  and  noble  lady,  and  reflecting  upon  the  true 
character  and  meaning  of  hurrying  events,  could  not  but  feel  more 
of  sadness  than  of  exaltation.  The  Queen-Regent  read  her  speech 


24  HISTORY   OF   THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

from  the  throne,  the  boy  King  standing  on  her  right,  Senor  Sagasta 
on  her  left.  It  described  the  menaces  and  insults  of  America  as  in 
tolerable  provocations  which  would  compel  her  Government  to  sever 
relations  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  She  expressed 
her  gratitude  to  the  Pope  and  Powers,  and  hoped  the  "  supreme  deci 
sion  of  parliament"  would  sanction  the  unalterable  resolution  of  her 
Government  to  defend  the  rights  of  Spain.  She  appealed  to  the 
Spanish  people  to  maintain  the  integrity  both  of  the  dynasty  and 
the  nation.  "I  have  summoned  the  Cortes,"  she  said,  "to  defend  our 
rights,  whatever  sacrifice  they  may  entail.  Thus  identifying  myself 
with  the  nation,  I  not  only  fulfill  the  oath  I  swore  in  accepting  the 
regency,  but  I  follow  the  dictates  of  a  mother's  heart,  trusting  to  the 
Spanish  people  to  gather  behind  my  son's  throne,  and  to  defend  it 
until  he  is  old  enough  to  defend  it  himself,  as  well  as  trusting  to  the 
Spanish  people  to  defend  the  honor  and  the  territory  of  the  nation." 
Her  brave  words  found  their  answer  in  all  hearts,  and  were  echoed 
and  re-echoed  throughout  the  Senate  Chamber  and  the  nation. 

It  was  not  until  the  25th  of  April  that  Congress  passed  a  bill  for 
mally  declaring  war  to  exist,  and  dating  this  from  the  preceding 
21st  of  April,  though  the  President  had  already  called  out  125,000 
volunteer  soldiers.  Meanwhile,  the  entire  north  coast  of  Cuba,  includ 
ing  Havana,  had  been  blockaded,  and  several  Spanish  prizes  had  been 
captured  and  brought  into  Key  West  by  the  naval  vessels  operating 
in  that  quarter. 

At  last  after  fifty  years  of  unsuccessful  but  continuous  revolution, 
of  heroic  sacrifices  on  the  one  hand,  and  oppression  incalculable  on 
the  other  hand,  were  the  Cubans  about  to  feel  the  friendly  hand  of 
the  great  Republic  mailed  and  stretched  out  across  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
to  save  them  from  the  barbarism  and  corruption  of  Spanish  domi 
nation  ;  and  at  last  after  thirty-three  years  of  peace  were  the  patrio 
tism  and  the  manhood  of  America  to  be  again  tested  on  land  and 
sea,  not  now,  as  formerly,  in  civil  strife  or  in  resistance  to  foreign 
aggression,  but  as  an  aggressive  and  progressive  force,  and  in  direct 
answer  to  the  call  of  liberty  and  humanity. 


ALPHONSE  XIII.,  KING   OF  SPAIN 


CHAPTER   THE   SECOND. 
THE  MAKING  OF  ARMIES  AND  NAVIES. 

FIRST  ACTS  OF  THE  WAR  AND  A  COMPARISON  OF  TIIK  COMBATANTS  — THK  ORGANIZATION  OF  TUB 

UNITED  STATES  ARMY  AND   THK  STRENGTHENING  OF  THE  NAVY  — Tin.  PRESIDENT  CALLS 

FOR  125,000  VOLUNTEERS  AND  THE  COUNTRY  ANSWERS  WITH  750.000  APPLICATIONS 

FOR    ENLISTMENT — APPOINTMENT   OF  THE    GENERAL   STAFF,    INCLUDING 

EX-FEDERALS  AND  EX-CONFEDERATES  —  OUTBURSTS  OF  PATRIOTIC 

RIVALRY    AND    FRATERNIZATION    BETWEEN    NORTH   AND 

SOUTH  —  UNIFICATION  OF  NATIONAL  SENTIMENT. 


O 


I. 

N  Tuesday,  April  19,  the  American  Congress  had  declared  its 
ultimatum  to  the  Spanish  Government,  and  the  same  day, 
as  if  intended  to  be  an  answering  act  of  de- 

.      ,  ,  FIRST  ACTS  OF 

nance,   a   strong    squadron    composed    ot    the  WAR 

flower  of  the  swift  armored  cruisers  of  the  Spanish 
navy  sailed  out  of  the  port  of  Cadiz,  westward,  with  Havana  as  its 
ostensible  port  of  destination.  The  squadron  consisted  of  the  first-class 
armored  cruisers  Vizcaya,  Almirante  Oquendo,  Maria  Theresa,  Cristobal 
Colon,  and  a  complement  of  three  torpedo  boats  and  three  destroyers. 
It  was  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Cervera,  a  Spanish  officer  of 
high  character,  who  had  been  naval  attache"  of  his  government  with 
the  United  States,  and  who  was  well  informed  of  the  spirit  and  strength 
of  American  determination. 

The  news  of  this  reached  Washington  immediately  by  cable,  and 
the  President  issued  orders  to  Acting  Rear-Admiral  W.  T.  Sampson, 
commanding  the  North  Atlantic  squadron  of  the  United  States  navy, 
directing  a  blockade  of  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  particularly  the  city 
of  Havana,  and  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast.  A  squad 
ron  consisting  of  the  two  first-class  battleships,  Iowa  and  Indiana, 
the  armored  cruiser  New  York  (flagship),  the  Wilmington,  and  Cincin 
nati,  and  a  number  of  gunboats,  and  converted  auxiliaries,  sailed 

(25) 


26  HISTORY   OF   THE 

from  Key  West  before  daylight  and  at  4  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of 
April  22  an  effective  and  close  blockade  had  been  established  over 
the  harbor  of  Havana  and  the  northern  coast  was  under  patrol. 

These  events  and  movements  so  quickly  passing  turned  all  ex 
pectation  upon  a  decisive  naval  engagement  in  Cuban  waters  or  an 
attack  by  the  Spaniards  upon  one  or  more  of  the  American  coast 
cities.  Feeling  leaped  to  a  high  pitch  of  excitement.  "Remem 
ber  the  Maine"  became  the  war-cry,  despite  the  protests  of  church 
societies  and  ethical  bodies  against  public  expression  of  a  desire  for 
vengeance.  The  belief  that  the  Spanish  navy  was  stronger  than  our 
own  in  fast,  ocean-going  offensive  cruisers  and  in  the  torpedo  boat 
arm,  at  once  made  the  capacity  and  skill  of  the  American  seamen 
qualities  to  be  counted  upon  in  advance  and  to  be  extolled  by  pop 
ular  admiration.  The  fact  that  266  such  seamen  had  been  done  to 
death  by  treachery  in  Havana  harbor  kindled  resentment  in  the  pop 
ular  heart  and  the  ominous  legend  ''Remember  the  Maine"  expressed 
what  statesmen,  diplomats,  and  religionaries  might  try  to  cover  up 
in  vain.  The  long  and  vexatious  controversies  over  Cuban  wrongs 
were  concentrated  and  merged  into  an  irresistible  desire  to  punish 
a  distinct  and  atrocious  crime  against  civilization  and  American 
sailors.  It  was  this  feeling  that  justified  to  the  public  the  appro 
priation  of  $50,000,000  to  be  used  by  the  President  in  his  discretion 
for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  our  coast  defenses  and  of  adding 
to  the  effectiveness  of  the  naval  establishment.  A  large  portion  of 
the  appropriation  had  been  used  in  the  purchase  of  steel  steamships 
and  their  conversion  into  auxiliary  war  vessels.  From  Brazil  the 
newly  completed  protected  cruiser,  Amazonas,  of  3,600  tons,  had  been 
purchased  and  rechristened  the  New  Orleans.  From  the  same  friendly 
government  the  dynamite  cruiser  Nichteroy  was  afterward  obtained 
and  named  after  the  city  of  Buffalo.  This  was  the  result  of  six 
weeks  of  urgent  operations  by  the  Navy  Department  anticipating  the 
course  of  events.  It  had,  indeed,  accomplished  much  more  than  this. 

When  the  .destruction  of  the  Maine  occurred  the  Government, 
hitherto  confident  of  avoiding  war,  was  without  a  war  supply  of 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  27 

powder,  new  explosives,  and  projectiles.  These  it  was  necessary  to 
provide  suddenly  and  with  secrecy,  and  upon  their  purchase  and  man 
ufacture  the  President  was  forced  to  wait,  deferring  action  in  the 
face  of  popular  impatience  which  he  was  estopped  from  placating  by 
openly  avowing  the  unpreparedness  of  the  Government.  It  was  not 
until  the  blockade  of  Cuba  was  well  established  and  prolonged  that 
the  sources  of  continuous  supply  were  perfected. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  people  of  the  United  States  wit 
nessed  the  sailing  of  Admiral  Sampson's  squadron  and  waited  for 
collision  with  the  Spanish  ships.  Four  days  later  the  American  squad 
ron  on  the  Asiatic  station,  under  command  of  Commodore  George  W. 
Dewey,  sailed  from  Hong  Kong  under  orders  to  "capture  or  destroy" 
the  Spanish  squadron  under  Admiral  Montejo  at  Manila,  in  the  Phil 
ippine  Islands.  Then  came  ten  days  of  wearying  uncertainty  and 
doubt.  The  Spanish  ships  of  Cervera  put  in  at  Port  St.  Vincent, 
Cape  de  Verde  Islands,  and  became  enveloped  in  mystery.  They  were 
reported  as  intending  to  descend  upon  the  North  Atlantic  coast,  and 
a  flying  squadron  under  Commodore  Winfield  Scott  Schley  was  kept 
on  waiting  orders  at  Hampton  Roads  to  repel  such  an  attempt  if 
made.  Atlantic  harbors  were  placed  in  a  state  of  defense  and  the 
old  single-turreted  monitors  used  in  the  Civil  War  were  overhauled, 
manned,  and  put  in  active  commission.  Ten  days  were  thus  passed  in 
tiresome  suspense,  relieved  only  by  the  occasional  capture  of  Spanish 
merchant  vessels  as  prizes  of  war,  some  twenty  of  which  were  taken 
into  the  harbor  of  Key  West. 

ii. 

DURING  a  week  of  waiting,  interrupted  only  by  trivial  incidents 
that  seemed  to  be  momentous  because  of  the  tension,  the  adminis 
tration  at  Washington  began  a  work  of  hurried  organ- 

MAKING  AN 

ization  of  the  army  and  navy,  the  ultimate  completion  ARMY  AND 

NAVY 

of  which  demonstrated  before  the  other  powers  of  the 

world  the  unequalled  resources  and  celerity  of  the  Americans.     There 

was  no  question  of  the  disparity  between  the  two  nations  in  wealth, 


28  HISTORY   OF   THE 

population,  and  the  means  of  conducting  an  aggressive  war.  But  the 
effective  condition  of  each  at  the  moment  of  beginning  the  struggle 
was  involved  in  doubt.  Europe  looked  on  with  interest  and  com 
pared  the  possibilities. 

The  regular  army  of  Spain  consisted  of  an  apparent  force  of 
150,000  men  in  Cuba,  under  the  command  of  General  Blanco ;  of 
about  60,000  in  garrison  in  the  fortresses  and  principal  cities  of  the 
mother  country,  and  some  30,000  more  scattered  through  the  Phil 
ippines,  Porto  Rico,  the  Canaries,  and  other  colonies.  In  round  num 
bers  the  whole  was  estimated  at  about  250,000  troops.  These  could 
be  increased  by  calling  out  the  first  reserves,  numbering  about  160.000, 
consisting  of  Spanish  subjects  undergoing  instruction  by  performing 
compulsory  military  service — a  better  organized  and  more  advanced 
militia  than  that  maintained  by  the  States  of  the  United  States. 
The  general  reserves,  that  is  the  capable  fighting  material  left  in 
Spain,  numbered  about  1,000,000.  The  total  Spanish  military  strength 
in  men  was  therefore  about  1,410,000.  These  numbers  could  be  en 
larged  by  the  volunteers  of  the  colonies,  but  the  ineradicable  spirit 
of  revolution  rendered  the  loyalty  of  these  colonial  volunteers  unre 
liable.  They  were  intractable  and  the  constant  source  of  uneasiness 
to  Spanish  governors  and  commanders. 

As  against  the  Spanish  military  fighting  strength,  the  United  States 
had  a  regular  army  that  was  limited  by  law  to  25,000  men,  but  which 
had  been  depleted  by  lack  of  recruitment  to  about  18,000  men,  of 
which  one-third  or  more  were  colored  regiments.  The  regular  army 
of  the  United  States,  notwithstanding  thirty-three  years  of  general 
peace,  had  been  kept  in  a  state  of  high  efficiency  in  discipline  by 
the  Indian  outbreaks  in  the  West,  in  which  courage,  skill,  endurance, 
and  ingenuity  had  been  developed. 

The  next  military  resource  was  in  the  militia  organizations  of  the 
various  States,  numbering  between  150,000  and  200,000  men.  The 
instant  mobilization  of  the  State  militia  was  hampered  by  sentiments 
growing  out  of  our  political  institutions.  That  they  could  be  ordered 
into  the  service  of  the  National  government  at  home  was  not  ques- 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  29 

tioned,  but  assent  to  the  authority  of  the  President  to  order  them  on 
service  out  of  the  United  States  was  not  conceded  by  tradition.  To 
that  extent  the  militia  was  not  so  ready  an  arm  as  the  reserves  of 
European  countries  constituted.  There  was  no  question  of  the  readi 
ness  of  the  militia  of  the  various  states  to  go  out  of  the  country  and 
light.  On  the  contrary,  the  patriotic  spirit  of  these  organizations 
flamed  up  at  the  prospect  of  war  and  they  were  ready  as  a  single 
man  to  march  against  Spain.  The  question  was  one  merely  of  pro 
cedure,  and  in  order  that  no  controversy  might  interrupt  thorough 
unity  of  purpose,  the  President  concluded  to  call  for  enlistments  in 
the  volunteer  army  of  the  United  States,  announcing  a  preference 
for  the  militia  regiments  of  the  States  as  completed  organizations. 

The  third  resource,  the  body  of  men  of  fighting  age  in  the  United 
States,  could  yield  at  least  10,000.000  men.  As  against  Spain's  limit 
of  1,410.000,  the  preponderance  of  the  United  States  was,  of  course, 
overwhelming. 

In  the  naval  establishment  of  each  country  the  number  of  ships 
constructed  for  war  was  nearly  equal,  but  of  greatly  differing  character, 
both  in  purpose  and  condition.  The  Spaniard  possessed  but  one  battle 
ship  of  the  first-class,  the  Pelayo,  of  9,900  tons  and  moderate  speed  power. 
Of  armored  cruisers  of  the  first-class  he  possessed  six,  each  about  7,000 
tons  and  having  a  speed  estimated  at  20  knots  per  hour.  Of  torpedo 
boats  and  swift  torpedo  boat  destroyers  there  were  28,  and  of  smaller 
torpedo  and  gunboat  craft  for  harbor  service,  about  100.  The  Spanish 
navy  footed  up  153  boats  of  all  sorts,  but  it  was  in  the  modern  armored 
cruisers  of  high  speed,  carrying  great  battery  power,  strongly  protected 
by  steel  armor,  and  in  the  yet  untested  and  mysterious  torpedo  ma 
chines,  that  its  strength  was  concentrated. 

The  navy  of  the  United  States,  before  war  approached,  presented 
every  opposing  feature  of  purpose.  The  four  sea-going  battleships  of 
the  first-class,  the  Oregon,  Massachusetts,  Icnra,  and  Indiana,  with  the 
second-class  battleship,  Texas,  were  regarded  more  as  coast-defenders 
than  as  open  sea  fighters  and  sailers.  In  an  organized  battle,  how 
ever,  their  enormous  gun  power  and  low  freeboard  exposures  to  the 


30  HISTORY   OF   THE 

enemy's  fire  would  have  found  them  more  than  a  match  for  all  the 
large  ships  Spain  possessed.  We  had  but  two  armored  cruisers, 
the  Brooklyn  and  New  York,  each  with  lighter  armor  than  their  ad 
versaries  of  the  corresponding  class.  There  were  fourteen  protected 
cruisers  of  high  speed,  four  double-turreted  monitors  and  twelve  tor 
pedo  boats,  besides  a  number  of  gunboats  and  antiquated  craft  for 
harbor  protection.  Untried  experiments  were  the  dynamite  cruiser 
Vesuvius,  and  the  ram  Katahdin,  the  product  of  American  inventive 
ideas. 

The  Vesuvius  was  expected  to  be  more  effective  in  battle  than 
battleships  or  torpedo  boats,  but  her  practical  efficiency  had  been  so 
stubbornly  questioned  that  the  government  had  not  duplicated  her. 
She  was  small,  swift,  and  easily  handled,  and  carried  three  pneumatic 
guns,  each  of  which  could  discharge  500  pounds  of  nitro-glycerin  every 
five  minutes.  Nitro-glycerin  has  five  times  the  explosive  power  of  gun 
cotton  and  twenty-five  times  the  explosive  power  of  ordinary  powder. 
The  Katahdin  was  designed  to  destroy  the  enemy  by  ramming  under 
the  water  line. 

Such  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  appraised  and  recorded  forces  of 
the  adversaries  at  the  moment  when  the  destruction  of  the  Maine 
made  war  imminent.  Beneath  this  open  page  of  the  governmental 
ledger  on  each  side,  however,  were  concealed  congenital  differences 
of  national  and  racial  character  that  were  to  render  the  instruments 
of  war  a  mere  item  of  record.  It  was  not  the  armor,  the  fortifica 
tion,  or  the  gun,  that  was  to  decide  the  contest ;  but  the  man  behind 
the  gun  and  the  institutions  behind  the  man. 

Every  boy.  in  America  is  born  a  machinist  and  the  instinct  of 
mechanical  genius  has  found  enlargement  in  the  competition  for  in 
ventions  and  in  the  acceptance  and  use  of  all  mechanical  contriv 
ances.  The  esteem  in  which  labor  is  held,  the  scorn  that  is  felt  for 
ignorance  and  indolence,  the  entire  freedom  of  education,  of  religion, 
of  political  contention  —  all  these  have  made  the  average  American  a 
responsible  individual,  self-reliant,  skillful  with  his  hands,  with  his 
head,  and  cool  of  heart  and  mind  in  moments  of  trial.  This  natural 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  31 

and  acquired  skill  and  familiarity  with  mechanical  appliances  was 
required  to  make  the  old  Springfield  rifle  and  grain  powder  superior 
to  the  Mauser  rifle  and  smokeless  powder  on  battlefields.  It  was  to 
be  relied  upon  to  turn  slow  battleships  into  racers  that  could  pursue 
fleet  cruisers,  and  to  take  an  enormous  vessel  such  as  the  Oregon  a 
flying  voyage  of  15,000  miles  in  sixty-six  days  without  hurt  to  her 
machinery  or  equipment,  so  that  she  could  go  into  actual  battle  with 
out  needing  repairs.  When  to  such  type  of  man  is  given  an  imple 
ment  he  adds  to  its  effectiveness  and  preserves  its  capacity.  Self- 
poised,  openly  confident  of  his  resources  to  the  point  of  boasting,  the 
American  has  been  regarded  by  Europeans  as  a  vain  braggart,  and 
his  direct  manner  of  thrusting  aside  the  conventionalities  of  diplo 
matic  and  governmental  etiquette  —  the  Circumlocution  Office  rules 
of  international  relations  —  drew  upon  him  the  Spanish  epithet  of 
"the  Yankee  Pig." 

England  alone,  of  all  the  European  nations,  understood  the  reso 
lute  intelligence,  practical  skill,  and  patriotism  of  the  Americans.* 
The  Continent  would  not  believe  that  we  could  make  out  of  raw 


*  Mr.  Henry  Norman,  a  distinguished  English  journalist  of  groat  experience,  who  visited 
Washington  during  the  opening  weeks  of  the  war,  wrote  to  the  London  Chronicle  concerning 
certain  features  of  the  American  character  under  the  stress  of  the  crisis.  After  some  amusing 
comments  upon  "spread-eagle  enthusiasm,"  he  said  of  the  army:  "After  admitting  every 
reasonable  criticism,  it  is  a  triumph  of  organization.  I  doubt  if  so  much,  from  so  little,  has 
ever  been  accomplished  so  expeditious]}-  and  so  uneventfully  before.  And  look  at  the  display 
of  American  patriotism.  When  the  volunteers  were  summoned  by  the  President  they 
walked  on  the  scene  as  if  they  had  been  waiting  in  the  wings.  They  were  subjected  to  a 
physical  examination  as  searching  as  that  of  a  life  insurance  company.  A  man  was  re 
jected  for  two  or  three  filled  teeth.  They  came  from  all  ranks  of  life.  Young  lawyers, 
doctors,  bankers,  well-paid  clerks  are  marching  by  thousands  in  the  ranks.  The  first  surgeon 
to  be  killed  at  Guantanamo  left  a  New  York  practice  of  $10,000  a  year  to  volunteer.  As 
I  was  standing  on  the  steps  of  the  Arlington  Hotel  one  evening,  a  tall,  thin  man,  carrying 
a  large  suit-case,  walked  out  and  got  on  the  street  car  for  the  railway  station,  on  his  way 
to  Tampa.  It  was  John  Jacob  Astor,  the  possessor  of  a  hundred  millions  of  dollars. 
Theodore  Roosevelt's  rough  riders  contain  a  number  of  the  smartest  young  men  in  New 
York  society.  A  Harvard  classmate  of  mine,  a  rising  young  lawyer,  is  working  like  a 
laborer  at  the  Brooklyn  Navy  Yard,  not  knowing  when  he  may  l>e  ordered  to  Cuba  or 
Manila.  He  is  a  naval  reserve  man  and  sent  in  his  application  for  any  post  '  from  the 
stoke-hole  upward.'  The  same  is  true  of  women.  When  I  called  to  say  g<xxl-by  to  Mrs. 
John  Addison  Porter,  the  wife  of  the  Secretary  to  the  President,  whose  charming  hospi 
tality  I  had  enjoyed,  she  had  gone  to  Tampa  to  ship  as  a  nurse  on  the  Red  Cross  steamer 
for  the  coast  of  Cuba.  And  all  this,  be  it  remembered,  is  for  a  war  in  which  the  country 


32  HISTORY   OF   THE 

recruits  efficient  soldiers  that  could  face  the  Spanish  regulars.  They 
sneered  at  the  conglomerate  American  population  as  composed  of 
sordid  mercenaries,  the  scum  and  refuse  of  the  world,  or  emigrants 
intent  alone  upon  making  fortunes  with  which  to  return  home  —  hav 
ing  no  loyalty  or  patriotism,  and  no  courage  against  a  trained  army 
of  the  European  standard. 

The  American  people  understood  their  strength  and  at  the  same 
time  the  weakness  of  their  adversary.  They  did  not  make  the  mis 
take  of  estimating  the  Spaniards  as  cowards.  But  they  rated  Spanish 
courage  as  that  of  desperation  rather  than  of  cool  tenacity  and  hope. 
While  the  Spaniard  believed  that  Republican  institutions  rendered 
the  volunteer  soldier  of  America  insubordinate  under  discipline,  the 
American  knew  that  his  adversary  was  a  servile  dependent  upon 
caste  leadership.*  That  his  final  courage  must  depend  upon  his 
officers,  since  they,  alone,  were  informed  and  intelligent,  though  cor 
rupted  by  national  degeneration.  Caste  placed  an  impassable  barrier 
between  the  Spanish  officer  and  the  line.  Under  rigid  censorship  of 
the  printing  press,  and  through  religious  intolerance,  the  masses  were 


is  not  in  the  remotest  danger,  and  when  the  ultimate  summons  of  patriotism  is  unspoken. 
Finally,  consider  the  reference  to  the  war  loan.  A  New  York  syndicate  offered  to  take 
half  of  it  at  a  premium  which  would  have  given  the  Government  a  clear  profit  of  $1,000,000. 
But  the  loan  was  wisely  offered  to  the  people,  and  the  small  investor  gets  all  he  can  buy 
before  the  capitalist  is  even  permitted  to  invest.  And  from  Canada  to  the  Gulf,  from 
Long  Island  to  Seattle,  the  money  of  the  people  is  pouring  in.  As  I  write,  it  is  said 
the  loan  will  be  all  taken  up  in  small  amounts. 

"Here,  then,  is  the  new  America  in  one  aspect  —  armed  for  a  wider  influence  and  a 
harder  fight  than  any  she  has  envisaged  before.  And  what  a  fight  she  will  make !  Dewey, 
with  his  dash  upon  Manila;  Hobson  and  his  companions  going  quietly  to  apparently  cer 
tain  death,  and  ships  offering  the  whole  muster  roll  as  volunteers  to  accompany  him ; 
Rowan,  with  his  life  in  his  hand  at  every  minute  of  his  journey  to  Gomez  and  back, 
worse  than  death  awaiting  him  if  caught ;  Blue,  making  his  70-mile  reconnoissance  about 
Santiago ;  Whitney,  with  compass  and  note-book  in  pocket,  dishwashing  his  perilous  way 
round  Porto  Rico  —  this  is  the  old  daring  of  our  common  race.  If  the  old  lion  and  the 
young  lion  should  ever  go  hunting  side  by  side  !" 

*  Major  De  Grandprey,  military  attache  to  the  French  embassy  in  Washington,  who 
was  present  at  the  battles  fought  about  Santiago  early  in  July,  observing  the  army  opera 
tions  for  his  government,  made  this  statement  to  the  Associated  Press  on  July  12,  after 
returning:  "I  have  the  most  complete  admiration  for  your  men.  They  are  a  superb  body, 
individually  and  as  an  army,  and  I  suppose  not  throughout  the  world  is  there  such  a 
splendid  lot  of  fighting  men.  It  is  the  fighting  characteristic  of  the  men  which  is  most 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAK  38 

in  dense  ignorance  of  their  adversaries,  without  practical  resources, 
skillful  only  in  the  cunning  of  cruelty  and  deception,  such  as  has 
marked  the  race  since  the  time  of  Philip  II. 

The  administration  at  Washington,  representing  the  type  of  the 
practical  American,  who  only  needed  tools  with  which  to  tight,  had 
begun  to  make  the  army  and  navy  even  before  war  was  declared. 
While  Spain,  with  a  bankrupt  treasury,  was  ostentatiously  searching 
in  all  European  countries  to  purchase  ships  of  war,  the  United  States 
obtained  three  abroad  and  constructed  out  of  our  own  merchant 
marine  a  squadron  of  eleven  steel  cruisers.  The  American  line  fur 
nished  four  steamers,  the  »S7.  Louis,  St.  Paul,  New  York,  and  Parts 
(the  latter  two  rechristened  Yale  and  Harvard}  and  the  Morgan  line 
provided  four,  whose  Spanish  names  were  altered  to  Dixie.  Yankee, 
Prairie,  and  Yosemite.  Many  other  yachts  were  converted  into  scout 
fighters  and  within  two  weeks  after  war  began  there  were  eighty-eight 
effective  fighting  ships  in  commission,  mostly  assembled  in  Atlantic 
waters.  Six  weeks  later  Congress  made  appropriations  for  building 
fifty-one  new  ships,  the  largest  authorization  in  the  history  of  the 
country. 

The  making  of  the  army  was  pushed  with  equal  activity.  Promptly 
on  April  22  a  bill  was  adopted  for  calling  out  the  volunteers,  and  on 
the  23d  the  President  issued  his  proclamation  calling  for  125,000 
men,  distributed  pro-rata  among  the  several  States.  Within  ten 
days  there  were  750.000  applications  for  enlistment.  A  few  days  later 
a  bill  was  adopted  authorizing  the  President  to  recruit  the  regular 


apparent.  They  are  aggressive,  eager  for  action,  never  needing  the  voice  of  an  officer  to 
push  them  forward.  Another  marked  characteristic  is  the  self-reliance  of  each  man  ;  what 
we  call  the  character  of  '  initiative.'  It  is  almost  unknown  in  European  armies,  where 
every  movement  and  the  move  to  meet  each  action  of  the  enemy  awaits  the  initiative  of 
an  officer.  But  with  your  men  they  fight  to  the  front,  meeting  each  emergency  as  it 
arises,  overcoming  obstacles  by  their  own  initiative.  Such  self-reliant  fighting  men  make 
an  exceptionally  impetuous  army,  for  every  unit  contributes  to  the  irresistible  onward 
movement.  The  Spanish  troops  do  not  have  this  same  characteristic.  They  are  more 
passive,  more  cautious.  Besides  the  impetuosity  of  such  fighting  material,  it  has  the 
effect  of  inspiring  a  morale  among  the  troops,  making  them  feel  that  success  is  assured, 
and  at  the  same  time  carrying  disorder  and  depression  to  the  ranks  of  the  enemy." 


34  HISTORY   OF   THE 

army  to  an  effective  strength  of  60,000  officers  and  men,  whenever 
in  his  judgment  it  should  be  needed  to  place  the  regular  army  on  a 
war  footing,  and  the  work  of  recruiting  immediately  began.  Camps 
of  instruction  and  recruitment  for  the  volunteers  were  opened  in 
every  State,  from  which  regiments,  after  mustering,  were  mobilized 
at  Chickamauga  National  Park,  Tennessee,  at  Camp  Alger,  Virginia, 
and  Tampa,  Florida.  The  regular  troops  were  collected  at  New  Or 
leans,  Mobile,  and  Tampa. 

On  May  4  the  President  appointed  the  army  staff  including  the 
following  as  Major-Generals  :  Promoted  from  the  regular  army  —  Briga 
dier-Generals  Joseph  C.  Breckinridge,  Elwell  S.  Otis,  John  J.  Cop- 
pinger,  William  R.  Shafter,  William  M.  Graham,  James  F.  Wade,  Henry 
C.  Merriam.  Appointed  from  civil  life  —  James  H.Wilson,  of  Delaware; 
Fitzhugh  Lee,  of  Virginia;  William  J.  Sewell,  of  New  Jersey,  and  Joseph 
Wheeler,  of  Alabama. 

Of  the  civilians,  General  Wilson  and  General  Sewell  had  been  distin 
guished  Federal  commanders  during  the  Civil  War,  and  General  Fitz 
hugh  Lee  and  General  Joseph  Wheeler  served  with  corresponding  dis 
tinction  upon  the  Confederate  side.  General  Sewell  did  not  accept  the 
appointment,  however.  He  was  serving  as  United  States  Senator  from 
New  Jersey,  and  it  was  held  that  his  acceptance  of  a  commission  in 
the  army  would  vacate  his  seat  in  the  Senate.  General  Wheeler,  who 
was  representing  his  Alabama  district  in  the  lower  house,  entered  the 
service  immediately  without  regard  to  the  point. 

As  soon  as  practicable  a  second  call  for  75,000  volunteers  was  is 
sued,  and  before  Spain  could  land  a  regiment  of  reinforcements  in 
Cuba  or  place  a  portion  of  her  fleet  in  Cuban  waters,  the  United  States 
had  provided  a  sufficient  and  powerful  navy  and  had  in  service  camps 
on  the  southern  watershed  about  150,000  troops,  of  which  30,000  were 
efficient  enough  to  force  a  landing  in  Cuba  within  six  weeks  of  en 
listment,  and  16,000  had  been  mobilized  at  San  Francisco  and  trans 
ported  to  Manila  under  Major-General  Merritt  to  destroy  Spanish 
authority  in  the  Philippines.  It  was,  indeed,  a  triumph  of  practical 
Americanism. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  35 

in. 

THE  declaration  of  war  by  the  Congress,  followed  by  the  procla 
mation  of  the  President  calling  for  volunteers,  proved  signals  for  an 
extraordinary  outpouring  of  national  sentiment.  As  in 
1S12  and  in  1846,  the  response  of  the  people  was  en-  UPRISING  OF 
thusiastic  and  spontaneous.  In  each  of  the  forty-five 
States  of  the  Union  there  was  a  generous  rivalry  for  the  opportunity 
to  rally  around  the  flag  and  to  serve  the  country.  In  Georgia,  Ala 
bama,  and  Texas,  no  less  than  in  Vermont,  Michigan,  and  Illinois,  in 
Massachusetts  and  in  South  Carolina,  in  Kentucky,  Missouri,  Indiana, 
and  Wisconsin,  in  the  crowded  centers  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and  New 
York,  as  in  the  more  isolated  regions  of  New  Hampshire,  Arkansas, 
and  Oregon,  the  drum-beats  and  the  heart-beats  kept  time  to  the 
music  of  the  nation's  anthem  and  niade  a  cause  common  to  all  men. 
If  there  had  been  question  anywhere  about  the  wisdom  or  the  justice 
of  the  war  with  Spain,  it  ended  with  the  call  to  arms. 

During  thirty-three  years,  except  upon  the  Indian  frontier,  not  a 
hostile  shot  had  been  heard  in  the  United  States.  An  entire  gener 
ation  had  grown  to  manhood  since  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  in  1H()5. 
The  wounds  of  prolonged  and  embittered  sectional  controversy  were 
healed,  indeed,  and  there  had  been  many  evidences  that  the  resto 
ration  of  the  Union  was  complete,  both  in  spirit  and  in  fact;  but 
there  was  wanting  some  great  occasion  to  proclaim  to  the  world  the 
thorough  reconstruction  of  the  States,  the  thorough  rehabilitation  of 
the  people  in  the  restored,  and,  in  a  sense,  in  the  regenerated  Union. 
There  was  something  exhilarating  and  at  the  same  time  pathetic  in 
the  promptitude  with  which  party  distinctions  were  dropped  by  the 
men  who  rushed  to  the  national  standard,  and  in  the  mingling  of 
regiments,  without  regard  to  States  or  sections,  into  army  divisions 
and  brigades.  In  camp,  Tennessee  touched  elbows  with  Connecticut, 
and  Mississippi  and  Maine  fraternized  as  one  family,  whilst  such 
terms  as  Republican,  Democrat,  and  Populist  were  unknown  and 
unheard. 


36  HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

The  fathers  of  the  men  now  enlisted  to  fight  side  by  side  had  fought 
bravely  against  one  another  during  four  years  of  deadly  battle.  In 
many  cases  veterans  of  the  Union  army  and  survivors  of  the  Con 
federate  army,  divided  in  the  former  war,  were  brought  together  in 
this  as  comrades  and  colleagues.  The  appointment  of  the  gallant 
Confederate  Generals,  Joseph  Wheeler,  and  Fitzhugh  Lee,  followed  by 
that  of  other  distinguished  Southern  soldiers,  was  everywhere  hailed 
with  the  liveliest  acclaim ;  and  very  soon  upon  the  assembling  of  the 
forces,  North  and  South  were  given  an  object  lesson  of  rare  impres- 
siveness  and  value  in  the  exploits  of  Dewey,  the  Vermonter,  at  Ma 
nila,  and  of  Hobson,  the  Alabamian,  at  Santiago,  illustrating  the  union 
of  skill  and  daring  which  was  now  assured  to  American  arms.  In 
1861  the  country  had  been  divided.  Now  it  was  united.  Then  the 
sections  stood  in  opposing  battle.  Now  they  stood  shoulder  to  shoul 
der  and  heart  to  heart.  The  world  was  to  witness  at  last  what  this 
union  truly  means.  It  was  to  see  arise  from  the  ashes  of  old,  and 
dead  and  buried  controversies,  a  power  undreamed  of  by  itself  before  ; 
a  vast  world-power,  with  which  henceforward  the  nations  of  the  earth 
must  reckon.  The  swaddling  clothes  of  National  babyhood  were  gone. 
The  giant  stood  forth  in  all  the  pride  of  his  manhood,  armed  cap-a- 
pie  and,  arrayed  on  the  side  of  humanity  and  liberty,  ready,  willing, 
and  able  to  give  battle  to  all  comers  who  might  challenge  his  suprem 
acy,  wherever  he  might  plant  the  star-spangled  banner,  or  set  up  the 
standards  of  free  government. 


CHAPTER  THE   THIRD. 
DEWEY  AND  MANILA. 

EXTENT  AND  CONDITION   OF  THE  SPANISH   COLONIES  OF  THK  PHILIPPINES  — THE  NAVAI.  PROB 
LEMS  OF  OFFENSE  AND  DEFENSE  IN  THE  PACIFIC  — THE  MOVEMENTS  PRECEDING  THE  BATTLE 
OF    MANILA  — EXTRAORDINARY    APPEAL    OK    THE    GOVERNOR-GENERAL   TO    RESIST   THE 
AMERICANS  — COMMODORE  DEWEY  SAILS  TO  "  FIND  THE  SPANIARD  AND  SMASH  HIM" 
—  THE    EXTRAORDINARY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY   IN   WHICH   THK   SPANIARDS 
WERE  ANNIHILATED    BY    COMMODORE   DEWEY'S   SQUADRON  —  THE   EFFECT 
OF  THE  VICTORY  UPON  THE  UNITED  STATES,  SPAIN,  AND  ALL  EUROPE. 


I. 


D 


URING  the  first  ten  days  of  the  war  attention  was  centered  upon 
the  naval  field  of  operations  in  Cuban  waters  or  upon  the 
Atlantic  seaboard  of  the  United  States,  the 


I  HL 

great   cities    along    which,    it   was   expected,  PHILIPPINE 

would  invite  swift  attack  from  the  Spanish  ships. 
Meanwhile  in  Asiatic  waters  an  event  was  preparing  that  was  to  fill 
the  wrorld  with  wonder  and  admiration,  and  to  render  American  arms 
glorious  in  the  very  first  collision  with  the  enemy.  This  was  the 
enterprise  of  the  American  squadron  on  the  Asiatic  station  against 
the  city  of  Manila,  the  capital  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  colonies  of 
Spain  in  the  Pacific  not  less  valuable  and  productive  than  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico  in  the  Atlantic.  The  Philippines  had  been  first  discovered 
by  Spanish  adventurers  and  had  been  in  the  possession  of  the  Span 
ish  crown  for  more  than  four  hundred  years,  during  all  of  which  time 
the  cruelty  and  rapacity  of  the  sovereigns  and  of  the  Governors  sent 
out  to  administer  colonial  affairs,  had  provoked  many  revolutions  and 
uprisings.  The  archipelago,  which  consists  of  from  1,200  to  1,800 
separate  islands,  only  a  few  of  which  are  of  considerable  size,  con 
tains  mixtures  of  the  most  savage  and  intractable  populations  in  the 
world.  These  occupy  the  principal  islands  of  Luzon,  Mindanao,  Samar, 

(37) 


38  HISTORY   OF   THE 

and  Panay.  Luzon  has  an  area  of  about  43,000  square  miles,  nearly 
equal  to  the  State  of  Illinois;  Mindanao  covers  about  38,000  square 
miles,  nearly  the  area  of  the  State  of  Kentucky.  The  land  area  of 
the  archipelago  is  estimated  at  114,000  square  miles,  equal  to  the 
whole  of  New  England  and  New  York. 

In  order  to  comprehend  the  problems  that  confronted  the  American 
forces  in  the  Philippines,  the  peculiar  contradictions  of  tribal  prejudice 
and  the  oppression  of  the  Spanish  Government  must  be  considered. 
The  colonial  government  was  administered  by  a  Governor-General, 
invariably  selected  in  Spain.  The  place  was  used  to  reward  crown 
favorites  who  could  return  home  after  a  few  years  of  service  with 
enormous  fortunes  wrung  from  natives  and  foreign  immigrants  alike 
by  a  system  of  taxation  that  savored  of  blackmail  and  confiscation. 
The  Governor-General  had  a  junta  or  cabinet  composed  of  the  Arch 
bishop  of  Manila,  the  Captain-General  of  the  army  and  the  Admiral 
of  the  navy  stationed  in  the  colonies.  The  administrative  power  lay 
with  the  Governor-General  and  the  Archbishop,  and  the  religious 
orders  of  the  Spanish  Catholic  Church  were  the  practical  controllers, 
under  their  superiors,  of  the  fortunes  and  the  fate  of  every  locality 
and  village  that  Spanish  power  had  been  able  to  subjugate  to  its 
iron  rule.  The  first  permanent  settlement  of  the  islands  had  been 
made  by  the  missionaries,  and  Philip  II.  had  conferred  upon  the  suc 
cession  of  these  peculiar  and  most  rigorous  powers  of  civil  and  reli 
gious  government,  which  have  been  little  changed.  The  result 
through  four  centuries  was  the  acquisition  of  vast  wealth  by  the 
religious  orders,  the  possession  of  well-defined  incomes  from  monopo 
lies  and  collections,  and  the  perfection  of  a  system  of  espionage  that 
deprived  the  inhabitants  of  refuge  from  the  rapacity  of  the  conquer 
ors.  The  persistence  and  intolerance  of  the  system  had  been  secured 
by  excluding  all  native-born  persons  from  appointment  under  either 
the  civil  or  church  branches.  All  civil  servants  and  priests  were 
native-born  Spaniards  sent  out  for  the  purpose,  to  take  their  instruc 
tions  from  those  already  adept  in  oppression,  and  ambitious  to  sur 
pass  their  predecessors  in  the  fortunes  to  be  accumulated  for  the 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  39 

home  churches  or  by  the  court  favorites  who  returned  to  Spain  to 
dazzle  the  supporters  of  the  crown  with  the  glories  of  a  short  term 
abroad  in  the  service  of  their  country.  The  trying  climate  of  the 
Philippines,  which  is  tropical,  subjected  to  violent  monsoons,  seasons 
of  drenching  rains,  and  an  almost  intolerable  heat  lasting  from  March 
to  July,  has  made  it  necessary  to  change  continually  the  Spanish  ad 
ministrators.  From  the  Governor-General  down  to  the  private  sol 
dier,  five  years  was  the  average  length  of  service  possible,  so  that  the 
native  population,  estimated  at  from  8,000,(XH)  to  15,(MK),(KM)  in  num 
bers,  was  always  under  the  rule  of  transient  strangers,  having  no 
continuing  interest  in  their  welfare.  There  have  been,  of  course, 
individual  instances  of  honorable  and  just  governors.  Among  these 
recognized  in  recent  times  was  General  Blanco,  who  was  afterwards 
selected  to  establish  the  weak  experiment  of  autonomistic  govern 
ment  in  Cuba.  It  was,  however,  the  rule,  under  the  very  nature  of 
the  colonial  system,  that  temptation  to  oppress,  rob,  and  enslave  the 
natives  was  held  out  to  every  administration  in  succession,  and  such 
temptations  are  not  long  resisted  by  those  appointed  over  uncivilized 
and  ignorant  people. 

The  population  of  the  Philippines  was  especially  difficult  to  hold 
in  orderly  government.  Naturally  a  heterogeneous  mass,  the  problem 
of  assimilating  the  different  tribes  and  races  would  have  been  one 
difficult  to  accomplish  by  the  most  patient  and  industrious  govern 
ment,  with  years  of  application.  The  fiercest  and  most  primitive 
savages  inhabit  the  scattered  islands,  sometimes  two  or  more  anti 
pathetic  races  occupying  the  same  island  and  ceaselessly  waging 
war  against  each  other  and  the  government  alike.  The  Aborigines 
are  called  "Negritos,"  or  little  Negroes,  dwarfs,  rarely  exceeding  five 
feet  in  stature,  intractable  and  wary  mountaineers,  indulging  in  the 
crudest  pagan  rites  of  sacrifice,  including  cannibalism,  and  who  have 
resisted  conquest  by  retiring  to  mountain  fastnesses  where  they 
have  been  slowly  diminishing  in  numbers  by  self-extinction. 

The  Manthras,  an  equally  wretched  but  more  contemptible  tribe, 
are  nearly  as  great  in  nuhibers  as  the  Negritos.  They  are  a  cross 


40  HISTORY   OF   THE 

between  the  Negritos  and  Malays  and  are  more  degenerate,  after 
being  at  one  time  warlike  and  aggressive.  The  great  body  of  the 
population  is  Malayan,  with  some  Chinese  and  a  few  Japanese. 

A  historical  writer  in  the  French  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes  has  de 
scribed  the  most  recent  condition  of  the  endless  conflict  in  the  archi 
pelago  in  a  manner  to  exhibit  the  spirit  of  Spanish  colonial  government 
as  it  is  displayed  in  the  capital  of  Manila  and  in  the  restless  and  un- 
conquered  provinces.  There,  as  in  Europe  and  America,  Spain  set 
upon  every  locality  she  occupied  the  indelible  mark  of  her  sinister 
and  unchanging  intolerance  and  pride.  In  Manila,  as  well  as  in 
Mexico,  Panama,  and  Lima,  was  the  severe  and  solemn  aspect,  the 
feudal  and  religious  stamp,  which  the  Spaniard  impresses  upon  his 
monuments,  his  palaces,  his  dwellings  in  every  latitude.  Manila  ap 
peared  like  a  fragment  of  Spain  transplanted  to  the  archipelago  of 
Asia.  On  its  churches  and  convents,  even  on  its  ruined  walls,  time 
has  laid  the  sombre,  dull-gold  coloring  of  the  mother  country.  The 
ancient  city,  silent  and  melancholy,  stretches  interminably  along 
gloomy  streets,  bordered  with  convents  whose  flat  facades  are  only 
broken  here  and  there  by  a  few  narrow  windows.  It  still  preserved 
all  the  austere  appearance  of  a  city  of  the  reign  of  Philip  II.  But 
there  was  a  new  city  within  the  ramparts  of  Manila,  sometimes  called 
the  Escolta,  from  the  name  of  its  central  quarter,  and  this  city  is 
alive  with  its  dashing  teams,  its  noisy  crowd  of  Tagal  women,  shod 
in  high-heeled  shoes,  and  every  nerve  in  their  bodies  quivering  with 
excitement.  They  are  almost  all  employed  in  the  innumerable  cigar 
factories  whose  output  inundates  all  Asia.  The  city  contained  260,000 
inhabitants  of  every  known  race  and  color. 

From  Manila  throughout  the  archipelago  the  religious  fanaticism 
of  the  Spaniards  radiated  and  came  into  collision  with  manners,  tra 
ditions,  and  a  fanaticism  fully  as  tierce  as  those  of  Spain  —  the  im 
movable  fanaticism  of  the  Mussulman.  At  a  distance  of  6,000  leagues 
from  Toledo  and  Granada,  the  same  ancient  hatreds  have  brought 
European  Spaniard  and  Asiatic  Saracen  into  the  same  relentless  an 
tagonism  that  swayed  them  in  the  days  of  the  Cid  and  Ferdinand  the 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  41 

Catholic.  The  island  of  Sulu,  on  account  of  its  position  between  Min 
danao  and  Borneo,  was  the  commercial,  political,  and  religious  center 
of  the  followers  of  the  Prophet,  the  Mecca  of  the  extreme  Orient. 
From  this  center  they  spread  over  the  neighboring  archipelagoes. 
Merciless  pirates  and  unflinching  fanatics,  they  scattered  everywhere 
terror,  ruin,  and  death,  sailing  in  their  light  proas  up  the  narrow 
channels  and  animated  with  implacable  hatred  for  those  conquering 
invaders,  to  whom  they  never  gave  quarter  and  from  whom  they 
never  expected  it.  Constantly  beaten  in  pitched  battle,  they  as  con 
stantly  took  again  to  the  sea,  eluding  the  pursuit  of  the  heavy  Span 
ish  vessels,  taking  refuge  in  bays  and  creeks  where  no  one  could  follow 
them,  pillaging  isolated  ships,  surprising  the  villages,  massacring  the 
old  men,  leading  away  the  women  and  the  adults  into  slavery,  push 
ing  the  audacious  prows  of  their  skiffs  even  up  to  within  300  miles  of 
Manila,  and  seizing  every  year  nearly  4,000  captives. 

Between  the  Malay  creese  and  the  Castilian  carronade  the  struggle 
was  unequal,  but  it  did  not  last  the  less  long  on  that  account,  nor, 
obscure  though  it  was,  was  it  the  less  bloody.  On  both  sides  there 
was  the  same  bravery,  the  same  cruelty.  It  required  all  the  tenacity 
of  Spain  to  purge  these  seas  of  the  pirates  who  infested  them,  and 
it  wras  not  until  after  a  conflict  of  several  years,  in  1876,  that  the 
Spanish  squadron  was  able  to  bring  its  broadsides  to  bear  on  Tianggi, 
a  nest  of  Suluan  pirates,  land  a  division  of  troops,  invest  all  the  out 
lets,  and  burn  the  town  and  its  inhabitants,  as  wrell  as  the  harbor  and 
all  the  craft  within  it.  The  soldiers  planted  their  flag  and  the  engi 
neers  built  a  new  city  on  the  smoking  ruins.  This  city  was  then  pro 
tected  by  a  strong  garrison. 

For  a  time,  at  least,  piracy  was  at  an  end,  but  not  the  Moslem 
spirit,  which  was  exasperated  rather  than  crushed  by  defeat.  To  the 
rovers  of  the  seas  succeeded  the  organization  known  as  juramentados. 
One  of  the  characteristic  qualities  of  the  Malays  is  their  contempt  of 
death.  They  have  transmitted  it,  with  their  blood,  to  the  Poly 
nesians,  who  see  in  it  only  one  of  the  multiple  phenomena  and  not 
the  supreme  act  of  existence,  and  witness  it  or  submit  to  it  with 


42  HISTORY   OF   THE 

profound  indifference.  Travelers  have  often  seen  a  Kanaka  stretch  his 
body  on  a  mat,  while  in  perfect  health,  without  any  symptom  of  dis 
ease  whatever,  and  there  wait  patiently  for  the  end,  convinced  that 
it  is  near,  and  refuse  all  nourishment  and  die  without  any  apparent 
suffering.  His  relatives  say  of  him :  "  He  feels  he  is  going  to  die," 
and  the  imaginary  patient  dies,  his  mind  possessed  by  some  illusion, 
some  superstitious  idea,  some  invisible  wound  through  which  life 
escapes.  When  to  this  absolute  indifference  to  death  is  united  Mus 
sulman  fanaticism,  which  gives  to  the  believer  a  glimpse  of  the  gates 
of  a  paradise  where  the  excited  senses  revel  in  endless  and  numberless 
enjoyments,  a  longing  for  extinction  takes  hold  of  him  and  throws 
him  like  a  wild  beast  upon  his  enemies.  The  juramentado  kills  for 
the  sake  of  killing  and  being  killed,  and  so  winning,  in  exchange  for 
a  life  of  suffering  and  privation,  the  voluptuous  existence  promised 
by  Mohammed. 

The  laws  of  Sulu  make  the  bankrupt  debtor  the  slave  of  his  cred 
itor,  and  not  only  the  debtor,  but  the  debtor's  wife  and  children  are 
enslaved  also.  To  free  them  there  is  but  one  means  left  to  the  hus 
band — the  sacrifice  of  his  life.  Reduced  to  this  extremity,  he  does 
not  hesitate — he  takes  the  formidable  oath.  From  that  time  forward 
he  is  enrolled  in  the  ranks  of  the  juramentados,  and  has  nothing  to  do 
but  await  the  hour  when  the  will  of  a  superior  shall  let  him  loose 
upon  the  Christians.  Meanwhile  the  panditas,  or  Mohammedan  priests, 
subject  him  to  a  system  of  excitement  that  will  turn  him  into  a  wild 
beast.  They  madden  his  already  disordered  brain,  they  make  still 
more  supple  his  oily  limbs,  until  they  have  the  strength  of  steel  and 
the  nervous  force  of  the  tiger  or  panther.  They  sing  to  him  their 
impassioned  chants,  which  show  to  his  entranced  vision  the  radiant 
smiles  of  intoxicating  houris.  In  the  shadow  of  the  forests,  broken 
by  the  gleam  of  the  moonlight,  they  evoke  the  burning  and  sensual 
images  of  the  eternally  young  and  beautiful  companions  who  are  call 
ing  him,  opening  their  arms  to  receive  him.  Thus  prepared,  the  jura 
mentado  is  ready  for  everything.  Nothing  can  stop  him,  nothing  can 
make  him  recoil.  He  will  accomplish  prodigies  of  valor,  borne  along 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  43 

by  a  buoyancy  that  is  irresistible,  until  the  moment  when  death  seizes 
him.  He  will  creep  with  his  companions  into  the  city  that  has  been 
assigned  to  him ;  he  knows  that  he  will  never  leave  it,  but  he  knows, 
also,  that  he  will  not  die  alone,  and  he  has  but  one  aim — to  butcher 
as  many  Christians  as  he  can. 

When  to  such  natural  antipathies  of  race  and  religion  are  added 
the  iron  oppression  which  Spain  has  always  laid  upon  peaceful  com 
merce  and  production,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  colonies  were  in  per 
petual  unrest  and  that  the  colonial  authorities  had  little  sympathy 
from  even  the  most  peaceful  classes.  The  native  Spaniards  resident 
in  the  country  never  exceeded  10,000  in  number,  except  on  a  few  rare 
occasions  when  large  bodies  of  troops  were  sent  out  for  specific  serv 
ice.  There  are  about  one  hundred  thousand  mixed  descendants  of 
Spaniards,  who  were  held  in  contempt  by  the  natives  of  Spain  as  Span 
iards  of  Cuban  birth  were  regarded  in  Cuba.  These  10,000  Spaniards 
were  the  civil  servants  and  religious  orders,  and  the  favored  owners 
of  concessions  in  manufacturing  and  planting  that  conferred  monop 
olies;  about  4,000  were  soldiers  garrisoning  Manila  and  the  arsenal 
forts  at  Cavite,  situated  upon  a  point  eight  miles  south  of  Manila  in 
the  bay  and  intended  to  render  the  defense  of  the  city  unquestion 
able.  In  addition  to  the  soldiers  there  were  2,000  sailors  and  marines, 
manning  a  squadron  of  fourteen  warships  and  gunboats.  When  war 
with  America  was  begun  these  forces  were  just  recovered  from  the 
hardships  of  a  fierce  revolution,  headed  by  General  Emilio  Aguinaldo, 
a  native  half-breed  of  great  popularity  and  activity.  After  bloody  up 
risings  for  independence,  without  money,  arms,  or  supplies,  the  Span 
ish  had  resorted  to  their  usual  tactics  of  bribing  the  leaders  and 
massacring  the  disordered  followers,  duped  into  surrender  by  promises 
of  amnesty.  The  hatred  of  the  natives  was  still  fierce  and  only 
awaited  opportunity  and  leadership  to  blaze  with  renewed  fury. 


44  HISTORY   OF   THE 

II. 

WHEN  Congress   issued   its   ultimatum   to   Spain   on   April   20,  the 

condition  of  our  Pacific  defenses  and  naval  force  was  such  as  to  cause 

uneasiness.     San   Francisco,  San  Diego,  and  other  sea- 

*'  FIND  THE 

SPANIARD  AND  ports  were  nominally  in  a  state  of  defense,  but  no  more. 
The  United  States  naval  squadron  in  Asiatic  waters, 
commanded  by  Commodore  George  Washington  Dewey,  was  assembled 
at  Hong  Kong.  In  preparation  for  events  it  had  been  well  supplied 
with  ammunition,  stores,  and  coal.  It  consisted  of  six  ships,  as  follows  : 
The  Commodore's  flagship  Olympia,  protected  cruiser  of  5,900  tons,  of 
high  speed  and  with  heavy  armament,  regarded  as  one  of  the  best 
fighting  cruisers  among  the  navies  of  the  world;  the  protected  cruis 
ers  Baltimore,  4,400  tons,  Raleiyh,  3,200  tons,  Boston,  3,000  tons;  the 
gunboats  Concord,  1,700  tons,  Petrel,  890  tons.  The  dispatch  boat  Mc- 
Culloch  and  the  steamers  Zafiro  and  Nanshan,  used  for  supply  and  col 
lier,  were  attached  to  the  squadron.  The  six  fighting  ships  were  7,000 
miles  from  the  nearest  American  port  base,  since  the  United  States 
possessed  no  coaling  station  in  the  Pacific  nearer  than  California 
available  for  purposes  of  war.  On  the  California  coast  were  the  first- 
class  battleship  Oregon,  the  gunboat  Marietta,  and  the  monitors  Mon 
terey  and  Monadnock,  all  purely  coast  defenders  and  all  unable  to 
cross  the  Pacific  upon  their  own  coal  supply.  The  lack  of  American 
merchant  steamers  in  the  Pacific  rendered  it  difficult  to  obtain  trans 
ports  and  auxiliary  vessels  if  they  should  be  needed. 

The  Spanish  naval  force  available  at  Manila  bay,  under  command 
of  Admiral  Montejo,  consisted  of  fourteen  ships  and  gunboats.  Four 
were  protected  cruisers,  one,  the  flagship  Reina  Christina,  well  armed 
and  equipped,  though  of  only  3,500  tons  displacement.  The  Castilla, 
Don  Juan  de  Austria,  and  Velasco  were  smaller  cruisers,  and  the  re 
maining  eight  were  gunboats.  While  the  Spaniards  had  more  vessels, 
they  were  not  as  powerful  in  size  or  armament  combined  as  the  six 
ships  of  the  American  squadron.  They  were,  however,  assembled  in 
Manila  harbor,  under  the  guns  of  the  forts  at  Manila  and  Cavite, 


REAR-ADMIRAL   GEORGE   DEWEY,  U.  S.  N. 


SPANISH -AMERICAN    WAR  45 

with  batteries  on  Corregidor  Island,  at  the  entrance  to  Manila  Bay, 
a  position  apparently  impregnable  if  properly  maintained,  especially 
as  the  approaches  could  be  covered  with  mines  to  render  entrance 
dangerous. 

If  the  Spanish  fleet  remained  at  Manila  the  safety  of  our  Pacih'c 
coast  against  attack  was  assured,  but  if  declaration  of  war  should  be 
made  the  American  fleet  would  be  forced  to  leave  the  neutral  harbor 
of  Hong  Kong,  and,  with  its  supply  of  coal,  stores,  and  ammunition 
limited,  its  effectiveness  would  also  be  limited  to  the  period  of  con 
sumption  of  these  articles  without  any  available  source  of  fresh  sup 
ply.  It  was  plain  that  the  American  squadron  must  sail  for  American 
waters  and  act  upon  the  defensive,  or  seek  out  the  Spaniard  in  the 
bay  of  Manila  under  the  guns  of  his  own  fortresses  and  abide  the 
issue  of  battle.  To  Americans,  eager  to  test  the  enemy,  to  authorities 
fully  confident  of  the  intelligence,  courage,  skill,  patriotism,  and  readi 
ness  of  our  sailors,  there  was  but  one  thing  to  do. 

On  April  25,  when  the  declaration  of  war  was  formally  made,  Com 
modore  Dewey  received  orders  by  cable  from  the  President  to  "seek 
the  Spanish  fleet  and  capture  or  destroy  it."  The  same  day  the  British 
authorities  at  Hong  Kong,  after  receiving  notice  of  the  declaration  of 
war,  notified  Commodore  Dewey  that  as  Great  Britain  was  neutral  in 
the  conflict,  his  squadron  would  be  expected  to  leave  Hong  Kong  within 
twenty-four  hours  under  the  rules  of  international  agreement.  The 
Commodore  immediately  set  sail  without  consuming  the  time  remain 
ing  to  him  under  the  rule,  and  rendezvoused  at  Mirs  Bay  on  the  Chi 
nese  coast,  to  strip  his  ships  for  action  and  communicate  his  plans  to 
the  officers  of  his  ships.  The  plan  was  simplicity  itself.  It  was  to 
ob'ey  orders  by  seeking  the  Spaniard,  finding  him  as  quickly  as  possible 
and,  without  hesitating  a  moment,  to  "smash  him"  with  all  the  might 
of  projectiles  that  the  American  ships  could  deliver.  The  details  of 
the  line  of  battle  and  order  of  ships  were  also  arranged  and  the  prep 
arations  aroused  the  sailors  to  great  enthusiasm.  George  Washington 
Dewey  was  born  in  Vermont  of  good  old  Puritan  stock.  When  he 
was  ordered  against  Manila  he  was  in  his  sixty-second  year.  A 


46  HISTORY   OF   THE 

graduate  of  the  Naval  Academy  at  Annapolis  in  1858,  he  had  served 
with  courage  and  distinction  in  the  Civil  War.  He  was  a  junior 
officer  on  the  Hartford  under  Admiral  Farragut  when-  that  com 
mander,  entering  Mobile  Bay  and  finding  the  bay  mined  with  ex 
plosives  that  had  already  destroyed  a  ship  ahead  of  him,  had  cried 
out  to  the  ship's  captain  who  seemed  to  hesitate:  "Go  right  ahead, 
Captain,  damn  the  torpedoes!"  The  same  laconic  spirit  of  action 
was  in  Commodore  Dewey's  language  thirty-three  years  later  when 
in  Mirs  Bay  he  told  his  men,  "we  are  to  seek  the  Spaniard  and 
smash  him  as  soon  as  we  find  him."  To  sailors  imbued  with  patri 
otic  pride,  far  from  home,  and  who  cherished  a  determination  to 
"Remember  the  Maine"  the  promise  of  quick  battle  was  full  of  ex 
citing  recompense. 

But  Commodore  Dewey's  plan  went  further  than  one  of  mere  battle. 
The  Philippine  revolutionary  leader,  Aguinaldo,  who  had  found  refuge 
at  Hong  Kong,  had  been  invited  to  cooperate.  Supplied  with  money, 
arms,  and  ammunition,  he  and  his  influential  followers  were  to  be 
transported  to  Luzon  and  landed.  In  the  event  of  a  protracted  siege 
or  the  miscarriage  of  plans,  the  Americans  would  thus  have  allies  in 
the  rear  of  the  Spanish  army  and  navy,  and  the  revolutionists  under 
the  encouragement  of  new  and  powerful  allies  in  front,  would  be  able 
to  reduce  the  Spanish  power  to  impotence  for  offensive  action.  These 
arrangements  were  perfected  in  one  day,  and  on  Friday,  April  29, 
the  American  squadron  sailed  for  Manila,  distant  about  700  miles,  re 
quiring  three  days'  steaming. 

The  Spaniards  awaited  the  approach  of  the  Americans  with  a  dis 
play  of  exultation.  Governor-General  Augusti  announced  that  after 
the  expected  battle  Spanish  cruisers  would  be  dispatched  against  San 
Francisco.  The  capture  of  an  American  trading  bark  by  a  Spanish 
gunboat  was  made  an  occasion  of  popular  rejoicing.  The  means 
adopted  to  excite  native  hatred  against  the  Americans  by  inspiring 
dread  of  them  seems  incredible  and  would  only  be  possible  in  a  coun 
try  where  press  censorship  and  general  ignorance  combine  to  leave 
the  people  at  the  mercy  of  unscrupulous  rulers.  The  Governor- 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  47 

General  issued  a  bombastic  address  in  which,  after  declaring  that 
•'the  hour  of  glory  had  arrived,"  he  reveled  in  abuse  of  the  Ameri 
cans:— 

••The  North  American  people,  constituted  of  all  social  excrescences,  have  ex 
hausted  our  patience  and  provoked  war  by  their  perfidious  machinations,  their 
acts  of  treachery,  their  outrages  against  the  laws  of  nations  and  international  con 
ventions. 

"  Spain,  which  counts  upon  the  sympathies  of  all  nations,  will  emerge  trium 
phant  from  this  new  test,  humiliating  and  blasting  the  adventurers  from  those 
United  States  that,  without  cohesion,  offer  humanity  only  infamous  traditions  and 
ungrateful  spectacles  in  her  chambers,  in  which  appear  insolence,  defamation,  cow 
ardice,  and  cynicism. 

"  Her  squadron,  manned  by  foreigners,  possessing  neither  instruction  nor  dis 
cipline,  is  preparing  to  come  to  this  archipelago  with  ruffianly  intention,  robbing 
us  of  all  that  means  life,  honor,  and  liberty,  and  pretending  to  be  inspired  by  a 
courage  of  which  they  are  incapable. 

"American  seamen  undertake  as  an  enterprise  capable  of  realization  the  sub 
stitution  of  Protestantism  for  the  Catholic  religion,  to  treat  you  as  tribes  refractory 
to  civilization,  to  take  possession  of  your  riches  as  if  they  were  unacquainted  with 
the  rights  of  property,  to  kidnap  those  persons  they  consider  useful  to  man  their 
ships  or  to  be  exploited  in  agricultural  and  industrial  labor. 

"  Vain  designs,  ridiculous  boastings!  Your  indomitable  bravery  will  suffice 
to  frustrate  the  realization  of  their  designs.  You  will  not  allow  the  faith  you  pro 
fess  to  be  made  a  mockery  or  impious  hands  to  be  placed  on  the  temple  of  the  true 
God.  The  images  you  adore  thrown  down  by  the  unbelief  of  the  aggressors  shall 
not  prove  the  tombs  of  your  fathers.  They  shall  not  gratify  lustful  passions  at  the 
cost  of  your  wives'  and  daughters'  honor,  or  appropriate  property  accumulated  in 
provision  for  your  old  age. 

"  They  shall  not  perpetrate  these  crimes,  inspired  by  their  wickedness  and  covet- 
ousness,  because  your  valor  and  patriotism  will  suffice  to  punish  a  base  people 
that  is  claiming  to  be  civilized  and  cultivated.  They  have  exterminated  the  natives 
of  North  America  instead  of  giving  them  civilization  and  progress." 

As  if  the  defense  of  Manila  were  a  theatrical  spectacle  the  au 
thorities  sent  daily  to  Madrid  rhetorical  assurances  of  their  security 
and  the  preparations  to  destroy  the  Americans;  of  the  impregnabil 
ity  of  their  fleet  and  forts  and  the  patriotism  of  the  Spaniards  and 
volunteers.  Yet  it  was  well  known  at  Manila  that  the  forts  alone 
mounted  good  modern  guns,  that  the  fleet  was  poorly  equipped,  that 


48  HISTORY    OF    THE 

the  insurgents  beleaguered  the  city  ready  to  fall  on  when  the  Ameri 
can  ships  arrived,  that  the  harbor  contained  few  if  any  effective  mines 
to  prevent  entrance.  During  these  days  thousands  of  refugees  left  for 
Hong  Kong  on  passing  ships  and  the  price  of  food  increased  alarm 
ingly.  Terror  was  felt  by  the  whole  population.  The  Spanish  Admi 
ral,  Monte  jo,  whose  reputation  for  courage  was  unchallenged,  took  his 
vessels  to  Subic  Bay,  a  harbor  at  the  northern  entrance  to  Manila 
Bay,  with  the  intention  of  assailing  the  American  fleet  unexpectedly 
as  it  passed.  He  found  only  worthless  defenses  at  Subic  and  brought 
his  ships  back  under  the  guns  of  Cavite,  to  give  battle  inside  the  bay 
and  support  the  capital  defenses.  This  Admiral,  who  was  called  "The 
Fighting  Montejo"  by  the  Spanish  sailors,  was  at  one  and  the  same 
time  to  prove  his  dauntless  courage  and  to  demonstrate  his  utter  in 
competence  to  provide  against  surprise  or  to  make  adequate  prepa 
ration  for  combat. 


in. 

THE  morning  of  Saturday,  April  30,  the  American  squadron  was 
sighted  off  Cape  Bolinao  and  at  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  it  rounded 
THE  BATTLE  ^°  °^  Subic  Bay  on  the  sea  side  of  the  peninsula  that 
OF  encloses  the  great  bay  of  Manila  on  the  west.  The  dis 

tance  to  the  city  of  Manila  was  about  fifty  miles.  The 
cruisers  Boston  and  Concord  were  detailed  to  search  Subic  Bay  for 
the  enemy,  the  crews  of  all  ships  standing  by  their  guns  ready  to  en 
gage.  There  was  no  trace  of  the  Spaniard  in  Subic.  It  was  then  that 
Commodore  Dewey  for  the  first  time  made  known  to  the  commanders 
of  his  ships  his  intention  to  force  the  entrance  of  Manila  Bay  under 
cover  of  night,  and  to  engage  the  enemy  under  the  fire  of  the  forts. 
Slow  headway  was  made  down  the  coast  and  at  11  o'clock  at  night 
the  squadron  entered  the  Boca  Grande,  the  larger  mouth  of  the  two 
entrances  to  the  bay. 

The  bay  of  Manila  is  one  of  the  largest  and  deepest  harbors  of  the 
world.  It  has  an  area  of  125  square  miles,  with  a  depth  approximating 


ADMIRAL  MONTEJO 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  49 

the  ocean  itself.  The  entrance  is  twelve  miles  wide  on  the  south  and 
almost  midway  rise  the  rocky  islands  of  Corregidor  and  Caballos. 
Corregidor  was  strongly  fortified,  armed  with  heavy  modern  guns 
and  equipped  with  searchlights  that  would  have  enabled  competent 
defenders  to  render  entering  it  a  hazardous  feat.  The  channel  to  the 
north  of  Corregidor  is  called  the  Boea  Chica,  or  small  mouth,  and 
the  Boca  Grande  is  on  the  south. 

More  than  twelve  hours  earlier  the  appearance  of  the  Americans 
at  Cape  Bolinao  had  been  reported  to  the  Spaniards,  yet  when  the 
squadron  in  order,  with  all  lights  out,  and  every  man  at  his  station, 
turned-  Corregidor  and  headed  up  the  Boca  Grande  toward  the  city 
of  Manila,  there  was  not  a  Spanish  patrol  to  give  warning  of  its  ap 
proach,  and  apparently  no  watch  on  Corregidor  fortress  or  tower.  On 
board  the  American  ships  every  man  was  at  his  post,  and  had  been 
for  eighteen  hours,  as  he  was  to  be  for  eighteen  hours  longer,  except 
for  brief  moments  of  rest.  Down  in  the  engine  and  furnace  rooms 
the  heat  was  from  125  to  160  degrees;  but  no  engineer  or  stoker  left 
his  place,  save  the  engineer  of  the  dispatch  boat  McCulloch,  who 
dropped  dead  from  heart  disease  superinduced  by  the  heat.  This 
happened  as  the  ships  were  passing  in. 

Realizing  the  preparation  that  could  be  made  by  a  warned  foe, 
expecting  floating  mines,  torpedo  attacks,  and  a  plunging  fire  from  the 
lofty  fortress  on  Corregidor,  the  Americans,  hidden  only  by  darkness, 
slowly  and  silently  as  possible  filed  into  the  channel,  led  by  the 
flagship,  and  began  to  run  the  terrible  gauntlet  of  unknown  dangers 
without  hesitation. 

Half  the  squadron  had  passed  when  sparks  escaping  from  one  of 
the  funnels  were  observed  by  the  watch  on  Corregidor.  Instantly  the 
guns  on  the  fort  opened  fire  upon  the  squadron,  to  which  the  Ifoston 
and  McCulloch  replied  with  a  few  shots,  and  then  silence  again  reigned. 
Past  the  fort  the  ships  slowed  down  to  bare  steerway  and,  all  hands 
resting  by  their  guns,  the  squadron  waited  for  day  to  dawn  to  begin 
the  terrible  work  that  lay  before  it  in  the  splendid  amphitheatre  of 
the  mountain-locked  bay. 


50  HISTORY    OF    THE 

At  5  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Otympia  was  five  miles  from  Ma 
nila,  the  spires  of  whose  churches  and  the  towers  of  whose  fortresses 
could  be  dimly  seen  through  the  glasses  of  the  lookouts.  The  city 
lies  on  the  east  side  of  the  bay,  about  twenty-five  miles  from  the  en 
trance,  situated  upon  a  low  plateau,  divided  by  Pasig  Eiver.  Volcanic 
mountains  enclose  the  coasts  at.  varying  distances.  Eight  miles  south 
of  Manila,  on  the  same  side  of  the  bay,  is  a  low  point  of  land  pro 
jecting  into  the  water,  eked  out  by  the  construction  of  a  breakwater, 
upon  which  'stand  the  arsenal  and  fortress  of  Cavite,  commanding  the 
Spanish  navy  yard.  Thus  Manila  and  Cavite  were  within  sea  view 
and  gun  range  of  each  other,  and  the  theatre  of  battle  was  so  de 
signed  that  the  combat  might  be  witnessed  by  the  300,000  people 
dwelling  within  range. 

The  American  ships  and  the  Spanish  guard  at  Manila  discovered 
each  other  at  5  o'clock.  As  the  light  increased  the  Spanish  ships 
were  revealed  lying  under  the  guns  of  Cavite,  in  line  of  battle 
almost  east  and  west.  At  15  minutes  past  5  the  light  permitted  ac 
tion,  and  three  batteries  of  heavy  guns  at  Manila  and  two  at  Cavite, 
together  with  the  long  range  guns  of  the  Spanish  ships,  opened  fire 
on  the  Americans.  The  shots  were  harmless.  Two  guns  were  fired 
at  Manila  from  our  ships,  but  Commodore  Dewey  signaled  orders  not 
to  reply  to  Manila.  It  was  not  his  intention  to  subject  the  helpless 
non-combatants  of  that  crowded  city  to  a  bombardment,  but  to 
"smash  the  Spanish  fleet."  So  that,  while  the  Manila  batteries  kept 
up  a  continuous  fire  upon  our  ships  for  two  hours,  without  effect,  no 
shells  were  thrown  into  the  city,  which  must  have  been  a  thing 
greatly  marveled  at  by  those  who  had  described  the  Americans  as 
pitiless  destroyers  and  cruel  cowards. 

Under  the  cross-fire  of  the  enemy  Commander  Dewey  formed  his 
squadron  for  attack  as  coolly  as  if  for  target  practice.  His  flagship 
Olympia  led,  followed  at  regular  distance  in  line  by  the  Baltimore,  the 
Raleigh,  the  Petrel,  the  Concord,  and  the  Boston,  in  the  order  named, 
which  formation  was  preserved  without  change.  Notwithstanding  the 
furious  fire  of  the  enemy,  our  ships  moved  steadily  without  replying 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  51 

for  twenty-six  minutes,  steaming  directly  for  Cavite,  which  was  some 
miles  distant.  Commodore  Dewey,  with  his  officers,  was  on  the  bridge 
of  the  ()/i/nipia,  and  Captain  Gridley,  who  was  lighting  the  ship,  was 
in  the  conning  tower.  The  day  was  clear  and  the  heat  intense. 
On  every  ship  the  fighters  were  stripped  to  the  waist,  waiting  with 
natural  impatience  for  firing  orders,  and  eager  for  close  collision  in 
fighting.  As  the  Olywpia  steamed  to  the  attack  in  the  lead  two 
torpedo  mines  were  exploded  in  her  path  by  the  Spaniards,  but  too 
far  ahead  to  affect  her.  The  explosions  threw  enormous  columns 
of  water  to  a  great  height.  The  power  was  sufficient  to  have  de 
stroyed  the  vessel  if  it  had  been  successfully  managed.  Tn  spite 
of  these  dangers,  and  of  more  to  be  apprehended,  the  Oli/mpia 
kept  steadily  on.  No  other  mines  were  exploded,  however,  if  any 
existed. 

At  41  minutes  past  5  o'clock  Commodore  Dewey,  the  Olympia 
then  being  bow  on,  5,500  yards  or  about  three  miles,  from  the  fortress 
at  Cavite,  called  out  to  Captain  Gridley :  "  You  may  fire  when  ready." 
A  moment  later  one  of  the  8-inch  guns  in  the  forward  turret  belched 
forth  flame  and  steel  at  the  flagship  of  Admiral  Montejo.  At  this 
signal  to  engage  the  enemy  an  eyewitness  with  the  squadron  reports 
that  from  the  throats  of  the  Americans  on  all  the  ships  rose  a  tri 
umphant  cheer  and  the  cry.  ''Remember  the  Maim'."  And  then, 
from  every  ship  that  could  train  guns  on  the  enemy,  poured  a  rain 
of  shot  and  shell  directed  by  men  who  were  as  deliberate  and  cool 
as  if  they  were  at  play.  The  deadly  accuracy  of  American  marks 
manship  was  exhibited  under  circumstances  so  extraordinary  that  it 
was  destined  to  stand  without  precedent  or  comparison  in  all  naval 
history. 

Sheltered  under  the  guns  of  Cavite  the  Spanish  cruiser  Cfixtilla 
lay  anchored  by  head  and  stern,  broadside  to  our  fire.  On  either 
side  Admiral  Montejo's  flagship,  the  Reina  Christina,  the  Don  Juan 
de  Austria,  and  the  Velasco  moved  in  action,  while  the  gunboats  behind 
the  breakwater  were  sheltered  to  some  extent,  The  Americans  at 
5,500  yards  filing  in  line  past  the  enemy  and,  countermarching  in  a 


52  HISTORY    OF    THE 

circle  that  extended  closer  to  the  Spaniard  at  every  turn,  sent  in 
a  crushing  rain  of  fire  from  each  broadside  as  it  was  presented. 

Lieutenant  L.  J.  Stickney,  a  former  naval  officer  who  was  on  the 
bridge  of  the  Olympia  as  a  volunteer  aide  to  Commodore  Dewey  and 
who  wrote  an  account  of  the  battle  as  a  press  correspondent,  thus 
describes  the  combat  after  the  first  fire  of  the  Americans :  — 

"The  Spaniards  seemed  encouraged  to  fire  faster,  knowing  exactly 
our  distance,  while  we  had  to  guess  theirs.  Their  ships  and  shore 
guns  were  making  things  hot  for  us.  The  piercing  scream  of  shot 
was  varied  often  by  the  bursting  of  time  fuse  shells,  fragments  of 
which  would  lash  the  water  like  shrapnel  or  cut  our  hull  and  rigging. 
One  large  shell  that  was  coming  straight  at  the  Olympics  forward 
bridge  fortunately  fell  within  less  than  one  hundred  feet.  One  frag 
ment  cut  the  rigging ;  another  struck  the  bridge  gratings  in  line  with 
it ;  a  third  passed  under  Commodore  Dewey  and  gouged  a  hole  in  the 
deck.  Incidents  like  these  were  plentiful. 

"Our  men  naturally  chafed  at  being  exposed  without  returning 
fire  from  all  our  guns,  but  laughed  at  danger  and  chatted  good- 
humoredly.  A  few  nervous  fellows  could  not  help  dodging,  mechanic 
ally,  when  shells  would  burst  right  over  them,  or  close  aboard,  or 
would  strike  the  water,  or  pass  overhead  with  the  peculiar  spluttering 
roar  made  by  a  tumbling  rifled  projectile. 

"Still  the  flagship  steered  for  the  center  of  the  Spanish  line,  and, 
as  our  other  ships  were  astern,  the  Olympia  received  most  of  the 
Spaniards'  attention. 

"Owing  to  our  deep  draught,  Commodore  Dewey  felt  constrained 
to  change  his  course  at  a  distance  of  4,000  yards  and  run  parallel  to 
the  Spanish  column. 

"  '  Open  with  all  guns,'  he  ordered,  and  the  ship  brought  her  port 
broadside  bearing.  The  roar  of  all  the  flagship's  5-inch  rapid-firers 
was  followed  by  the  deep  diapason  of  her  turret  8-inchers.  Soon  our 
other  vessels  were  equally  hard  at  work,  and  we  could  see  that  our 
shells  were  making  Cavite  harbor  hotter  for  the  Spaniards  than  they 
had  made  the  approach  for  us. 


NAVAL  BATTLE  ( 


^NILA,  MAY  1st,  1898. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  53 

"Protected  by  their  shore  batteries  and  made  safe  from  close  at 
tack  by  shallow  water,  the  Spaniards  were  in  a  strong  position.  They 
put  up  a  gallant  tight. 

"One  shot  struck  the  Baltimore  and  passed  clean  through  her, 
fortunately  hitting  no  one.  Another  ripped  the  upper  main  deck, 
disabled  a  6-inch  gun,  and  exploded  a  box  of  3-ponnder  ammunition, 
wounding  eight  men.  The  Olympia  was  struck  abreast  the  gun  in 
the  wardroom  by  a  shell,  which  burst  outside,  doing  little  damage. 
The  signal  halyards  were  cut  from  the  officer's  hand  on  the  after 
bridge.  A  sailor  climbed  up  in  the  rain  of  shot  and  mended  the 
line. 

"A  shell  entered  the  Boston's  port  quarter  and  burst  in  Ensign 
Dodridge's  stateroom,  starting  a  hot  tire,  and  fire  was  also  caused 
by  a  shell  which  burst  in  the  port  hammock  netting.  Both  these 
fires  were  quickly  put  out.  Another  shell  passed  through  the  Boston's 
foremast  just  in  front  of  Captain  Wildes,  on  the  bridge. 

"After  having  made  four  runs  along  the  Spanish  line,  finding  the 
chart  incorrect,  Lieutenant  Calkins,  the  Olympiad  navigator,  told  the 
Commodore  he  believed  he  could  take  the  ship  nearer  the  enemy, 
with  lead  going  to  watch  the  depth  of  water.  The  flagship  started 
over  the  course  for  the  fifth  time,  running  within  2,000  yards  of  the 
enemy,  followed  by  all  the  American  vessels,  and,  as  even  the  6-pounder 
guns  were  effective  at  such  short  range,  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell 
launched  against  the  Spaniard  was  destructive  beyond  description." 

Two  small  launches  were  sent  out  from  the  ("axilla  and  boldly 
advanced  toward  the  Olympia.  They  were  supposed  to  be  provided 
with  torpedoes  to  be  discharged  against  the  flagship.  No  sooner  was 
their  purpose  suspected  than  the  small  guns  of  the  Olympia  were 
turned  upon  the  two  boats  with  deadly  effect.  One  was  riddled  and 
sunk  at  the  first  fire  and  the  other,  badly  damaged,  turned  back  and 
sought  safety. 

The  enemy  fought  with  desperation.  Admiral  Montejo  with  the 
Reina  Christina,  sallied  forth  from  his  line  against  the  Olympia,  but 
was  met  with  a  concentrated  fire  from  our  ships  so  frightful  that 


54  HISTORY   OF    THE 

he  could  not  advance.  The  Eeina  Christina  turned  and  made  for  the 
breakwater  when  an  8-inch  shell  from  the  Olympia  was  sent  whizzing 
through  her  stern,  penetrating  the  whole  extent  of  the  ship  to  her 
engine-room  where  it  exploded  with  awful  destruction,  setting  fire  to 
the  vessel  and  rendering  her  unmanageable. 

The  fire  made  such  headway  that  Admiral  Monte  jo  abandoned  his 
vessel  and  taking  his  flag  in  an  open  boat,  was  transferred  to  the  Isla 
de  Cuba  gunboat,  whence  he  continued  to  issue  his  orders.  It  was  an 
act  of  personal  bravery  so  marked  that  it  elicited  admiration  from  all 
the  Americans  and  was  especially  commented  upon  by  Commodore 
Dewey  in  his  report  of  the  battle.  Captain  Cadarso,  of  the  Eeina 
Christina,  a  Spaniard  of  noble  family  at  Madrid,  was  mortally  wounded 
with  many  others  on  his  ship,  but  refused  to  be  carried  off.  He  re 
mained  with  his  men  and  went  down  with  his  ship.  A  shell  entered 
the  magazine  of  the  Don  Juan  de  Austria  and  that  vessel  was  blown 
up.  The  Castillo,  at  her  moorings  was  also  on  fire  by  this  time,  but 
the  firing  from  the  other  vessels  and  the  forts  was  maintained  with 
wild  desperation. 

The  heavy  guns  from  Manila  were  also  keeping  up  their  attack. 
Commodore  Dewey  sent  a  flag  messenger  to  the  Governor-General 
bearing  notice  that  if  the  firing  from  that  quarter  did  not  instantly 
cease  he  would  attack  and  shell  the  city.  The  message  at  once  silenced 
the  batteries. 

It  was  now  7:35  o'clock  and  the  men  had  been  in  suspense  or  in 
exhaustive  action  for  nearly  thirty  hours.  During  the  two  hours  of 
fighting  they  had  been  served  with  only  a  cup  of  coffee  each.  Observ 
ing  the  destruction  in  the  enemy's  ranks  and  desiring  to  give  him 
time  for  reflection,  but  mainly  to  give  his  own  men  refreshment  and 
new  strength,  Commodore  Dewey  ordered  action  to  cease  and  the  ships 
to  retire  beyond  range.  This  they  did,  the  squadron  filing  past  the 
Olympia  with  triumphant  cheers  and  steaming  across  the  bay  followed 
by  the  sullen  fire  of  the  enemy.  The  Olympia  brought  up  the  rear 
and  orders  were  issued  to  serve  breakfast  bountifully  on  all  the 
ships. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  55 

While  the  men  were  refreshing  themselves,  the  commanders  of  the 
ships  were  summoned  aboard  the  0/ytnpia  to  make  reports  of  their 
condition  and  for  conference.  It  was  then  the  discovery  was  made  — 
almost  incredible  —  that  no  material  casualty  had  occurred  to  the 
Americans  during  an  engagement  filled  with  such  disaster  to  the 
enemy.  It  seemed  miraculous  to  have  gone  through  a  hail  of  fire 
without  one  man  being  killed  or  a  ship  disabled.  Meanwhile  the 
Spanish  had  viewed  the  withdrawal  of  our  ships  with  exultation. 
With  the  fatuity  of  over-confidence  in  their  own  courage  they  had 
construed  the  American  pause  for  rest  as  a  retreat.  To  that  effect 
they  cabled  the  Spanish  Government,  where  the  news  caused  excited 
rejoicings.  The  Minister  of  Marine  cabled  a  message  of  bombastic 
compliments  to  Admiral  Monte  jo  upon  the  glory  of  Spanish  sailors. 
While  these  messages  were  yet  passing  under  the  ocean  the  second 
attack  was  in  progress  that  was  to  turn  exultation  to  despair  and  set 
the  Spanish  populace  at  Madrid  on  fire  with  angry  protests  of  decep 
tion  and  betrayal. 

After  three  and  a  half  hours  of  recuperation,  the  American  squad 
ron  got  under  way  at  a  quarter  past  eleven  o'clock  and  advanced 
again  to  attack  the  enemy.  Buoyed  up  by  the  early  morning  results, 
the  gunnel's  aimed  with  perfect  deliberation  and,  under  orders  for 
"close  action,"  the  line  steamed  up  as  near  as  the  water-depth  per 
mitted,  and  poured  a  remorseless  fire  into  the  enemy's  ships  that  were 
now  replying  slowly.  But  the  guns  of  Cavite  were  hard  at  work  and 
the  Baltimore  was  ordered  to  silence  the  arsenal.  The  bay  was  filled 
with  smoke,  and  into  this  the  Baltimore  steered  straight  for  the  point 
of  attack.  When  close  up  she  opened  all  her  batteries,  and  in  a  mo 
ment  the  powder  magazine  of  the  arsenal  blew  up  with  a  deafening 
roar,  and  the  battery  of  Cavite  was  destroyed. 

The  Boston,  Concord,  and  Petrel  were  ordered  to  enter  the  bay  and 
destroy  the  ships  there.  The  Petrel  being  of  very  light  draught  was 
able  to  penetrate  behind  the  breakwater  up  to  the  gunboats.  The 
Spaniards  on  board  made  haste  to  surrender,  and  their  ships  were 
then  scuttled  and  fired.  The  only  ship  left  was  a  transport  belonging 


56  HISTORY    OF    THE 

to  the  coast  survey,  and  she  was  taken  possession  of  by  our  forces. 
At  40  minutes  past  12  o'clock,  the  Spanish  flag  had  been  hauled  down 
from  Cavite  and  the  white  flag  of  surrender  was  flying.  The  Olympia 
stood  off  towards  Manila,  leaving  the  other  vessels  to  take  care  of  the 
wounded  on  shore. 

In  this  battle  the  Spanish  lost  the  following  vessels :  Beina  Chris 
tina,  Castilla,  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  sunk ;  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Isla  de 
Luzon^Isla  de  Cuba,  General  Lezo,  Marquis  del  Duero,  El  Correo,  Velasco 
and  Isla  de  Mindanao,  burned ;  the  Manila  and  several  tugs  and  launches 
captured.  There  were  about  1,000  Spaniards  killed  in  the  engagement 
and  more  than  600  wounded,  among  the  latter  Admiral  Montejo  and 
his  son,  a  lieutenant,  both  slightly.  The  wounded  were  removed  to 
the  arsenal  in  Cavite,  where  they  were  attended  by  the  American 
surgeons,  who  gave  their  skill,  science,  and  labor  to  succor  the  unfor 
tunate.  Yet  while  this  work  of  humanity  was  in  progress  the  Arch 
bishop  of  Manila  was  issuing  a  pastoral  letter  to  his  flock  in  which 
he  called  upon  all  Christians  in  the  island  to  defend  the  faith  against 
heretics  who  designed  to  erect  an  insuperable  barrier  to  salvation, 
intending  to  enslave  the  people  and  forbid  the  sacraments  of  bap 
tism,  matrimony,  and  burial,  and  the  consolation  of  absolution.  He 
declared  that  if  the  Americans  were  allowed  to  possess  the  islands, 
altars  would  be  desecrated  and  the  churches  changed  into  Protes 
tant  chapels.  Instead  of  there  being  pure  morality,  as  then  existed, 
examples  of  vice  only  would  be  inculcated.  He  closed  by  appointing 
May  17  as  a  day  of  rejoicing  over  the  renewed  consecration  of  the 
islands  to  the  sacred  heart  of  Jesus.* 

Commodore  Dewey  sent  a  message  to  Governor-General  Augusti 
in  Manila  proposing  to  be  permitted  to  use  the  submarine  cable  to 
Hong  Kong  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  his  reports  to  the  Gov 
ernment  at  Washington.  Augusti  refused  the  permission  and  Com 
modore  Dewey  cut  the  cable,  thus  rendering  impossible  all  communi 
cation  with  the  world  except  by  mail,  by  way  of  Hong  Kong,  three 


*  Translation  cabled  from  Hong  Kong,  May  17,  1898. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  57 

days'  sail  distant.  He  then  sat  down  before  Manila  to  await  rein 
forcements  and  orders,  the  revolutionists  under  General  Aguinaldo 
cutting  off  all  supplies  from  the  landside,  and  investing  the  city  in 
effective  siege. 

IV. 

THE  impression  made  upon  the  United  States  and  upon  Europe 
by  the  battle  of  Manila  was  in  an  unexpected  degree  momentous. 
The  extraordinary  nature  of  the  victory  won  by  Com-  THE  EFFECT  OF 
modore  Dewey's  squadron,—  in  which  the  enemy  had  THE  MANILA 
1,400  men  killed  and  wounded,  lost  fourteen  ships, 
valued  at  millions  of  dollars,  vast  stores  of  coal,  supplies,  guns,  and 
equipments,  together  with  a  great  colonial  possession  of  enormous 
wealth  and  resources,  without  the  loss  of  one  man  or  one  ship  by 
the  victors. —  filled  the  world  with  amazement  and  admiration,  and 
caused  the  United  States  to  ring  with  enthusiasm  for  the  cool  and 
intrepid  commander  and  his  brave  sailors.  The  first  news  received 
was  through  distorted  sources  at  Madrid,  where  reports  came  from 
Manila  speaking  of  glorious  action  by  the  Spaniards  and  confessing 
Spanish  losses  by  piecemeal.  Accustomed  to  the  mendacity  of  Spanish 
reports  and  the  duplicity  of  the  officials  discharging  the  function  of 
supervising  all  information  concerning  the  war,  the  English-written 
press  of  the  world  eked  out  from  the  involved  mass  of  incoherent 
exultation  and  evasion  the  central  fact  of  a  sweeping  American  vic 
tory.  The  moment  this  was  recognized  all  possibility  of  obtaining 
details  was  destroyed  by  the  cutting  of  the  cable.  For  a  week  there 
was  suspense,  during  which  the  fact  of  American  victory  was  con 
firmed  by  desperate  rioting  in  Madrid  caused  by  the  Spanish  people 
discovering  that  their  losses  were  greater  than  Senor  Sagasta  and  his 
advisers  had  admitted. 

On  May  8  the  dispatch  boat  McCulIoch  arrived  at  Hong  Kong 
from  Manila  with  the  first  official  reports  from  Commodore  Dewey. 
They  consisted  of  two  brief  messages,  but  no  commander  ever  con 
veyed  to  his  country  so  much  information  in  detail  of  such  wonderful 


58  HISTORY    OF    THE 

achievement  in  fewer  words.     The  first  message,  dated  Manila,  May  1, 
but  sent  only  when  the  second  was  forwarded,  was  as  follows  :  — 

"  Squadron  arrived  at  Manila  at  daybreak  this  morning.  Immediately  engaged 
the  enemy  and  destroyed  the  following  Spanish  vessels  :  JKeina  Christina,  Castillo,, 
Don  Antonio,  Isla  de  Ulloa,  Isla  de  Luzon,  Isla  de  Cuba,  General  Lezo,  Marquis 
del  Duero,  Correo,  Velasco,  Isla  de  Mindanao,  a  transport  and  a  water  battery  at 
Cavite.  The  squadron  is  uninjured  ;  and  only  a  few  men  are  slightly  wounded.  Only 
means  of  telegraphing  is  the  American  consul  at  Hong  Kong.  I  shall  communicate 
with  him." 

The  second,  dated  at  Cavite,  May  4,  completed  his  record  of  the 
action :  — 

"  I  have  taken  possession  of  the  naval  station  at  Cavite  and  destroyed  its  fortifi 
cations.  Have  destroyed  fortifications  at  the  bay  entrance,  paroling  the  garrison. 
I  control  the  bay  completely,  and  can  take  the  city  at  any  time.  The  squadron  is  in 
excellent  health  and  spirits.  The  Spanish  loss  not  fully  known,  but  very  heavy  ;  150 
killed,  including  the  Captain  of  the  Reina  Christina.  I  am  assisting  in  protecting  the 
Spanish  sick  and  wounded  ;  250  sick  and  wounded  in  hospital  within  our  lines.  Much 
excitement  at  Manila.  Will  protect  foreign  residents." 

With  these  came  columns  of  press  reports  of  the  victory.  The 
suspense  of  a  week  to  Americans  accustomed  to  the  procurement  and 
immediate  publication  of  all  news  at  every  hazard  and  at  any  cost, 
found  relief  in  a  national  outburst  of  praise  of  the  victorious  com 
mander  and  the  officers  and  men  of  his  squadron.  In  every  city  and 
hamlet  the  news  fired  the  popular  imagination.  "Dewey  day"  was 
set  apart  in  many  cities  and  towns,  and  school  children  rehearsed  pa 
triotic  speeches  and  songs.  Naval  authorities  of  the  world  testified  to 
the  completeness  of  the  demonstration  of  American  fighting  ability  and 
to  the  unprecedented  annihilation  of  an  adversary  in  his  own  fastness 
without  the  slightest  loss  in  return.  It  was  conceded  that  the  name 
of  Dewey  was  enrolled  among  the  names  of  immortal  naval  command 
ers.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  upon  the  receipt  of  Commodore 
Dewey's  reports,  cabled  to  him  and  his  men,  in  the  President's  name, 
the  thanks  of  the  American  people  for  the  "splendid  achievement 
and  overwhelming  victory,"  in  recognition  of  which  he  appointed 
Commodore  Dewey  an  Acting-Admiral.  On  the  following  Monday 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  59 

the  President  sent  a  message  to  Congress  recommending  the  adoption 
of  a  vote  of  thanks.  "The  magnitude  of  this  victory,"  said  the  Presi 
dent  in  his  message,  "can  hardly  be  measured  by  the  ordinary  stand 
ards  of  naval  warfare.  Outweighing  any  material  advantage  is  the 
moral  effect  of  this  initial  success.  With  this  unsurpassed  achieve 
ment,  the  great  heart  of  our  nation  throbs,  not  with  boasting  or  with 
greed  of  conquest,  but  with  deep  gratitude,  that  this  triumph  has  come 
in  a  just  cause,  and  that  by  the  grace  of  God  an  effective  step  has  thus 
been  taken  toward  the  attainment  of  the  wished-for  peace.  To  those 
whose  skill,  courage,  and  devotion  have  won  the  fight,  the  gallant  com 
mander  and  the  brave  officers  and  men  who  aided  him,  our  country 
owes  an  incalculable  debt." 

To  the  American  people  the  victory  at  Manila  was  indisputable 
proof  of  the  superiority  of  American  training,  discipline,  intelligence, 
mechanical  skill,  and  courage,  to  the  ignorant  and  undisciplined 
bravery  of  the  Spaniard.  The  capacity  of  the  free  volunteer  in  the 
regular  branches  of  armed  science  as  against  the  forced  conscription 
of  the  continental  systems  was  again  established,  and  the  people  looked 
now  confidently  to  see  the  same  spirit  exhibited  in  the  army  organiz 
ing  to  occupy  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines.  To  those  coun 
tries  that  believed  the  American  navy  to  be  manned  by  foreigners 
and  mercenaries  disinclined  to  stand  up  at  the  critical  moment,  the 
lesson  was  startling. 

The  practical  results  of  the  combat  at  Manila  were  thus  stated  by 
Mr.  Beach,  an  engineer  officer  on  the  Baltimore  during  the  battle. 
In  writing  home  after  the  event  he  said  :  — 

"  We  feel  that  we  have  had  a  great  victory  here,  which  we  ascribe  to  several 
causes.  First,  the  Spaniard  is  always  behind  the  times.  He  knew  that  an  Ameri 
can  fleet  was  expected  and  was  so  sure  of  his  tremendous  superiority  that  he  took 
absolutely  no  precaution.  The  night  we  ran  by  the  forts  (in  the  early  morning  of 
the  engagement)  the  Spanish  officers  were  all  at  a  grand  ball.  The  entrance  to  the 
harbor  was  planted  with  torpedoes  ;  he  thought  that  was  enough,  and  had  no  patrol, 
picket  boats,  or  torpedo  boats  on  watch.  The  result  is  that  we  ran  by  their  mag 
nificent  guns  guarding  the  entrance  to  Manila  Bay,  and  were  out  of  range  inside 
before  the  Spaniards  knew  it. 


60  HISTORY    OF    THE 

"Another  reason  for  our  success  was  due  to  Commodore  Dewey's  orders.  Not 
one  of  the  ships  had  any  intimation  that  we  would  run  by  the  forts  as  we  did 
until  thirty  miles  away.  We  were  by  the  Spanish  forts  and  at  the  fleet  by  5:30 
A.  M.  on  Sunday,  May  1.  They  were  ten  fighting  ships  strong,  carrying  116  modern 
guns,  to  which  we  opposed  a  superior  fleet  of  six  ships  carrying  135  guns.  Two 
of  their  ships  were  over  3,200  tons  displacement,  and  the  rest  were  modern  gun 
boats.  This  fleet  was  assisted  by  batteries  on  shore  armed  with  modern  guns, 
which  made  their  guns  superior  in  number  to  ours.  In  number  of  men  engaged, 
they  were  undoubtedly  far  superior  to  us.  The  Spaniards  were  absolutely  confi 
dent  of  victory.  No  other  outcome  was  anticipated  by  them  ;  no  preparation  was 
made  for  a  different  result.  I  think  that  their  ships,  combined  with  their  forts,  made 
them  equal  to  us,  so  far  as  powers  of  offense  and  defense  were  concerned.  They 
had  as  many  modern  guns  approximating  to  the  same  size  as  we  had,  and  more 
men  to  fire  them.  They  should  have  been  able  to  have  fired  as  much  weight  of 
shot  in  a  specified  time  as  we  did. 

"  The  whole  result,  in  other  words,  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  was  the  American 
against  the  Spaniard.  Every  shot  fired  from  our  fleet  was  most  deliberately,  coolly, 
and  pitilessly  aimed.  The  Spaniards  fired  an  enormous  number  of  times,  but  with 
apparently  the  most  impracticable  aim.  Shells  dropped  all  around  our  ship ;  we 
were  in  action  for  over  four  hours  ;  hundreds  of  shot  and  shell  fell  close  to  us. 
Only  five  or  six  pierced  us,  and  they  did  no  damage. 

"  The  damage  done  by  our  ships  was  frightful.  I  have  visited  all  of  the  sunken 
Spanish  ships,  and,  had  I  not  seen  the  effects  of  American  marksmanship,  I  would 
hardly  give  credit  to  reports  of  it.  One  smokestack  of  the  Castilla,  a  3,300-ton 
Spanish  ship,  was  struck  eight  times,  and  the  shells  through  the  hull  were  so  many 
and  so  close  that  it  is  impossible  that  a  Spaniard  could  have  lived  on  her  deck. 
The  other  large  ship,  the  Heina  Christina,  was  perforated  in  the  same  way.  We 
did  not  employ  much  tactics  because  there  wasn't  much  need  for  them.  There 
were  the  enemy,  and  we  went  for  them  bullheadedly  and  made  them  exceedingly 
sick. 

"  The  lesson  I  draw  from  the  fight  is  the  great  utility  of  target  practice.  The 
Spaniard  has  none  ;  we  have  it  every  three  months.  Strengths  of  navies  are  com 
pared  generally  ship  for  ship;  the  personnel  is  just  as  important.  I  am  confident 
that  had  we  manned  the  Spanish  ships  and  had  the  Spaniards  manned  our  fleet, 
the  American  side  would  have  been  as  victorious  as  it  was.  The  Spaniard  cer 
tainly  was  brave,  for  he  stuck  to  his  guns  to  the  last." 

The  effect  of  such  a  crushing  defeat  upon  Spain  was  correspond 
ingly  disheartening.  The  riots  that  ensued  in  her  principal  cities 
compelled  the  government  to  proclaim  martial  law  in  several  prov 
inces.  In  the  Cortes  the  opposition  taunted  the  Government  with 


DEPARTURE  OF  UNITED   STATES   TROOPS   FOR  MANILA 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  (\\ 

incapacity  and  supineness,  and  recrimination  became  both  bitter  and 
loud.  The  government  had  not  counted  upon  nor  made  plans  in  the 
event  of  defeat  any  more  than  had  its  officials  in  the  Philippines. 
Yet,  with  the  usual  methods  of  influencing  the  Spanish  people  through 
its  power  of  suppressing  or  manipulating  information  in  the  press, 
the  Cabinet  turned  to  Admiral  Cervera's  squadron,  yet  lingering  at 
the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  and  made  ostensible  preparations  for  reprisal. 

The  threat  of  sending  to  the  Philippines  a  new  Spanish  fleet,  much 
stronger  in  fighting  power  than  Commodore  Dewey's,  awoke  the  Amer 
icans  to  immediate  action.  The  President  assigned  General  Wesley 
A.  Merritt  to  the  command  of  an  army  corps  of  occupation  to  proceed 
at  once  to  the  support  of  our  fleet  at  Manila.  The  forces  were  to  con 
sist  of  4,000  regulars  and  16,000  volunteer  troops,  to  be  accompanied 
by  the  cruiser  Charleston,  and  the  monitors  Monterey  and  Monadnock. 
.Upon  General  Merritt  was  conferred  also  the  supreme  power  of 
Military  Governor  of  the  Philippines,  and  an  establishment  of  aides 
was  created  to  seize  and  administer  the  government  of  those  islands 
under  the  military  laws  of  the  United  States  as  applied  to  conquered 
territory.  The  preparations  were  carried  forward  with  utmost  speed 
and  in  a  few  weeks  the  first  division  of  the  new  army  was  upon  the 
Pacific,  preceded  by  the  Charleston  with  supplies  of  ammunition  and 
stores  in  convoy. 

The  step  toward  holding  the  Philippines  as  a  conquered  territory 
was  not  less  momentous  than  the  actual  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
forces  at  Manila.  It  intimated  the  acquirement  by  America  of  col 
onies  in  Asiatic  waters,  so  rich,  so  potential  of  power  and  development, 
that  it  injected  into  the  Oriental  questions  occupying  European 
diplomacy  a  shock  of  vital  change  so  startling  that  the  purposes  of  the 
United  States  at  once  became  the  absorbing  problem  of  the  world's 
great  chancelleries.  For  that  moment  the  fate  of  Spain  was  dwarfed 
in  interest  beside  the  question :  What  will  the  United  States  do  with 
the  Philippines?  The  progress  of  this  question,  the  most  novel  and 
far-reaching  that  had  come  upon  the  country,  must,  however,  be 
treated  in  its  proper  place. 


CHAPTER  THE  FOURTH. 
THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA. 

FIRST  WORK   OF  ADMIRAL   SAMPSON'S   SQUADRON  —  How   THE  BLOCKADE  OF  HAVANA   WAS   RE 
CEIVED   BY   THE   Two  WARRING  NATIONS  AND    IN    HAVANA  — THE  PROBLEMS  OF  WAR   IN 
THE  ATLANTIC  —  SPANISH  SPIES  DISCOVERED  AND  CAPTURED  —  THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF 
MATANZAS  —  "  THE  MATANZAS  MULE  "  ENTERS  INTO  HISTORY  — THE  AMERICAN 
BAPTISM  OF  BLOOD  AT  CARDENAS  —  DEATH  OF  ENSIGN  BAGLEY  AND  THE 
REPULSE  OF  THE  WINSLOW  —  UNIMPORTANT  EVENTS  OF  THE  WAR. 

I. 

THE  magnificent  victory  of  Dewey's  squadron  at  Manila  was  won 
at  exactly  the  opportune   moment.     The   intrepidity,  no   less 
than  the  unexampled  skill,  of   American  gunners  and  sailors 
so  gloriously  demonstrated,  gave  patience  for  the  hard  labor 
of  war  that  was  to  be  undertaken  in  the  work  of  driving  the  Span 
iards  out  of  Cuba.     The  first  step  was  taken  when,  on  April  22,  part 
THE  BLOCKADE     °^    tne    S(luadron    under   Acting  Rear- Admiral  Sampson 
OF  began  the  blockade  of  Havana  and  other  Cuban  ports. 

HAVANA 

The  destruction  of  Spain's  power  in  Cuba  was  the  chief 
object  of  the  war.  and  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  on  Cuban  soil  the 
naval  and  military  spirit  of  both  countries  could  be  exhibited  upon 
a  larger  scale  than  elsewhere.  The  blockade  of  Havana  and  its  trib 
utary  ports  was  therefore  an  act  to  challenge  at  once  the  vitality  of 
Spanish  power.  Havana  was  the  keystone  of  this  power  in  the  West 
Indies.  Its  large  population  and  vast  commerce  made  it  the  seat  of 
opulence,  and  the  strongest  fortifications  and  largest  garrisons  were 
to  be  found  there.  If  Spain  intended  to  hold  Cuba,  she  must  hold 
Havana.  She  could  only  hold  Havana  by  sending  constant  reenforce- 
ments  of  troops,  with  fresh  supplies  of  food  and  ammunition  to  main 
tain  them.  The  first  object  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  was  to 
prevent  at  all  hazards  the  landing  of  troops  and  supplies  by  Spain. 

(62) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  63 

For  this  reason  Sampson's  squadron  was  ordered  to  blockade  Havana 
as  the  initial  act  of  war,  on  April  22. 

The  following  day  the  President  issued  a  proclamation  declaring 
the  blockade  to  be  enforced  against  all  ports  on  the  north  coast  be 
tween  Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda,  including  Havana,  and  of  the  port 
of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast.  From  these  ports  there  were  rail 
ways  to  Havana  that  would  enable  Spain,  by  landing  supplies  at  any 
one  of  them,  to  succor  the  capital.  If  supplies  were  landed  else 
where  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  transport  them  to 
Havana  on  account  of  a  lack  of  railway  facilities  and  because  the 
Cuban  insurgents  could  be  depended  upon  to  intercept  them.  The 
closing  of  Havana  harbor  and  the  harbors  of  its  tributary  towns  at 
once  put  the  Spanish  army  in  Cuba  upon  its  own  resources  for 
maintenance,  or  rendered  it  necessary  for  Spain  to  force  her  way 
into  Havana  by  the  aid  of  her  navy,  then  in  home  waters. 

The  problems  of  the  Atlantic  were  easily  apparent.  If  Spain  sent 
her  navy  with  troops  and  supplies  to  the  assistance  of  Cuba,  a  great 
decisive  naval  battle  must  be  fought  in  Cuban  waters.  If  she  divided 
her  naval  force  and  sent  one  squadron  to  Havana  and  the  other  to 
attack  the  American  coast  cities  on  the  north,  she  would  divide  the 
American  naval  force  by  the  necessity  of  repelling  each  movement. 
The  Flying  Squadron  of  Spain  was  that  under  Admiral  Cervera  at 
the  Cape  Verde  Islands ;  her  heavily  armored  squadron  was  in  Spanish 
harbors  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Camara.  The  latter  squadron 
was  not  in  readiness  for  action,  but,  by  strict  censorship  of  all  tele 
graph  and  mail  channels  of  communication,  the  Spanish  Government 
at  first  succeeded  in  concealing  this  fact. 

To  meet  the  problem,  therefore,  Admiral  Sampson  was  sent  to 
blockade  Havana,  while  Commodore  Schley,  with  a  small  number  of 
battleships  and  cruisers,  waited  in  Hampton  Roads,  ready  to  sail  north 
or  south,  to  aid  Sampson,  or  to  repel  any  descent  that  might  be  at 
tempted  upon  the  northern  coasts  by  the  Spanish  ships. 

The  uneasiness  of  the  American  authorities  was  great,  and  it  was 
skillfully  promoted  by  Spanish  artifice.  The  Spanish  minister,  Senor 


64  HISTORY    OF   THE 

Polo  y  Bernabe,  on  leaving  Washington  had  gone  to  Canada,  accom 
panied  by  his  secretary,  Senor  Dubosc,  and  his  naval  attache,  Lieutenant 
Carranza.  There  the  two  latter  succeeded  in  arranging  an  ingenious 
system  of  spies  and  manufacturers  of  false  intelligence,  aided  by  Span 
ish  representatives  abroad,  by  which  the  press  was  kept  excited  with 
reports  of  Spanish  cruisers  and  other  war  vessels  on  the  North  At 
lantic  steamer  chart  line  and  off  the  Canadian  and  eastern  coasts. 

One  of  Carranza's  spies,  George  Downing,  who  had  been  employed 
as  a  steward  on  the  United  States  cruiser  Brooklyn,  and  who  had  been 
discharged  for  causing  trouble,  was  arrested  in  Washington  and  his 
papers  seized.  The  next  day  he  committed  suicide  by  hanging  him 
self  in  prison,  but  his  papers  enabled  the  secret  service  officers  to  en 
trap  Carranza  and  obtain  a  private  letter  which  he  had  written  to  a 
friend  in  Spain,  criticising  the  acts  and  personal  characters  of  Spanish 
leaders,  admitting  that  he  was  engaged  in  Canada  perfecting  a  spy 
system,  and  confessing  that  Downing  had  been  in  his  pay.  This,  al 
though  it  occurred  several  weeks  after  war  began  and  is  in  this  place 
an  anticipation  of  events,  caused  the  Canadian  Government  to  send 
Dubosc  and  Carranza  out  of  the  Dominion.  But  their  activity  for 
three  or  four  weeks  served  to  keep  the  newspapers  filled  with  false 
rumors  and  kept  the  cities  of  the  eastern  coast  excited  with  fears  that 
had  no  real  cause.  It  also  deterred  the  Navy  Department  from  con 
centrating  its  vessels  for  a  descent  upon  Cuba  in  overwhelming  force. 

The  vital  problem  remained  unaltered  by  all  the  incidental  possi 
bilities  :  Spain  must  relieve  and  rescue  Havana  if  she  meant  to  retain 
possession  of  Cuba. 

The  sailing  of  Sampson's  squadron  on  the  morning  of  April  22 
was,  therefore,  of  profound  significance  to  America,  to  Spain,  and  to 
Cuba.  In  Washington  the  excitement  and  satisfaction  were  uncon 
cealed  and  all  over  the  country  the  stars  and  stripes  were  unfurled, 
municipal  bodies,  associations  and  crowds  of  people  assembling  in 
the  streets  to  give  expression  to  their  patriotism  and  to  emphasize 
their  approval  of  the  first  act  of  the  war.  Business  corporations  and 
firms  allowed  leave  of  absence  to  employees,  upon  full  salary,  to  go 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  65 

with  their  militia  organizations  to  fight  for  the  freedom  of  Cuba. 
Similiar  outbursts  of  national  feeling  occurred  in  the  cities  of  Spain. 

That  evening  in  Havana  all  factions  of  the  Spanish  loyalists 
united  in  a  great  demonstration  of  fealty  to  the  crown.  The  news 
paper  El  Correo  issued  the  call  in  a  flaming  article  full  of  denuncia 
tion  of  "the  treacherous  perfidy  of  a  country  that  does  not  deserve 
to  be  called  civilized,  because  its  base  and  cowardly  crimes  are  the 
shame  of  mankind."  It  called  on  all  faithful  Spaniards  to  unite  in 
the  war-cry  "down  with  the  foreigner!"  The  theatres  were  crowded, 
patriotic  plays  were  performed  and  patriotic  songs  were  sung  until 
the  singers  were  hoarse.  But  Cuban  families  were  leaving  by  every 
ship  that  could  clear,  and  thousands  of  refugees  hurried  out  of  the 
citadel  of  Spanish  power  in  Cuba.  A  number  of  Spanish  officials  also 
deserted  their  posts  and  sought  safety  in  flight.  This  caused  great 
indignation  and  in  all  the  patriotic  shops  articles  of  women's  apparel 
were  displayed  in  the  windows  placarded  "  for  sale  to  men  who  wish 
to  run  away  like  women." 

Captain-General  Blanco  issued  an  address  urging  all  Cubans,  with 
out  regard  to  past  differences,  to  rally  against  the  invader.  "If  the 
United  States,"  he  said,  "wish  the  island  of  Cuba,  let  them  come  and 
take  it.  Perhaps  the  hour  is  not  far  distant  when  these  Carthagin 
ians  of  America  will  meet  their  Zama  in  this  land  of  Cuba,  which 
Spain  discovered,  settled,  and  civilized,  and  which  can  never  be  any 
thing  but  Spanish.  To  arms,  then!  Fellow-citizens,  to  arms!  There 
will  be  room  for  all  in  the  fight.  Let  all  contribute  and  cooperate 
with  like  firmness  and  enthusiasm  to  resist  the  eternal  enemies  of 
the  Spanish  name." 

At  night  he  addressed  the  crowds  asking  them  to  resist  to  the 
death.  The  populace  answered  with  cheers  and  shouts.  He  con 
tinued,  holding  the  national  flag  in  his  hand :  "  I  swear  to  die  before 
I  will  abandon  Cuba,  leaving  this  flag  dishonored.  The  hour  has 
come  for  us  to  avenge  the  wrongs  and  insults  of  sixty  years.  If  they 
want  Cuba,  let  them  come  and  take  it.  We  will  kick  them  into 
the  sea!" 

5 


66  HISTORY   OF   THE 

This  was  the  spirit  in  which  Havana  received  the  announcement 
of  the  sailing  of  the  American  fleet. 

Acting  Rear-Admiral  Sampson  had  been  chosen  by  the  President 
to  command  the  squadron  operating  in  Cuba,  over  the  heads  of  several 
officers  his  superior  in  rank  and  in  length  of  service.  The  selection 
was  made  because  of  Sampson's  reputation  as  a  careful  and  safe 
strategist  and  his  qualities  as  an  executive  commander.  Bred  to  the 
navy  he  had  been  in  the  Civil  War  and  had  served  at  Annapolis 
Academy  as  head  of  the  department  of  chemistry  and  physics.  He 
was  recognized  as  a  master  of  ordnance,  as  well  as  a  serious,  accurate, 
and  just  man,  having  a  sterling  sense  of  responsibility  and  unflinch 
ing  readiness  to  bear  it.  His  task  was  to  isolate  Havana  from  re- 
enforcement  by  Spain  and  from  supplies  from  any  source  outside  its 
own  provinces. 

About  sunset  on  Friday,  April  22,  part  of  the  American  squadron 
arrived  before  Havana.  It  consisted  of  the  flagship  New  York,  the 
battleships  Iowa  and  Indiana,  and  four  smaller  vessels.  From  all  the 
forts  of  Havana  three  warning  shots  were  fired  to  notify  the  citizens 
of  the  arrival  of  the  enemy.  The  streets  were  instantly  crowded  with 
people,  and  with  soldiers  going  to  quarters,  and  the  excitement  of  ex 
pected  attack  was  at  the  highest  pitch.  General  Blanco  and  his  staff 
made  the  rounds  of  the  defenses,  animating  the  soldiers,  reassuring 
the  citizens. 

In  this  beautiful  and  ancient  city  of  America,  filled  with  all  the 
luxury  and  squalor  characteristic  of  Spanish  civilization,  there  was 
much  that  was  sacred  to  the  memories  and  traditions  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States — much  that  had  stirred  their  resentment  and 
indignation.  There  was  the  Cathedral  in  which  the  bones  of  Colum 
bus  had  lain  so  long,  the  very  cradle  of  our  infancy ;  there  were 
magnificent  public  and  private  buildings,  the  institutions  of  those 
arts  that  spring  naturally  from  the  hearts  of  the  Latins.  There 
were  50,000  regular  troops  to  defend  it,  besides  the  splendid  for 
tresses  at  Morro  Castle,  at  Cabanas,  and  at  Santa  Clara.  These  had 
been  deemed  impregnable  for  nearly  a  century.  In  the  beautiful 


TOMB   OF  COLUMBUS,  IN   THE  CATHEDRAL,  HAVANA 


SPANISH  AMERICAN   WAR  67 

harbor  was  concealed  a  forest  of  dynamite  mines,  such  as  that  one 
which  had  wrought  international  and  unpardonable  murder  on  the 
Maine.  Havana,  the  beautiful,  the  luxurious,  the  romantic,  the  squalid, 
and  the  tyrannous,  was  defended  by  the  concentrated  courage  and  in 
genuity  of  the  flower  of  Spanish  strength. 

The  possible  bombardment  of  such  a  capital  was  indeed  momen 
tous  to  its  inhabitants. 

An  eyewitness  of  the  scenes  that  night  has  reported  what  the 
llavaiM-si'  saw  and  frit  when  Ihc  American  slii]»>  slno.l  (>IT  tin-  entrance 
to  the  harbor :  — 

"The  sky  and  the  shore  line  were  pierced  with  great  light  beams  of  the  search 
lights  that  swept  to  and  fro  and  up  and  down.  Now  they  rested  on  the  stone  walls 
of  Morro,  now  on  ships  in  the  harbor,  and  then  on  the  buildings  ashore.  The  sur 
face  of  the  water  was  always  alight  with  them,  and  there  was  not  an  object  afloat 
that  was  not  covered  by  them.  There  were  five  of  these  light  beams,  and  at  the 
end  of  each  could  be  made  out  the  dim  outlines  of  a  ship.  What  ships  they  were 
no  one  could  tell,  but  their  purpose  could  not  be  mistaken.  They  stood  well  out 
to  sea,  and  they  passed  constantly  up  and  down  before  the  entrance  to  the  harbor. 
Never  for  an  instant  did  the  light  beams  disappear,  and  never  was  the  surface  of 
the  water  unlighted  by  them. 

"Again  and  again  during  the  night  the  guns  of  Morro  and  Cabanas  blazed 
out  the  warning,  and  each  signal  was  greeted  in  the  city  with  renewed  excitement. 
From  the  moment  of  the  firing  of  the  first  guns  the  streets  were  alive.  Squads 
and  companies  of  soldiers  marched  and  countermarched  in  the  squares.  The  roll 
of  the  drum  was  almost  continuous,  and  was  accompanied  by  the  bugle  call  to 
arms.  The  people  were  wild,  some  of  them  with  fear,  but  most  of  them  with 
patriotism.  The  frightened  ones  hid  in  cellars  and  in  attics.  Some  of  them  fled 
the  city,  preferring  to  trust  themselves  to  the  insurgent  bands  that  swarm  about 
the  province  rather  than  to  chance  it  in  a  bombardment  by  the  American  fleet  that 
they  were  sure  would  follow  the  dawn  of  day. 

"As  the  night  wore  on  the  excitement  increased.  At  the  forts  every  soldier 
was  working  at  the  big  guns,  getting  them  in  shape  to  withstand  the  attack  of  the 
morning.  The  volunteers  were  there  in  such  crowds  that  the  regular  soldiers  fell 
over  them  in  their  work,  and  they  cursed  and  swore  at  each  other  as  they  damned 
the  'pigs'  of  Yankees  and  told  each  other  what  they  would  do  when  day  broke. 

"All  night  long  the  people  swarmed  the  streets  and  the  river  fronts.  They 
crowded  the  roofs  of  buildings  as  well.  They  demanded  impatiently  that  the  forts 
should  open  fire  and  sink  the  ships,  though  they  knew  that  the  squadron  was  be 
yond  the  reach  of  the  guns. 


68  HISTORY   OF    THE 

"  Dawn  came  at  last,  and  at  the  first  sign  of  it  the  big  light  beams  went  out 
and  the  ships  that  could  now  be  plainly  seen  steamed  off  to  the  east.  Why  they 
left  or  where  they  were  going  no  one  knew,  but  the  Spaniards  said  the  command 
ers  were  cowards,  and  that  they  were  fleeing  because  they  knew  that  with  the  light 
the  big  guns  of  the  forts  would  sink  them. 

"  The  excitement  and  apprehension  of  the  night  changed  to  joy  and  men 
hugged  each  other  and  laughed  and  shouted  at  what  they  thought  an  evidence  of 
fear.  Some  of  them  went  home  satisfied  that  there  would  be  no  more  seen  of  them. 

"The  morning  wore  away  and  noon  came.  There  was  still  no  sign  of  the  boats. 
But  at  three  o'clock  this  afternoon  the  lookouts  at  the  forts  saw  the  black  smoke  of 
five  ships  on  the  horizon  to  the  east.  They  reported  to  the  Captain-General.  A 
few  minutes  later  it  was  plainly  seen  that  the  smoke  came  from  the  visitors  of  the 
night  before,  and  again  the  warning  guns  sounded.  People  again  crowded  into  the 
streets,  women  and  children  as  well  as  men.  Workingmen  and  business  men  left 
their  work  and  seized  their  guns  and  rushed  again  for  the  forts.  The  water  front 
was  lined  and  jammed  in  less  time  than  it  takes  to  tell  it.  The  rolling  of  the 
drums  and  the  bugle  calls  began  again,  and  the  marching  and  countermarching  of 
the  soldiers  went  on. 

"  The  ships  loomed  up  on  the  horizon  bigger  and  bigger.  They  seemed  headed 
straight  for  the  big  guns  of  Morro,  and  the  soldiers  manned  the  guns  and  pre 
pared  for  an  assault.  But  the  chance  never  came.  By  5  o'clock  all  five  of  the 
ships  were  directly  off  the  entrance  to  the  harbor,  but  they  were  still  out  of  gun 
shot  and  they  resumed  their  pacing  up  and  down  of  the  previous  night. 

"As  darkness  came  the  big  beams  of  light  shone  again.  But  one  ship  came 
into  the  harbor  after  the  warships  were  sighted.  She  was  the  Italian  warship 
Giovanni  JSausan,  When  she  was  still  some  distance  out  the  roaring  of  guns 
could  be  heard  and  puffs  of  smoke  could  be  seen  coming  from  near  the  bow  of 
the  ship.  There  were  answering  puffs  from  one  of  the  five  ships.  This  all  added 
to  the  excitement,  and  the  report  started  and  went  through  the  city  like  wildfire 
that  the  boat,  which  had  not  then  been  identified,  was  a  Spanish  warship  and  was 
giving  battle  to  the  fleet.  But  the  sound  of  the  guns  and  the  puffs  of  smoke  died 
out  quickly,  and  as  the  strange  boat  approached  the  Italian  flag  was  run  up  and 
the  people  learned  what  she  was  and  that  she  had  merely  been  saluting,  but  they 
wouldn't  believe  it.  They  were  sure  she  had  fired  on  the  fleet.  They  prepared 
to  give  her  a  welcome.  As  she  passed  the  fortifications  her  sailors  yelled,  '  Long 
live  Spain,'  and  cheered  the  Spanish  flag.  This  set  everybody  wild  with  enthu 
siasm.  It  led  to  a  demonstration  on  the  French  cruiser  Ftilton,  which  was  in  port, 
and  the  Frenchmen  cheered  for  Spain,  too. 

"  The  crowds  continued  in  the  streets  all  night  and  the  excitement  kept  up. 
By  the  moving  of  the  beams  of  light  it  could  be  seen  that  the  warships  were  con 
stantly  shifting  their  position.  Up  in  the  top  of  the  foremast  of  each  signal  lights 
could  be  seen  changing  constantly  from  red  to  white  or  blue,  and  it  was  evident 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  69 

that  the  commanders  of  the  ships  were  continually  communicating  with  each  other, 
but  of  course  the  signals  could  not  be  read,  though  the  officers  at  the  forts  tried 
to  decipher  them." 

It  was  not  the  purpose  of  the  United  States,  however,  to  wage  a 
war  of  destruction  against  either  the  lives  or  the  property  of  non- 
combatants  in  Cuba.  Havana  was  not  to  be  bombarded,  unless  all 
other  means  of  bringing  Spain  to  reason  proved  fruitless.  But  the 
blockade  established  was  rigidly  maintained,  and  no  troops,  supplies, 
or  food  could  reach  Havana. 

This  blockade  soon  became  monotonous  and  the  crews  grew  rest 
less.  The  only  incidents  were  prize  captures  of  Spanish  vessels.  The 
New  York  had  taken  one,  the  Pedro,  just  as  the  squadron  reached 
Havana.  The  fine  Spanish  merchantman  took  the  desperate  chance 
of  attempting  to  escape  to  Spain  at  the  very  moment  of  investment, 
but  was  run  down  and  sent  to  Key  West  as  a  prize. 

An  incident  that  served  to  excite  popular  expectation  of  trouble 
with  France  grew  out  of  the  capture  of  the  French  steamer  La  Fat/ette, 
which  was  bound  from  Spanish  ports  with  passengers  and  food  for 
Havana.  She  left  the  Spanish  port  of  Corunna  two  days  after  war 
began,  and  while  she  was  crossing  the  French  Government  requested 
the  American  Government  to  permit  her  to  discharge  her  passengers 
at  Havana,  promising  that  none  of  the  cargo  should  be  taken  off. 
Our  authorities  consented  to  the  arrangement  and  sent  notice  to  that 
effect  to  Admiral  Sampson.  By  miscarriage  the  notice  did  not  come 
to  Admiral  Sampson  until  after  the  La  Fayette  appeared  and  steamed 
towards  the  harbor.  The  Frenchman  was  warned  by  several  blank 
shots,  but  he  paid  no  attention  until  a  solid  shot  crossed  his  bows  and 
a  shell  whistled  dangerously  near  his  bridge.  Then  he  hove  to  and 
made  vigorous  protest.  He  had  not  heard  of  the  blockade.  His  ship 
was  sent  under  a  prize  crew  to  Key  West  where  its  arrival  caused  a 
sensation.  As  soon  as  the  news  reached  Washington  the  ship  was 
released  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  permission  was 
granted  to  her  to  proceed  to  Havana  under  the  original  agreement. 
The  Frenchman  landed  his  passengers  at  Havana  and  was  so  greatly 


70  HISTORY   OF   THE 

impressed  with  the  quiet  release  given  to  him  that  he  ascribed  it  to 
American  fear  of  France.  He  was  proceeding  to  discharge  his  cargo, 
also,  in  which  event  he  would  have  been  seized  as  he  came  out,  but 
the  French  consul  interfered  and  compelled  him  to  restore  all  cargo 
and  leave  port  according  to  agreement.  There  was  no  ill  feeling 
between  the  two  governments  over  this  comedy  of  errors,  but  for  two 
or  three  days  there  was  excited  gossip  over  the  possibilities. 


ii. 

A  WEEK  of  suspense  and  inaction  was  passed  by  the  blockading 
squadron.  Not  a  hostile  gun  had  been  fired,  not  even  target  practice 
THE  FIEST  was  achieved.  Admiral  Sampson  had  been  directed  to 

THROUGH  keep  his  ships  at  a  sufficient  distance  from  the  Havana 

DEATH  fortifications  and  others  of  a  formidable  character,  in 

order  that  the  efficiency  of  his  squadron  might  not  be  impaired  while 
the  Spanish  naval  force  under  Cervera  remained  intact  at  St.  Vincent 
and  Cadiz.  But  it  was  not  intended  that  Admiral  Sampson  should 
remain  silent  against  the  barking  of  Spanish  coast  defense  guns.  Such 
a  policy  would  make  the  enemy  confident  that  the  American  vessels 
could  be  shot  at  without  fear  of  receiving  a  shot  in  return,  and,  besides, 
it  would  probably  cause  the  excellent  state  of  discipline  now  main 
tained  on  the  blockading  squadron  to  deteriorate.  The  men  were 
already  restless,  when,  on  April  27,  the  flagship  New  York,  the  monitor 
Puritan,  and  the  Cincinnati  steamed  off  Matanzas  Bay  to  reconnoitre 
the  fortifications  and  works  that  were  being  strengthened  and  con 
structed. 

Matanzas  is  fifty-two  miles  east  of  Havana,  on  the  San  Juan  River, 
and  was  the  most  important  commercial  point  in  Cuba  after  the  cap 
ital.  It  had  a  population  of  about  35,000  and  the  city,  situated  up 
the  bay  and  protected  by  forts  on  the  small  bluffs  on  the  coast,  was 
built  of  stone  and  ornamented  with  handsome  structures. 

The  point  furthest  out  from  Matanzas,  where  the  Spaniards  had 
been  building  fortifications,  was  Point  Rubalcava.  It  is  to  the  west 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  71 

of  the  harbor,  and  out  from  the  entrance  about  three  miles.  The 
next  nearest  point  was  Point  Maya,  which  is  four  miles  from  Point 
Unbalcava,  on  the  east  side  of  the  harbor  and  directly  at  the  entrance, 
four  miles  from  Matanzas,  which  is  at  the  head  of  the  bay.  The  New 
York'  ran  provokingly  near  to  the  first  of  these  fortifications,  and  in 
a  few  minutes  there  was  a  puff  of  smoke  from  Point  Rubalcava,  fol 
lowed  by  the  roar  of  a  heavy  gun  and  the  whistle  of  a  shell.  At  the 
same  time  there  was  another  puff  of  smoke  to  the  east,  near  Point 
Maya,  and  the  roar  of  another  gun.  It  was  the  expected  Spanish 
marksmanship  and  the  shells  went  ludicrously  wide  of  the  mark. 

Instantly  the  three  American  ships  answered  with  Yankee  accu 
racy.  Going  in  as  close  as  the  water  depth  permitted,  they  poured 
in  broadsides  that  demolished  the  fortifications,  while  not  one  shot  of 
the  enemy  touched  a  ship.  After  fifteen  minutes  of  this  kind  of  target 
practice,  during  which  a  number  of  Spanish  soldiers  were  killed,  the 
signal  to  cease  firing  was  given,  since  the  work  of  days  on  the  forts 
had  been  knocked  down  in  a  few  minutes. 

As  the  signal  flew  up  the  halyards  on  the  New  York  the  perfection 
of  American  marksmanship  was  displayed  by  a  gunner  on  board  the 
Puritan.  At  the  very  moment  Rubalcava  fired  her  last  shot.  The 
Puritan  was  a  long  distance  away,  but  her  marksman  saw  the  smoke 
puff  out  and  aimed  for  that  spot  with  one  of  the  big  12-inch  guns. 
The  aim  was  magnificent.  The  huge  1,000-pound  shell  of  the  Puritan 
struck  exactly  in  the  centre  of  the  ring  of  smoke,  hit  the  cannon  from 
which  it  had  come,  smashed  it,  and  drove  on  into  the  earthworks, 
carrying  destruction  even  before  it  exploded.  When  it  exploded  it 
seemed  to  those  who  were  watching  the  shot  as  if  about  all  the  forti 
fications  that  remained  had  vanished  into  dust.  A  British  artillery 
officer  who  was  present  declared,  in  an  account  to  the  press,  that  it 
was  the  most  marvelous  exhibition  of  accurate  gunnery  in  the  history 
of  gun  firing. 

The  first  humor  of  the  war  appeared  in  this  action.  "The  Ma 
tanzas  Mule"  became  famous  in  verse  and  in  simile.  The  Spanish 
Government,  pursuing  its  usual  policy  of  concealing  all  facts,  gave 


72  HISTORY   OF   THE 

out  what  purported  to  be  General  Blanco's  official  report  of  the  bom 
bardment  of  Matanzas,  in  which  it  was  gravely  declared  that  the 
American  shells  did  no  damage  to  the  city,  but  that  a  mule  on  the 
beach  had  been  killed.  The  American  sense  of  humor  seized  on 
this  and  "the  Matanzas  Mule"  became  a  figure  in  history. 

From  this  time  forward  there  was  "target  practice"  for  all  the 
ships  patrolling  the  coast  against  fortifications  and  against  Spanish 
soldiers  that  were  kept  on  guard  to  resist  any  effort  at  landing  parties 
to  carry  supplies  to  insurgents  in  the  interior.  Meanwhile  the  news 
of  the  Manila  victory  had  come  and  the  seamen  were  restive  for  an 
opportunity  to  repeat  in  Cuban  waters  the  intrepid  work  that  de 
stroyed  Montejo  at  Cavite. 

The  first  American  sailors  to  find  in  death  the  baptism  of  hero 
ism  were  killed  in  a  battle  between  small  ships  in  Cardenas  harbor, 
on  the  north  coast,  the  llth  of  May.  The  gunboat  Machias,  the  torpedo 
boats  Winsloio  and  Foote,  and  the  revenue  tug  Hudson  were  blockading 
Cardenas  in  the  harbor  of  which  were  three  Spanish  gunboats.  On 
the  llth  the  cruiser  Wilmington  arrived  off  the  harbor  and  Commander 
Merry  of  the  Machias  and  Captain  Todd  of  the  Wilmington  decided 
to  send  the  torpedo  boats  into  the  harbor  and  cut  out  or  destroy  the 
Spanish  craft  which  were  coming  out  and  menacing  our  boats.  The 
Wilmington  could  not  enter  on  account  of  her  draught  and  the  pres 
ence  of  mines  in  the  main  channel.  The  Winslow  entered  the  harbor 
at  full  speed  after  a  Spanish  gunboat,  and  immediately  the  vessels 
of  the  enemy  and  a  shore  battery  opened  a  raking  fire  upon  her,  to 
which  the  Winslow  and  the  Wilmington  both  replied.  The  Spaniards 
concentrated  their  whole  attention  upon  the  Winslow. 

There  followed  forty  minutes  in  which  American  heroism  and  cour 
age  rose  to  splendid  heights  as  described  by  the  reports  of  the  fight. 
The  first  shot  from  the  enemy  fell  among  the  buoys  in  the  harbor. 
The  next  tore  through  the  flimsy  hull  of  the  torpedo  boat,  wreck 
ing  the  steam  steering  gear  forward  and  rendering  the  boat  unman 
ageable.  The  Spanish  trap  had  caught  its  victim.  The  decoy  gunboat 
had  lured  the  fierce  little  fighter  to  within  range  of  the  shore  guns. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAK  73 

The  red  buoys  marked  the  range.  The  ]\'inxhir  could  not  escape, 
and  it  was  a  fight  then  to  the  death.  Her  three  little  1-pound  guns 
began  to  hurl  back  missiles  at  the  gunboat,  which  was  now  adding 
its  share  to  the  h'ring. 

Again  and  again  the  shells  crashed  into  the  Whixloir.  A  splinter 
Hying  from  the  deck  struck  Lieutenant  John  J.  Bernadou,  the  brave 
commander  of  the  little  craft,  just  below  the  groin  in  the  right  leg. 
He  wrapped  a  towel  about  it,  using  an  empty  1 -pound  shell  for  a 
tourniquet,  and  went  on  with  his  duty  as  commander.  When  he 
found  that  his  steam  steering  gear  was  gone  he  rushed  aft  to  arrange 
the  hand  gear.  A  shot  wrecked  that,  too.  Steam  was  already  pouring 
out  of  a  perforated  boiler  below  and  the  men  were  coming  up.  An 
other  shot  and  the  port  engine  was  wrecked.  Then  went  the  fore 
castle  gun.  But  still  the  brave  men  kept  firing  with  their  two 
remaining  1-pounders. 

Help  was  coming,  for  the  little  Hudson  was  steaming  in  at  full 
speed,  and  the  Wilmington's  4-inch  guns  were  dropping  shells  all  about 
the  murderous  battery  ashore. 

Amidships,  near  the  ammunition  stand,  was  Ensign  Worth  Bagley 
calling  down  to  the  engineer  to  back  and  go  ahead  with  his  one  re 
maining  engine  in  his  effort  to  spoil  the  Spaniards'  aim.  All  the 
electrical  contrivances  were  wrecked,  so  the  orders  went  by  word  of 
mouth.  By  the  Ensign  were  working  a  half  dozen  of  his  men.  No 
one  had  yet  been  killed,  although  the  craft  had  been  riddled  through 
and  through.  Then  came  a  shell  that  struck  squarely  on  the  deck  and 
exploded  as  it  fell.  The  Hudson  was  by  this  time  so  close  that  her 
crew  could  hear  the  words  of  the  men  as  they  went  to  their  death. 

"Save  me!  Save  me!"  shouted  one  poor  fellow,  with  his  face  all 
torn,  as  he  staggered  back  and  all  but  fell  into  the  sea.  Some  one 
reached  an  arm  to  him,  caught  him  by  a  leg,  pulled  him  back,  and 
laid  him  on  the  deck,  dead.  Ensign  Bagley  had  thrown  his  hands 
into  the  air,  tottered  forward,  and  fell  against  the  signal  mast,  around 
which  he  clasped  his  arms  and  sank  slowly  down  in  a  heap.  They 
did  not  know  he  was  dead  until  they  wrent  to  carry  him  below. 


74  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Besides  Bagley  those  killed  outright  by  the  shell  were  two  serv 
ice  sailors,  and  two  others,  who,  mortally  wounded,  died  within  an 
hour. 

Now  began  a  spectacle  of  unrivaled  heroism  by  the  Hudson.  She 
had  come  near  enough  to  extend  aid  to  the  Window.  A  long  line  was 
thrown  the  latter  and  made  fast,  but  as  the  revenue  cutter  backed 
away  this  line  parted.  Another  line  was  made  fast  after  twenty  min 
utes'  work.  The  shells  of  the  enemy  were  still  dropping  on  every 
side.  The  second  line  held,  but  the  Winsloiv  would  not  tow  because 
she  could  not  be  steered,  and  at  last  the  Hudson  made  fast  alongside. 

Though  crippled,  the  little  torpedo  boat  was  still  able  to  fight, 
and,  with  her  flag  flying  and  her  two  remaining  guns  puffing  away 
at  the  gunboat,  she  stuck  to  the  fight.  The  Hudson  was  fighting, 
and  had  been  all  the  time.  Her  commander,  Lieutenant  F.  H.  Newcomb, 
had  kept  his  two  guns  firing  so  rapidly  that  in  the  thirty-five  minutes 
she  was  engaged  she  fired  120  shots.  She  escaped  with  only  one  shot 
in  her  hull,  and  some  insignificant  wounds.  The  bravery  of  her  cap 
tain  and  crew  in  rescuing  the  Winsloiv  from  her  perilous  position 
was  unsurpassed  even  by  that  of  the  men  under  Bernadou. 

The  Wilmington  meanwhile  had  played  havoc  with  Cardenas.  By 
the  time  the  smaller  vessels  were  in  safety  the  town  along  the  shore 
was  on  fire  and  the  Spanish  gunboats  had  also  caught  fire,  and  soon 
the  shore  batteries  ceased  to  answer  the  Wilmington's  guns.  The  Wins- 
low  was  badly  injured  and  had  to  be  towed  to  Key  West  for  repairs. 
One  Spanish  gunboat  was  destroyed,  another  Spanish  steamer  was 
burned,  and  many  of  the  enemy  were  killed. 

The  death  of  Ensign  Bagley  and  the  four  sailors  brought  to  the 
United  States  the  first  realization  of  war.  Not  a  man  had  been  killed 
at  Manila.  Bagley  was  the  first  to  give  his  life  to  the  cause.  He 
was  appointed  to  the  Naval  Academy  from  Raleigh.  North  Carolina, 
in  1891,  and  had  been  in  the  service  but  three  years.  The  five  men 
wrho  were  first  to  lose  their  lives  in  the  war,  fighting  against  the 
Spaniards,  were  buried  with  martial  honors.  At  the  funeral  of  En 
sign  Bagley  at  Raleigh,  a  great  concourse  assembled  to  do  honor  to 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  75 

his  memory.  The  city  was  draped  in  mourning  and  the  first  dis 
play  of  patriotic  sorrow  and  homage  was  equally  complete  and  sig 
nificant. 

During  the  two  weeks  that  had  elapsed  since  war  began,  American 
sailors  had  achieved  glory  at  Manila  and  had  been  baptized  with  blood 
at  Cardenas.  There  were  several  efforts  made  to  land  supplies  for  the 
insurgents  in  Cuba,  but  the  first  expedition  on  the  steamer  Guiufie 
was  successfully  repulsed  by  the  Spaniards  without  loss  to  the  Ameri 
cans,  but  with  a  loss  of  ten  of  their  own  men  killed. 

Lieutenant  Andrew  S.  Rowan  of  the  Nineteenth  Infantry,  regulars, 
made  a  most  hazardous  journey  into  Cuban  forests  to  find  General 
Maximo  Gomez,  General-in-Chief  of  the  Cuban  forces,  to  communicate 
to  him  the  plans  of  the  United  States  Government  with  regard  to  co 
operation  with  the  Cuban  forces.  He  made  the  journey  successfully 
and  then  worked  his  way  to  Nassau,  N.  P.,  in  an  open  boat  with  full 
responses  and  reports  for  the  War  Department. 

At  this  moment  a  sequence  of  extraordinary  events  was  preparing 
for  the  world  that  must  be  described  in  detail.  Skirmishes  and  col 
lisions  were  no  longer  regarded  ;  marvelous  feats  of  war  and  of  strategy 
were  at  hand. 


CHAPTER  THE  FIFTH. 
"BOTTLING  UP"  CERVERA'S  SQUADRON. 

THE  CHASE  OF  THE  SPANISH  SQUADRON  OF  ADMIRAL  CERVERA  —  ITS  MYSTERIOUS  DISAPPEAR 

ANCE   AND   FINAL   APPEARANCE  IN  THE  WEST   INDIES  —  THE   BATTLESHIP    "OREGON'S" 

WONDERFUL  RACE  OF  15,000  MILES  AGAINST  TIME  —  A  WARSHIP'S  UNPARALLELED 

RECORD  OF  ENDURANCE  AND  CONDITION  —  CERVERA'S  FLEET  "BOTTLED  UP" 

IN   SANTIAGO   HARBOR  —  THE  HEROIC  DEED  OF  LIEUTENANT   HOBSON 

AND   His  VOLUNTEER  CREW  —  THE   "MERRIMAC"   SUNK  IN  THE 

HARBOR    ENTRANCE  —  "  THE    CORK    IN    THE    BOTTLE." 

I. 

ON  THE  very  day  that  the  Winslow  was  crippled  and  the  first 
Americans  were  killed  at  Cardenas,  began  a  series  of  puz 
zling  manoeuvres  in  the  game  of  war  that  were  adroitly 
conducted    on    both    sides,   and    were   destined   to   end   in 
astonishing  successes  to  both  branches  of  our  arms.     On  April  20,  it 
must  be  recalled,   a   Spanish  squadron  sailed   from    Cadiz   with   the 
ostensible  purpose  of  proceeding  to  Havana.     The  move- 


A  DUCHESS  ment  was  promptly  met  by  the  blockade  of  Havana,  so 

that  when  Cervera's  ships  reached  Port  St.  Vincent  in 
the  Portuguese  Cape  Verde  Islands,  they  were  met  with  news  of  the 
counter-movement.  They  remained  at  St.  Vincent,  and  the  expla 
nation  was  made  that  they  were  making  repairs  and  arranging  their 
coal  supply.  Day  after  day  slipped  by  and  then  early  in  May  it  was 
announced  that  Cervera's  ships  had  sailed  west,  leaving  three  of  the 
torpedo  boats  behind.  These  returned  to  Cadiz,  but  whither  Cervera's 
squadron  was  bound  could  not  be  known.  The  disappearance  of  this 
squadron  into  the  mysteries  of  the  Atlantic  waste  immediately  chal 
lenged  the  ingenuity  and  the  speculations  of  strategists.  It  was  not 
considered  probable  that  it  was  sailing  to  engage  Sampson's  forces. 
The  result  at  Manila  had  instantly  demonstrated  the  great  superiority 

(76) 


ADMIRAL  CERVERA 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  77 

of  American  naval  skill  and  American  gun  fighters,  and  Admiral 
Sampson's  seamen  were  eager  to  prove  that  superiority  by  another 
test. 

It  was  intimated  from  Spanish  sources  that  Cervera,  instead  of 
sailing  to  succor  Havana,  was  on  his  way  to  Manila  to  fall  upon  Dew- 
ey's  light  ships  and  transfer  the  war  to  the  Pacific  again.  The  drop 
ping  of  the  three  torpedo  craft  was  cited  as  proof  of  his  intention  to 
make  a  long  and  swift  voyage.  His  four  cruisers  were  faster  than 
any  the  Americans  were  supposed  to  possess,  and,  with  a  good  start, 
he  could  easily  reach  Manila  days  in  advance  of  our  ships. 

Another  suggestion  that  carried  with  it  much  uneasiness  was  that 
on  his  way  to  Manila,  around  Cape  Horn,  Cervera  could  meet,  and 
overpower  the  United  States  battleship  Oregon,  which  had  sailed  from 
San  Francisco  for  Florida  some  weeks  before,  and  was  now  making 
her  way  northward  along  the  South  American  east  coast.  In  the 
estuarial  Paraguay  River  in  the  Argentine  a  Spanish  torpedo  boat,  the 
Temerario,  lying  there  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  was  waiting.  The  Te.w- 
erario  was  invited  to  leave  by  the  Argentine  government,  but  she 
claimed  that  repairs  were  necessary  and  consumed  much  time.  If  she 
were  waiting  to  fall  on  the  Oregon  in  the  night,  and  if  Cervera  should 
be  able  to  come  to  her  aid,  serious  loss  might  ensue. 

Promoted  by  the  Spanish  system  of  setting  afloat  false  information, 
the  most  surprising  and  startling  rumors  appeared.  Cervera's  ships 
had  been  sighted  off  the  coast  of  Canada,  supposed  to  be  making  for 
a  descent  upon  New  England  and  eastern  coasts ;  it  had  gone  back 
to  Cadiz ;  it  was  going  to  sink  the  Oregon  and  then  ravage  the  Cali 
fornia  coast,  left  without  ships  to  defend  it. 

In  the  midst  of  this  uncertainty  our  Government  was  not  alarmed, 
but  wary.  It  determined  to  seek  Spain  in  a  vital  part.  On  the  sup 
position  that  Cervera  had  more  reasonable  orders  than  those  sug 
gested  by  the  Spanish  Government,  it  secretly  sent  Sampson  with 
four  ships  to  seek  Cervera  in  the  ports  of  Porto  Rico  where  he 
might  be  expected  to  enter  for  coal  and  supplies,  and  to  establish 
a  base. 


78  HISTORY   OF    THE 

Suddenly  on  the  morning  of  May  12,  Sampson  appeared  off  the  city 
of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico.  His  squadron  was  a  magnificent  fighting 
force,  consisting  of  the  Neio  York  (flagship),  the  battleships  Iowa  and 
Indiana,  the  monitors  Terror  and  Amphitrite,  and  the  gunboats  Mont 
gomery  and  Detroit.  It  was  not  yet  dawn  when  the  ships,  with  lights 
out,  arrived  off  the  harbor.  It  was  not  intended  to  attack  the  fortifi 
cations  unless  Cervera's  ships  were  behind  them,  but  as  the  long 
black  line  of  ocean  monsters  crept  up  close  to  the  entrance,  every 
man  was  at  quarters,  the  decks  were  sanded,  and  destruction  was  in 
suspense.  The  scout  Detroit  was  in  advance,  going  as  far  in  as  pos 
sible  in  an  attempt  to  reconnoitre  the  inner  harbor.  When  within  a 
mile  of  the  old  fort  on  the  east  side  of  the  harbor,  the  first  faint 
light  of  dawn  sprang  up,  and  in  another  moment  the  Spanish  gun 
ners  in  the  old  fort  made  out  the  ships  and  opened  fire  at  the  lotca. 

Instantly  the  battleship's  forward  guns  let  fly  at  the  fort,  and 
then  swinging  around  her  after  guns,  she  gave  the  fort  a  whole  broad 
side.  The  Detroit  and  Montgomery  were  ordered  out  of  range,  and  the 
five  armored  fighters,  steaming  in  a  long  ellipse  before  the  forts  on 
either  side  of  the  entrance,  poured  a  torrent  of  shot  and  shell  against 
the  fortifications.  The  old  Morro  fort  standing  on  the  hill  behind 
which  stood  the  city  of  San  Juan,  required  a  high  elevation  from  our 
guns,  and  some  of  the  shells  went  too  high  and  fell  into  the  city.  It 
was  not  intended  to  throw  a  shot  into  the  town  among  non-combat 
ants,  but  the  assault  having  come  from  the  shore,  the  forts  must  be 
chastised. 

For  three  hours  the  five  ships  made  their  death-dealing  rounds  of 
the  ellipse.  The  fortifications  were  irreparably  injured.  Repeatedly 
masses  of  masonry  were  blown  skywards  by  the  shells  from  the  Amer 
icans'  guns.  Fragments  from  one  shell  struck  the  commandant's 
residence,  which  was  situated  near  the  fortifications,  damaging  it 
greatly.  The  center  of  the  Morro  was  almost  blown  away.  The  shells 
that  passed  into  the  city  did  not  do  much  damage,  and  but  few  per 
sons  were  killed  in  the  forts,  though  many  were  injured.  A  number 
of  Spanish  guns  were  knocked  over  and  the  gunners  ran  from  their 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  79 

posts  and  had  to  be  forced  back.  One  of  the  Spanish  shells  exploded 
on  the  New  York,  killing  one  American  seaman,  and  wounding  five, 
but  not  seriously. 

The  bombardment  was  carried  on  in  a  hazy  fog  in  which  the  smoke 
hung,  so  that  the  contestants  could  not  see  each  other  well,  but  again 
the  American  gunners  proved  their  accuracy,  while  the  Spanish  shells 
were  wholly  wide  of  the  mark,  except  by  accident.  The  fact  was  as 
certained  that  Cervera  was  not  at  San  Juan,  and  Sampson's  fleet  sailed 
out  of  sight  again. 

Meanwhile  Cervera's  squadron  had  been  reported  at  the  French 
island  of  Martinique,  where  it  had  arrived  safe  and  in  search  of  coal. 
This  island  was  in  the  path  that  the  Oregon  mi^ht  take  on  her  north 
ward  way.  Then  the  squadron  disappeared  again  and,  on  the  day 
after  the  San  Juan  bombardment,  conclusive  information  reached 
Washington  that  Cervera's  ships  were  off  the  Dutch  island  of  Cura 
cao  on  the  Venezuelan  coast,  where  they  had  met  colliers  sent  ahead 
with  coal.  Instantly  Commodore  Schley's  squadron,  the  Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts,  Texas,  Minneapolis,  New  Orleans,  and  the  gunboat  Scorpion, 
sailed  out  of  Hampton  Roads  to  seek  the  enemy. 

Where  was  the  Oregon,  meanwhile? 


ii. 

THE  United  States  battleship  Oregon  was  making  an  ocean  race 
against  time  that  proved  to  be  a  performance  unparalleled  in  naval 
history,  demonstrating  at  once  the  perfection  of  Amer- 

,.,.,,.  ,    .  A   BATTLESHIP  S 

ican  shipbuilding,  the  unsurpassed  competency  of  Amer-       OCEAN  RACE 
Iran    engineers    in    the    care    of    machinery,    and    the 
sustained    courage    and    watchfulness    of    the    American    crew    that 
manned  her.    More  than  a  month  before  war  began,  on  the  14th  of 
M;i ifli.  the  Oregon  had  been  ordered  to  Key  West  to  strengthen  the 
squadron  there.    The   ship  was  at   Puget   Sound,  but   on    March   19 
sailed  from  the  Golden  Horn  with  a  journey  of  nearly  15,000  miles 


80  HISTORY   OF   THE 

to  make  with  all  the  haste  possible.  There  was  at  that  time  no  appar 
ent  danger  in  the  path  to  be  traversed,  which  lay  down  the  west 
coast  of  South  America  and  up  the  east  coast.  But  there  was  reason 
for  haste.  And  besides  there  was  the  case  of  the  Maine,  known  to  all 
the  crew. 

The  Oregon  is  a  sea-going  coast-line  battleship  of  the  first  class, 
348  feet  in  length,  69^  feet  broad,  with  a  displacement  of  10,288 
tons,  10,400  horse  power  in  the  driving  engines,  and  a  speed  of  nearly 
17  knots  an  hour.  The  regular  complement  consisted  of  32  officers 
and  441  men. 

A  battleship  of  the  first  class  is  intended  to  be  a  floating  fort  of 
steel  armor,  carrying  the  largest  guns  and  the  greatest  number  of 
batteries  of  all  sizes  possible.  The  interior  of  this  steel  fort  is,  how 
ever,  the  most  complex  and  delicate  mechanism  that  human  inge 
nuity  has  combined.  The  guns,  weighing  many  tons,  are  moved, 
loaded,  aimed,  and  fired  by  electrical  machinery ;  the  projectiles,  rang 
ing  from  125  to  1,200  pounds  in  weight,  are  brought  into  turrets  and 
gun  rooms  by  electrical  machinery.  From  "fighting  mast"  and  "con 
ning  tower"  the  range  or  distance  of  the  target  and  the  speed  and 
direction  of  the  ship  are  determined  by  delicate  instruments,  from 
which,  through  electrical  connection  with  the  various  parts  of  the  ship, 
the  pressing  of  a  button  carries  orders  to  fire  the  gun,  steer  the  ship, 
or  conveys  engineer's  orders.  Such  a  ship  carries  from  65  to  160  dif 
ferent  engines,  every  one  of  which  in  the  hour  of  battle  must  move 
with  perfect  precision  and  ease.  Such  a  ship  manufactures  ice  with 
one  machine,  distills  fresh  water  from  ocean  brine  with  another,  and 
all  move  and  breathe  as  with  life. 

Seamen,  sailors,  such  as  the  old  navies  had  and  needed — they  have 
no  place  upon  such  a  ship.  In  their  stead  are  scientific  machinists 
and  engineers,  students  of  navigation,  executives  trained  to  perfectly 
discipline  the  various  departments,  gunners  patiently  trained  to  an 
accuracy  of  aim  practical  to  attain  only  within  the  fifth  part  of  a 
second, —  during  which  the  indicated  dot  of  the  range  passes  the 
crossed  lines  upon  the  lens  of  the  "sight," — athletic  and  skilled 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  81 

assistants  to  tln>  gunners.  i-ni:iiHMM-s.  and  executives,  who  a  iv  n>-|.mi- 
sible  for  the  quick  and  accurate  execution  of  every  detail  of  the  or 
ganized  operations  of  the  machinery. 

A  modern  battleship  is  more  than  a  ship  and  a  fort  and  an  army 
combined  :  it  is  the  mechanical  incarnation  of  death-dealing  power 
and  massed  force  ;  it  is  almost  living  mechanism  of  destruction,  with 
the  commanding  brain  in  the  fighting  top,  whence,  by  lines  of  elec 
tricity,  all  the  nerve  centers  of  action  from  turret  to  furnace  room  are 
controlled  and  inspired  and  transformed  into  parts  of  one  brain. 
Such  a  ship  probably  should  not  be  called  "She."  Femininity  has 
given  way  here  to  the  very  essence  of  the  masculine,  though  the  old 
custom  of  personalizing  them  may  probably  continue  to  prevail. 

One  does  not  think  of  such  an  engine  of  force,  power,  and  potential 
destruction  except  as  typical  of  man's  highest  warlike  virility.  It  was 
so  that  a  poet  of  the  hour  saw  and  pictured  the  Oregon,  when  she  was 
out  on  the  ocean,  making  the  great  and  dangerous  race  of  life  and 
death  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic,  fearing  no  enemy,  but  rush 
ing  to  the  aid  of  the  fleet  —  "a  mailed  knight  of  the  sea." 

Thus  sang  H.  J.  D.  Browne  in  a  poem  called  "The  Voice  of  the 
Oregon." 

"  You  have  called  to  me,  my  brothers,  from  your  far-off  eastern  sea, 
To  join  with  you,  my  brothers,  to  set  a  prostrate  people  free. 
You  have  called  to  me,  my  brothers,  to  join  to  yours  my  might. 
The  slaughterers  of  our  brethren  with  our  armored  hands  to  smite. 

"We  have  never  met,   my  brothers,  we  mailed  knights  of  the  sea; 
But  there  are  no  strangers,  brothers,  'neath  the  Banner  of  the  Free; 
And  though  half  a  world's  between  us  and  ten   thousand   leagues  divide, 
Our  souls  are   intermingled  and  our  hearts  are  side  by  side." 

The  Oregon,  after  leaving  San  Francisco,  sailed  to  Callao,  Peru, 
without  stop,  arriving  there  on  April  4,  and  three  days  were  spent 
coaling.  Ten  days  later  the  Straits  of  Magellan  were  entered.  From 
spring  weather  at  San  Francisco,  the  ship  had  crossed  the  torrid 
equator,  where  the  furnace  room  heat  of  160  degrees  was  stifling, 

6 


82  HISTORY   OF   THE 

and  now  the  cold  of  December  in  the  southern  zone  was  encountered, 
with  ice  on  the  decks  and  wintry  blasts  in  the  air. 

Here  began  sleepless  watch  against  the  proved  treachery  of  the 
Spaniard.  War  had  not  been  declared  ;  nor  had  it  been  when  the 
Maine  was  destroyed.  Through  the  narrow  straits,  marked  with  many 
inlets  and  dangerous  places,  in  which  an  enemy  might  waylay,  the 
Oregon  ran  only  during  daylight,  and  at  highest  speed,  and  then 
turned  the  United  States  shield  on  the  prow  northward.  At  every 
stopping  place,  for  whatsoever  purpose,  however  brief  the  stay,  two 
launches  were  lowered  and  kept  ceaseless  round  of  the  ship  to  make 
sure  no  enemy  approached.  The  South  American  republics  were  one 
with  us  in  practical  interests  in  the  war,  but  there  were  many  Spanish- 
born  persons  in  every  port  and  the  perfidy  of  Havana  was  not  to  be 
repeated  with  the  Oregon.  The  great  ship,  costing  more  than  three 
millions,  was  to  be  brought  home  safely. 

The  Paraguay  was  passed  and  no  sign  of  the  Temerario  was  seen. 
The  gunboat  Marietta  and  the  dynamite  cruiser  Nichteroy  were  picked 
up  on  the  way,  and  on  April  30  they  sailed  into  Rio  Janeiro  to  coal. 
There  Captain  Clark  received  news  of  war  and  of  the  Cervera  squad 
ron's  disappearance,  and  the  possibilities  of  encountering  it.  Coal  was 
taken  on  and  the  Oregon  put  to  sea;  but  not  to  sail.  The  great  fighter 
was  getting  ready  to  fight,  if  necessary.  Outside  the  harbor,  in  the 
open  sea,  Captain  Clark  stopped  for  target  practice  with  all  guns 
and  at  varying  distances.  More  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  rounds 
were  fired  with  forty-seven  misses.  The  men  were  up  to  the  mark 
and  ready  for  work.  Then  the  ship  was  taken  back  into  the  harbor 
under  pretense  of  ''making  repairs"  and  remained  there  until  further 
orders  were  received. 

On  May  3  the  ocean  was  sought  and  there  the  battleship  left  the 
Marietta  and  Nichteroy  and  hurried  on.  On  May  24  the  great  ship 
steamed  into  Jupiter  Inlet,  Florida,  and  Captain  Clark  reported  to 
Washington  that  he  had  arrived  safely  and  was  ready  to  put  to  sea 
and  fight.  The  distance  had  been  covered  in  fifty-five  days  of  actual 
sailing  and  sixty-six  days  actual  time,  and  every  part  of  the  delicate 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  s:| 

mechanism  was  in  perfect  condition  and  the  health  and  spirit  of  the 
crew  excellent. 

That  is  what  the  Oregon  was  doing  during  the  uncertain  days  when 
Cervera's  squadron  was  sailing  in  mystery,  and  that  is  where-  the 
Oregon  was,  ready  for  action,  a  week  after  Schley  had  sailed  to  hunt 
the  enemy. 


in. 

CERVERA'S  squadron  was  all  this  time  playing  hide  and  seek  in 
the  West  Indian  islands  where  Spanish  sympathizers  were  many  and 
information  doubtful  of  accuracy.  From  Madrid  came 

BOTTLING   UP 

news   that   Cervera    had    reported    his    safe    arrival    at        THE  SPANISH 
Santiago  de  Cuba  on  the  southeastern  coast  of  Cuba, 
and  then   came   news   from   the   same   doubtful  source  that  Cervera 
had  left  Santiago.     The  first  statement  was  true,  the  latter  was  fic 
tion  ;  but  what  was  its  object  ?     Sampson  was  covering  the  Wind 
ward  Passage  and  could  prevent  Cervera  from   going  to  Havana  by 
the  eastern  route.     Schley  was  in  the  west  to  close  that  path. 

On  May  20  Cervera's  squadron  entered  the  harbor  of  Santiago,  and 
six  days  later  Schley's  squadron  appeared  off  the  harbor.  Commo 
dore  Schley  had  been  intent  upon  preventing  the  enemy  from  get 
ting  to  Havana,  and  on  his  way  eastward  along  the  southern  coast 
stopped  to  see  if  Cervera  had,  or  would  attempt  to,  put  into  the 
harbor  of  Cienfuegos,  where  two  days  were  lost  in  doubts.  At  San 
tiago  SchLey  got  word  that  Cervera  was  in  the  harbor  with  all  his 
ships,  but  the  high  hills  at  the  entrance  and  the  narrow  passage 
prevented  him  from  seeing  the  Spanish  fleet.  It  was  not  until 
May  30  that  Schley  sent  his  famous  dispatch  to  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  saying,  "I  have  seen  the  enemy's  ships  in  the  harbor  with  my 
own  eyes."  By  adroitly  sailing  in  small  boats  at  dawn  he  had  got 
near  enough  to  the  passage  to  be  enabled  to  see  the  Spanish  war 
ships. 

Cervera  was  "bottled  up." 


84  HISTORY   OF   THE 

But  the  Spaniard  had  chosen  the  safest  and  most  impregnable 
harbor  in  Cuba.  If  he  was  "bottled  up,"  our  own  ships  were  "bottled 
out";  for,  owing  to  the  narrowness  of  the  entrance,  it  would  be  diffi 
cult  for  us  to  get  inside  to  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  a 
blockade  of  that  port  would  be  very  easy,  and  we  could  starve  them 
into  submission.  The  Spaniards  could  get  little  or  no  supplies  in 
Santiago  province,  for  Calixto  Garcia  had  some  well-armed  men  in 
that  province,  and  he  held  most  of  the  interior  towns.  He  was  then, 
indeed,  holding  Santiago  city  from  the  rear,  and  if  we  blockaded  the 
port  the  Spanish  fleet  would  be  in  a  bad  way. 

On  the  day  that  Cervera  was  seen  in  the  harbor,  orders  were  issued 
to  Major-General  W.  R.  Shafter,  commanding  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  at 
Tampa,  to  prepare  15,000  or  20,000  troops  for  embarkation  on  trans 
ports  for  Santiago.  With  the  Spanish  fleet  in  the  trap  guarded  by 
Schley,  it  was  determined  to  attack  Santiago  at  once  by  land  and  sea 
and  make  it  the  base  of  operations  in  Cuba.  It  was  a  decisive  propo 
sition. 

On  May  31  Commodore  Schley  bombarded  the  forts  at  Santiago 
for  the  alternate  purpose  of  inviting  Cervera  out  to  give  battle  or  to 
test  the  effectiveness  of  the  shore  batteries.  Firing  was  exchanged 
for  nearly  an  hour,  in  which  the  guns  on  the  Spanish  ships  inside 
participated.  The  forts  were  damaged  and  a  shell  struck  the  Admi 
ral's  flagship  in  the  harbor  and  set  fire  to  Admiral  Cervera's  room. 
There  was  no  injury  to  the  Americans. 

The  following  day  Admiral  Sampson  arrived  with  his  squadron, 
and  all  hope  of  escape  was  cut  off  from  Cervera.  Still  no  American 
ships  could  venture  to  enter  the  harbor,  the  passage  to  which  was 
not  more  than  two  hundred  yards  in  width.  The  harbor  channels  were 
planted  with  torpedo  mines,  four  land  batteries  guarded  the  narrow 
door,  and,  inside,  a  battery  moored  upon  an  old  war  ship  faced  the 
entrance,  while  Cervera's  full  squadron  lay  in  wait.  For  days  the 
American  ships  lay  off  the  harbor,  like  cats  before  a  rat-hole,  varying 
the  suspense  with  bombardments  of  the  batteries  and  with  feints 
intended  to  draw  Cervera  out. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  WM.  R.  SHAFTER. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAH  85 

The  situation  was  ripe  for  heroism,  and  the  hero  appeared.  Ife 
was  Lieutenant  Richmond  Pearson  Hobson,  an  assistant  Naval  Con 
structor,  upon  whom  Admiral  Sampson  called  to  decide  whether  it 
would  be  possible  to  sink  a  ship  in  the  harbor  entrance  and  effectually 
block  it.  A  stopper  was  to  be  put  into  the  mouth  of  the  bottle 
which  held  Cervera's  ships.  Lieutenant  Hobson,  after  several  days' 
consideration,  came  forward  with  a  plan  that  he  pronounced  practic 
able  and  begged  to  be  permitted  to  command  the  enterprise,  which 
seemed  to  involve  nothing  less  than  sending  seven  men  into  the  jaws 
of  almost  certain  death,  in  order  that  the  navy  of  Spain  might  be 
trapped  beyond  escape,  and  the  sentinel  American  ships  relieved  of 
the  strain  of  watching. 

Lieutenant  Hobson's  daring  plan  was  to  take  the  big  ship  Mcrri- 
mac  straight  into  the  entrance  under  the  fire  of  forts  and  ships  and 
sink  her  suddenly  by  the  aid  of  torpedoes.  It  involved  the  assistance 
of  six  men  to  sail  her  in,  and  these,  with  the  commander,  had  to 
expect  to  escape  death  only  by  miracle.  Admiral  Sampson  accepted 
the  plan,  rewarded  Hobson  by  granting  his  request  to  command  the 
perilous  enterprise,  and  then  called  for  six  volunteers,  one  from  each 
of  his  fighting  ships. 

Then  a  spectacle  was  witnessed  that  was  to  make  the  world  ring 
with  surprise  and  admiration  for  American  seamen.  Our  sailors  had 
been  described  by  Europeans  of  the  continent  as  "mercenaries,"  "the 
scum  and  refuse  of  the  world's  navies,"  as  mere  hirelings,  without 
patriotism,  and  without  courage. 

When  these  "  mercenaries  "  heard  the  call  for  volunteers  to  face  the 
prospect  of  almost  certain  death,  practically  every  man  on  every  ship 
came  forward.  They  not  only  offered  to  go,  but  many  wept  and  begged 
for  the  privilege  of  going.  As  only  six  were  needed  for  special  duties 
the  choice  was  narrowed  down,  but  lots  were  drawn  in  some  instances 
and  record-ratings  resorted  to  in  others,  to  determine  thus  fairly  who 
should  be  taken,  and  so  pacify  the  eagerness  of  the  intrepid  crews. 

And  when  the  volunteers  were  put  aboard  the  Merrimac,  there 
were  eight  men  instead  of  seven  to  go,  because  a  coxswain  of  the 


86  HISTORY   OF   THE 

New  York,  who  had  been  at  work  on  the  Merrimac,  concealed  himself 
and  when  discovered  at  the  last  moment  became  insubordinate  and 
refused  to  leave  her.  The  officers,  rigorous  as  they  were  in  discipline, 
saw  that  there  was  sublimity  in  the  mutineer,  and,  in  silence,  left 
him  at  the  post  he  had  resolved  to  occupy. 

The  Merrimac  was  a  big  ship,  330  feet  in  length,  and  the  plan  was 
to  run  her  into  the  entrance,  swing  her  across  the  channel,  and,  by 
exploding  torpedoes  attached  to  the  hull  below  the  water  line  and 
opening  all  the  water  valves,  sink  her  instantly  and  leave  her  an 
immovable  obstacle  to  the  passage  of  ships  in  or  out. 

In  two  days  the  Merrimac  was  made  ready,  under  Hobson's  per 
sonal  supervision,  and  then  the  volunteers  were  called.  The  list  of 
these  would  adorn  any  page  of  the  world's  history.  They  were :  — 

Lieutenant  RICHMOND  PEARSON  HOBSON,  an  Assistant  Naval  Constructor. 

OSBORN  DEIGNAN,  a  coxswain  of  the  Merrimac. 

GEORGE  F.  PHILLIPS,  a  machinist  of  the  Merrimac. 

JOHN  KELLY,  a  water  tender  of  the  Merrimac. 

GEORGE  CHARETTE,  a  gunner's  mate  of  the  flagship  New  York. 

DANIEL  MONTAGUE,  a  seaman  of  the  cruiser  Brooklyn. 

J.  C.  MURPHY,  a  coxswain  of  the  Iowa. 

RANDOLPH  CLAUSEN,  a  coxswain  of  the  New  York — (the  heroic  mutineer). 

Wednesday  night,  June  1,  was  selected  for  the  enterprise ;  but  the 
night  was  unfavorable.  It  was  about  three  o'clock  on  Friday  morn 
ing  that  the  start  was  made.  The  night  was  beautiful,  with  the  sea 
bathed  in  the  splendid  luster  of  tropical  moonlight.  In  the  city,  far 
inshore,  the  lights  blinked,  and  the  searchlight  on  Morro  tower  burned 
brightly.  On  all  of  the  big  ships  of  the  American  fleet  every  man 
of  the  crews  was  lying  on  the  decks  with  his  rubber  blanket  under 
him,  waiting  to  witness  the  desperate  act. 

The  Merrimac  headed  straight  for  the  western  shore  of  the  harbor 
entrance,  followed  by  the  launch  of  the  New  York,  commanded  by 
Naval  Cadet  Joseph  Wright  Powell,  of  Oswego,  New  York,  with  five 
men.  Theirs  was  a  duty  scarcely  less  hazardous  than  that  of  the 
men  on  the  Merrimac.  There  was  no  apprehension  that  the  men  on 


NAVAL-CONSTRUCTOR  RICHMOND   P.  HOBSON,  U.  S.  N. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  87 

the  Merrimac  would  be  killed  by  the  explosion  of  the  torpedoes  against 
her  hull.  The  charges  were  to  be  controlled  by  an  electric  wire 
that  would  ignite  a  fuse  so  timed  as  to  allow  the  heroes  to  leap  into 
a  whaleboat  and  catamaran  towed  astern.  But  in  case  of  miscar 
riage  of  concerted  action  and  failure  to  reach  the  floats,  Cadet  Pow 
ell's  launch  was  to  rescue  the  survivors  if  she  could. 

On  board  the  Merrimac  Lieutenant  Hobson  stood  on  the  "bridge" 
of  the  ship  in  full  uniform,  in  command.  The  other  men,  stripped  to 
the  waist  and  wearing  light  under-trousers  alone,  were  at  their  posts. 
As  noiselessly  as  possible,  with  three  lights  showing  rearwards,  the 
ship  crept  towards  the  Estrella  point,  with  the  intention  to  drop  the 
bow  anchor  on  that  side  and  thus  swing  with  the  flood  tide  across 
the  channel.  She  had  fairly  reached  the  entrance  under  the  cover 
of  a  cloud  over  the  moon,  when  the  sentinels  on  Morro  sighted  her 
and  a  shot  was  flred  into  her.  In  another  moment  all  the  Spanish 
batteries  were  busy  pouring  a  torrent  of  shot  and  shell  into  the  ship, 
while  from  inside  the  harbor  the  ships  cleared  for  action  and  cen 
tered  their  metal  upon  her  sides.  In  the  midst  of  this  torrent  the 
heroes  of  the  Merrimac  calmly  stood  at  their  posts  and  carried  out 
their  plan  as  they  could.  Then  was  added  to  the  roar  of  cannon  the 
crash  of  the  torpedoes  that  had  been  set  against  the  Merri  mac's  hull, 
and,  almost  immediately,  she  sank.  Still  the  batteries  poured  in  their 
deadly  hail  of  missiles  for  ten  minutes,  until  the  absence  of  all  life 
on  the  sunken  ship  indicated  that  further  attack  was  useless. 

Under  this  fire  Cadet  Powell  and  his  crew  drove  the  launch  of  the 
New  York  close  in  and  hovered  on  the  spot  to  await  the  heroes.  None 
came.  All  night  the  launch  kept  watch  and  even  at  daylight  ran 
across  the  entrance  under  the  fire  of  the  batteries  to  look  for  sur 
vivors.  The  Merrimac  lay  across  the  channel. 

When  broad  day  was  in  the  sky  and  no  raft  or  boat  could  be  ob 
served,  Cadet  Powell  steamed  off  shore  for  his  ship,  pursued  by  Spanish 
shots. 

"No  man  came  out  of  that  harbor  alive,"  he  reported  to  Admiral 
Sampson,  sorrowfully.  It  was  true,  and  on  all  the  American  war 


88  HISTORY    OF    THE 

ships  the  sailors  looked  at  the  sunken  vessel  in  the  channel,  whose 
masts  and  funnels  could  be  seen,  and  thought  of  the  men  who  had 
apparently  given  up  their  lives  for  their  country's  service — and  again 
"Remembered  the  Maine." 

So  the  long,  hot  day  wore  into  afternoon,  until  a  small  tug,  bear 
ing  a  flag  of  truce  at  the  peak,  came  out  of  the  harbor  and  the  yacht 
Vixen  went  to  meet  her.  A  Spanish  officer  was  taken  aboard  and  con 
veyed  to  the  New  York.  From  the  New  York's  mast  the  signal  soon 
went  up  to  the  fleet  that  the  Merrimac's  whole  crew  were  prisoners 
of  war  on  Cervera's  ships,  two  slightly  wounded  only,  and  "all  well." 

The  sea  off  Santiago  harbor  seemed  to  roll  up  cheers  with  every 
wave.  The  same  charm  that  had  protected  the  American  fleet  in 
collision  with  the  Spaniards  at  Manila  seemed  to  be  holding  good. 

Lieutenant  Hobson  and  his  crew  were  safe.  They  had  executed 
their  plan,  escaped  to  the  raft,  and  were  carried  into  the  harbor  by 
the  tide,  where  they  were  picked  up  and  taken  before  Admiral  Cervera. 
When  he  learned  from  Lieutenant  Hobson  the  truth  of  the  heroic 
deed,  he  kissed  him  on  the  forehead  and  declared  that  men  capable 
of  such  gallant  deeds  should  not  be  mourned  by  their  comrades.  He 
at  once  gave  orders  to  prepare  a  vessel  to  convey  to  Admiral  Samp 
son  the  news  that  the  eight  heroes  were  honored  prisoners  of  war, 
and  soon  afterwards  took  steps  to  secure  their  exchange,  although  the 
act  was  much  delayed  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba  and  at 
Madrid.  It  was  a  month  before  the  heroes  of  the  Merrimac  were  ex 
changed.  But  during  their  imprisonment  they  were  treated  by  Admi 
ral  Cervera  with  great  kindness  and  respect,  and  they  were  permitted 
to  receive  money  and  food  from  the  American  ships. 

The  Spanish  officer  who  reported  the  safety  of  the  men,  reported 
also  that  the  Merrimac  did  not  close  the  channel.  "You  have  made 
it  more  difficult,"  he  said,  "  but  we  can  yet  get  out."  A  fact  that  was 
afterwards  demonstrated.  The  rush  of  the  tide  into  the  Merrimac's 
shattered  hull  sank  her  before  she  swung  squarely  across  the  channel. 

But  "the  cork  had  been  put  into  the  bottle"  that  held  Cervera  and 
his  ships.  And  the  American  people  ceased  from  worry  on  that  score 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  89 

and  showered  honors  on  Hobson  and  his  men.  The  seamen  were  all 
promoted  to  warrant  officers,  and  the  President  sent  a  message  to 
Congress  eulogizing  Lieutenant  Hobson  and  his  men,  suggesting  a 
vote  of  thanks  and  the  passage  of  a  special  act  to  enable  him  to 
transfer  Lieutenant  Hobson  to  the  line  of  the  Navy  for  such  promo 
tion  as  might  be  determined  upon. 

Lieutenant  Hobson,  the  hero  of  the  daring  enterprise,  was  not 
twenty-eight  years  old  when  he  carried  out  the  action  that  made  his 
fame  world- wide.  He  was  born  August  17,  1870,  at  Greensboro,  Hale 
County,  Alabama,  and  graduated  from  the  university  there  at  the  head 
of  his  class  when  he  was  fourteen.  At  h'fteen  he  entered  the  Annap 
olis  Naval  Academy.  He  graduated  there  at  nineteen,  the  youngest 
member  of  his  class.  His  aptitude  in  mathematics  and  mechanics 
was  so  great  that  he  was  sent  abroad  to  take  technical  courses  in  con 
struction  at  French  academies,  from  which  he  received  several  medals 
of  distinction.  On  returning  he  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  acad 
emy  course  of  construction  at  the  Annapolis  School,  a  course  he  had 
suggested.  He  wrote  a  number  of  papers  upon  naval  topics,  which 
attracted  considerable  attention  abroad.  He,  like  Admiral  Dewey,  was 
so  careful  of  the  conventions  of  dress,  manner,  and  the  little  amen 
ities  of  society,  that  he  was  esteemed  a  "dude"  among  those  with 
whom  he  enjoyed  the  relaxations  of  social  life.  But,  like  Dewey, 
also,  the  garb  of  the  "dude"  covered  the  clear  brain,  the  cool  cour 
age,  the  quiet  heart,  and  the  steel  nerves  of  the  dauntless  American 
tighter. 

IV. 

AFTERWARDS,  on   the  stage   of  the  Metropolitan    Opera   House   in 
New  York,  at  a  great  meeting  held  to  assist  the  Soldiers'  and  Sailors' 
Fund,  Lieutenant  Hobson,  who  had  come  home  for  the    HOBSON,8  STORY 
purpose  of  devising  means  to  raise  some  of  the  Span-       OF 
ish  ships,  told  the  story  of  his  feat,  and  described  the 
heroism  of  the  American  sailor  and  soldier  in  these  glowing  terms :  — 

"It  is  known  to  everybody  that  when  the  call  was  made  for  vol 
unteers  to  go  in  on  the  Merrimac,  men  fell  over  one  another  in  their 


90  HISTORY   OF   THE 

haste  to  be  accepted.  On  the  New  York  alone,  140  men  volunteered 
before  the  order  could  be  passed  that  no  more  volunteers  were  needed- 
When  a  few  out  of  this  number  had  been  assigned  to  stations  on  the 
Merrimac,  all,  in  obedience  to  orders,  lay  flat  on  their  faces.  Two  were 
stationed  by  the  anchor  gear,  others  by  the  torpedoes  arranged  along 
the  side,  two  in  the  engine  room.  It  was  agreed  by  each  one  that  he 
should  not  even  look  over  his  shoulder,  no  matter  what  happened  to  the 
ship,  to  any  of  his  companions,  or  to  himself.  If  wounded  he  would 
place  himself  in  a  sitting  or  a  kneeling  posture,  or  whatever  posture 
was  necessary,  so  that  when  the  time  for  his  duty  came  he  could  do  it  to 
the  best  advantage.  And  so  they  lay,  each  man  at  his  post,  and  under 
what  difficulties  you  may  understand  when  I  tell  you  that,  out  of  the 
seven  torpedoes  placed  along  the  side,  five  had  been  shot  away  by  the 
enemy's  fire  before  the  order  was  given  for  the  Merrimatfs  crew  to 
gather  at  the  rendezvous  on  the  quarter  deck.  Projectiles  were  coming 
more  as  a  continuous  stream  than  as  separate  shots.  But,  through  the 
whole  storm,  Jacky  lay  there  ready  to  do  his  duty  as  he  had  been 
instructed  to  do  it.  There  was  not  only  the  plunging  fire  from  the 
forts  on  both  sides,  but  a  terrific  horizontal  fire  from  the  fleet  in  the 
harbor,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the  next  projectile  would  wipe  all  the  sailors 
out  of  life  at  once.  If  ever  a  feeling  of  '  each  man  for  himself,'  a  feeling 
of  'get  away  from  this,'  'get  out  of  this  any  way,  anyhow,'  was  to  be 
justified  it  was  justified  then.  Not  a  man  so  much  as  turned  his  head. 

"Then,  later,  when  we  were  on  the  catamaran  and  the  enemy's 
picket  boats  came  crawling  up  out  of  the  darkness  with  their  lanterns, 
the  impulse  was  just  as  strong  to  slip  off  the  raft  and  swim  for  the 
shore,  or  for  the  entrance  of  the  harbor.  The  simple  order  was  given: 
'No  man  moves  until  further  orders.'  And  not  a  man  moved  or  stirred 
for  nearly  an  hour. 

"On  that  same  afternoon,  by  the  kindness  of  the  gallant  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  Spanish  forces,  Admiral  Cervera,  the  party  was 
in  prison,  and  the  men's  clothing  was  permitted  to  be  brought  to 
them  from  the  fleet.  One  of  the  men,  as  spokesman  for  the  rest, 
was  allowed  to  come  over  to  my  cell  with  a  package  for  me.  He 
said:  'We  would  do  it  over  again  to-night,  sir.' 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  <J1 

"  The  next  day,  when  it  seemed  uncertain  whether  or  not  a  remnant 
of  the  Inquisition  was  to  be  revived,  when  the  enemy  did  not  know 
whether  it  was  his  fault  or  ours  that  a  ship  had  been  sunk,  and  rather 
inclined  to  the  belief  that  he  had  sunk  an  American  battleship  and  that 
we  were  the  only  survivors  out  of  several  hundred,  the  men  were  taken 
before  the  Spanish  authorities  and  serious  and  impertinent  questions 
put  to  them.  Remember,  they  did  not  know  what  it  might  cost  them 
to  refuse  to  answer.  Spanish  soldiers  of  the  guard  stood  before 
them,  making  significant  gestures  with  their  hands,  thus:  [Mr.  Hobson 
passed  his  hand  edgewise  across  his  throat];  our  seamen  laughed  in  their 
faces.  Then  a  Spanish  Major  questioned  (Jharette,  because  he  spoke 
French,  and  asked  him  this  question:  — 

"'What  was  your  object  in  coining  in  here?'  and  so  long  as  I  live  I 
shall  never  forget  the  way  Charette  threw  back  his  shoulders,  proudly 
lifted  his  head  and  looked  him  in  the  eye,  as  he  said:  — 

"'In  the  United  States  navy,  sir,  it  is  not  the  custom  for  the  seamen 
to  know,  or  to  desire  to  know,  the  object  of  an  action  of  his  superior 
officer.' 

"Take  this  simple  incident, —  and,  after  all,  in  comparison  with  the 
whole  war,  a  very  simple  incident, —  the  sinking  of  the  Merriinnc,  and 
make  your  own  deductions  as  to  the  quality  of  manhood  in  the  United 
States  navy.  You  will  have  then  a  more  or  less  complete  but  certainly 
not  an  overestimated  idea  of  Jacky. 

"Experience  with  the  soldier  has  naturally  been  restricted  for  me 
under  existing  conditions,  but  recently  from  my  prison  window,  which 
was  but  little  in  the  rear  of  the  Spanish  line  of  intrenchments,  1  saw 
the  Spaniards  fortifying  the  city  for  twenty  days.  I  watched  them 
with  critical  interest.  I  saw  them  bring  up  guns  from  the  ships  and 
place  them.  Then  I  saw  our  men  come  up  and  drive  the  Spaniards  into 
those  intrenchments,  and  when  they  had  driven  them  into  the  intrench 
ments  I  saw  them  go  on  and  try  to  take  the  intrenchments  themselves. 
It  looked  to  be  an  impossible  thing,  but  as  yet  the  artillery  was  silent. 
The  men  came  on  up  the  hill  and  the  artillery  opened,  and  my  heart 
sank  when  I  saw  that  it  was  flanking  artillery.  For  a  moment  the 


92  HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

American  fire  ceased,  as  though  the  enemy's  guns  had  been  a  signal. 
'Now,  then,'  said  I  to  myself,  'this  is  the  place  where  the  individuality 
of  the  soldier  will  appear,  for  each  man  there  knows  that  he  is  just 
as  likely  as  any  other  man  to  be  struck  with  that  shrapnel.'  None 
of  them  had  ever  been  under  fire  before;  they  could  not  be  put  to  a 
harder  test;  but  how  did  they  respond  to  it?  Instantly  after  the  lull  a 
more  rapid  fire  set  in,  and  a  more  rapid  rush  of  men  up  to  the  trenches. 
In  spite  of  flanking  artillery  we  had  taken  those  fortified  trenches  with 
unsupported  infantry,  a  thing  that  army  experts  the  world  over  said 
could  not  be  done.  I  have  nothing  further  to  say.  A  sailor  cannot  go 
out  of  his  experience." 

With  a  few  words  of  appreciation  for  the  spirit  of  the  volunteer 
soldiers  in  the  camps  who  had  not  had  a  chance  to  fight,  for  the  men 
who  wanted  to  volunteer,  but  did  not  have  the  opportunity,  Mr.  Hobson 
closed  with  these  words:  — 

"I  can  only  say  that  after  seeing  our  soldiers  and  our  sailors  as  I 
have  seen  them,  I  thank  Heaven  that  it  is  vouchsafed  to  me  to  devote 
my  life,  my  whole  lifework,  I  trust,  to  the  country." 


CHAPTER  THE   SIXTH. 
THE  INVASION  OF  CUBA. 

LANDING  OF  THK  MARINES  AT  CAIMANKRA  —  FIVE  DAYS  OK  ALMOST  SLEEPLESS  FIGHTING  WITH 

SPANISH  FIGHTERS  — FIRST  OK  THE  CUBANS  —  THE  MAUSER  RIFLE  IN  ACTION  — LANDING 

OF  SHAFTER'S   DIVISION    AT   DAIQUIRI,  AND    OF  WHEELER'S    AT    SIBONEY  —  UNITED 

STATES   SOLDIERS    AND  THEIR   TORMENTS   WHILE  MARCHING  —  THK    ENEMY 

VANISHES     IN     RETREAT — FIRST     USE     OF    THE     DYNAMITE    CRUISER 

"VESUVIUS"    IN    WARFARE — RESULT    OF    THE    EXPERIMENTS. 


T 


I. 

HE  hull  of  the  Merrimac  had  scarcely  settled  at  the  bottom  of 
the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbor  when  the  President  instructed 
Major-General  Shafter  to  proceed  with  the  Fifth 

r  IKS  I    LANDING 

Army  Corps   and   effect  a   landing   at   or   near      BY  MARINES  AT 

-  r  ~_~     ,  .  CAMP  McCALLA 

Santiago.  There  were  15,000  troops  ready  for  service 
at  Tampa,  regulars  and  volunteers,  and  it  required  thirty-five  trans 
ports,  with  supply,  hospital,  and  other  service  ships,  and  a  convoy  of 
men-of-war,  to  convey  them  safely  to  whatsoever  point  should  be 
deemed  best  to  seize  for  a  base.  The  ordering  and  embarkation 
of  the  expedition  was,  of  course,  therefore,  attended  with  delay  and 
some  impatience.  Meanwhile  the  war  ships  released  from  continual 
watch  at  Santiago  reconnoitered  the  coast  to  the  east  and  west,  con 
ferring  with  the  Cuban  allies  and  seeking  to  discover  the  best  landing 
point.  To  cover  the  place  selected,  feints  were  made  at  several  points, 
which  were  bombarded  by  our  ships  in  turn. 

The  first  descent  in  force  was  upon  the  town  of  Caimanera,  in 
Guantanamo  Bay,  about  forty  miles  east  of  Santiago.  Caimanera,  or 
Alligator  Pool,  is  a  small  town  situated  six  "miles  from  the  bay  en 
trance,  and  was  the  only  place  of  any  importance  in  the  shallow 
harbor.  It  is  the  sea  terminus  of  a  railroad  fifteen  miles  in  length 
to  the  towns  of  Guantanamo.  Santa  Catalina,  and  Jamaica  northward. 

(93) 


94  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Tuesday,  June  7,  five  ships  bombarded  the  shore  batteries,  which  the 
Spaniards  had  constructed  for  defense,  and  for  eight  hours  threw 
shells  toward  the  town  in  which  there  was  a  garrison  of  about  1,000 
Spanish.  Here,  under  the  fire  of  the  shore  batteries,  the  St.  Louis 
was  sent  in  to  cut  the  cable  line,  which,  under  the  international 
agreement,  could  only  be  done  within  three  miles  of  the  shore.  Pro 
tected  by  her  consorts  the  St.  Louis  lay  steady  under  terrific  fire  and 
succeeded  in  the  task  without  injury.  At  the  end  of  two  days  of 
bombardment  the  ships  had  destroyed  the  shore  batteries  and  forced 
their  way  within  the  entrance  of  the  bay  to  Fisherman's  Point,  on 
the  east  side. 

Here  it  was  that,  on  Friday,  June  10,  the  first  forces  of  the  United 
States  landed  upon  Cuban  soil.  They  were  650  men  of  the  First  Ma 
rine  Battalion  Volunteers  of  New  York,  under  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Robert  W.  Huntington.  They  had  been  aboard  the  transport 
Panther  since  May  22,  without  setting  foot  on  land.  They  had  en 
countered  a  fearful  storm  off  Cape  Hatteras,  had  lain  for  weeks  under 
a  broiling  sun,  and  now,  with  the  prospect  of  stretching  themselves 
on  shore,  were  full  of  enthusiasm.  The  afternoon  of  the  10th  they 
landed  and  marched  up  the  steep  hillside  east  of  Fisherman's  Point 
to  the  plateau  at  the  summit,  where  a  grateful  breeze  was  blowing. 
Then,  under  the  influence  of  unrestrained  enthusiasm,  a  pole  was 
erected  and  at  ten  minutes  before  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Color- 
Sergeant  Richard  Silvey,  of  Company  C,  raised  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
over  Cuban  soil,  while  the  men,  drawn  up  with  uncovered  heads,  sa 
luted  the  flag  with  cheers.  Then,  on  the  hilltop  a  camp  was  laid 
out,  tents  set  up,  supplies  fetched  with  enormous  difficulty  up  the 
side  of  the  hill  overgrown  with  dense  brush  and  the  sharp  cactus 
plant  that  covers  the  whole  country.  But  this  was  a  labor  of  en 
joyment  to  the  marines  sick  of  being  cooped  up  on  shipboard  in 
inaction.  No  Spaniards  appeared  to  oppose  the  landing  or  to  resist 
the  establishment  of  the  camp.  The  sun  went  down  that  afternoon 
upon  Camp  McCalla,  so  christened  after  the  commander  of  the  gun 
boat  Marblehead,  leaving  the  marines  weary  with  labor  but  grateful 


THE  WERNER  COM 


FIRST  HOISTING  OF  THE  STARS  / 


*•  • .'  • ". : . 


RIPES  ON  CUBAN  SOIL,  JUNE  10th,  1898. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  % 

for  rest  assured,  and  proud  of  the  honor  of  first  landing.  Next  day 
the  camp  was  finished  and  the  men  gave  themselves  up  to  security. 

This  was  to  be  rudely  destroyed,  however.  About  four  in  the  after 
noon,  while  some  of  the  men  were  bathing,  and  others  lounging,  with 
scouts  out  among  the  foothills  to  the  north  and  east,  a  Cuban  scout 
rushed  into  camp  and  reported  that  200  Spaniards  were  in  the  tropi 
cal  forest  preparing  to  attack.  Immediately  shots  were  heard  in  the 
tangled  fastnesses  and  our  men  were  called  to  defense.  A  hundred 
and  h'fty  who  were  bathing  scrambled  ashore,  ran  up  the  hill  entirely 
nude,  grasped  their  carbines,  and  fell  into  line  with  their  comrades. 
Then  followed  a  few  minutes  of  fighting. 

For  the  first  time  the  Mauser  rifle  and  smokeless  powder  of  the 
Spanish  regulars  were  matched  against  the  Lee  rifle  of  the  American 
navy,  with  its  grain  powder.  The  result  of  the  test  was  to  prove 
the  superiority  of  smokeless  powder,  at  least.  The  rain  of  Spanish 
bullets  —  more  like  steel  wire  nails  than  conical  bullets  —  came  from 
ambush  without  betraying  the  hiding  place  of  the  marksman,  so  that 
our  marines  were  fighting  an  unseen  foe  who  could  be  flushed  only 
by  hunting  for  him.  This  exposed  the  hunter  more  than  the  hunted. 

The  little  skirmish  was  soon  over,  but  at  nine  o'clock  that  night 
when  the  moon  had  come  up,  burying  the  thickets  in  dense  gloom  and 
flooding  the  open  spaces  with  silvery  radiance,  the  Spanish  again  at 
tacked  from  the  thickets,  shooting  into  the  white  tents  and  at  the 
moving  figures  of  pickets  or  those  to  be  seen  in  camp.  Four  of  our 
men  were  killed  and  a  number  wounded.  The  first  to  fall  was  Dr. 
John  Blair  Gibbs,  of  New  York,  a  distinguished  young  surgeon  who 
had  given  up  a  large  practice  to  volunteer.  He  was  the  first  man  to 
be  accepted  as  a  New  York  volunteer  in  the  navy  and  the  first  to  be 
killed  in  a  battle  on  Cuban  ground.  He  was  shot  as  he  came  out  of 
the  hospital  tent  into  the  moonlight.  He  was  surgeon  of  the  bat 
talion. 

All  night  long,  without  a  moment's  sleep,  the  marines  sustained 
the  defense,  sending  out  scouting  squads  into  the  thickets  and  amongst 
the  prickly  cactus  plants,  almost  impenetrable.  They  could  discover  the 


96  HISTORY   OF   THE 

enemy  only  by  the  flash  of  his  gun.  The  ships  in  the  bay  threw  their 
searchlights  into  the  thickets  to  assist,  but  all  night  the  unseen  foe 
beleaguered  the  marines.  When  morning  dawned  there  were  four 
marines  dead  and  a  number  wounded,  while  there  were  indications 
that  the  Spaniards  had  carried  off  their  dead  and  wounded,  the  num 
ber  of  which  could  not  be  ascertained. 

When  day  dawned  the  marines  had  been  twenty-four  hours  with 
out  sleep.  They  were  not  yet  to  get  any.  For  twenty-four  hours 
afterwards  no  man  in  that  camp  had  an  hour  of  sleep  or  even  of 
rest.  The  hilltop,  which  had  seemed  impregnable  to  attack,  proved 
to  be  a  target  for  the  hiding  foe.  So  at  daylight  down  came  all  the 
clean,  white  tents,  and  all  the  camp  luggage  and  supplies  had  to  be 
wearily  carried  down  the  hill  again.  Then  trenches  must  be  dug 
around  the  crown  of  the  hill.  In  these  for  a  week  the  men  were  to 
crouch  by  day  and  sleep  by  night.  They  intended  to  hold  Camp  Mc- 
Calla.  Huddled  on  the  hilltop  they  could  see  nothing,  save  here  and 
there  a  flash  in  the  night  or  a  moving  bush  in  the  day,  but  they  fired 
away  as  best  they  could.  When  they  were  not  in  camp,  they  were 
out  in  the  woods  scouting  and  skirmishing.  These  expeditions  were 
trying  to  those  untrained  to  the  work.  Most  of  the  marines  came 
from  the  cities.  They  were  absolutely  ignorant  of  woodcraft.  None  of 
the  men  had  been  taught  to  fight  in  this  manner.  Even  the  bravest 
do  not  like  to  keep  looking  for  death  and  have  it  continually  about 
to  seize  them. 

With  the  arrival  of  sixty  Cuban  scouts  and  soldiers  under  the  in 
surgent  Colonel  Alfredo  Laborde,  of  General  Garcia's  command,  however, 
on  the  second  day,  there  was  improvement  in  the  situation.  They 
understood  the  guerilla  method  of  fighting.  Their  intuition  in  the 
thickets  astonished  the  marine  volunteers.  They  would  go  carelessly 
through  the  jungle,  apparently  keeping  no  watch  and  devoid  of  fear. 
Then,  without  there  seeming  to  be  any  reason  for  it,  they  would  an 
nounce  that  there  were  Spaniards  in  the  vicinity  and  prepare  to  meet 
them.  They  were  of  immense  service  as  scouts  and  guides,  and  en 
abled  the  marines  in  three  or  four  days  to  hunt  down  the  secreted 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  97 

Spaniards,  who  were  killed  all  through  the  chaparral  as  if  they  were 
lurking  animals. 

At  the  end  of  five  days  and  nights  of  scouting,  lighting,  with 
almost  no  sleep,  the  Spaniards  were  driven  back  to  Caimanera,  and 
then  Camp  McCalla  was  again  occupied  with  the  tents  of  the  brave 
volunteers  who  encountered  the  first  horrors  of  the  campaign  to  cap 
ture  Santiago. 

The  sailors  of  the  navy  on  board  the  war  ships  in  the  harbor,  who 
had  not  expected  great  things  of  the  volunteers  at  first,  saw  the  heroic 
capture  of  the  base  with  wonder  and  pride.  They  volunteered  again 
and  again  to  land  and  assist  the  volunteers  in  keeping  the  flag  aloft, 
When  the  last  Spaniard  was  driven  back  to  the  trenches  of  the  town, 
the  sailors  on  the  Marblehead  sent  to  the  volunteers  a  testimonial  of 
their  admiration.  It  took  the  form  of  340  pounds  of  "plug"  tobacco, 
sent  over  and  delivered  in  camp  by  the  impulsive  seamen.  When  it 
was  received  the  marines  were  drawn  up  in  line  on  top  the  hill,  the 
megaphone  was  pointed  at  the  Marblehead,  and  then  ensued  a  passage 
of  complimentary  greetings  between  ships  and  marines,  accompanied 
by  cheers  and  shouts  of  joy. 

In  this  heroic  encounter,  which  cannot  be  called  a  battle,  although 
no  battle  ever  demanded  more  fortitude  or  involved  more  endurance 
or  suffering,  the  United  States  forces  obtained  their  first  impressions  of 
Spanish  and  Cuban  soldiers.  It  was,  that,  while  both  were  brave,  they 
were  of  no  value  as  disciplined  fighters.  The  Cuban  scouts  were  a 
total  surprise.  They  could  not  shoot.  The  rifles  with  which  they  were 
supplied  after  their  arrival  in  camp  were  as  so  many  useless  clubs,  hi 
the  excitement  of  battle  their  instinct  was  to  throw  them  away  and 
take  to  their  machetes.  If  they  did  fire,  it  was  from  the  hip  and  they 
\u-iv  as  likely  to  kill  their  own  men  or  the  Americans  as  the  Span 
iards.  Their  enthusiasm  was  unbounded.  When  fighting  was  on  they 
gave  one  wild  cheer  after  another:  "Viva  Cuba  Libre,"  "Viva  los 
Americanos,"  "Viva  Cubanos."  They  refused  the  concealment  of 
breastworks,  preferring  to  rise  at  full  length  after  each  volley  and, 
waving  their  machetes,  to  shout  wild  oaths  of  defiance  at  their  foes, 


98  HISTORY   OF   THE 

for  whom  they  appeared  to  have  the  utmost  hatred  and  contempt. 
Their  endurance  was  superb.  They  clambered  over  the  cactus-covered 
hills  in  their  bare  feet  all  day,  easily  outlasting  the  much  larger  and 
more  powerful  Americans,  who  are  not  accustomed  to  such  movements. 

Most  of  the  Cuban  soldiers  were  negroes,  although  their  officers  were 
white.  Some  of  them  were  full-blooded  blacks,  who  seemed  to  inherit 
the  savage  blood  of  their  African  ancestors.  Had  it  not  been  for  the 
Americans  the  Spaniards  who  were  captured  would  have  fared  badly. 
The  night  the  first  were  captured  the  Cubans  were  in  tremendous  ex 
citement.  They  hopped  about  smoking,  laughing,  and  shouting,  in 
utter  defiance  of  camp  regulations.  While  arrangements  were  being 
made  to  have  the  prisoners  taken  on  board  the  Marblehead,  one  of  the 
Cubans  —  a  little  black  fellow  with  a  string  of  white  beads  about  his 
neck —approached  an  American  officer.  Not  being  able  to  speak  Eng 
lish,  he  rolled  his  eyes  suggestively  in  the  direction  of  the  prisoners, 
tilted  back  his  head,  and  drew  his  finger  across  his  throat  three  times. 

"  Si  ? "  he  asked  with  a  nod  of  his  head  toward  the  Spaniards,  and 
again  he  cut  at  his  throat  with  his  finger. 

"No,"  said  the  officer,  shaking  his  head  positively.  The  Cuban 
scowled,  grunted,  shrugged  his  shoulders,  and  walked  away  in  deep 
disgust. 

Deserters  began  to  come  in  from  the  Spanish  lines  in  a  starving 
condition  and  much  disheartened.  These,  with  the  prisoners  captured 
and  their  statements  and  condition,  surprised  the  Americans.  Like 
the  Cubans,  the  Spanish  regulars  were  totally  ignorant  of  the  mech 
anism  of  the  modern  rifle.  The  "sights"  on  many  of  the  Mausers 
found  on  the  ground  were  so  badly  rusted  that  they  could  not  be 
moved,  and  in  such  position  as  to  indicate  that  the  only  elevation  the 
Spanish  soldier  knew  was  "point  blank."  The  Spaniard,  like  the  Cuban 
again,  fired  from  the  hip,  disregarding  accuracy  of  aim.  The  fatalities 
among  the  marines  were  therefore  accidental  hits.  These  hits,  even 
if  accidental,  caused  dreadful  wounds,  and  in  the  second  day's  fighting 
gave  rise  to  the  charge  that  the  Spaniards  mutilated  the  dead.  Care 
ful  investigation  by  our  own  surgeons  entirely  disproved  the  charge. 


r  * 
mm     , 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  99 

The  long,  slender  Mauser  bullet,  at  close  range,  after  entering  the 
body  appeared  to  turn  around  and  go  tearing  and  cutting  its  way 
through.  The  aperture  at  entry  was  small,  but  where  the  bullet 
came  out  great  holes  were  torn  in  the  killed  and  wounded. 


ii. 
THE    first   division    of    the   United    States    army    of    THE  LANDING 

OF  THE  TROOPS 

invasion  arrived   off  Santiago    June   20.     It   was    com 
manded    in   pei-son    by    Major-General    Shafter  and   consisted  of  the 
following  troops:  — 

Infantry  regiments:  Sixth,  Sixteenth,  Seventy-first  New  York  Volunteers,  Tenth, 
Twenty-second,  Second,  Thirteenth,  Ninth,  Twenty-fourth,  Eighth,  Second  Massachu 
setts  Volunteers,  First,  Twenty-fifth,  Twelfth,  Seventh,  Seventeenth,  Third,  Twentieth. 
Total  infantry,  561  officers  and  10,701)  enlisted  men. 

Cavalry:  Two  dismounted  squadrons  of  four  troops  each  from  the  Third,  Sixth, 
Ninth,  First,  and  Tenth  Cavalry,  and  two  dismounted  squadrons  of  four  troops  each 
from  the  first  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry.  Total  dismounted  cavalry,  159 
officers,  2,875  enlisted  men;  mounted  cavalry,  one  squadron  of  the  Second,  9  officers 
and  280  enlisted  men. 

Artillery:  Light  batteries  E  and  K,  First  Artillery;  A  and  F,  Second  Artillery; 
14  officers  and  323  enlisted  men.  Batteries  G  and  H,  Fourth  Artillery,  siege,  4 
officers  and  132  enlisted  men. 

Engineers:  Companies  C  and  E,  9  officers,  200  enlisted  men. 

Signal  Corps:  One  detachment,  2  officers,  and  45  enlisted  men. 

Hospital  detachments  are  included  in  these  official  figures.  The 
staff  corps  numbered  15  officers.  The  grand  total  of  the  expedition 
was  773  officers  and  14,564  enlisted  men. 

General  Shafter,  who  was  on  board  the  transport  Seyuranra,  went 
on  the  New  York  to  confer  with  Admiral  Sampson,  after  which  both 
proceeded  to  Aserradero,  eighteen  miles  west  of  the  harbor,  for  a  con 
ference  with  the  Cuban  General,  Calixto  Garcia,  who  held  that  place 
with  4,000  of  the  insurgent  troops,  under  agreement  established  with 
General  Maximo  Gomez,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  insurgent  forces. 
This  had  been  arranged  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Andrew  S.  Rowan,  and 
was  a  part  of  the  occasion  of  his  dangerous  journey  through  Cuba  in 


100  HISTORY    OF    THE 

search  of  General  Gomez.  The  three  commanders  held  a  long  con 
versation  at  Aserradero  and  the  plan  of  invasion  was  fully  agreed 
upon. 

On  Wednesday,  the  22d,  the  preconcerted  measures  for  landing 
were  put  into  effect.  The  fleet  under  Sampson  separated  into  small 
groups  of  ships  and  proceeded  to  attack  all  the  batteries  along  the 
coast  for  many  miles.  Against  the  batteries  on  the  west  of  Santiago,  at 
Aguadores,  two  and  one-half  miles  east,  at  Las  Altares,  eight  miles 
east,  and  at  Baiquiri  (or  Daiquiri),  twelve  miles  east,  the  ships  at 
tacked  with  such  weight  that  the  batteries  were  silenced,  and  the  small 
garrisons  were  driven  in  confusion  to  the  hills  in  the  rear.  When 
this  was  achieved  the  transports  were  run  in  at  Baiquiri  and  at  Las 
Altares  where  the  troops  were  disembarked  without  meeting  the 
slightest  resistance.  These  two  places  were  selected  in  order  that 
the  Spanish  outposts  defending  Santiago  might  be  attacked  in  front 
by  the  United  States  forces  landed  at  Baiquiri,  while  those  disem 
barking  at  Altares  or  Siboney,  would  be  able  to  fall  on  the  right 
flank  or  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

Here,  again,  as  at  Camp  McCalla,  the  landing  was  so  easily  made 
and  the  first  advance  was  so  little  resisted  that  the  campaign  began 
with  no  intimation  of  the  stout  resistance  and  desperate  obstacles  that 
were  to  be  met.  The  division  that  went  ashore  at  Baiquiri  advanced 
to  the  northwest  upon  a  foe  that  vanished  into  the  jungle  and  among 
the  hills  without  making  a  stand.  At  Demajayabo,  two  miles  north 
west  of  Baiquiri,  the  head  of  the  invading  column  rested  on  Wednesday 
night.  Thursday  morning  the  vanguard  advanced  to  Juragua,  four 
and  a  half  miles  further,  without  check.  General  Lawton's  brigade, 
which  formed  the  vanguard  of  the  army,  consisted  of  the  Second 
Massachusetts  Volunteers,  the  Eighth,  Twelfth,  Twenty-second,  First. 
Fourth,  Seventh,  and  Seventeenth  Regular  Infantry,  and  the  Eighth, 
Fourth,  and  Ninth  Cavalry,  and  a  battalion  of  engineers.  The  skir 
mish  line  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Wagner.  In  it  were  fifty  picked 
men  from  the  brigade  and  about  two  hundred  Cubans  whose  famil 
iarity  with  the  country  and  the  tactics  of  the  Spaniards  rendered 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAH  J01- 

them  most  desirable  for  this  service.  Colonel  Aguirra  was  in  charge 
of  the  Cubans. 

Within  a  mile  of  Juragua  a  messenger  came  in  from  Colonel  Wag 
ner  announcing  that  the  Spanish  under  General  Linares  had  aban 
doned  the  place.  Brigadier-General  Lawton  took  possession  of  the 
town  without  tiring  a  shot.  He  found  that  the  Spaniards  had  retreated 
so  precipitately  that  they  were  unable  to  carry  out  their  purpose  of 
destroying  the  town  by  fire.  An  unsuccessful  attempt  to  burn  the 
railroad  shops  had  been  made  and  a  few  huts  on  the  outskirts  were 
set  on  tire.  Otherwise  property  there  was  unharmed,  and  the  Stars 
and  Stripes  were  raised  over  the  Government  buildings. 

General  Lawton  established  temporary  headquarters  at  Juragua 
and  set  about  taking  the  precautions  necessary  to  hold  it  against  pos 
sible  attack.  Colonel  Wagner's  scouting  party  in  advance  pushed  on 
in  a  westerly  direction.  They  had  not  gone  far  when  the  Cubans  under 
Colonel  Aguirra  stumbled  upon  the  rear  of  the  retreating  Spaniards 
and  shots  were  exchanged.  Two  Cubans  were  killed  and  the  others 
wounded. 

General  Linares  with  his  1,200  Spanish  forces  fell  back  upon  Se villa, 
near  which  is  a  plantation  called  Las  Guasimas,  which  was  the  field 
of  a  bloody  battle  between  Cubans  and  Spaniards  in  the  Ten  Years' 
War.  in  which  the  Spaniards  lost  a  thousand  killed  and  were  badly 
defeated. 

On  Wednesday,  also,  at  Siboney,  eight  miles  east  of  Santiago  Hay 
and  about  six  miles  southeast  of  Sevilla,  the  second  division  of  the 
United  States  forces  under  Major-General  Wheeler  had  disembarked. 
It  consisted  of  the  First,  Third,  Fourth,  Eighth,  Ninth,  and  Twenty- 
fifth  Regiments  of  regulars;  the  First  and  Tenth  Regiments  of  cav 
alry:  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders:  four  troops  of  the  Second  Regular 
Cavalry,  mounted;  the  Second  Regiment  of  Massachusetts  Volunteers, 
a  battalion  of  engineers,  and  a  number  of  horses  intended  to  be  used 
by  mounted  infantry. 

The  landing  was  effected  under  cover  of  a  fierce  fire  from  the 
battleships.  When  the  bombardment  had  ceased,  a  large  number 


'fOfr-'  '  HISTORY   OF    THE 

of  famished,  ill-clothed  Cubans,  flocked  down  the  mountain  sides  to 
welcome  the  Americans.  Many  of  them  wept  when  they  saw  the 
soldiers  who  had  come  to  rescue  them.  The  Spaniards  who  had  been 
driven  out  of  the  village  and  the  forts  defending  the  place,  applied 
the  torch  before  they  left  and  when  the  Americans  reached  the  shore 
the  houses  in  the  village  and  the  forest  also  were  burning. 

While  the  loaded  small  boats  were  being  pulled  ashore  the  bands 
on  the  transports  enlivened  the  proceedings  by  playing  "  There'll  be  a 
Hot  Time  in  the  Old  Town  To-night."  The  popular  air  was  greeted 
with  wild  cheers  from  the  soldiers  and  from  the  bluejackets  and  ma 
rines  on  the  war  ships. 

Thursday  the  division  set  out  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  main 
body  under  General  Shafter.  The  march  ahead  was  to  prove  almost 
intolerable,  even  to  regulars  inured  to  the  hardships  of  marching.  The 
men  were  equipped  with  all  the  impedimenta  described  by  the  War 
Department  for  campaigning.  Each  man  had  his  rifle  and  cartridges, 
bayonet,  pistol,  canteen,  blanket,  poncho,  half  of  a  shelter  tent,  rations, 
and  the  other  things  considered  necessary.  All  had  worn  the  packs  in 
Florida,  and  it  was  thought  that  they  had  become  accustomed  to  them 
and  would  be  able  to  bear  them  throughout  the  march. 

The  progress,  as  described  by  those  present,  under  the  blazing  sun, 
fighting  along  half-made  trails  through  cactus  and  jungle,  was  in  itself 
heroism.  There  was  no  shade  to  protect  the  men,  and  their  feet 
crushed  the  red  earth  into  a  fine  dust  which  rose  in  clouds,  enveloping 
them  from  head  to  foot.  It  settled  in  the  perspiration  on  their  faces 
and  arms,  covering  them  with  a  red  paste.  It  worked  into  the  folds 
of  their  packs,  and  was  blown  out  into  their  faces  and  down  their  necks 
as  the  packs  shifted  on  their  shoulders.  Dust  and  perspiration  entered 
their  eyes  and  nostrils,  blinding  and  choking  them ;  but  the  men  toiled 
on,  unmurmuring  and  clinging  to  their  packs,  heedful  of  the  warnings 
which  they  had  heard  about  deserting  their  shelters  and  rations. 

But  now  this  intolerable  condition  was  to  grow  worse.  As  they 
penetrated  further,  not  only  was  the  burning  sun  overhead,  but  the 
hills  shut  out  the  breeze.  The  packs  on  the  backs  of  the  men 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  103 

caught  in  the  overhanging  brush,  causing  them  to  lose  their  footing. 
At  last  one  man  threw  his  blanket  away.  His  example  was  followed  by 
others,  and  extra  clothing,  blankets,  cans  of  meat  and  vegetables,  shel 
ter  tents,  and  cooking  outfits  littered  the  path  along  which  the  army 
passed.  The  first  guideposts  on  the  way  to  Santiago  were  the  articles 
cast  aside  by  that  weary,  toiling  line  of  soldiers  who  forced  their  way 
over  the  hills  through  the  hot  sun.  The  practice  once  begun,  it  was 
easy  to  discard  things.  Coats,  underclothes,  and  haversacks  followed 
the  bulkier  articles,  and  the  ground  might  have  been  the  scene  of  a 
retreat  instead  of  a  scarcely  opposed  advance,  judging  from  the  litter 
along  the  line  of  march.  Many  a  soldier  who  started  out  bravely  with 
all  the  outfit  that  his  superiors  considered  necessary  finished  his  first 
day's  march  with  little  besides  the  clothing  he  wore,  his  arms,  and  his 
canteen.  What  was  thrown  away  was  not  wholly  lost,  however,  for  a 
busy  band  of  Cubans  spent  their  time  in  picking  up  the  articles  cast 
aside  and  packing  them  back  to  Baiquiri  and  Siboney  where  they 
disappeared  in  the  huts  in  which  the  Cubans  live. 

It  was  not  until  night  came  that  regret  began  to  weigh  heavily  upon 
our  troops.  With  the  setting  of  the  sun  the  terrific  heat  passed  and 
the  damp  night  air  seemed  doubly  chill  after  the  exhausting  march 
they  had  made.  The  question  of  food  was  an  important  one,  too. 
Many  of  the  men  had  abandoned  their  rations,  which  were  not  liberal 
at  the  outset,  and  as  there  was  no  hope  of  a  supply  train  reaching  the 
camps  before  two  or  three  days  the  situation  threatened  to  become 
serious.  The  plight  of  the  men  was  no  worse  than  that  of  their  officers, 
and  the  first  regiments  that  pitched  camp  did  so  with  a  gloomy  enough 
outlook. 

Under  these  circumstances,  as  on  the  march,  the  wonderful  good 
nature  of  the  soldiers  came  to  their  aid  and  made  it  possible  for  them 
to  overlook  some  of  the  discomforts,  dismiss  others,  and  belittle  the 
rest.  Despite  their  weariness  and  hunger,  they  went  to  work  without 
complaint,  and  by  combining  and  contriving,  lending  and  begging,  were 
able  to  give  something  to  eat  to  every  one  and  to  provide  shelter  for 
most.  Bacon  and  hardtack,  in  very  limited  quantity,  made  up  the  bill 


104  HISTORY    OF    THE 

of  fare.  The  coffee  supply  was  also  very  limited,  and  almost  without 
exception  the  men  had  abandoned  the  tinned  meats  and  vegetables 
with  which  they  had  been  supplied  at  starting.  The  fare  of  officers 
and  men  in  most  of  the  regiments  was  identical.  The  officers  had  what 
each  had  packed  for  himself  and  many  of  them  had  thrown  their  sup 
plies  away  on  the  march.  No  hardship  borne  by  the  men  was  not 
in  equal  measure  borne  by  their  officers,  and  all  alike  took  the  situation 
philosophically.  Fortunately,  there  was  abundance  of  water  in  moun 
tain  brooks  and  streams,  complete  water  supply  systems  at  Baiquiri  and 
Siboney,  so  that  the  torments  of  thirst  were  not  added  to  the  exhaus 
tion  of  heat  and  hunger  on  the  first  days  of  the  march. 


in. 

THE  landing   of   the   troops  had   been   fully   covered  by  the   fleet. 

The    Spanish    ships    in    Santiago    Bay   and    the    garrison    of    General 

Linares  in  the  city  had  been  kept  under  constant  ten- 

HURLING  DYNA- 

MITE  WITH  THE   sion  by  bombardments  from  the  heavy  ships  of  the  line. 

"VESUVIUS"  r»o     o 

On  June  23,  Santiago  was  closed  to  the  sea  and  our  army 
was  starting  to  invest  it  by  land.  General  Pando,  with  a  force  said 
to  be  12,000  strong  of  Spanish  regulars,  was  reported  to  be  advancing 
across  Cuba  from  Havana  to  the  relief  of  the  city.  At  Manzanillo, 
a  hundred  miles  west  of  Santiago,  was  a  garrison  of  7,000  Spaniards, 
but  Garcia  and  his  Cubans  lay  at  Aserradero  and  were  to  move  north 
ward  around  the  bay,  so  that  he  would  have  to  be  reckoned  with  by 
any  reinforcements  from  that  direction. 

During  the  bombardments  of  Santiago  Bay  the  first  experiment 
in  warfare  with  pneumatic  guns  throwing  dynamite  shells  was  made. 
On  June  14  the  American  dynamite  cruiser  Vesuvius  hurled  into  the  bay 
three  of  these  dynamite  shells.  The  Brazilian  government  had  pur 
chased  a  similar  ship,  the  Nichteroy  (now  the  United  States  ship  Buffalo), 
for  the  purpose  of  using  her  against  the  ships  controlled  by  the  naval 
commanders  who  had  joined  the  revolutionists.  But  the  Nichteroy's 


SPANISH -AMERICAN    WAR  1()5 

guns  had  never  been  fired.  It  has  been  explained  that  dynamite  has 
twenty-five  times  the  explosive  power  of  gunpowder.  For  twelve 
years  the  navy  had  been  divided  as  to  the  usefulness  of  the  Vesuvius 
in  war  time,  and,  until  some  practical  experiments  could  be  made,  it 
was  argued  that  it  would  be  foolish  to  build  more  ships  of  her  type. 
She  was  one  of  the  early  ships  completed  for  the  navy  and  the  fastest 
in  the  service  for  many  years,  but  she  was  always  regarded  as  a  fail 
ure  except  by  a  few  officers  who  had  tested  her  and  had  the  amplest 
confidence  that  she  would  do  everything  she  was  designed  for.  The 
good  results  obtained  with  the  pneumatic  gun  invented  by  Mefford 
and  greatly  improved  by  Zalinski  were,  it  is  true,  conceded  long  ago. 
The  slow,  steady  action  of  compressed  air  as  the  propulsive  force 
had  allowed  the  use  of  enormous  quantities  of  high  explosives  for 
the  bursting  charge  of  the  shell,  whereas,  with  ordinary  gunpowder 
to  expel  the  projectile,  explosion  in  the  bore  had  resulted  even  when 
comparatively  small  quantities  of  dynamite  were  fired.  But  many 
naval  officers  regarded  these  weapons  as  better  suited  to  land  forts 
with  stable  platforms  than  to  naval  uses.  Owing  to  her  extreme 
length  and  narrowness  it  was  difficult  for  her  to  turn  in  a  radius  of 
less  than  400  yards,  although  provided  with  twin  screws.  Naval 
officers  have  pointed  out  that  another  defect  was  the  fact  that  her 
three  tubes  are  stationary  and  can  be  trained  only  by  the  rudder. 
To  train  them,  therefore,  is  sometimes  a  difficult  matter  in  heavy 
seaway. 

Captain  Folger,  her  commander,  had  said  on  sailing  to  join  the 
fleet  in  Cuban  waters:  "Whatever  we  can  hit  with  a  shell  will  be 
destroyed.  But  if  a  shell  strikes  us  first  it  will  not  be  necessary  to 
erect  a  monument  over  us.  There  will  be  nothing  left  of  us  to 
bury." 

This  was  the  mysterious  vessel  that  arrived  at  Santiago  on  June 
14  and  remained  concealed  all  day  behind  the  big  war  ships.  A 
Cuban  pilot,  acquainted  with  the  moorings  of  Cervera's  ships  in  the 
bay,  went  aboard  her,  and  at  nine  o'clock  at  night  she  was  sent  in 
towards  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  She  crept  in  to  within  six  hundred 


106  HISTORY   OF   THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

yards  of  the  shore  and  took  position  and  range  with  great  care. 
In  three  minutes  as  many  shells  were  fired,  one  from  each  of  the 
tubes.  The  report  of  the  pneumatic  guns  was  peculiar,  sounding  like 
a  sudden,  short  cough.  The  discharge  imparted  no  perceptible  force 
of  recoil  to  the  ship. 

The  first  shot  struck  near  the  ridge  of  the  hills  and  exploded 
with  a  tremendous  roar,  not  unlike  the  thunder  of  a  shell.  There 
was,  however,  very  little  flame.  The  light  emitted  was  rather  in  the 
nature  of  a  glow.  An  immense  column  of  earth  was  blown  straight 
up  into  the  air  to  a  height  of  two  hundred  feet. 

The  effect  of  the  second  shot,  which  struck  higher  up  on  the  cliff, 
was  similar  to  that  of  the  first. 

The  third  shot  went  over  the  hill  and  probably  reached  the  sup 
posed  position  of  the  torpedo  boats  in  the  harbor. 

The  Vesuvius  backed  out  at  a  high  rate  of  speed,  although  she 
was  moving  with  her  engines  reversed.  She  swept  by  a  lighthouse 
tender  that  was  lying  to  seaward  and  which  was  getting  away  from 
the  fire  of  the  forts,  passing  her  as  though  the  tender  were  lying  at 
anchor. 

Several  times  the  Vesuvius  repeated  her  work,  though  it  was  after 
wards  ascertained  that  no  great  damage  had  been  done.  But  the 
tremendous  force  of  the  explosions  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  attack, 
combined  with  the  lack  of  flame  and  report,  filled  the  enemy  with 
terror,  and  reduced  the  Spanish  sailors  to  a  condition  bordering  upon 
nervous  exhaustion. 

The  tubes  of  the  Vesuvius  are  of  15  inches  calibre,  but  she  did 
not  fire  the  full  charge  they  are  capable  of  throwing.  Sub-calibre 
charges  of  5-  8-  and  10-inch  projectiles,  containing  from  200  to  500 
pounds  of  gun  cotton,  were  used  in  the  attacks  on  Santiago.  It  was 
regarded  as  practically  settled  that  the  Vesuvius  would  play  as  im 
portant  a  part  in  completing  the  destruction  of  Morro  Castle  at  Ha 
vana,  if  that  should  be  necessary.  Her  range  of  effectiveness  is  from 
one  mile  to  one  mile  and  a  half  for  smaller  charges. 

The  pneumatic  mortar  was  a  match  for  the  Mauser  rifle,  at  least. 


CHAPTER  THE   SEVENTH. 
HEROES  AT  LAS  GUASIMAS. 

FIRST  MILITARY    BATTLE   OF   THE   WAR  —  STORY  OF   THE  "  ROUGH    RIDERS"  VOLUNTEERS, 

THE   OFFICERS    AND    MEN  — WITH    BATTALIONS    OF    THE    FIRST   AND   TENTH   CAVALRY 

THEY  CARRY    AN    IMPREGNABLE   POSITION   AT   LAS  GUASIMAS  AGAINST  FOUR  TIMES 

THEIR     FORCE  — THE     GALLANTRY     OF     VOLUNTEERS     AND     REGULARS  — FIRST 

MILITARY    DEATHS   IN   THE   FIELD  — HUMORS  AND  TRAGEDIES  UNDER  FIRE. 


F 


RIDAY,  June  24,  1898,  is  a  date  memorable  in  the  history  of 
the  war  with  Spain.  Not  so  much  for  what  was  actually 
gained  in  victory,  but  for  what  was  exhibited  of 

0  rtOUtrH   KIDEKS 

American  courage,  tenacity,  and  character  in  the        AND 
three  factors  that  made  up  the  fighting  forces  of  United 
States  troops.    That  day  was  fought  the  battle  of  Las  Guasimas,  near 
Sevilla,  on  the  road  to   Santiago,   the   first  battle   of  the  war.     The 
brunt  of  it  was  borne  by  a  battalion  of  450  of  the  regiment  of  Rough 
Riders,  volunteers,  200  of  the  First  Regular  Cavalry,  and  224  of  the 
Tenth  Regular  Cavalry  (colored),  all  dismounted.     Not  more  courage 
galloped  into  the  lane  of  death  at  Balaklava  than  marched  into  the 
treacherous  valley  bordered  by  trees  concealing  hidden  forces  far  in  ex 
cess  of  the  invaders  at  Las  Guasimas. 

It  is  the  nature  of  Americans  to  welcome  bold  experiments  and  to 
applaud  success.  There  was  no  volunteer  body  of  the  war  that  received 
as  much  attention  and  invited  as  much  interest  as  the  regiment  of 
cavalry  known  as  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders.  That  was  its  popular 
name,  although  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt  was  but  second  in  com 
mand.  His  was  the  resolute  spirit  that  prompted  its  organization  and 
fixed  public  interest  upon  it. 

The  Honorable  Theodore  Roosevelt  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  at  the  opening  of  the  war.  He  had  long  been  one  of  those 

(107) 


108  HISTORY   OF    THE 

characteristic  personalities  in  the  public  and  private  life  of  the  United 
States  that  represent  the  vigor  of  democracy  without  regard  to  dif 
ferences  of  opinion.  Of  the  old  Dutch  stock  of  New  York's  oldest 
settlers,  he  was  born  to  great  wealth,  and  with  determined  character. 
Carefully  educated  in  universities,  he  made  his  entrance  into  poli 
tics  early,  with  vigorous  ideals  and  practical  methods.  Greeted  with 
the  epithet  of  the  "dude"  politician,  he  received  the  epithet  with  the 
good  nature  that  an  athletic,  courageous,  and  good-humored  man  would 
naturally  exhibit.  He  was  soon  a  representative  in  national  conven 
tions,  was  the  forlorn  hope  candidate  of  his  party  for  the  mayoralty  of 
New  York,  was  appointed  president  of  the  Civil  Service  Commission, 
was  Police  Commissioner  of  New  York,  and  became  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  in  1897.  Recognizing  then  the  probabilities  of  war  with 
Spain  he  began  to  encourage  the  system  of  State  Naval  Reserves  and 
made  many  addresses  in  which  he  upheld  the  manful  necessity  of  war 
to  compel  peace  and  secure  justice.  The  good  condition  of  the  navy 
at  the  outbreak  of  war  was  largely  due  to  his  labors  and  enthusiasm. 

When  war  was  inevitable,  he  resigned  his  position  as  Assistant 
Secretary  and  asked  for  a  commission  to  organize  a  regiment  of  cavalry 
of  which  Dr.  Leonard  Wood  was  to  be  commissioned  Colonel.  Great 
was  the  public  surprise.  His  friends  remonstrated  with  him  and  urged 
that  he  was  jeopardizing  his  career.  The  authorities  suggested  that  he 
would  be  more  valuable  in  the  Navy  Department.  "  The  Navy  Depart 
ment,"  he  answered,  "is  in  good  order.  I  have  done  all  1  can  here. 
There  are  other  men  who  can  carry  it  on  as  well  as  I,  but  I  should 
be  false  to  my  ideals,  false  to  the  views  I  have  openly  expressed,  if 
I  were  to  remain  here  while  fighting  is  going  on,  after  urging  other  men 
to  risk  their  lives  for  their  country."  He  declined  a  Colonel's  commis 
sion  and  asked  it  for  his  friend,  Dr.  Wood.  There  was  in  his  answer  the 
self-reliant  courage  of  American  manhood.  Mr.  Roosevelt  had  written 
admirable  historical  works,  exciting  stories  of  adventure  in  hunting 
"big  game,"  while  he  was  leading  the  life  of  a  ranchman  in  the  Far 
West.  He  was  at  once  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  American  type, 
rich,  intelligent,  industrious,  thoughtful,  cultured,  and  had  "sand." 


LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  109 

Colonel  Leonard  Wood,  who  was  commissioned  as  Colonel  of  the 
regiment  of  Rough  Riders,  was  an  assistant  surgeon  in  the  army.  He 
had  been  with  the  army  on  the  plains,  and  General  Miles  had  brought 
him  to  Washington  as  his  attendant  physician.  He  was  then  detailed 
as  physician  at  the  White  House;  but  while  surgery  was  his  profession, 
lighting  was  his  bent.  He  had  the  instincts  and  bearing  of  a  soldier;  of 
New  England  birth,  a  graduate  of  Harvard,  he  had  a  record  of  which  any 
soldier  might  be  proud,  and  wore  a  medal  of  honor  which  testified 
to  his  gallant  conduct. 

These  two  commanders,  who  had  lived  on  the  plains  of  the  Far  West, 
turned  their  eyes  in  that  direction  for  recruits  and  the  appeal  was 
answered  by  a  response  from  the  most  remarkable  types  of  men  that 
the  varied  population  of  the  United  States  could  produce.  With  admir 
able  felicity  of  terse  description  and  picturesque  suggestion  the  regi 
ment  was  afterwards  described  by  John  Fox,  Jr.,  the  well-known 
author,  who  wrote  from  Cuba  to  Harpers  Weekly:  "Never  was  there 
a  more  representative  body  of  men  on  American  soil;  never  was  there  a 
body  of  such  varied  elements;  and  yet  it  was  so  easily  welded  into 
an  effective  fighting  machine  that  a  foreigner  would  not  know  that 
they  were  not  as  near  brothers  in  blood,  character,  occupation,  mutual 
faith,  and  long  companionship  as  any  volunteer  regiment  that  ever 
took  the  Held.  The  dominant  element  was  the  big-game  hunter  and 
the  cowboy,  and  every  field  officer  and  captain  had  at  one  time  or 
another  owned  a  ranch.  The  majority  came  from  Arizona,  New 
Mexico.  Oklahoma,  and  Indian  Territory,  though  every  State  in  the 
Union  was  represented.  There  were  graduates  of  Harvard.  Yale, 
Columbia,  Princeton,  Cornell,  University  of  Virginia,  of  Pennsylvania, 
of  Colorado,  of  Iowa,  and  other  Western  and  Southern  colleges.  There 
were  members  of  the  Knickerbocker  Club  of  New  York  and  the  Somer 
set  of  Boston,  and  of  crack  horse  organizations  of  Philadelphia,  New 
York,  and  New  Jersey.  There  were  revenue  officers  from  Georgia  and 
Tennessee,  policemen  from  New  York  City,  six  or  eight  deputy  mar 
shals  from  Colorado,  half  a  dozen  Texan  Rangers,  and  one  Pawnee, 
several  Cherokees  and  Chickasaws,  Choctaws  and  Creeks.  There  were 


HO  HISTORY   OF   THE 

men  of  all  political  faiths,  all  creeds  —  Catholics,  Protestants,  and  Jews. 
There  was  one  strapping  Australian  and  one  of  the  Queen's  mounted 
police,  though  90  per  cent,  of  all  were  native-born  Americans.  And 
athletes  a  plenty  —  Wrenn,  who  twice  saved  America  the  tennis  cham 
pionship  over  England,  and  Lamed,  the  second-best  player  in  the  land; 
Goodrich,  the  captain  of  Harvard's  crew  in  1897,  and  Bull,  who  rowed 
on  that  crew;  Dean,  the  best  quarter-back  in  Harvard's  history,  and 
Greenway,  the  best  end  in  the  history  of  Yale;  Channing  and  Church, 
who  played  football  at  Princeton;  Hollister  the  runner  and  Waller  the 
high- jumper  of  Yale;  Stephens  the  polo  player,  and  Ferguson  and 
Thorpe,  the  members  of  Roosevelt's  old  polo  team  at  Oyster  Bay;  and 
besides  these,  who  were  all  troopers,  Lieutenant  Devereux,  who  played 
good  football  at  Princeton,  and  Lieutenant  Woodbury  Kane,  who  did 
the  same  at  Harvard,  and  who  helped  win  his  commission  washing 
dishes  on  a  cooking  detail  for  a  New  Mexico  outfit,  and  washing  them, 

as  a  superior  said,  "  d d  well." 

"And  more:  Sergeant  McElhinny,  the  Louisiana  planter,  who  has 
an  island  of  his  own;  Captain  Jenkins  of  South  Carolina,  son  of  the 
Confederate  general;  Captain  O'Neill,  ex-mayor,  ex-sheriff,  and  hunter  of 
Indian  and  white  desperado,  Populist  and  Free-Silver  man;  Captain 
Llewelyn,  who  carries  four  bullets  in  his  body;  Captain  Luna,  who 
demanded  at  Tampa  that  he  should  be  permitted  to  go  to  the  front  and 
show  his  loyalty  because  he  was  the  only  man  of  pure  Spanish  blood 
holding  a  commission  in  the  American  army;  Sergeant  Darry,  who  was 
Speaker  of  a  Lower  House  and  Gold  Democrat  candidate  for  Congress; 
Heffner,  who,  though  shot  mortally,  asked  Colonel  Roosevelt  to  give  him 
his  gun,  and,  propped  against  a  tree,  kept  firing  until  the  line  went  for 
ward;  and  Lieutenant  Thomas,  whose  fa.ther  fought  in  the  Civil  War, 
whose  grandfather  was  killed  in  the  Mexican  War,  who  had  two  great 
grandfathers  in  the  War  of  1812,  three  great-grandfathers  in  the  war  of 
the  Revolution,  while  the  fourth  was  Patrick  Henry — all  these  were 
citizens  of  New  Mexico.  Lastly,  there  was  Captain  Capron,  who  fell  — 
the  fifth  from  father  to  son  in  the  United  States  army,  a  captain  of 
Indian  scouts,  an  expert  in  Indian  sign  language,  and  a  great  hunter." 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  HI 

What  finer  or  more  thorough  description  could  be  given,  that  would 
set  forth  the  swinging  characteristics  of  that  regiment  of  conglomerate 
Americans  who  were  called  "  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders "  until  they 
were  dismounted  at  Tampa  to  go  to  the  front  on  foot.  Then  the 
irresistible  instinct  of  humor  in  Americans  instantly  dubbed  them 
"Wood's  Weary  Walkers."  These  were  the  volunteers  who  were  to 
be  first  under  fire  and  to  die  on  Cuban  soil. 

At  the  other  extreme  were  the  two  troops  of  the  Tenth  Regular 
Cavalry,  men  whose  fathers  had  been  slaves  and  whose  capacity  to  fight 
had  long  been  doubted  by  unbelievers,  but  whose  record  of  intrepidity 
and  exhaustive  service  on  the  frontier  with  its  twin  regiment,  the 
"  Black  Ninth,"  was  well  known  to  the  War  Department  and  signalized 
by  many  medals  of  honor  for  courage  and  gallantry.  Nearly  every 
man  black,  nearly  every  man  disciplined  by  years  of  service,  these  sons 
of  former  slaves  had  a  place  in  equity  in  the  first  line  to  fight  for 
the  freedom  of  Cuba. 

Between  these  extremes  were  the  two  hundred  men  of  the  First 
Regular  Cavalry,  white  troops,  with  ranks  suddenly  filled  with  recruits. 
Yet  all  these  cavalrymen  were  to  fight  on  foot  —  dismounted  cavalry. 


ii. 

LAS  GUASIMAS  is  so  called  from  the  tree  la  guasima,  which  is  the 
characteristic  growth  of  the  locality,  a  low  wide-spreading  tree  with 
strong  boughs  extending  almost  horizontally  out  from  THE  BATTLE  AT 
the  trunk.  It  bears  nuts  rich  in  nutrition  for  the  swine  LAS  GUASIMAS 
herded  by  the  farmers.  The  spot  is  about  six  miles  inland  from 
Baiquiri  and  near  Sevilla. 

General  Young's  brigade  of  troops,  the  vanguard  of  the  army,  had 
been  marched  from  the  coast  to  Siboney  in  the  afternoon  of  June  23, 
and  went  into  camp.  Its  object  was  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  other 
division  of  the  army  and  threaten  the  flank  of  the  retreating  Spaniards. 
That  night  Cuban  scouts  reported  to  General  Young  the  presence  of  the 
enemy  in  a  strong  position  at  Las  Guasimas  beyond  Siboney.  It  was 


112  HISTORY   OF   THE 

the  junction  of  a  mountain  trail  and  a  valley  roadway.  It  was  deter 
mined  to  attack  next  morning  and  fight  the  first  battle  of  the  war. 
Colonel  Wood  of  the  Rough  Riders  was  ordered  to  take  his  battalion 
over  the  mountain  trail,  supported  by  the  two  troops  of  the  First  Regu 
lar  Cavalry,  while  the  two  troops  of  Tenth  Cavalry  followed  the  valley 
road. 

The  march  began  at  dawn  and  the  Rough  Riders  climbed  the  hill. 
After  proceeding  several  miles,  moving  with  difficulty  along  a  narrow 
trail  that  would  not  admit  of  more  than  four  men  abreast,  while  the 
scouts  and  skirmishers  were  working  their  way  through  dense  under 
brush,  the  advance  entered  upon  the  top  of  a  ridge  that  pointed  towards 
high  hills  ahead  and  on  either  side  —  holding  the  ridge  like  a  horseshoe. 
The  hills  outlooking  the  ridge  were  covered  with  trees  amid  which  the 
Spanish  were  concealed,  from  2,000  to  3,000  strong.  The  900  United 
States  troops  were  in  a  cul  de  sac  that  was  to  have  the  force  of  an 
ambuscade,  because  of  the  enemy's  enormously  greater  number  and 
stronger  position.  The  country  around  was  a  chaos  of  high  hills  and 
peaks.  So  numerous  were  these  that  a  tenacious  force,  fertile  in  re 
source,  ought  to  have  been  able  to  annihilate  an  invading  force  much 
larger  than  the  defenders.  The  Americans  were  marching  with  heavy 
packs  and  suffered  greatly  with  the  Jieat.  The  First  Cavalry  behind  and 
the  Tenth  in  the  valley  road  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  were  inured  to 
the  heat  and  moved  cheerily  along. 

The  advance  halted  for  relief  from  the  heat  to  permit  men  in  ranks 
to  fall  out  on  the  roadside  and  recover. 

Captain  Allyn  Capron  of  Troop  L,  Rough  Riders,  was  riding  "at 
point,"  or  ahead  of  the  main  bodj%  when  he  became  aware  of  the 
presence  of  Spaniards  on  the  hill  to  his  right.  He  sent  word  back 
to  the  main  body  and  the  men  were  deployed  on  both  sides  of  the  trail 
with  injunctions  to  keep  silence.  The  news  that  Spaniards  were  within 
striking  distance  had  suddenly  developed  in  this  remarkable  body  of 
hard  riders  and  dead-shots  a  spirit  of  strange  hilarity.  Some  of  them 
laughed  aloud  and  exchanged  jokes.  Quiet  was  restored  and  the 
advance  proceeded  cautiously. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  113 

Suddenly  from  the  hill  on  the  right  a  Spaniard  stood  up  from  cover 
and  fired  the  first  shot.  Thomas  Isbell  of  Troop  L,  a  dead-shot,  saw. 
him  rise  and  almost  as  soon  as  the  Spaniard  had  fired,  he  fell  dead  with 
Isbell's  bullet  through  his  head. 

Then  from  the  three  sides  that  encircled  the  ridge  the  enemy  began 
to  pour  a  furious  plunging  fire  upon  the  volunteers,  who  were  now  at  a 
disadvantage  because  of  the  smokeless  powder  employed  by  the  Span 
iards.  These  first  volleys  were  mostly  concentrated  on  Troop  L,  in 
advance.  Captain  Capron  was  killed  in  the  first  few  minutes.  It  was 
difficult  for  our  soldiers  to  see  the  enemy  through  the  underbrush,  but 
every  advance  step  of  an  American  offered  a  plain  target  upon  which 
the  Spanish  riflemen  could  concentrate  their  fire. 

After  the  first  shock  of  encounter,  the  Rough  Riders  were  ordered 
ahead  at  double-quick,  shooting  as  they  ran.  The  Mauser  bullets  from 
an  overwhelming  force  were  dropping  our  men  dead  and  wounded 
about,  when  the  rage  of  the  volunteers  began  to  find  vent  in  curses 
at  their  inability  to  get  sight  of  the  enemy  and  take  vengeance. 

"  Don't  swear,  men!"  cried  out  Colonel  Wood,  with  cool  good-humor, 
"  Don't  swear  or  you'll  catch  no  fish!" 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt,  who,  with  Colonel  Wood,  was  in  front 
encouraging  the  men.  picked  up  a  Krag-Jorgensen  rifle  that  had  been 
dropped  by  a  wounded  trooper  and  leaping  forward  ahead  of  his  men 
began  firing  shot  after  shot  into  a  blockhouse  that  stood  at  the  head  of 
the  slope. 

Then  the  men  steadied  down  and  fought  with  the  precision  of  regu 
lars.  Five  times  during  the  advance  the  volunteers  were  ordered  to 
cease  firing  and  they  obeyed  instantly,  a  proof  of  discipline  remarked 
by  the  regulars  as  most  unusual. 

Forty  or  fifty  men  had  fallen,  when  the  battalion  cleared  the  under 
brush  and  could  see  the  blockhouse  at  the  top  of  the  slope  with  a  clear 
open  space  between. 

After  a  moment's  pause  for  formation,  the  volunteers, with  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Roosevelt  marching  in  front  of  the  line,  made  a  dash  for  the 
blockhouse,  the  men  raising  the  terrible  yell  of  the  Western  Indians  as 


114  HISTORY   OF   THE 

they  went.  A  murderous  lire  poured  from  the  blockhouse.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Koosevelt  turned  and,  waving  his  sword,  called  on  his  command 
to  follow  him  up  the  hill. 

The  Spaniards  poured  a  steady  fire  and  for  a  second  the  volunteer 
fighters  hesitated  under  the  shock  of  it.  At  that  critical  moment  the 
Tenth  Cavalry  on  the  valley  road  to  our  left  and  the  First  Cavalry  in 
the  rear  that  had  been  ordered  against  the  wings  of  the  enemy  had 
made  their  attacks  and  charged  up  the  slopes  with  the  intrepidity  of 
disciplined  veterans.  The  sound  of  their  guns  was  echoed  by  cheers 
from  the  Rough  Riders  who  dashed  against  the  blockhouse  with  cyclonic 
force.  At  the  sight  of  such  impetuous  daring  the  enemy  burst  from  the 
fort  and  ran  to  the  cover  of  the  woods  behind,  leaving  seventeen  dead 
on  the  ground  as  they  fled.  Then  they  gave  way  on  both  wings  and 
3,000  Spaniards  were  in  full  flight  before  950  Americans  that  had 
fought  againt  enormous  odds  and  disadvantages. 

No  pursuit  was  possible,  and  our  victorious  troops  camped  on  the 
ground  and  held  it. 

It  was  charged  that  the  Rough  Riders  were  led  into  ambush  by 
the  unnecessary  carelessness  of  the  officers.  This  charge  was  immedi 
ately  dispelled  by  the  reports  of  General  Wheeler  and  General  Young, 
stating  that  the  movement  was  made  under  orders  and  for  the  pur 
pose  of  forcing  a  collision.  It  was  probably  true  that  the  force  of 
the  enemy  was  largely  underestimated  by  the  Cuban  scouts  that  dis 
covered  them. 

But  the  result  of  the  encounter  was,  beyond  all  its  cost,  of  great 
value  to  our  troops.  Our  army  was  as  irresistible  as  our  navy  against 
great  odds.  The  Spaniards  were  plainly  disheartened  and  confused 
by  the  result  of  the  battle.  So  sure  were  they  of  victory  that  they  had 
brought  some  of  their  women  with  them  to  witness  the  defeat  of  the 
Americans.  The  fact  was,  the  unfaltering  advance  of  our  men,  after 
volleys  had  been  poured  into  them  from  the  front  and  flanks  was  a 
killing  surprise  for  the  Spaniards.  By  Spanish  rules  of  war  the  Ameri 
cans  were  whipped  early  in  the  fight,  and  so  badly  whipped  that  their 
invincible  volleying  and  rushing  were  like  the  resurrection  of  men 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  115 

who  ought  properly  to  remain  dead.  Indeed,  they  complained  that 
the  Americans  did  not  fight  under  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare,  but. 
like  savages,  charged  on  without  fear  of  death,  when  they  should 
have  retreated. 


in. 

THE  victory  at  Las  Guasimas  was  not  dearly  bought — as  casualties 
in  battles  go  —  but  the  list  of  dead  and  wounded  produced  a  great 
impression  upon  the  public  at  home.  First  to  fall  was  THE  FIRST 
Captain  Allyn  K.  Capron  of  Troop  L,  Rough  Riders,  one  MILITARY 

of  a  family  of  soldiers.  His  father  was  Captain  Allyn 
Capron  of  the  First  Regular  Artillery.  Allyn  K.  was  one  of  three  sons 
and  was  ambitious  to  enter  West  Point  Academy,  but.  with  a  younger 
brother,  failed  of  appointment.  They  were  not  turned  from  their  pur 
pose,  however,  but  enlisted  in  the  regular  army,  and  by  conscientious 
work  and  study  both  finally  won  commissions  as  Second-Lieutenants. 
Allyn  K.  Capron  got  a  transfer  to  the  Rough  Riders  and  was  made 
Captain  of  Troop  L.  He  was  a  well-built,  handsome  man,  about  twenty- 
seven  years  of  age.  He  was  very  courageous  and  very  popular  in  his 
troop.  His  friends  were  not  at  all  surprised  to  learn  that  he  was  in 
the  thick  of  the  fight,  and  he  died  a  hero.  After  being  mortally  struck 
he  turned  to  a  Sergeant  standing  near.  "Give  me  your  gun  a  minute," 
he  said  to  the  Sergeant,  and,  kneeling  down,  deliberately  aimed 
and  fired  two  shots  in  quick  succession.  At  each  a  Spaniard  was  seen 
to  fall.  The  Sergeant,  meantime,  had  seized  a  dead  comrade's  gun  and 
knelt  beside  his  Captain  and  fired  steadily.  When  Captain  Capron  fell 
he  gave  the  Sergeant  a  parting  message  to  his  wife  and  father,  bade 
the  Sergeant  good-bye  in  a  cheerful  voice,  and  was  then  borne  away 
dying. 

The  second  on  the  list  was  Hamilton  Fish,  Jr.,  prospective  mil 
lionaire,  athlete,  adventurer,  ranchman,  laborer,  Sergeant  of  Rough 
Riders.  He  was  one  of  a  family  that  has  rendered  conspicuous  service 


116  HISTORY    OF   THE 

to  this  country  from  the  days  of  the  Revolution.  His  great-grand 
father,  Colonel  Nicholas  Fish,  was  a  gallant  soldier  of  the  Revolution, 
esteemed  especially  by  Washington.  His  grandfather  was  Hamilton 
Fish,  fifty  years  ago  Governor  of  New  York,  and  afterwards  a  United 
States  Senator,  and,  finally,  Secretary  of  State  in  the  Cabinet  of 
President  Grant.  Young  Fish's  father,  the  Honorable  Nicholas  Fish, 
who  was  just  graduated  from  college  as  the  Civil  War  was  drawing 
to  a  close,  has  been  United  States  Minister  to  Belgium  and  Switzer 
land,  and  was  at  the  time  of  his  son's  death  an  honored  resident  of 
New  York  City.  His  uncle,  the  Honorable  Hamilton  Fish,  was  long 
an  able  and  conspicuous  member  of  the  New  York  Assembly,  and 
subsequently,  as  its  Speaker,  sustained  the  honorable  record  of  his 
family.  Young  Fish  was  about  twenty-six  years  old.  Like  most  mem 
bers  of  the  family  he  was  very  tall,  standing  six  feet  three  inches  in 
his  bare  feet.  He  was  of  powerful  build.  For  two  or  three  years  he 
was  a  student  at  Columbia  University,  and  was  a  crack  oarsman.  He 
was  a  fine  boxer  and  was  magnetized  with  animal  spirits  and  the  love 
of  danger.  Wild,  prankish,  yet  good-natured,  this  young  man  who  was 
called  "  incorrigible "  met  his  death  with  the  simplicity  of  a  hero. 
Standing  behind  a  tree,  firing,  a  comrade  in  the  open  fell  wounded. 
Young  Fish  stepped  out,  drew  the  wounded  man  behind  the  tree, 
stepped  out  in  the  open  to  take  his  place  and  was  shot  the  next  mo 
ment.  He  lived  twenty  minutes  and  died  without  complaint. 

Captain  Maxim  Luna  of  the  Rough  Riders  was  of  pure  Spanish  blood 
and  enlisted  in  New  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  to  obtain  for 
Cuba  the  freedom  he  had  found  in  the  United  States. 

Among  the  wounded  were  Major  Alexander  0.  Brodie  of  the 
Second  Battalion,  Major  James  L.  Bell  of  the  First  Cavalry,  and  half 
a  dozen  officers  of  the  three  commands.  The  wounded  numbered 
about  fifty. 

The  stories  of  heroism  were  characteristic.  One  of  the  men  of  Troop 
E,  desperately  wounded,  was  lying  between  the  firing  lines  in  an  open 
spot.  Assistant  Surgeon  Church  hurried  to  his  side  and,  with  bullets 
falling  all  around  him,  calmly  dressed  the  man's  wound,  bandaged  it 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  117 

and  walked  unconcernedly  back,  soon  returning  with  two  men  and 
a  litter,  bringing  him  into  the  lines.  While  engaged  in  his  duties, 
another  Rough  Rider  who  was  standing  behind  a  tree  ahead,  called 
aloud.  "  Doctor,  you'll  get  shot  if-you-don't-watch-out." 

The  Surgeon  turned  his  face,  laughed  at  the  man  behind  the  tree, 
and  retorted:  "Well,  what  business  have  you  here  without  getting 
killed?"  And  each  resumed  his  work  with  a  smile. 

In  the  hardest  of  the  fighting  during  the  advance,  the  New  York 
"  swells,"  as  the  aristocratic  privates  were  called,  began  to  sing  pop 
ular  songs  and  apply  the  words  to  the  occasion,  amidst  laughter  and 
applause. 

Edward  Marshall,  a  newspaper  correspondent,  who  was  in  the  thick 
of  it,  was  shot,  the  ball  striking  his  spine  and  causing  paralysis.  He 
was  borne  to  the  rear  and,  as  his  condition  seemed  desperate,  he  called 
for  his  chief,  asked  for  a  cigarette,  and  lying  on  the  stretcher  smoking, 
dictated  the  story  of  the  battle  as  far  as  he  had  seen  it,  between  mo 
ments  of  paroxysm.  When  he  was  asked  where  he  had  been  struck,  he 
smiled  and  answered,  ''All  over,  I  guess,  because  I  don't  feel  it  any 
where." 

The  courage  of  the  black  troops  as  they  charged  deliberately  up 
the  slope  was  everywhere  applauded.  There  was  no  hurry,  no  hesi 
tation,  but  cool  deliberation.  When  a  man  was  struck  his  comrade 
turned  and  called  "Hospital!"  with  as  much  presence  of  mind  as  if 
it  were  a  sham  battle.  The  black  troops  displayed  fine  courage  and 
discipline. 

There  was  not  lacking  courage  among  the  enemy.  They  were  badly 
disciplined  and  poor  marksmen,  but  there  were  individual  instances 
of  daring  that  were,  repaid  with  death  by  the  American  dead-shots. 

There  were  two  hundred  Spanish  killed  and  many  wounded.  That 
they  had  carefully  planned  the  fight  was  plain,  because  their  wounded 
were  carried  off  to  Santiago  in  wagons,  of  which  there  was  a  long  train. 


CHAPTER  THE   EIGHTH. 
CLOSING  IN  ON  SANTIAGO. 

THE  TERRIBLE  HARDSHIPS  OF  THE  TROOPS  MOVING  FROM  BAIQUIRI  TO  ATTACK  —  SPANIARDS 

TERRORIZE  CITIZENS  AND  SOLDIERS  WITH  TALKS  OF  "YANKEE"  CRUELTY  — PREPARING 

THE  LINE  OF  ASSAULT  AND  CUTTING  OFF  THE  ENEMY'S  SUPPLIES  —  THE  FEINT 

ON  AGUADORES    AND   SANTIAGO   BY   THE   AMERICAN   FLEET   AND   DUF- 

FIELD'S   TROOPS  —  Two   DAYS  OF  MURDEROUS   GUN-FIRING. 


THE  fierce  and  irresistible  onslaught  of  our  cavalry  on  the  enemy 
at   Las   Guasimas    sent   the    Spaniards    flying   back   upon   the 
outposts  of  Santiago.     They  made   no   effort   to  hold  Sevilla, 
which   General   Wheeler   occupied   next  day   and  whence,  on 
Sunday,   he   sent   the   advance    guard   with   Cuban    scouts   two    miles 
ahead  to  take  position  near  the  hill  of  San  Juan.     Rest  was  needed 
THE  ADVANCE        an^  delay  was  required  to  bring  up  field  guns  and  re- 
ON  SANTIAGO       enforcements   from    Baiquiri.      Then,   too,   the    dreaded 
rainy  season  began  on  Saturday  and  the  camps  and  roads  were  del 
uged  with   the   downpour.     The   troops   chafed,  and  the   officers  also, 
but  it  was  necessary  to  have  the  siege  guns  and  to  draw  them  over 
the  trail  through  the  jungle. 

A  newspaper  correspondent  on  the  ground  admirably  described  in 
the  New  York  Sim  the  condition,  the  prospects,  and  spirit  of  the  army 
during  this  wait  of  six  days. 

"No  man,"  he  wrote,  "who  has  not  gone  over  this  trail,  no  man 
who  was  not  in  the  terrible  downpour  of  rain  which  drenched  the 
American  army  to  the  skin  this  afternoon,  can  understand  the  suf 
fering  of  our  troops  and  the  heroism  with  which  they  bore  it. 

"Cavalrymen,  dismounted  for  the  first  time  in  years,  and  infantry 
men  from  cool  Michigan  and  Massachusetts,  toiled  hour  after  hour 
along  these  so-called  roads  and  paths,  through  the  jungles  of  cacti, 
poison  vines,  and  high  grass  that  cuts  like  a  razor,  in  a  blistering 

(118) 


HISTORY   OF   THE  SPANISH- AM  ERIC  AN    WAR  H9 

sunlight  that  makes  the  skylines  of  the  distant  hills  shimmer  and 
waver  before  the  eyes,  while  from  the  stagnant  pools  strange,  gray 
mists  float  upward,  and  vultures,  with  outstretched  wings,  look  greedily 
down  from  above. 

"The  vegetation  torn  down  and  trampled  under  foot  by  our  troops 
has  fermented,  and  a  horrible  sour  breath  arises  from  the  earth.  Curi 
ous  stenches  steal  from  hidden  places  in  the  jungle. 

"Thousands  of  gigantic  land  crabs,  spotted  with  yellow  and  red, 
wriggle  and  twist  themselves  along  the  sides  of  the  roads,  with  leprous, 
white  claws  clicking  viciously,  a  ghastly,  dreadful  sight  to  young  sol 
diers  fresh  from  New  York,  Boston,  and  Detroit.  Ragged  Cubans 
slip  noiselessly  through  the  undergrowth  or  sprawl  under  the  shade 
of  huge  gossamer  trees  watching  with  childish  pleasure  the  steady 
onpush  of  their  American  defenders. 

"The  heat  is  almost  intolerable.  The  sun  is  like  a  great  yellow 
furnace,  torturing  everything  living  and  turning  everything  dead  into 
a  thousand  mysterious  forms  of  terror. 

"The  fierce  light  swims  in  waves  before  the  eyes  of  the  exhausted 
soldiers.  This  morning  a  young  infantryman  reeled  and  fell  in  the 
road  almost  under  the  feet  of  the  mule  ridden  by  your  correspondent. 
When  I  helped  him  to  his  feet  he  smiled  and  said:  'It's  all  right.  I 
never  struck  such  a  place  as  this,  but  I  must  get  to  the  front  before 
the  fight  begins.  I  had  to  lie  to  get  into  the  army  for  I  am  only 
seventeen  years  old.'  Five  minutes  after  he  was  trudging  along  gal 
lantly. 

"Two  hours  later  the  first  great  tropical  rainstorm  we  have  en 
countered  fell  from  the  sky,  not  slantwise,  but  straight  down.  It 
was  the  first  actual  test  of  the  army  in  a  most  dreadful  experience 
of  the  tropics.  For  three  hours  a  great,  cold  torrent  swept  down 
from  the  clouds,  drenching  the  soldiers  to  the  skin,  soaking  blankets, 
and  carrying  misery  into  all  our  vast  camp,  reaching  out  on  either 
side  of  the  trail,  extinguishing  camp  fires,  and  sending  rivers  of  rnud 
and  red  water  swirling  along  the  narrow  road,  dashing  over  rocks 
where  the  trail  inclined  downward,  and  through  this  filthy  flood  the 


120  HISTORY   OF   THE 

army  streamed  along,  splashing  in  the  mud  and  water  or  huddling 
vainly  for  shelter  under  the  trees. 

"An  hour  before  the  heat  was  so  intense  that  men  reeled  and 
swooned ;  but  now  came  one  of  the  mysterious  transformations  of 
the  tropics.  The  whole  army  shivered,  and  robust  men  could  be  seen 
shaking  from  head  to  foot,  turned  gray  and  white.  Millions  of  land 
crabs  came  clattering  and  squirming  from  under  the  poisonous  under 
growth,  and  the  soldiers  crushed  them  under  their  heels.  Every  man 
who  had  quinine  swallowed  a  dose.  The  officers,  splashed  with  mud 
to  their  hips,  hurried  here  and  there,  urging  the  men  to  strip  naked 
when  the  rain  was  over  and  dry  their  clothes  at  the  camp  fires. 

"Presently  thousands  of  men  were  standing  about  naked  while 
the  sun  drew  up  thick  vapors  from  the  earth  and  vicious  tropical 
flies  stung  their  white  skins.  The  American  army  is  a  noble  body  of 
men  when  it  is  stripped.  Think  of  the  tremendous  strain  of  heat 
like  this  and  rain  like  this  in  one  day  on  men  from  a  northern  cli 
mate,  and  yet  there  was  not  one  word  of  complaint  anywhere. 

"  The  writer  has  seen  several  armies  in  the  field,  but  he  never  saw 
a  more  splendid  exhibition  of  cheerful  endurance.  One  thought  which 
seemed  to  run  like  an  electric  current  through  the  army  was  anxiety 
to  get  to  the  front.  The  soldiers  everywhere  begged  to  have  their 
regiments  put  in  the  first  line  of  attack.  The  weather  is  nothing  to 
them,  the  possibility  of  disease  is  nothing  to  them,  exposure  and  hunger 
do  not  trouble  them.  They  want  to  fight.  You  can  see  it  in  their 
faces;  you  can  hear  it  in  their  talk." 

During  six  days  a  cordon  of  these  men  was  drawing  around  the 
enemy.  The  situation  and  the  plan  of  attack  may  be  briefly  described. 
Six  miles  from  the  sea  at  the  head  of  the  bay  of  the  same  name,  lies  the 
city  of  Santiago,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  high  mountains  which  rise 
almost  straight  up  from  the  water.  These  mountains  stand  in  ridges 
practically  running  parallel  with  the  coast.  Between  the  first  and 
second  ridges  is  Santiago.  Two  and  a  half  miles  east  of  the  entrance 
of  the  harbor  is  Aguadores,  directly  south  of  Santiago  itself.  South 
east  of  Santiago,  on  the  top  of  a  hill,  is  San  Juan.  About  three 


SPANISH  AMKIJI(\A\    WAU  121 

miles  northeast  of  the  city  is  El  Caney.  Santiago  is  a  walled  city, 
and  the  three  small  towns  were  its  outposts.  General  Shatter  first 
intended  to  take  it  by  siege,  then  concluded  to  carry  it  by  assault, 
and,  in  the  end,  both  plans  were  adopted. 

From  Aguadores  to  El  Caney  the  line  of  the  invading  army  pre 
sented  nearly  six  miles  of  front  when  arrayed  for  attack.  It  consisted  of 
about  12,000  soldiers  of  the  United  States,  together  with  a  force  of 
Cubans,  under  the  command  of  General  Calixto  Garcia,  estimated  at 
from  3.000  to  4.000  men,  many  of  whom  were  occupied  in  scouting 
service.  Refugees  and  deserters  from  Santiago  reported  that  there  were 
12,000  Spanish  regulars  in  the  city  under  General  Linares,  of  which 
number  4,000  were  sick  or  disabled.  A  condition  of  terror  prevailed 
among  the  inhabitants,  who  had  been  told  that  40,000  American  troops 
were  marching  on  the  city.  It  was  declared  also  that  the  United  States 
troops  were  picking  up  Cubans  as  they  advanced  and  were  forcing  them 
to  carry  guns  and  to  fight  in  the  front.  The  women  of  the  city  were 
terror-stricken  at  the  tales  that  were  told  of  the  cruelties  and  outrages 
perpetrated  by  the  hated  "Yankees." 

The  Spaniards  warned  Cubans  that  all  who  left  the  city  would  be 
killed  by  the  Americans.  They  added  that  the  Cubans  who  left  the 
city  to  join  the  American  army  were  all  shot  as  soon  as  they  got 
in  range  of  the  "Yankee"  guns;  that  the  Americans  were  killing 
pacifcos,  men,  women,  and  children.  The  better  class  of  Cubans  knew 
that  all  these  stories  were  false  and  did  their  best  to  counteract  them. 
They  were  not  very  successful,  however,  as  the  Spaniards  declared 
they  had  absolute  proof. 

The  situation  in  Santiago  was  desperate.  There  was  famine  every 
where.  The  soldiers,  of  course,  had  most  of  the  food,  but  it  was 
of  the  poorest  quality  and  greatly  restricted  as  to  quantity.  Civilians 
had  to  shift  for  themselves.  Practically  all  the  food  in  the  city  con 
sisted  of  black  bread,  which,  in  most  cases,  was  unfit  to  eat.  Many 
were  starving  because  they  could  not  get  even  this.  Water  was 
scarce,  owing  to  the  cutting  off  of  two  of  the  sources  of  supply  by 
the  Americans.  There  were  many  wells  in  the  city,  however. 


122  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Meanwhile  the  enemy  was  preparing  to  defend  Santiago  to  the 
bitter  end.  Trenches  and  earthworks  were  constructed  and  in  front 
of  these  were  erected  barbed-wire  fences,  many  in  number,  to  pre 
vent  our  troops  from  making  any  of  the  tremendous  charges  such 
as  had  swept  away  the  Spaniards  at  Las  Guasimas.  But  the  Ameri 
cans  had  prepared  for  this  with  details  of  soldiers  supplied  with  steel 
"clippers"  to  precede  the  main  body  and  cut  down  the  fences.  Naval 
guns  from  the  batteries  of  the  disabled  war  ship  Reina  Mercedes  in 
the  harbor  were  landed  and  mounted  at  the  various  points  of  defense, 
and  the  guns  on  Admiral  Cervera's  ships  were  relied  upon  to  throw 
a  great  weight  of  shell  and  solid  shot  into  our  troops. 

From  Manzanillo  on  the  west  General  Pando  was  expected  to  come 
to  Linares'  assistance  with  a  force  estimated  at  from  5,000  to  11,000 
men.  It  was  proposed  to  send  General  Garcia  with  his  Cubans  to  pre 
vent  this,  but  when  General  Shafter  heard  that  food  was  scarce  and 
disease  prevalent  in  Santiago,  he  decided  that  it  was  better  to  have 
Pando's  force  enter  and  increase  the  distress.  "  Besides,"  he  added, 
"  we  will  know  then  where  all  the  Spanish  forces  are."  General  Pareja 
at  Caimanera,  with  a  number  of  Spaniards,  was  kept  busy  with  the 
United  States  marines  and  war  ships  in  the  harbor  and  could  not 
reach  Santiago. 

On  June  30  the  investment  was  complete.  The  Cuban  outposts 
nearest  to  the  city  had  reached  a  picturesque  old  stone  house  three 
miles  from  Santiago.  The  portholes  and  turrets  of  the  old  building 
were  a  few  days  before  manned  by  a  hundred  Spanish  soldiers.  Now 
the  house  was  held  by  fifty  Cubans.  From  this  position  the  city  of 
Santiago  could  be  distinctly  seen  below.  Red  Cross  flags  were  flying 
in  many  places,  apparently  to  discourage  gunners.  All  this  time 
the  advanced  skirmish  and  picket  lines  were  exchanging  desultory 
shots,  with  little  effect.  The  methods  of  the  Cubans  in  picketing 
the  advance  excited  admiration  among  American  officers  and  troops. 
The  work  is  of  such  a  character  that  it  would  have  been  impossible 
for  the  Americans  themselves  to  do  it  as  well,  owing  to  their 
ignorance  of  the  country  and  their  lack  of  exact  knowledge  of  Spanish 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  123 

methods.  The  ragged,  half-starved  insurgents  in  the  harassing  under 
growth  and  almost  impassable  defiles  left  not  a  single  footpath  or 
knoll  unguarded.  At  least  three  sentries  were  at  every  point.  No 
one  could  pass  without  their  knowledge.  They  would  sit  on  one  knee, 
crouched  over,  with  guns  at  half-cock,  for  hours  at  a  time,  watching 
patiently  every  wave  of  grass  or  movement  of  the  trees  that  might 
indicate  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 


ii. 

AT  EARLY  morning  on  July  1  the  American  army  and  navy  began 
a  continuous  assault  on  the  enemy  from  Aguadores  on  the  sea  to  El 
Caney  on  the  northeast  of  Santiago.  Never  before  in 

,    BOMBARDING 

warfare  had  there  been  massed  so  many  powerful  and     AGUADORES  AND 


ingenious  engines  of  destruction  to  be  wielded  on  both 

sides  by  men  of  acknowledged  courage,  and  on  the  side 

of  the  United  States,  at  least,  by  men  of  the  highest  competence  and 

training.    The  assault  was  actually  three  separate  battles,  although 

two  of  them,  inland  —  San  Juan  and  El  Caney  —  involved  each  other 

and  the  same  troops. 

The  attack  on  Aguadores  by  General  Duffield  with  the  Michigan 
Volunteers  and  some  Cubans,  aided  by  the  war  ships,  was  purely  a 
feint  to  prevent  the  Spanish  forces  there  from  going  to  the  assist 
ance  of  those  at  points  nearer  Santiago.  General  Duffield's  four  bat 
talions  were  loaded  in  cars  on  the  railroad  and  transported  westward 
from  Sibouey  until  the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  met.  Then  they  were 
taken  off  the  cars  and  marched  forward  to  the  assault. 

Aguadores  is  on  the  sea  side.  Through  the  mountain  in  its  rear 
is  a  pass  through  which  the  railway  line  extends.  Batteries  were  on 
the  crags  on  the  west  side  of  the  rocky  pass  and  a  masonry  fort  on 
the  east  side,  half  a  mile  inland.  Standing  off  the  shore  were  the 
United  States  cruiser  New  York,  with  Admiral  Sampson  on  board, 
and  the  Sutcanee  and  Gloucester,  converted  yachts.  Communication 


124  HISTORY   OF   THE 

between  the  ships  and  General  Duffield  was  maintained  by  signals 
made  by  means  of  a  white  flag  "wig-wagged"  by  code. 

At  seven  o'clock  eight  companies  marched  inland  to  get  in  the  rear 
of  Aguadores.  An  hour  later  the  sound  of  firing  was  heard,  indicating 
that  the  pretense  of  assault  had  been  commenced  by  the  army.  Ac 
cording  to  signal,  the  war  ships  then  began  their  part  of  the  work. 
The  Suwanee  began  shooting  at  the  fort  and  got  the  range  on  the 
second  shot.  The  New  York's  aim  was  remarkably  accurate,  the  shore 
batteries  being  struck  every  time  by  her  shells.  Clouds  of  smoke, 
red  with  dust,  obscured  everything.  This  was  kept  up  for  an  hour, 
and  it  seemed  that  every  inch  of  the  vicinity  had  been  ploughed  up 
by  the  missiles.  In  the  meantime  the  Suwanee  kept  firing  at  the  fort. 
Every  shell  went  through  and  exploded  inside. 

There  was  a  huge  red  and  yellow  flag  at  the  corner  of  the  fort. 
Commander  Delahanty  of  the  Suwanee  fired  and  hit  it  just  at  the  base 
of  the  staff.  The  men  on  the  New  York  and  Gloucester  cheered  lustily. 
No  one  was  seen  within  the  fort,  but  the  tilted  flagstaff  was  straight 
ened.  The  Commander  fired  four  more  shots  and  hit  the  fort  every 
time,  but  not  the  flag.  The  fifth  time  the  flag  and  staff  were  tilted 
again.  The  sixth  shell  struck  the  flag  squarely  in  the  middle,  tear 
ing  it  to  ribbons;  the  seventh  severed  the  pole,  at  a  range  of  2,000 
yards. 

This  splendid  marksmanship  was  received  with  cheers  and  the 
roar  of  siren  whistles  on  the  war  ships.  The  men  on  the  New  York 
and  Gloucester  were  so  interested  that  they  had  ceased  firing ;  but 
now  they  resumed,  and  it  rained  shell  everywhere.  The  fort  was  hit 
often  ;  great  holes  were  knocked  in  it,  and  blocks  of  granite  were 
thrown  into  the  air  to  fall  into  crumbled  dust. 

The  answering  fire,  if  any,  was  too  feeble  to  be  noticed.  Now  and 
then  there  was  a  puff  of  smoke  at  places  where  batteries  were  sup 
posed  to  be.  The  next  moment  a  shell  from  one  of  the  ships  would 
strike  the  spot.  No  shots  from  the  forts  were  seen  to  land  on  the  ships. 

While  the  firing  was  in  progress  the  Yale,  Newark,  and  Vulcan 
arrived,  crowded  with  soldiers.  They  ran  close  alongside  the  New 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  125 

York.  The  soldiers  cheered  every  shot,  They  wanted  to  land,  then, 
but  the  sun  was  too  high. 

All  the  ships  carried  great  American  flags,  the  Newark  the  largest 
of  all.  She  sailed  in  under  the  guns  of  Morro  so  that  from  her  decks 
the  Spaniards  could  be  seen  with  the  naked  eye,  but  she  did  not  draw 
their  h're,  although  she  steamed  up  and  down  twice.  She  signaled 
to  the  New  York  for  permission  to  join  in  the  fire  against  Aguadores, 
but  the  flagship  refused.  The  Newark  continued  parading  in  front  of 
Morro  until  eleven  o'clock.  Then  firing  ceased  for  half  an  hour  and 
the  ships  took  up  new  positions,  opening  again.  After  the  second  re 
newal  of  the  firing  the  bushes  on  shore  parted  and  men  in  single  file 
came  out.  The  first  carried  a  Red  Cross  flag,  the  last  had  the  same 
banner  in  his  hand  ;  the  party  had  half  a  dozen  wounded  men  and  two 
dead. 

There  was  another  stop  at  noon;  then  the  firing  was  resumed  with 
greater  energy,  the  shots  being  aimed  at  the  masked  batteries.  The 
result  was  not  seen  from  the  ships,  but  the  soldiers  inland  saw  the 
great  shells  burst  passing  over  their  heads.  The  firing  lasted  until 
2:20  o'clock,  and  ceased  for  the  day.  The  soldiers  who  came  out  said 
the  shells  had  ruined  all  the  fortifications. 

Next  morning,  responding  to  the  advance  made  by  the  army  on 
San  Juan  and  El  Caney  and  for  the  purpose  of  distracting  the  Span 
iards  in  the  city  and  on  the  ships  in  the  bay,  a  magnificent  bom 
bardment  began  of  the  forts  and  batteries  at  the  entrance  and  of  the 
inner  harbor  and  of  the  Spanish  positions  about  Santiago  itself.  The 
tremendous  assault  was  to  deceive  the  enemy's  navy  into  the  belief 
that  the  American  ships  intended  to  force  their  way  past  the  sunken 
Merrimac  into  the  bay.  It  succeeded,  as  it  was  afterwards  admitted 
that  the  nervous  strain  of  expectation  had  exhausted  the  Spanish 
sailors. 

At  sunrise  the  line  of  the  United  States  war  ships  wras  formed.  It 
comprised  the  Gloucester,  New  York,  Newark,  Indiana,  Oregon,  Iowa, 
Massachusetts,  Texas,  Brooklyn,  and  Vixen  in  the  order  named.  The 
gunners  received  orders  to  fire  slowly,  but  not  to  lose  opportunities. 


126  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  firing  began  at  a  signal  raised  upon  the  New  York  at  ten  minutes 
to  six  o'clock.  The  first  shot  was  fired  from  the  forward  turret  of 
the  flagship.  It  was  immediately  answered  by  the  batteries  to  the 
east  and  west  of  the  harbor  entrance.  The  other  ships  quickly  followed 
the  New  York,  and  the  bombardment  became  general.  The  Spanish 
guns  replied  for  ten  minutes,  then  the  gunners  seemed  to  desert 
them.  Sampson's  fire  was  maintained  steadily  for  half  an  hour,  when 
the  Newark  was  ordered  out  of  the  line. 

The  manoeuvring  of  the  battleships  during  the  action  evidently 
surprised  the  enemy.  As  the  ships  changed  position,  moving  on  to 
give  those  behind  them  a  place,  the  Spaniards  began  to  shout,  in  the 
belief  that  they  were  retiring  disabled.  But  it  was  poor  satisfaction, 
for  every  Spanish  shot  was  answered  by  one  that  struck  almost  the 
spot  whence  the  last  puff  of  smoke  came  from  the  Spanish  batteries. 
The  Oregon,  which  led  the  way,  firing  deliberately,  sailed  in  almost 
to  the  entrance  of  the  harbor.  The  Indiana  swung  in  to  the  east  of 
the  Oregon.  When  she  opened  up,  every  one  of  her  guns  was  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  east  battery,  and  the  result  was  observed  by  the 
dust  and  the  masses  of  earth  and  brick,  with  here  and  there  a  cannon, 
hurled  high  into  the  air.  The  ship  was  concealed  by  smoke,  but, 
belching  fire  every  second,  she  rained  shells  true  to  the  mark  until 
the  east  battery  ceased  to  answer. 

The  Oregon  took  Morro  Castle  for  her  mark,  and  knocked  great  holes 
in  it.  The  big  flag  on  the  castle,  which  had  waved  lazily  above  the 
smoke  of  every  engagement,  was  lost  sight  of  when  the  Oregon  opened 
fire  at  just  seven  o'clock.  As  the  flag  was  knocked  over  an  exultant 
yell  from  the  battleship  was  taken  up  on  the  other  ships  and  wild 
cheering  followed.  One  shell  struck  the  face  of  the  old  castle,  which 
was  now  crumbling.  At  the  next  shot  a  large  section  of  the  ramparts 
seemed  to  be  carried  away.  After  this  there  was  no  reply. 

The  Oregon  and  Indiana  were  then  ordered  inshore  until  their  guns 
were  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Punta  Gorda  battery,  behind  Morro. 
They  passed  to  the  west  directly  under  all  the  outer  guns,  firing  quickly 
as  they  went.  A  great  explosion  was  seen  on  Tivoli  Hill,  where  Punta 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


127 


Gordo  is,  nnd  there  were  thirty  distinct  explosions,  all  within  a  small 
area.  A  shell  went  through  the  cabin  of  Admiral  Cervera  on  his  flag 
ship  in  the  bay,  setting  it  on  fire.  Another  exploded  on  the  deck  of 
a  Spanish  ship,  killing  and  wounding  several  sailors.  One  of  the  great 
13-inch  shells,  not  intended  to  cause  such  injury,  struck  the  facade 
of  the  Cathedral  in  Santiago  and  caused  great  damage  to  the  old 
church. 

The  firing  lasted  until  eight  o'clock,  when  the  fleet  was  signaled 
that  the  shells  thrown  toward  the  Spanish  positions  might  endanger 
our  own  troops.  Then  firing  ceased,  but  no  such  magnificent  naval 
spectacle  had  been  witnessed  up  to  that  time.  Again  the  marksman 
ship  of  American  gunners  was  demonstrated  to  be  unsurpassed. 


CHAPTER   THE   NINTH. 

SAN  JUAN  AND  EL  CANEY. 

THE  TERRIBLE   STRUGGLES   OUTSIDE  OF   SANTIAGO  —  WHEELER  AND  KENT'S  ADVANCE  FROM  EL 

Pozo  UP  THE  VALLEY  TO   SAN  JUAN— "THE  BLOODY  CORNER"  AND  THE  HEROISM  OF 

OUR  TROOPS  — HAWKINS'S  AND  ROOSEVELT'S  CHARGES  ON  THE  HILL  — CHAFFEE'S 

GREAT    FIGHT    AT  EL    CANEY    AND    THE   DEARLY    BOUGHT   VICTORY  — 

SCENES  AND  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  BATTLES  —  A  FOREIGN  OPINION. 

I, 

WHILE  the  war  ships  and  Duffield's  brigade  were   hammering 
Aguadores  and  the  bay  of  Santiago,  General  Shatter's  two 
divisions   under  General   Wheeler   and    General    Lawton 
were   charging   the   outposts  of  San  Juan  and  El  Caney 
with  an  impetuous  vigor  that  was  to  overthrow  the  superior  strength 
of  the  enemy  in   his   own   chosen    intrenchments.     General   Lawton's 
division  composing  the  right  wing  of  the  American  line 
BJSANLJUAN  was  sen^  against  El  Caney,  a  village  three  miles  north 

east  of  Santiago,  protected  by  fortifications,  a  block 
house,  and  trenches.  On  Lawton's  right  General  Garcia  with  2,000 
Cubans  covered  the  roads  leading  to  Santiago  to  cut  off  any  reen- 
forcements. 

The  center  of  the  army  was  at  El  Pozo,  about  four  or  five  miles  south 
of  El  Caney,  under  Generals  Wheeler  and  Kent.  Its  objective  was  the 
high  hill  of  San  Juan,  almost  a  part  of  the  suburbs  of  Santiago  and 
the  highest  eminence  in  close  reach  of  the  city.  It  was  defended  by 
trenches,  two  houses  converted  into  defenses,  and  its  approaches  were 
covered  by  mazes  of  barbed  wire  obstacles  and  innumerable  hiding 
places  for  sharpshooters  along  the  available  road.  The  flanks  of  the 
roads  were  also  defended  by  numerous  hills,  each  occupied  and  defended 
by  Spaniards,  rendering  advance  one  continuous  series  of  skirmishes, 
amounting  altogether  to  a  day's  battle. 

(128) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  129 

Tlio  fighting  line  of  our  army  consisted  of  about  13,500  men;  1,500 
under  Duffield  on  the  left,  about  7,000  under  Wheeler  and  Kent  in 
the  center,  and  5,000  under  Lawton,  engaged  on  the  right.  Of  this 
number  there  were  three  regiments  of  volunteer  infantry  and  one  of 
volunteer  cavalry.  The  remainder  were  the  regulars  with  their  re 
cruited  force.  The  cavalry  under  Wheeler  was  dismounted. 

Before  daylight  Friday  morning  (July  1),  every  thing  was  in  readiness. 
Wheeler  had  planted  Grimes's  battery  of  field  guns  in  the  San  Juan 
valley,  menacing  a  hillside  plantation  called  El  Pozo  which  had  been 
converted  into  a  blockhouse.  There  were  four  guns  in  Grimes's  bat 
tery,  and  they  were  but  three  miles  from  the  walls  of  Santiago  with 
San  Juan  hill  between. 

The  first  gun  of  the  battle  was  fired  by  Captain  Capron  of  the 
First  Battery,  who  was  with  Lawton  on  the  right.  His  son  had  been 
killed  at  Las  Guasimas  a  week  before. 

But  the  battle  itself  was  to  begin  in  the  center,  at  El  Pozo,  the 
first  intrenched  hill  on  the  road  to  San  Juan.  It  is  almost  impossible 
to  describe  the  action  at  San  Juan,  which  was  a  battle  fought  largely 
without  orders,  with  orders  that  could  not  be  delivered,  and  in  oppo 
sition  to  orders.  What  plan  there  was,  at  first,  was  thrown  to  the 
winds  through  necessity.  It  was  a  battle  without  record,  except  the 
actual  experiences  as  remembered  by  officers  and  men.  It  is  asserted 
that  it  was  no  part  of  Shafter's  intention  to  take  San  Juan  on  that 
day,  unless  El  Caney  could  be  reduced  early;  so  that  Lawton  could 
move  along  the  ridge  to  the  southwest  and  attack  San  Juan  in  the 
flank  or  rear.  It  is  also  asserted  that  Shafter  believed  El  Caney 
could  be  taken  in  a  short  engagement,  and  that  his  army  would  be 
before  the  walls  of  Santiago  in  one  day  and  capture  the  city  the  next. 

Whatever  the  intention,  the  obstinacy  of  the  Spanish  defense  proved 
much  greater  than  was  expected;  yet,  however  much  the  fighting 
qualities  of  the  Spaniards  were  underestimated,  the  unflinching  courage 
of  the  Americans  was  to  overcome  all  the  failure  of  plan,  estimate, 
and  actual  resistance,  and  to  surprise  the  world  with  unsurpassed 
heroism. 


130  HISTORY    OF    THE 

General  Wheeler,  with  his  two  cavalry  brigades,  commanded  by 
General  Samuel  S.  Sumner  and  Colonel  Leonard  Wood,  had  moved 
to  within  two  and  a  half  miles  of  San  Juan  on  the  night  before,  and 
was  resting  on  the  hillside  on  the  left  of  the  valley,  through  which 
ran  the  shallow  San  Juan  River,  and  the  Santiago  wagon  road.  Across 
the  valley  was  Hawkins's  brigade  of  Kent's  division  of  infantry,  and  in 
the  rear  of  these  the  two  brigades  of  Colonel  Wikoff  and  Colonel  Pear 
son.  They  were  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy's  guns  on  San  Juan. 

At  half-past  six  in  the  morning  Grimes's  battery  opened  fire  on  El 
Pozo,  for  the  purpose  of  uncovering  the  enemy's  position.  He  pro 
voked  no  reply  for  twenty  minutes,  when  the  Spaniard,  having  ob 
tained  our  range  by  the  smoke  of  Grimes's  guns,  answered.  It  was 
first  detected  by  a  muffled  report,  followed  by  the  sinister  singing  and 
hissing  whizz  of  shrapnel  that  came  over  the  brow  of  the  hill  where 
Grimes  was  posted,  and  burst  into  death-dealing  fragments.  The  shot 
revealed  our  disadvantage.  Grimes  was  employing  3.2-inch  field  guns 
with  black  powder.  The  Spaniards  were  replying  with  5-inch  guns 
and  smokeless  powder.  Nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  enemy's  posi 
tion;  our  troops  were  fighting  spectres  in  jungle  and  hills.  For 
ten  minutes  the  Spanish  artillery  fired  away  and  Grimes  responded, 
though  his  gunners  were  picked  off  and  the  enemy's  fire  was  being 
concentrated  upon  our  men  in  the  bushes  behind.  Then  the  troops 
were  ordered  off.  At  the  same  moment  the  Spanish  battery  ceased 
firing  and  remained  entirely  silent  against  all  attempts  to  draw  their 
fire. 

It  was  a  successful  ruse  to  draw  the  Americans  out.  Hawkins's 
brigade  moved  down  the  hillside  to  the  river  and  road,  a  narrow  pas 
sage  at  that  point,  under  orders  from  Kent  to  advance  up  the  road 
toward  the  objective  point.  When  they  reached  the  ford  they  were 
met  with  orders  to  let  the  cavalry  under  Sumner  and  Wood  have 
right  of  way.  This  resulted  in  confusion,  owing  to  the  narrow  roadwTay 
and  a  new  form  of  attack  that  now  began. 

From  every  tree  top,  from  every  bush-crowned  knoll  and  jungle 
thicket  in  the  vicinity,  front,  sides,  and  rear,  sharpshooters  of  the 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  131 

enemy,  hitherto  silent,  began  to  pour  in  deadly  and  galling  fire  upon 
our  troops  as  they  emerged  upon  open  ground.  Using  smokeless 
powder,  the  position  of  these  sharpshooters  was  not  revealed.  They 
were  covered  by  the  fan-like  sprays  of  foliage.  All  that  could  be 
known  was  what  the  ear  discovered  of  the  continuous  crackle  of  the 
rifles,  and  what  the  eye  observed  of  our  men  falling  dead  and  wounded 
as  they  entered  the  open  spot  at  the  ford,  where  the  water  was  thrashed 
by  the  rifle  balls  as  if  hail  were  falling. 

Under  this  baptism  of  fire,  forty  minutes  were  lost  in  permitting 
the  cavalry  to  pass,  and  then,  without  waiting  longer,  the  infantry 
were  marched  along  parallel  to  the  cavalry,  a  tedious  and  dangerous 
movement,  necessitating  slow  progress,  and  presenting  masses  to  the 
sharpshooting  fire  of  the  enemy. 

After  moving  ahead  the  advance  entered  an  open  spread  of  the 
valley,  from  which  San  Juan  could  be  seen.  The  view  was  full  of 
deception.  It  was  apparently  a  smooth,  green  hill,  with  clumps  of 
trees  and  bushes  here  and  there,  and  houses  among  them.  But  each 
clump  proved  to  be  the  summit  of  an  intervening  hill,  defended  by 
barbed  wire  and  Spanish  troops.  From  this  point  of  view  it  was  de 
termined  that  San  Juan  could  be  captured  by  assault  upon  the  Spanish 
right,  to  the  left  of  the  road. 

At  this  moment  a  message  was  received  from  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Derby,  who  was  scouting  from  a  balloon  over  our  army,  that  there 
was  a  narrow  pathway  along  a  creek  branching  off  to  the  left  of  our 
advance,  but  some  distance  in  the  rear.  This  path  had  been  in 
geniously  covered  by  the  Spaniards  from  passing  observation,  but  from 
the  balloon  it  was  clearly  visible. 

The  value  of  the  path  to  deliver  the  brigades  in  the  rear  by  a  detour 
against  the  enemy's  right  at  San  Juan,  was  instantly  perceived  and 
General  Kent  rode  back  to  deflect  his  troops  in  that  direction,  while 
two  regiments  of  Hawkins's  brigade  and  the  cavalry  pushed  ahead  under 
the  galling  fire. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  point  indicated,  a  ford  at  which  a  small  creek 
entered  the  San  Juan,  Kent  and  his  staff  met  the  first  battalion  of 


132  HISTORY   OF   THE 

the  Seventy-first  New  York  Volunteers  coming  foward  to  join  their 
brigade  under  Hawkins. 

The  ford  and  cross-path  here  combined  to  make  a  small,  open,  rock- 
covered,  swampy  spot,  overgrown  at  the  edges  by  tall  grass  and  bushes, 
closed  in  by  tall  trees  and  jungle  growth  that  also  lined  the  creek 
and  path  that  entered  from  the  left  or  west  side.  Halting  the  battalion, 
General  Kent  gave  instructions  to  the  officer  in  command  to  proceed 
west  by  the  path. 

This  was  the  spot  since  called  "  The  Bloody  Bend  of  San  Juan."  As 
the  battalion  entered  the  open  and  moved  to  the  left,  entirely  inexpe 
rienced  in  war,  without  any  knowledge  of  the  shock  of  sudden  fire  from 
ambush,  they  were  assailed  by  deadly  volleys  from  every  tree  top 
and  ambuscade  about  the  ford.  Little  wonder  that  these  raw  troops 
were  for  the  time  being  thrown  into  confusion  and  recoiled  from  the 
shock.  Kent  ordered  them  to  lie  down  in  the  grass  and  thickets.  Soon 
after  the  Second  and  Third  battalions  came  up,  and,  being  informed  of 
the  dangers  of  the  ford,  were  prepared  against  the  shock.  It  was  the 
highest  test  of  the  pride  and  courage  of  these  volunteers  that,  disdain 
ing  the  cover  of  bushes  and  trees,  they  marched  erect  through  the 
deadly  angle,  while  the  trained  regulars  behind,  practiced  in  the  sci 
ence  of  war,  and  knowing  the  value  of  avoiding  danger  until  the 
final  blow  is  to  be  delivered,  crawled  and  wriggled  on  their  bellies 
through  the  grass  and  bushes  until  they  were  in  the  shelter  of  the 
narrow  path. 

Immediately  behind  this  regiment  came  the  Third  brigade  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Wikoff.  It  consisted  of  the  Ninth,  Thirteenth,  and 
Twenty-fourth  Regulars.  Its  passage  of  the  "Bloody  Bend"  was  the 
beginning  of  a  record  of  soldierly  heroism  never  surpassed  in  American 
history.  Moving  into  the  open  it  seemed  to  invite  a  concentration 
of  all  the  ambuscaded  Spanish  hatred.  Colonel  Wikoff  was  killed  a 
moment  after  he  had  reached  the  ford.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Worth  of 
the  Thirteenth  succeeded  him  and  in  five  minutes  fell  wounded.  He 
was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Liscum  of  the  Twenty-fourth, 
who  also  fell  in  five  minutes  badly  shot.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ewers  of 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  1:1:', 

the  Ninth  then  became  commander.  The  brigade  had  had  four  com 
manders  in  eleven  minutes. 

A  brigade  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  P.  Pearson  was  hurried 
up,  and  two  of  the  regiments,  the  Second  and  Tenth,  were  sent  to 
the  left,  while  the  Twenty-first  was  ordered  forward  to  take  the  place, 
in  Hawkins's  brigade,  of  the  Seventy-first  New  York  that  was  now 
attached  to  Pearson's. 

The  three  divisions  of  our  army  toiled  and  fought  with  dogged 
persistence  for  hours  against  continuous  ambuscades,  only  less  con 
centrated  and  dismaying  than  those  at  the  "  Bloody  Bend."  The  cavalry 
in  front,  marching  to  get  opposite  the  enemy's  left,  advanced  the  en 
tire  distance  through  this  deadly  fire,  being  torn  by  shrapnel  from 
San  Juan  whenever  they  came  into  view  in  the  flat  and  broadening 
valley,  having  continually  to  make  detours  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
the  hills  that  rose  on  the  sides,  and  which  were  defended  by  trenches, 
barbed  wire,  and  trees  concealing  sharpshooters  no  eye  could  detect. 
With  the  cavalry,  occasionally  parallel,  sometimes  in  advance, 
marched  Hawkins's  infantry,  under  the  same  force  of  resistance, 
while  the  brigades  of  Pearson  and  Ewers,  detouring  to  the  left,  were 
passing  hillside  ambuscades. 

It  is  not  wonderful,  therefore,  that  —  now  advancing,  now  stopping 
to  make  a  diversion  against  a  hill  —  commands,  regiments,  bat 
talions,  and  companies  became  confused,  orders  went  astray,  and  the 
rear  guard  became  the  advance  without  knowing  it.  But  not  one 
body  of  these  troops  turned  back.  That  determination  of  American 
character,  developed  by  years  of  struggle  against  the  silent  immensity 
of  plains  and  forests,  which  in  deadliest  temper  develops  into 
patience  and  coolness,  shone  out  all  along  the  line  of  march  through 
that  awful  ambuscade,  with  a  steady  glow  that  was  but  accumulating 
force  for  explosion. 

No  troops  ever  made  better  use  of  their  advantages  than  the  Span 
iards  did  about  San  Juan.  Ingenuity  had  seized  upon  every  bush  and 
every  weapon  that  could  be  brought  into  play.  No  place  of  concealment 
was  neglected,  no  opening  left  unguarded.  Knowing  the  range  to  every 


134  HISTORY    OF   THE 

open  spot,  through  which  our  troops  must  pass,  concealed  by  smoke 
less  powder,  they  were  spirits  of  air,  terrible  because  unseen. 

After  two  or  three  hours  of  advance  the  cavalry  were  on  the  east 
front  of  San  Juan,  Hawkins's  brigade  was  on  the  southeast,  and  Pearson's 
and  Ewers's  brigades  were  on  the  south  and  southwest.  Between  our 
lines  that  had  been  moving  along  the  valleys  there  were  several  inter 
vening  hills  almost  like  terraces  leading  to  San  Juan  itself.  The  hill 
of  San  Juan  that  had  appeared  so  gentle  in  ascent  from  a  distance,  now 
rose  high  up  from  the  valley. 

From  this  time,  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  all  accounts 
of  the  battle  that  have  been  available  are  confused  with  respect  to 
the  general  action  and  are  based  upon  individual  observations  by 
officers  of  their  own  commands,  unable  to  correctly  perceive  the  forces 
supporting  or  operating  at  another  part  of  the  field. 

A  halt  was  called.  Nothing  had  been  heard  from  Lawton's  division 
at  El  Caney,  except  the  booming  of  Capron's  guns  from  time  to  time. 
To  take  San  Juan  without  Lawton's  assistance  was  not  in  orders,  and 
yet  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  take  the  hill,  go  into  camp  under 
the  very  muzzles  of  its  artillery  and  rifles,  or  to  retreat.  Retreat  was 
ignored  as  impossible,  and  encampment  under  fire  as  absurd. 

It  was  a  moment  pregnant  with  heroism.  It  was  delivered  of  thou 
sands  of  heroes,  one  of  whom  by  his  conspicuous  rank,  his  intrepid  cool 
ness  and  magnetic  control  of  men,  stood  out  among  them  all.  This  was 
Brigadier-General  Henry  S.  Hawkins,  whose  conduct  in  another  part 
of  the  field  was  duplicated  by  Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt,  and  on  yet 
another  side  by  regiments  and  battalions,  with  no  orders  or  settled 
leadership,  whose  men  acted  upon  the  intelligence  that  perceived  oppor 
tunity  and  seized  it  by  common  impulse. 

After  conference,  the  brigade  under  Hawkins  was  ordered  to  advance 
up  the  terrace  in  the  direction  of  San  Juan.  The  movement  took  them 
out  of  the  cover  of  trees  and  bushes  in  the  valley  and  across  the  open 
and  unprotected  hillside  upon  which  a  growth  of  high  grass  offered 
the  only  chance  of  safety  in  crawling.  The  two  regiments  that  were 
with  him,  the  Sixth  and  Sixteenth,  went  doggedly  up  the  hill,  squirming 


SPANISH-AMEKK'AX    WAR  135 

in  the  grass  where  they  were  deployed.  The  Twenty-first  had  not 
arrived.  Yard  by  yard  the  cool  regulars  drove  the  enemy  back  from 
clumps  of  bushes  and  thickets  until  they  found  themselves  over  the 
last  terrace,  with  the  center  of  San  Juan  hill  rising  in  front  of  them, 
crowned  with  trenches  in  which  the  enemy  was  lying  in  force. 

At  about  the  same  moment,  it  appears  beyond  all  question,  the 
brigade  of  Colonel  Ewers  on  the  left,  consisting  of  the  Ninth,  Thir 
teenth,  and  Twenty-fourth,  arrived  from  its  jungle  detour  and  appeared 
before  the  right  of  the  enemy  at  the  foot  of  San  Juan  itself.  Colonel 
Ewers  had  not  been  able  to  get  his  regiments  so  connected  as  to 
communicate  his  succession  to  the  command;  but  these  regulars  had 
advanced  under  battalion  orders  and  by  companies.  They  halted  as 
they  saw  the  hill  and  realized  the  charge  to  be  made.  The  men  of  the 
Twenty-fourth  began  to  sing  the  "Star  Spangled  Banner"  and  took 
off  their  hats  in  the  very  teeth  of  the  enemy  that  was  harassing  them 
with  deadly  fire. 

Then,  on  their  right,  General  Hawkins,  a  magnificent  soldierly  figure, 
tall,  stalwart,  with  a  white  moustache,  pointed  gray  beard,  and  the  eye 
of  an  eagle,  rode  out  in  front  of  his  two  regiments,  the  Sixth  and  Six 
teenth,  and  scornfully  turning  his  back  to  the  Spanish  line,  every 
man  in  which  marked  him  for  death,  cried:  — 

"  Boys,  the  time  has  come.  Every  man  who  loves  his  country,  for 
ward  and  follow  me!" 

He  turned  his  horse  and  with  set  face  rode  forward  up  the  hill. 
Two  thousand  Americans  leaped  to  their  feet  with  a  tremendous  cheer 
in  which  the  "Rebel  yell"  and  the  Indian  yell  were  mingled,  and 
dashed  up  the  hill  after  their  fearless  leader.  Through  volley  after 
volley  of  withering  fire,  during  which  men  reeled  and  fell  out,  while 
their  unhurt  comrades  sprang  to  fill  the  gap,  the  men,  steadying  down 
from  the  first  rush,  climbed  and  pulled  themselves  up  the  slope  until 
they  could  see  the  strained  and  amazed  eyes  of  Spaniards  gazing  at 
a  spectacle  never  before  witnessed  in  war — the  dogged  advance  of  those 
intrepid  Americans  who  would  not  be  denied  by  even  the  yawning  hell 
that  modern  instruments  of  war  could  belch  in  their  faces. 


136  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Our  men  fired  as  they  went  and  then,  with  a  last  rush,  bayonets 
on,  they  sprang  for  the  trenches  from  which  the  astounded  Spaniards 
turned  and  ran  like  rabbits,  while  our  troops,  breathless  as  they  were, 
shot  them  as  they  fled,  but  could  not  pursue. 

General  Hawkins  smiled  grimly.  He  had  not  received  a  scratch 
in  the  terrific  melee,  but  down  the  hill  lay  scores  of  his  brave  soldiers, 
dead  or  wounded.  In  that  day's  fighting  the  heroic  Sixth  had  lost  119 
killed  and  wounded,  and  not  a  man  was  "  missing."  The  Sixteenth  lost 
101,  with  only  six  missing. 

On  the  left  of  Hawkins,  the  Ninth,- Thirteenth,  and  Twenty-fourth 
had  heard  the  cheer  of  their  comrades  on  their  right  and  they,  too, 
had  charged  up  the  hill  on  the  enemy's  right,  going  through  the  same 
deadly  fire  arid  resistance.  It  was  a  longer  distance  and  they  had  none 
but  the  line  officers  to  lead  them  on.  When  they  had  nearly  reached 
the  summit  a  Gatling  gun,  that  had  been  brought  up  by  Hawkins,  was 
planted  so  as  to  enfilade  the  Spanish  trenches  before  the  Third  brigade, 
and  with  a  yell  the  Americans  made  a  savage  rush,  bayonetting  the 
Spaniards  who  had  not  been  quick  to  run,  and  driving  the  enemy  flying 
into  the  trenches  outside  Santiago's  walls. 

On  the  right,  at  about  the  same  time,  the  cavalry  was  maintaining 
American  heroism  by  equally  glorious  work.  Under  the  brow  of  the 
first  hill  leading  to  San  Juan,  a  council  of  war  was  held  upon  the 
advisability  of  charging  the  main  hill.  There  was  some  suggestion  that 
the  loss  of  life  necessary  could  not  be  justified.  Colonel  Roosevelt 
argued  that  the  only  way  to  capture  the  hill  was  at  once,  when  our 
troops  were  at  its  foot.  General  Wheeler  had  listened  without 
comment. 

"If  you  will  let  me,  I  will  lead  the  way,"  cried  Colonel  Roosevelt, 
turning  to  General  Wheeler. 

Without  a  word  Wheeler  gave  the  daring  volunteer  that  inscrutable 
look  which  in  the  hour  of  extremest  peril  gives  consent  and  confers 
death  or  honor. 

Roosevelt  sprang  to  the  front  of  his  Rough  Riders,  flashed  his  sword, 
and  cried  "Forward,  charge  the  hill! " 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  137 

The  Rough  Riders,  some  of  the  Twenty-first  Infantry  now  come  up,  and 
some  of  the  Ninth  and  Tenth  (black)  Cavalry  followed  him  with  cheers 
and,  with  a  determined  rush  that  carried  them  to  the  very  top  of  the  ridge, 
they  fell  upon  the  trenches  from  which  the  enemy  had  fled  in  confusion. 
Now  it  was  discovered  that  there  was  yet  another  hill,  that  had  been 
masked  by  the  ridge  of  that  captured,  and  which  was  a  little  higher. 
Roosevelt,  excited  with  the  enthusiasm  of  battle,  called  for  another 
charge  and  dashed  forward,  followed  by  only  five  men.  Observing  this 
he  rode  back  and  cried:  "I  did  not  think  you  would  refuse  to  follow 
where  I  would  lead." 

With  one  impulse  the  troopers  followed  him  up  the  hill.  His  horse 
was  shot,  but  the  rider  fell  upon  his  feet  and,  seizing  a  rifle,  climbed  up, 
firing  as  he  went.  That  hill,  also,  was  captured. 

And  now  for  an  hour  the  Americans  hid  under  the  cover  of  their 
captured  places,  avoiding  the  artillery  onslaught  from  the  trenches 
before  them,  and  waiting  for  the  cover  of  night. 

What  company  or  what  regiment  was  first  at  the  top  of  San  Juan 
hill  that  day?  What  matters  it?  All  wrere  there  at  different  points 
when  needed.  What  spot  was  the  top  of  that  deadly  hill?  They  were 
all  American  companies  and  regiments  —  any  one  of  them  was  brave 
enough  and  worthy  to  be  first! 

ii. 

OFF  to  the  right  of  the  army  that  took  San  Juan  out  of  the  "very 
jaws  of  hell,"  General  Lawton  began  the  attack  on  El  Caney  at  six 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  when  Capron's  battery  fired  the  THE  CAPTURE 
first  gun  at  the  fort.  The  report  echoed  and  reechoed  OF  EL  CANEY 
and  died  away.  There  was  ho  reply.  Another  shot  followed,  and 
then  another.  Still  there  was  no  reply.  It  seemed  as  if  the  Spaniards 
would  not  fight.  That  view  of  it,  however,  was  a  great  mistake. 
The  Spaniards  had  no  artillery  at  El  Caney,  and  our  own  troops  had 
none  but  the  four  field  guns  under  Capron,  distant  a  mile  and  a  half 
from  the  village.  El  Caney,  situated  on  the  top  of  a  hill,  had  at  its 
southeast  corner  a  steep,  bare,  conical  hill,  upon  the  top  of  which 


138  HISTORY    OF    THE 

stood  a  round  stone  fort  with  a  tiled  roof  sloping  up  to  a  sharp 
point.  To  the  east,  south,  and  southwest  the  town  was  defended  by 
barbed  wire  entanglements,  and  the  stone  houses  in  the  town — even 
the  old  church  —  had  been  loopholed  and  converted  into  defensive 
stands  for  resistance. 

Capron's  battery  continued  firing  until  it  had  delivered,  twenty- 
seven  shots,  to  which  no  answer  was  made.  But  as  the  twenty- 
eighth  shot  was  being  fired  there  was  a  whistling  near  our  battery, 
followed  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell  from  the  Eeina  Mercedes'  battery. 
Another  and  another  followed,  but  the  Spaniards  on  their  harbor 
water  battery  did  poor  shooting.  Their  shells  did  not  touch  our  bat 
tery,  but  fell  on  a  house  where  some  soldiers  were  hiding,  some  dis 
tance  away.  The  three  shells  wounded  thirteen  Cubans  and  eighteen 
Americans. 

The  number  of  our  troops  sent  against  El  Caney  was  about  5,000, 
though  only  about  3,500  were  engaged.  The  plan  of  attack  was  made 
by  Brigadier-General  Adna  R.  Chaffee,  who  had  reconnoitered  the 
country  and  acquainted  himself  with  all  the  paths  and  roads.  Gen 
eral  Chaffee's  brigade  of  the  Seventh,  Twelfth,  and  Seventeenth  In 
fantry  was  placed  on  the  east  of  the  town,  Colonel  Miles's  brigade  of 
the  First,  Fourth,  and  Twenty-fifth  Infantry  was  on  the  south,  and 
General  Ludlow's  brigade,  comprising  the  Second  Massachusetts  Vol 
unteers  and  the  Eighth  and  Twenty-second  Infantry,  was  at  the  left 
on  the  southwest  side. 

The  Spaniards  were  quite  as  willing  as,  and  better  prepared  to 
sustain  a  fight  than,  the  Americans.  After  the  long  bombardment  by 
Capron's  battery  Chaffee's  brigade  was  sent  forward  to  lead  the  attack 
under  cover  of  the  artillery.  The  Seventh  and  Twelfth  were  moved 
ahead  and  the  Seventeenth  was  held  in  reserve.  An  advance  was 
also  ordered  on  the  south  and  southwest,  but  all  had  to  be  made  cau 
tiously.  The  powder  smoke  from  the  battery  and  the  guns  of  the 
volunteers  gave  the  Spaniards  our  range,  and  enabled  them  to  do 
deadly  execution.  Besides,  the  ground  was  covered  with  barbed  wire 
resistances  and  every  thicket  concealed  sharpshooters. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  !:;'.) 

At  a  distance  of  600  yards  from  El  Caney,  hiding  behind  bushes 
and  lying  in  the  grass,  our  troops  maintained  a  rifle  duel  with  the 
enemy  for  three  hours.  The  volunteers  were  ordered  to  the  rear, 
so  as  not  to  expose  our  line  by  the  smoke  from  their  guns. 

A  blockhouse  on  the  slope,  that  harbored  a  small  detachment  of 
the  enemy's  sharpshooters,  was  turned  over  to  a  detachment  of  our 
Cuban  allies.  They  exhausted  their  ammunition,  but  did  not  disturb 
the  Spaniards.  Yard  by  yard  the  Americans  crept  up  the  hill,  but 
hour  after  hour  passed  and  the  progress  was  painfully  slow. 

At  10:30  we  were  just  holding  our  advance  in  good  safety,  although 
losing  more  than  the  enemy,  when  an  order  arrived  from  Shafter  to 
cease  the  assault  and  move  to  the  assistance  of  Wheeler  and  Kent  at 
San  Juan.  It  was  a  serious  interruption.  As  a  military  observer 
present  pointed  out,  to  comply  with  the  order  would  have  entailed 
a  demoralizing  defeat  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  General  Lawtou 
did  not  obey  the  order,  but  pressed  the  attack.  The  Fourth  and 
Twenty-fifth  Infantry  joined  in  the  attack.  The  fire  of  Capron's  bat 
tery  became  terribly  effective,  and  was  directed  to  reduce  the  fort. 
At  one  o'clock  the  flag  was  shot  away.  The  incident  evoked  cheers 
from  the  whole  army  of  attack,  and  heartened  them  up. 

Captain  Lee  of  the  British  army,  who  was  present  for  observations 
under  the  orders  of  his  Government,  described  the  spirit  and  peril  of 
our  troops  at  that  moment.  "Wishing  to  see  how  Chaffee's  men  were 
faring,"  he  wrote,  "I  crawled  through  a  hedge  into  the  field  beyond, 
and,  accidentally,  into  such  a  hot  corner,  that  I  readily  complied  with 
General  Chaffee's  abrupt  injunction:  'Get  down  on  your  stomach, 
sir.'  Indeed,  I  was  distinctly  grateful  for  his  advice,  but  could  not 
fail  to  notice  that  he  was  regardless  of  it  himself.  Wherever  the 
foe  was  thickest  he  strolled  about  unconcernedly,  a  half-smoked  cigar 
between  his  teeth,  and  an  expression  of  exceeding  grim  ness  on  his 
countenance. 

''The  situation  was  a  trying  one  for  the  nerves  of  the  oldest  sol 
dier,  and  some  of  the  younger  hands  fell  back  from  the  firing  line 
and  crept  into  the  road.  In  a  moment  the  General  pounced  upon 


140  HISTORY   OF   THE 

them,  inquiring  their  destination  in  low,  unhoneyed  accents,  and  then 
taking  them  persuasively  by  the  elbows,  led  them  back  to  the  extreme 
front  and,  having  deposited  them  on  the  firing  line,  stood  over  them 
while  he  distributed  a  few  last  words  of  pungent  advice.  Throughout 
the  day  he  set  the  most  inspiring  example  to  his  men,  and  that  he 
escaped  unhurt  was  a  miracle.  One  bullet  clipped  a  breast  button  off 
his  coat,  another  passed  under  his  shoulder  strap,  but  neither  touched 
him,  and  there  must  be  some  truth  in  the  old  adage  that  fortune 
favors  the  brave. 

"Close  in  front  of  me,  a  slight  and  boyish  Lieutenant  compelled 
my  attention  by  his  persistent  and  reckless  gallantry.  Whenever  a 
man  was  hit  he  would  dart  to  his  assistance,  regardless  of  the  fire 
that  this  exposure  inevitably  drew.  Suddenly  he  sprang  to  his  feet, 
gazing  intently  into  the  village,  but  what  he  saw  we  never  knew,  for 
he  was  instantly  shot  through  the  heart  and  fell  over  backward, 
clutching  at  the  air.  I  followed  the  men  who  carried  him  to  the  road 
and  asked  them  his  name.  '  Second-Lieutenant  Wansboro,  sir,  of  the 
Seventh  Infantry,  and  you  will  never  see  his  better.  He  fought  like 
a  little  tiger.' 

"A  few  convulsive  gasps  and  the  poor  boy  was  dead,  and  as  we  laid 
him  in  a  shady  spot  by  the  side  of  the  road  the  Sergeant  reverently 
drew  a  handkerchief  over  his  face  and  said :  '  Good-bye,  Lieutenant, 
you  were  a  brave  little  officer,  and  you  died  like  a  true  soldier.'" 

A  few  minutes  before  three  o'clock  Capron's  battery  had  played  so 
effectively  upon  the  stone  fort  as  to  materially  reduce  the  resistance, 
and  then  General  Chaffee  at  the  head  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Infantry 
charged  the  hill  and  took  the  fort  in  the  face  of  deadly  volleying. 
The  inner  walls  of  the  fort  were  splashed  with  blood.  The  gate  was 
so  wedged  with  dead  and  debris  that  it  could  not  be  entered.  The 
rifle  trenches  were  full  of  Spanish  dead,  most  of  them  shot  through 
the  forehead,  their  brains  oozing  out. 

But  yet  the  town  remained  to  be  taken.  Our  troops  were  sheltered 
in  Spanish  trenches  and  by  the  brow  of  the  hill.  Capron's  battery 
now  turned  upon  the  town  itself,  but  the  effect  could  not  be  observed. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  141 

When  our  troops  had  moved  up  under  the  shelter  of  the  foothill,  they 
were  divided  and  sent  right  and  left  to  enter  the  streets. 

The  fighting  before  they  reached  El  Caney  was  as  nothing  com 
pared  with  the  resistance  met  in  the  town.  They  were  fired  on  from 
all  sides  by  the  enemy,  who  were  concealed  everywhere.  The  trenches 
in  view  were  filled  with  men,  whose  hats  were  visible.  The  Amer 
icans  shot  the  hats  to  pieces,  but  killed  none  of  the  Spaniards,  who 
had  resorted  to  the  old  trick  of  placing  their  hats  on  sticks  for  our 
men  to  shoot  at.  The  breastworks  in  the  northeast  corner  of  the 
town  did  the  most  damage.  This  battery  of  Gatlings  was  not  discovered 
for  a  long  time.  It  showered  an  almost  resistless  fire  upon  our  men. 
The  Americans  lay  down  to  avoid  it.  The  Spaniards  had  the  range, 
however,  and  killed  and  wounded  many  of  our  men  as  they  lay.  The 
officers  suffered  particularly. 

But  the  masked  battery  was  soon  located  and  then  began  a  charge 
through  the  streets  that  sent  the  Spaniards  flying,  while  our  soldiers 
picked  them  off  as  they  ran.  Every  street  leading  out  was  filled  with 
the  rout,  and  125  Spaniards  were  captured.  The  enemy  had  lost  half 
their  number  in  killed  and  wounded,  125  were  prisoners,  and  375 
escaped. 

Up  went  the  flag  over  the  fort  and  church  and  four  miles  to  the 
southwest  came  cheers  from  the  heights  of  San  Juan,  where  victory  was 
already  perched. 

The  Spanish  retreat  from  El  Caney  left  that  outpost  safely  in  our 
possession,  being  further  from  the  city  than  San  Juan.  At  night 
General  Lawton  attempted  to  march  with  some  troops  to  reenforce 
Wheeler's  division  at  San  Juan,  but  met  with  opposition  from  con 
cealed  Spanish  forces  and  was  compelled  to  make  a  detour  so  long 
that  he  reached  the  point  only  next  day  at  noon. 


142  HISTORY   OF   THE 


III. 


WHEN  the  sun  went  down  on  that  terrible  first  day  of  July,  the 
stars  and  stripes  waved  over  San  Juan  and  El  Caney,  and  over  our 
troops,  weakened  by  many  killed  and  wounded,  worn  by 
twelve  hours  of  constant  marching  and  fighting  under 


BOUGHT  ^Q  broiling  sun.  with  little  to  eat,  and  yet  with  the  pros- 

VICTORY 

pect  of  still  more  desperate  work  ahead.  There  was  to 
be  no  rest.  No  wonder  there  was  a  moment  of  depression,  when  for 
an  hour  the  hearts  of  some  of  these  heroes  sank  within  them.  On 
San  Juan  there  were  not  more  than  5,000,  while  in  front  of  them  the 
enemy,  8,000  strong,  lay  in  their  trenches,  supported  by  heavy  artillery 
ready  to  assault  or  defend.  We  had  5,000  at  El  Caney. 

In  his  report  to  General  Shafter,  written  that  night  at  8  o'clock, 
General  Wheeler  described  the  position  with  the  simplicity  of  a  soldier, 
and  the  dauntless  heart  of  a  hero.  This  sick  man  had  been  at  his  post 
all  day.  After  describing  the  capture  of  the  hill  and  the  cessation  of 
the  fighting  towards  sunset,  he  wrote  :  — 

"I  examined  the  line  in  front  of  Wood's  brigade,  and  gave  the  men  shovels  and 
picks  and  insisted  on  their  going  right  to  work.  I  also  sent  word  to  General  Kent  to 
come  and  get  intrenching  tools,  and  saw  General  Hawkins  in  person  and  told  him  the 
same  thing.  They  all  promise  to  do  their  best,  but  say  the  earth  is  very  difficult,  as  a 
great  part  of  it  is  rocky. 

"  The  positions  our  men  carried  were  very  strong,  and  the  intrenchments  were  very 
strong. 

"A  number  of  officers  have  appealed  to  me  to  have  the  line  withdrawn  and  take  up 
a  strong  position  farther  back,  and  I  expect  they  will  appeal  to  you.  I  have  positively 
discountenanced  this,  as  it  would  cost  us  much  prestige. 

"  The  lines  are  very  thin,  as  so  many  men  have  gone  to  the  rear  with  wounds  and 
so  many  are  exhausted,  but  I  hope  these  men  can  be  got  up  to-night,  and  with  our  line 
intrenched  and  Lawton  on  our  right  we  ought  to  hold  to-morrow,  but  I  fear  it  will  be  a 
severe  day.  If  we  can  get  through  to-morrow,  all  right  ;  we  can  make  our  breastworks 
very  strong  the  next  night.  You  can  hardly  realize  the  exhausted  condition  of  the 
troops.  The  Third  and  Sixth  Cavalry  and  other  troops  were  up  marching  and  halting 
on  the  road  all  last  night,  and  have  fought  for  twelve  hours  to-day,  and  those  that  are 
not  on  the  line  will  be  digging  trenches  to-night. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  143 

"  I  have  been  on  the  extreme  front  line.  The  men  were  lying1  down  and  reported 
the  Spaniards  not  more  than  three  hundred  yards  in  their  front." 

There  was  in  the  condition  much  to  appal  any  but  the  strongest 
heart.  Throughout  the  night  the  picket  firing  was  continuous.  Men 
who  could  be  spared  were  carrying  the  wounded  back  to  Siboney  and 
burying  the  dead  on  the  battlefield.  The  wounded  were  carried  in 
army  wagons,  that  jolted  over  the  stones  during  the  passage  of  five 
long  miles. 

What  a  passage  of  torture  that  was  —  not  of  physical  pain  alone; 
but  the  Spaniards,  with  the  instinct  of  cruelty,  threw  off  the  restraints 
of  civilized  warfare.  During  the  day's  fighting  their  sharpshooters 
deliberately  fired  upon  our  wounded  as  they  were  carried  from  the 
battlefield,  and  guerillas,  armed  with  Mausers,  infested  the  road  to 
Siboney,  firing  upon  the  wounded,  nurses,  helpers,  newspaper  corre 
spondents,  and  all  non-combatants.  The  perpetration  of  such  acts 
enraged  our  troops  to  a  point  that  threatened  reprisals,  but  none  was 
permitted. 

The  Spaniards  expected  vengeance,  conscious  of  their  own  brutality. 
A  body  of  165  Spanish  prisoners  was  sent  to  the  rear  in  charge  of  a 
detachment  of  our  troops.  Half  the  prisoners  were  servants  and 
camp  followers  taken  at  El  Caney.  The  remainder  were  a  company 
of  regulars  of  the  Battalion  Constitutional,  with  two  lieutenants  and 
one  sergeant.  They  saluted  the  American  officers  they  met,  in  a  most 
cringing  fashion,  and  one  officer  hailed  a  Cuban  who  was  with  our 
troops,  saying :  — 

"Please  ask  these  gentlemen  who  are  in  charge  of  us  to  kill  us 
here  by  the  roadside  and  not  force  us  to  undergo  the  torture  of  a 
long  walk  before  we  are  shot." 

"Fools,"' answered  the  Cuban  in  Spanish  and  with  evident  disgust, 
"they  will  not  harm  you ;  they  will  only  keep  you  prisoners." 

But  the  Spaniard  shook  his  head.  He  believed  little  in  warfare  in 
which  the  lives  of  captives  were  spared,  and  he  could  not  believe 
that  the  Cuban  was  not  taunting  him. 


144  HISTORY   OF    THE 

At  Siboney  doctors  and  nurses  were  ready.  The  nurses  did  won 
derful  work.  In  the  cases  of  a  large  percentage  of  the  wounded 
operations  were  necessary ;  the  tables  were  filled,  and  hundreds  were 
waiting  their  turn.  The  work  went  on  steadily  all  night  by  the  light 
of  small  lanterns  and  candles.  It  was  a  strange  scene  in  the  huge  tents. 
When  their  wounds  had  been  dressed,  the  men  were  carried  out  and  laid 
upon  the  grass  in  blankets. 

At  the  front  fighting  was  resumed  early  Saturday  morning.  The 
Spaniards  made  a  desperate  effort  to  recapture  San  Juan  hill.  They 
assaulted  again  and  again,  and  each  time  were  driven  back  with 
awful  loss.  Our  Hotchkiss  guns  did  great  execution.  Finally,  the 
enemy  was  driven  back  upon  the  third  intrenchment,  before  Santiago 
itself.  Then  the  Spanish  sharpshooting  began  and  all  day  long  the 
exhausted  soldiers  on  both  sides  carried  on  the  sullen  duel,  with  artil 
lery,  with  volley  firing,  with  spasmodic  advances  and  feints,  while  all 
through  the  field  and  along  the  roads  the  guerillas  harassed  and  shot 
down  our  stragglers.  The  Spanish  fire  along  the  line  was  so  hot  that 
no  one  could  stand  up  at  times.  For  two  miles  in  our  rear  the  road 
was  blocked  with  wounded.  But  when  night  came  the  Americans 
held  every  inch  of  ground  they  had  taken,  and  the  Spanish  prisoners 
brought  in  were  dejected  and  confessed  the  desperation  of  the  enemy 
within  the  city's  entrenchments. 

Our  losses  in  the  two  days'  fighting  included  twelve  officers  and 
about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  killed,  with  thirteen  hundred 
wounded.  The  wounds  proved  to  be  unusually  easy  to  handle  and 
deaths  from  them  were  few.  The  Spanish  loss  was  very  much  greater, 
both  in  killed  and  wounded.  Half  the  force  in  the  city  was  disabled 
in  the  two  days'  fighting. 

Among  our  dead  were  a  number  of  gallant  and  distinguished  offi 
cers.  Colonel  Charles  A.  Wikoff  of  the  Twenty-second  Infantry,  killed, 
enlisted  as  a  private  in  Company  H,  First  Pennsylvania  Infantry,  in 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion.  He  was  made  a  First-Lieutenant,  and  pro 
moted  to  Captain  in  1864.  He  was  made  a  Major  in  the  Fourteenth 
in  1886,  and  promoted  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Nineteenth  in 


SPANISH -AMERICAN    WAR  145 

1891.  His  commission  as  Colonel  of  the  Twenty-second  dated  from 
1897.  For  gallant  and  meritorious  services  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh 
he  was  bre vetted  Captain,  April  7,  1862,  and  for  bravery  at  Chicka- 
mauga  and  Missionary  Ridge  was  made  a  Brevet  Major.  Colonel  Wikoff 
was  born  and  reared  at  Eastou,  Pennsylvania.  He  was  highly  esteemed 
as  an  excellent  officer  and  amiable  and  agreeable  man.  Colonel  Wikoff 
lost  an  eye  in  the  Civil  War,  and  could  have  been  retired  for  that  dis 
ability,  but  he  always  expressed  the  wish  that  he  might  serve  until 
his  sixty-fourth  year  and  be  regularly  retired.  Since  the  Civil  War 
he  had  been  on  constant  duty  in  the  West. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  John  H.  Patterson  of  the  Twenty-second  In 
fantry,  killed,  wore  a  medal  of  honor  presented  to  him  by  Con 
gress  "for  most  distinguished  gallantry  in  action  at  the  battle  of 
the  Wilderness  in  Virginia,  on  May  5,  1864,  under  the  heavy  fire  of 
the  advancing  enemy,  in  picking  up  and  carrying  several  hundred 
yards,  to  a  place  of  safety,  a  wounded  officer  of  his  regiment,  who  was 
helpless  and  would  otherwise  have  been  burned  in  the  forest;  while 
serving  as  First- Lieutenant,  Eleventh  United  States  Infantry."  He 
was  a  New  Yorker  by  birth,  a  soldier  of  fine  character,  and  popular 
in  the  service. 

Colonel  John  M.  Hamilton  of  the  Ninth  (black)  Cavalry  enlisted 
in  the  Civil  War  as  a  private  in  1861.  He  was  born  in  Canada,  and 
after  serving  for  two  years  with  gallantry  he  was  transferred  to  the 
regular  army  and  came  out  of  the  struggle  a  Captain.  He  was  ad 
vanced  to  the  command  of  the  Ninth  during  the  Indian  wars  on  the 
frontier. 

On  the  Spanish  side  there  was  among  the  killed  General  Vara  del 
Rey,  a  distinguished  officer  in  charge  of  the  defense  at  El  Caney. 
General  Linares,  Commander-in-Chief  at  Santiago,  was  badly  wounded 
in  the  charge  on  San  Juan  and  was  compelled  to  hand  over  the  com 
mand  to  General  Jose  Toral.  Commander  Romero,  of  the  celebrated 

Guarda  Civile  of  Spain,  was  also  desperately  wounded. 
10 


146  HISTORY   OF   THE 


IV. 

SAN  JUAN  and  El  Caney  comprised  together  one  of  those  great 

contests  that  history  will  discuss  and  controversy  will  struggle  with 

SUMMARY  OF         *or  &  ^ou%  time.     Everything  will  be  disputed  except 

A  GREAT  the  valor  and  determination  of  American  soldiers  and 

VTPTOR.Y 

the  desperation  of  Spanish  resistance.  Well-informed 
men  who  participated  express  the  opinion  that  when  the  military 
statistician  completes  his  work  and  military  experts  analyze  the  totals 
showing  the  number  of  men  engaged  and  those  killed  and  wounded, 
it  will  be  found  that  the  battle  of  San  Juan  was  one  of  the  bloodiest 
on  record.  It  is  estimated  that  the  average  of  disabilities  was  above 
ten  per  cent.  General  Kent's  division,  it  is  said,  suffered  to  the  extent 
of  thirteen  per  cent. — an  average  higher  than  many  of  the  famous 
battles  in  history. 

Although  the  battle  of  July  1  was  properly  one  engagement,  never 
theless  there  were  two  distinct  and  separate,  though  interdependent, 
fights  going  on  at  the  same  time — that  which  gave  us  the  stone  fort 
and  the  town  of  El  Caney,  taken  by  the  men  of  Lawton's  division, 
and  that  which  advanced  our  center  (Wheeler's  division)  three  miles  and 
gave  us  San  Juan  hill  and  blockhouse,  and  commanding  positions  for 
our  batteries.  The  two  engagements  were  interdependent,  for,  if  the 
center  had  been  repulsed  and  driven  back  the  Spaniards  could,  and 
probably  would,  have  swept  down  and  flanked  our  right.  Had  Lawton's 
division  been  driven  back,  the  Spaniards  would  have  come  between 
Wheeler  and  our  base  of  supplies -r-Siboney  —  and  starved  Wheeler 
out.  The  artillery  opened  the  engagement  in  each  fight  (treating  El 
Caney  and  San  Juan  as  separate  engagements),  but  it  was  the  infantry 
and  dismounted  cavalry,  assisted  to  some  extent  by  the  Gatling  sec 
tion,  that  secured  definite  results. 

From  the  best  obtainable  information  it  may  be  set  down  to  the  glory 
of  the  United  States  soldier  that  part  of  the  charge  on  San  Juan  was 
made,  not  after  orders,  but  without  orders  from  any  officer  command 
ing  a  division  or  brigade.  It  was  the  spontaneous  forward  movement 


SPANISH- AMERICAN   WAR  147 

of  one  brigade  that  could  not  be  stopped  or  checked  until  the  troops 
halted,  breathless,  but  victorious,  on  top  of  San  Juan  hill,  and  that 
carried  commanding  officers  along  with  it,  willing,  leading,  and  brave, 
but  without  the  intention. 

Of  the  incidents  of  the  first  day's  fighting,  that  illustrate  the  tem 
per  of  our  troops  and  the  uncomplaining  patience  and  fortitude  of 
the  wounded  in  the  absence  of  surgeons  and  hospital  helpers,  those 
described  by  Captain  Arthur  Lee  of  the  British  army,  a  competent 
and  disinterested  observer,  are  best  in  point.  His  observations  were 
set  out  in  his  official  report  to  his  Government,  and  are  not,  therefore, 
to  be  considered  as  tinged  with  any  sentiment,  except  that  which  is 
necessary  to  put  his  own  military  authorities  in  possession  of  the  truth 
concerning  the  character,  courage,  discipline,  and  disposition  of  the 
troops  of  another  nation. 

He  noted  that  at  El  Caney  our  total  artillery  force  was  but  four 
guns,  and  these  were  quite  unequal  to  the  task  of  demoralizing  the 
enemy.  Consequently  the  infantry  had  to  do  all  the  fighting,  and  the 
brunt  of  it  fell  upon  the  men  of  one  brigade.  He  reported  that  little 
attention  was  paid  to  the  Spanish  firing  until  our  black  powder  smoke 
established  the  range,  and  then  bloody  execution  commenced. 

"The  expenditure  of  ammunition  on  our  side,"  he  writes,  "was  enor 
mous  and  improvident,  for  there  was  little  target  visible,  but  the 
Spanish  sharpshooters  concealed  in  the  trees,  cottages,  and  blockhouses 
were  replying  with  deadly  effect.  At  one  point  eight  marksmen  of 
Captain  Evans's  company  crept  forward  to  occupy  a  small  advanced 
knoll,  and  five  were  hit  in  less  than  as  many  minutes.  At  another  point 
seven  men  of  the  Seventeenth  regiment  broke  through  a  hedge  into 
the  field  beyond,  and  instantly  a  volley  killed  three  and  wounded  the 
remaining  four.  The  Second  Massachusetts  was  compelled  to  withdraw 
from  the  fight,  because  their  Springfield  single-loaders  drew  so  much 
fire  in  their  direction. 

"Two  men  of  the  First  Infantry  crept  forward  under  fire,  and,  within 
200  yards  of  the  enemy's  trenches,  cut  all  the  barbed-wire  imped 
iments.  Colonel  Haskell,  leading  the  Seventeenth  Infantry,  was  hit 


148  HISTORY   OF   THE 

three  times  in  a  very  few  seconds;  his  quartermaster  was  killed  by 
his  side. 

"  The  Seventh  was  exposed  to  a  terrible  fire.  Hour  after  hour  the 
men  stood  it  unflinchingly,  the  tierce  sun  scorching  their  backs,  suffer 
ing  heavy  losses  from  an  enemy  practically  invisible,  and  to  whom  they 
could  not  reply  effectively." 

Captain  Lee  at  noon  came  to  a  sunken  road  and  noticed  it  was 
full  of  men  lying  down.  He  asked  an  officer  if  they  were  reserves. 
The  answer  was :  — 

"  No,  sir ;  by ,  they  are  casualties." 

He  found  over  a  hundred  killed  and  wounded  laid  out  on  as  many 
yards  of  road,  and  so  close  together  that  one  could  only  pass  by 
stepping  over  them.  There  was  a  strange  silence  among  these  men, 
not  a  whimper  or  a  groan,  but  each  lay  quietly  nursing  his  wound 
with  closed  eyes  and  set  teeth,  only  flinching  when  the  erratic  sleet 
of  bullets  clipped  the  leaves  off  the  hedge  close  above  their  heads. 

"Many  looked  up  curiously  at  my  strange  uniform  as  I  passed," 
he  added,  "and  asked  quickly  and  quietly:  'Are  you  a  doctor,  sir?' 
I  could  but  shake  my  head,  and  they  would  instantly  relapse  into 
their  strained,  intent  attitudes,  while  I  felt  sick  at  heart  at  the  thought 
of  my  incompetence.  Some  of  the  slightly  wounded  were  tending 
those  who  were  badly  hit,  and  nothing  could  have  surpassed  the 
unskilled  tenderness  of  those  men.  I  was  astonished,  too,  at  their 
thoughtful  consideration. 

" '  Keep  well  down,  sir,'  several  said  as  I  stopped  to  speak  to  them, 
'them  Mausers  is  flying  pretty  low  and  there's  plenty  of  us  here  al 
ready.' 

"The  heat  in  the  little  road  was  intense;  there  was  no  shade,  not 
a  breath  of  air,  and  the  wounded  lay  sweltering  in  the  sun  until  the 
head  reeled  with  the  rank  smell  of  sweat  and  saturated  flannel.  Right 
among  the  wounded  lay,  curled  up,  a  Cuban,  apparently  asleep.  Upon 
approaching  him,  however,  it  was  only  too  apparent  that  he  had  been 
dead  for  several  days,  and  on  the  tree  overhead  two  sleek  and  gorged 
vultures  looked  down  furtively  at  his  ever-increasing  companions. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  149 

"  The  worst  feature  of  it  all  was  the  scarcity  of  doctors.  Hour  after 
hour  these  wounded  men  had  lain  in  the  scorching  sun,  unattended, 
and  often  bleeding  to  death.  Their  comrades  had,  in  many  cases, 
applied  the  first  aid  dressings  in  rough  and  unskilled  fashion,  but, 
so  far  as  one  could  see,  there  had  been  no  medical  assistance.  The 
nearest  dressing  station  was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  rear,  and, 
while  the  medical  staff  there  was,  undoubtedly,  more  than  busy,  it  was 
chiefly  with  such  cases  as  were  slightly  enough  wounded  to  walk  down 
for  aid. 

"One  man  I  noticed  lying  very  quiet  in  a  great  pool  of  bloocj.  A 
comrade  with  a  shattered  leg  was  fanning  him  with  a  hat,  and  keeping 
the  flies  off  his  face.  I  sat  down  beside  them,  and,  seeing  the  man  was 
shot  right  through  the  stomach,  knew  there  was  nothing  T  could  do 
beyond  giving  him  a  little  water.  I  asked  him  how  he  felt,  and  he 
replied  with  difficulty: — 

'"Oh,  I  am  doing  pretty  well,  sir.'  His  companion  then  said:  'Well, 
sir,  if  you  can,  you  might  send  a  doctor  to  see  this  man.  He  was  one  of 
the  first  hit,  about  eight  this  morning,  and  no  one  has  seen  him  yet.' 
The  wounded  man  here  broke  in:  'That's  all  right,  Mick,  I  guess  the 
doctors  have  more  than  they  can  do  looking  after  them  as  are  badly 
hurt,  and  they  will  be  along  soon.'  I  looked  at  my  watch  and  it  was 
nearly  one  o'clock." 


Saturday  afternoon  both  sides,  worn  out  with  fatigue,  rested.  Then 
came  a  lull  as  if  before  a  storm  —  the  night  of  Saturday,  July  2,  glori 
ous  to  our  military  arm,  presaging  ominously  the  event  that  was  to 
follow  on  Sunday  on  the  sea,  and  fill  the  world  with  astonishment  at 
American  prowess. 


CHAPTER  THE  TENTH. 
DESTRUCTION  OF  CERVERA'S  SQUADRON. 

THE  DASH  OF  THE  SPANISH  SHIPS  OUT  OF  THE  HARBOR  OF  SANTIAGO  — THE  GREATEST  NAVAL 

DUEL  IN  THE  WORLD'S  HISTORY— ALL  THE  ENEMY'S  SHIPS  AND  DESTROYERS  BUT  ONE 

ANNIHILATED  BY  OUR  WAR  SHIPS  IN   FIFTY-FIVE  MINUTES  — THE  LONG  CHASE 

AFTER  THE  "CRISTOBAL  COLON  "    AND  HER  CAPTURE  AFTER  A   RACE 

OF    FIFTY    MILES  —  THE    GLORY    OF    THE    "BROOKLYN," 

"OREGON,"    "TEXAS,"    AND    "GLOUCESTER." 

I. 

SUNDAY  morning,  the  third  of  July,  dawned  clear  and  beautiful 
over  the  ocean  and  the  bay  of  Santiago.     The  United  States 
ships  of  war  that  lay  in  a  great  semicircle  before  the  entrance 
were  bathed   in   the  brilliant    sunshine   that  glittered   on   the 
water  just  rippled  by  a  breeze.    Along  shore  the  last  misty  haze  of 
dawn  hung  under  the  cliffs,  blue  and  dim.     On  the  crags 

AVE  C-rtiSAR 

MORITURI  TE  of  Old  Morro  and  Socapa  Point  the  guns  were  still  point 
ing  outward  from  the  battered  forts,  and  above  the  walls 
streamed  the  flag  of  Spain. 

For  a  month  and  a  day  our  ships  of  war  had  lain  off  the  same 
spot,  keeping  unwearied  watch  upon  the  gash  in  the  cliffs  that  marked 
the  harbor  entrance.  By  day  they  lay  off  from  four  to  six  miles, 
with  a  lookout  at  every  ship's  head ;  at  night  they  steamed  in,  lying 
from  two-and-a-half  to  four  miles  off,  with  a  blazing  searchlight  from 
one  of  the  ships,  by  two-hour  turns,  fixed  upon  the  center  of  the  gash. 
As  our  troops  closed  about  Santiago,  the  ships  drew  nearer  in  day 
light,  and  on  this  Sunday  morning  they  steamed  with  bare  steer- 
way,  or  drifted,  in  a  half-circle  eight  miles  long,  from  two  to  four 
miles  from  the  shore. 

Inside  the  bay,  in  front  of  the  wharves  of  Santiago,  were  the  ships 
of  Spain  commanded  by  Admiral  Cervera,  the  torpedo  section  com 
manded  by  Vice-Admiral  Villamil,  two  officers  of  great  repute  and 

(150) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  151 

noble  lineage.  The  Admiral  had  determined  to  remain  in  the  harbor 
and  assist  in  the  defense  of  the  city  by  driving  back  the  American 
troops  with  his  heavy  guns  when  our  men  should  move  on  the  lines. 
But  the  cord  had  tightened  about  Santiago,  and  the  Admiral's  plan 
had  proved  impracticable.  He  could  not  elevate  his  guns  sufficiently, 
and  the  intrepid  Americans  had  followed  the  Spanish  so  closely,  beating 
them  back  step  by  step,  that  his  fire  would  have  endangered  his  own 
allies  quite  as  much  as  the  American  forces.  It  was  gloomy  in  the 
city.  With  the  invaders  at  its  very  doors,  the  Spanish  soldiers,  ex 
hausted  by  fighting,  hunger,  disease,  and  sleeplessness,  were  dejected; 
the  citizens  terrorized  with  vague  apprehension.  The  sailors  on  Cer- 
vera's  ships  were  in  want  of  food  and  worn  with  nervous  anxiety. 

The  Admiral  had,  moreover,  received  positive  orders  from  the  Spanish 
Government  and  Captain-General  Blanco  at  Havana,  to  leave  the  har 
bor,  put  to  sea  and,  if  possible,  sail  to  the  rescue  of  Havana.  With 
his  swift  cruisers  it  was  believed  Cervera  could  at  an  opportune  mo 
ment  dash  out  of  the  harbor  at  full  speed  and  escape  danger  from 
pursuit,  except  by  our  New  York  and  Brooklyn,  equally  swift  vessels. 
Under  these  orders,  against  which  the  Admiral  had  protested  as  being 
impossible  to  execute  with  hope  of  success,  he  had,  nevertheless,  made 
his  preparations  to  act.  The  coal  bunkers  were  filled,  live  cattle  for 
provision  were  taken  aboard,  the  ships  were  stripped,  guns  loaded, 
and  all  was  in  readiness. 

Saturday  night,  in  fact,  had  been  selected  for  the  desperate  enter 
prise;  but  on  that  night  the  United  States  ships  had  refrained  from 
keeping  their  searchlights  on  the  harbor  entrance,  and  it  had  been 
decided  that  the  Spanish  ships  could  not  steam  past  the  sunken  Mer- 
rimac  in  the  dark.  For  that  reason  Cervera  waited  till  Sunday  morn 
ing.  The  news  of  his  purpose  was  abroad  in  the  city,  and  thousands 
of  persons  were  expected  on  the  wharves  to  witness  the  dash  to  battle. 
But  the  events  of  the  previous  day  had  rendered  such  a  spectacle 
uninteresting  to  the  beleaguered  and  terrorized  populace  in  Santiago. 
None  came  to  see  the  pride  of  Spain's  navy  go  to  the  field  of  the 
swiftest  and  most  awful  destruction  ever  known  in  naval  warfare. 


152  HISTORY   OF    THE 

On  the  ships,  therefore,  the  men  waited  in  dejection  for  orders. 
The  Captains  issued  brandy  freely  to  dispel  the  nervous  depression, 
and  encouraged  their  men  with  promises  or  urged  them  with  threats 
to  do  their  duty.  There  was  to  be  no  surrender,  but  a  fight  to  death. 
At  eight  o'clock  a  lookout  on  the  mountain  top  brought  the  informa 
tion  that  Admiral  Sampson's  flagship,  the  New  York,  and  the  battle 
ship  Massachusetts  had  left  the  blockading  line  and  steamed  eastward 
out  of  sight.  This  was  good  news  to  the  Admiral.  The  Brooklyn,  he 
thought,  was  the  only  American  left  capable  of  overhauling  any  of 
his  own  cruisers.  Quickly  the  plan  of  sortie  was  arranged.  Admiral 
Cervera,  on  his  flagship,  the  Maria  Teresa,  was  to  lead  the  way,  turn 
to  the  west,  where  the  Brooklyn  lay  at  one  end  of  the  blockading 
line,  and  attack  Commodore  Schley's  cruiser.  Under  cover  of  this  the 
Vizcaya  was  to  follow  and  ram  the  Brooklyn  if  possible.  If  this  was 
successful,  there  was  the  open  sea  in  which  to  run  away  from  the 
heavy  battleships. 

The  commanders  were  given  orders,  more  brandy  was  served,  and 
the  men  were  worked  up  to  the  point  of  desperation,  at  which  it 
seems  the  Spanish  sailors  were  expected  to  fight  best  —  the  old 
eighteenth-century  plan  of  "Dutch  courage  through  a  blind  drunk," 
as  long  ago  described  by  an  English  sailor. 

Meanwhile,  out  on  the  sea,  in  the  dancing  sunlight,  the  Americans 
were  at  easy  Sunday  duties.  No  man  on  those  ships  dreamed  that 
Cervera  would  emerge  in  the  broad  light  of  early  morning,  when  the 
men  he  must  engage  were  fresh  from  a  profound  night's  rest  and 
in  perfect  condition  to  meet  attack.  The  Brooklyn  lay  at  the  west  of 
the  line,  three  miles  off  shore,  while  the  little  converted  yacht  Vixen 
was  close  in  under  the  cliffs,  two  miles  west  of  the  Socapa  battery. 
Next  in  order,  eastward  from  the  Brooklyn,  lay  the  Texas,  Iowa,  Oregon, 
Indiana,  and  the  steel  yacht  Gloucester,  formerly  the  pleasure  yacht 
Corsair.  The  Gloucester  was  off  the  bay  of  Aguadores,  so  that  it  was 
at  the  western  end  of  the  line  only,  between  the  Brooklyn  and  the 
shore,  that  there  was  an  open  space  through  which  the  enemy  could 
turn,  unless  it  intended  to  attack  the  line. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  153 

The  Massachusetts  had  sailed  east  to  Guantanamo  bay  to  coal,  and, 
seven  miles  off  in  the  same  direction,  Admiral  Sampson,  on  the  New 
York,  was  steaming  to  Siboney  to  meet  General  Shafter  by  agreement 
for  a  conference. 

At  half-past  nine  o'clock  Commodore  Schley,  seated  in  his  chair 
under  the  awning  of  the  Brooklyn,  had  just  dismissed  the  men  after 
"quarterly  muster,"  when  the  articles  of  war  are  read  aloud  to  the 
crew,  according  to  regulations,  four  times  a  year.  On  the  other  ships 
quarters  inspection  was  in  progress.  The  men  were  in  their  "Sunday 
clothes."  It  was  a  peaceful  and  lazy  scene,  despite  the  air  of  prompt 
discipline  during  the  performance  of  duty. 

Overhead  the  bright  sun.  There  was  nothing  ominous  of  the  next 
minute  that  was  pregnant  with  the  most  frightful  destruction  and 
terrible  carnage  that  modern  war  has  yet  known. 


n. 

THERE  came  one  moment  when  every  ship  in  the  line  was  alive 
with  premonition.  Lookouts  had  observed  smoke  rising  back  in  the 
harbor,  but  that  was  not  unusual.  Suddenly,  every  look- 

THE  DASH 

out  saw  the  same  thing,  and  at  the  same  instant  every        TO 
sailor  on  the  fleet  felt  a  mysterious  thrill.     Even  those 
on  the  New  York,  seven  miles  away,  afterwards  told  of  the  mysterious 
instinct  that,  like  a  telepathic  whisper,  made  all  suddenly  look  back 
at  the  harbor  entrance. 

At  the  rear  of  the  gash  in  the  cliffs  appeared  the  fighting  masts 
of  a  war  ship,  her  funnels  pouring  out  dense  clouds  of  smoke,  indi 
cating  that  she  was  coming  out  with  speed. 

"The  ships  are  coming  out!"  was  shouted  on  every  Yankee  war 
vessel. 

It  was  as  if  electricity  had  vitalized  every  man  and  every  machine 
on  our  ships  of  war.  The  same  signal  flew  to  every  masthead,  fol 
lowed  by  another  from  Commodore  Schley,  on  the  Brooklyn,  "Close 
in  and  engage  the  enemy!" 


154  HISTORY    OF    THE 

But  signals  were  not  necessary.  The  clear  orders  that  had  been 
known  for  weeks,  the  perfect  discipline  on  board  every  vessel,  caused 
every  Captain  to  fight  his  ship  without  signals.  Then  it  was,  not 
taken  by  surprise,  but  steadied  by  amazed  excitement,  that  the  three 
thousand  men  aboard  our  war  ships,  drilled  in  perfect  sobriety,  trained 
upon  excellent  food  and  with  regular  method,  felt  the  nerves  and 
muscles  in  their  healthy  bodies  tingle  with  the  eagerness  of  long- 
expected  combat.  They  had  enjoyed  splendid  gunning  practice  during 
the  bombardments,  and  now  it  was  "to  do  or  die." 

It  was  thirty-five  minutes  past  nine  when  the  nose  of  the  Spanish 
flagship,  Maria  Teresa,  showed  outside  the  entrance  and,  swinging  to 
the  west,  headed  toward  the  Brooklyn,  firing  as  she  came.  On  all  our 
ships  some  of  the  furnaces  and  boilers  were  being  cleaned  out,  and 
the  driving  power  was  low ;  but  signal  bells  and  tubes  were  hurrying 
orders  everywhere,  while  messengers  went  scurrying  about  ship,  gun 
ners  stripped  for  action,  and  awnings  were  stowed  away.  The  Iowa, 
Indiana,  Oregon,  and  Texas  were  at  nearest  range,  with  the  Gloucester 
off  to  the  right. 

In  a  minute  guns  were  trained  from  every  turret,  barbette,  and 
steel  bastion,  and  into  the  cloud  of  white  steam  and  black  coal 
smoke  that  enveloped  the  Maria  Teresa,  the  four  battleships  hurled 
their  shells  and  solid  shot.  The  first  shell  that  struck  the  Spaniard 
shattered  her  main  water-supply  pipe  and  the  second  went  into  the 
Admiral's  cabin,  exploded  and  set  the  stern  afire,  while  another  from 
the  Indiana,  as  the  flying  Spaniard  turned  to  westward,  exploded  as 
it  tore  through  a  gun-room  and  killed  sixty  men.  Still  the  Spaniard 
held  on  his  way  and  headed  out  somewhat  toward  the  Brooklyn. 

And  now,  eight  hundred  yards  behind  her,  the  second  Spaniard, 
the  Vizcaya,  steamed  out  of  the  entrance,  belching  smoke  and  flame 
under  forced  draught,  and  turned  to  follow  the  Maria  Teresa. 

Commodore  Schley,  on  the  Brooklyn,  had  but  two  boilers  in  service, 
though  the  others  were  being  fired  up,  and  he  was  not  able  to  make 
more  than  eight  knots.  With  the  instinct  of  a  fighter  he  guessed  the 
intention  to  ram  his  ship,  and  with  the  splendid  skill  of  a  manoeuvrer, 


HE  WERNER  COMP 


NAVAL  BATTLE  OF 


TIAGO,  JULY  3rd,  1898. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  155 

he  executed  a  movement  so  bold  as  to  confound  the  Spaniards.  He 
had  not  yet  fired  a  shot,  but  was  running  westward  and  northward 
to  cut  off  the  flight.  Now,  however,  he  wheeled  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy,  to  starboard,  and  with  all  the  speed  he  could  command,  steamed 
bow  on  to  meet  the  Vizcaya  prow  to  prow.  The  Spanish  flagship, 
however,  was  undone.  Already  her  men  were  unable  to  stand  to 
their  guns,  swept  by  the  killing  metal  of  our  battleships,  and  thick 
with  the  smoke  of  tire  burning  everywhere.  In  vain  did  her  officers 
threaten  their  gunners,  and  even  shoot  them  down  to  prevent  deser 
tion  of  the  guns.  The  Texas  and  Oregon  were  running  in  and  devas 
tating  her,  and  the  Iowa  and  Indiana  were  assisting. 

Captain  Victor  Concas,  of  the  Teresa,  was  standing  on  his  bridge 
with  the  second  officer,  Captain  Maocochron,  to  whom  he  turned : — 

"  Shall  we  beach  the  ship  for  humanity's  sake  or  fight  longer,  dis 
abled  as  we  are?"  he  asked. 

"We  should  beach  her,"  replied  Maocochron. 

As  he  spoke,  a  shell  struck  Captain  Concas,  who  fell  dying.  His 
last  orders  were  to  beach  the  Teresa  and  haul  down  the  colors.  This 
was  done  and  the  Spaniard  ran  ashore,  on  fire  from  stem  to  stern. 
The  men  were  compelled  to  leap  into  the  water  and  swim  ashore. 
Admiral  Cervera,  an  old  man,  was  aided  by  his  son,  a  Lieutenant, 
and  gained  the  beach  wearing  only  his  underclothing.  All  occurred 
in  twenty  minutes. 

Meanwhile  the  Vizcaya  had  come  out  twelve  minutes  after  the 
Teresa,  and,  seeing  the  plight  of  the  flagship  ahead,  abandoned  the  idea 
of  ramming  the  Brooklyn.  She  therefore  sheered  off  towards  the 
coast,  seeing  which  the  Brooklyn  changed  her  course,  and  with  the 
Oregon  and  Texas  poured  a  terrible  fire  into  the  new  enemy  that  had 
just  run  the  gauntlet  of  the  Indiana  and  Iowa. 

At  this  moment  the  Cristobal  Colon,  the  fleetest  ship  of  the  Spanish 
navy,  its  pride  and  glory,  had  steamed  out,  and  the  scene  in  front  of 
the  harbor  became  magnificent  and  terrible.  The  clouds  of  smoke 
that  enveloped  the  ships  from  the  rapid  discharge  of  the  great  guns 
began  to  expand  and  cover  the  water.  The  Oregon,  Iowa,  Indiana,  and 


156  HISTORY    OF   THE 

Texas  were  cramming  their  furnaces  with  coal  saturated  with  oil, 
which  produced  such  rapid  and  pure  combustion  that  the  flames  from 
the  furnaces  roared  out  of  the  smoke  stacks,  while  the  continuous 
flashes  from  the  guns  belching  out  fire  and  smoke  gave  observers  in 
the  rear  an  impression  that  American  and  Spanish  ships  alike  were 
on  fire.  And  all  around  on  the  water  the  falling  and  exploding  shells 
made  fountains  of  spray  leap  up. 

Through  the  veil  of  smoke  that  impended,  the  Cristobal  Colon  had 
rushed  from  the  harbor  fast  upon  the  heels  of  the  Vizcaya  and  plunged 
through  the  rain  of  shot  and  shell  almost  unscathed.  Immediately 
behind  her  came  the  Almirante  Oquendo,  last  of  the  cruisers.  Into 
her  the  Indiana,  Iowa,  Texas,  Oregon,  and  Brooklyn  hurled  the  full 
weight  of  their  guns.  The  first  shell  that  landed  exploded  in  her  after- 
torpedo  compartment,  setting  the  ship  on  fire.  The  decks  were  swept 
as  if  by  a  hurricane  of  destruction,  the  Spanish  gunners  were  killed  at 
their  guns,  and  the  guns  overturned  upon  them.  But  she  fought  on 
desperately,  hoping  to  give  the  Vizcaya  and  Colon  some  advantage 
in  flight. 

Just  as  she  passed  the  Indiana  and  Iowa,  the  Oregon  moved  in 
upon  her  with  guns  vomiting  destruction,  while  the  Texas  and  Brook 
lyn,  heading  for  the  quarry  making  west,  turned  their  after-guns 
upon  her.  On  the  Oquendo  brandy  had  been  served  out  to  the  crew 
for  desperate  resistance,  but  no  courage  could  withstand  the  tempest 
of  fire  that  swept  her.  Suddenly  there  was  an  explosion  forward  and 
she  turned  to  the  beach,  just  a  mile  beyond  the  spot  where  the  Maria 
Teresa  was  already  wrecked  and  burning.  Her  colors  came  down  and 
her  commander,  Captain  Juan  Lazaga,  it  was  reported  by  some  of  the 
crew,  committed  suicide  in  the  conning  tower  of  his  vessel,  as  she 
headed  to  the  rocks.  Afterwards,  when  the  wreck  was  examined, 
there  were  found  at  the  entrance  to  the  tower  a  jeweled  sword,  a  re 
volver,  and  a  heap  of  ashes,  among  which  were  human  bones.  The 
cartridges  of  the  revolver  had  been  discharged,  four  by  heat,  one  by 
the  hammer.  The  captain  of  the  Oquendo  was  not  found  among  the 
prisoners. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAK  157 

Forty  minutes  had  now  elapsed  since  the  first  ship  emerged.  To 
the  west  the  Vizcaya  and  Colon  were  speeding,  pursued  by  the  Brook 
lyn,  Texas,  and  Oregon. 

A  few  minutes  before,  out  of  the  harbor  entrance  came  rushing, 
like  a  railroad  train,  the  torpedo  destroyer  1'lnton,  with  Vice-Admiral 
Villamil  in  command,  and,  immediately  behind,  her  sister  craft,  the 
Furor.  They  were  spitting  shots  furiously  from  the  small  guns  they 
carried. 

These  were  the  type  of  war  craft  designed  to  make  thirty  knots 
an  hour.  Armed  with  torpedo  tubes  and  small  batteries,  much  mys 
terious  power  had  been  attributed  to  them  by  the  navies  of  the  world 
in  the  absence  of  practical  tests.  Was  it  part  of  Cervera's  plan  to 
have  these  boats  come  out  last,  and,  while  our  great  ships  were  occu 
pied  with  his  cruisers,  the  torpedo  machines  should  fall  upon  the  rear 
and  destroy  them?  If  it  was,  never  did  plan  fail  so  wretchedly. 

At  the  east  of  Morro  the  steel  yacht  Gloucester  had  been  lying. 
Her  commander,  Lieutenant  Richard  Wainwright,  expectant  of  the 
appearance  of  the  destroyers  in  the  rear,  had  moved  up  slowly 
under  cover  of  the  shore,  gaining  steam  power  by  the  delay,  but 
tiring  the  small  batteries  of  his  ship  at  the  big  cruisers  as  they 
came  out. 

As  soon  as  the  low,  black,  racing  hulls  of  the  destroyers  were  seen 
in  the  harbor  channel,  the  big  shells  from  the  battleships  began  to  fall 
about  them,  enveloping  them  in  the  smoke  of  explosion  and  the  spray 
of  columns  of  water  that  shot  up  like  fountains  from  the  spots  where 
shot  and  shell  fell  about  them.  The  awful  impact  of  that  storm  of 
metal  seems  to  have  produced  upon  the  little  craft  a  shock  like  that 
which  a  charging  army  feels  when  it  receives  the  point-blank,  deadly 
volley  of  a  cool  adversary  in  waiting.  They  wavered  for  a  minute, 
seemed  to  slow  up,  and  hesitated  whether  to  turn  to  the  east  or  west. 
That  moment  was  fatal.  One  more  concentrated  hail  of  missiles  fell 
upon  them  from  the  battleships  that  immediately  left  and  steamed 
westward.  Captain  Taylor,  of  the  Indiana,  signaled  "Gunboats  in." 
indicating  that  the  Gloucester  would  not  be  endangered  by  our  own 


158  HISTORY   OF   THE 

ships'  fire.     The    destroyers,  with  blind  fatality,  had  also  turned  west 
and  were  following  the  path  of  death. 

Then  the  thrill  which  always  accompanies  the  sight  of  heroic 
bravery  leaped  in  the  hearts  of  the  American  crews.  They  saw  the 
Gloucester  with  the  speed  of  the  wind  dash  in  northwestwardly  towards 
the  shore,  directly  across  the  course  of  the  destroyers,  firing  her  port 
guns  at  the  Oquendo  and  Vizcaya,  her  starboard  broadside  at  the  de 
stroyers.  The  Texas  sent  one  last  shot  at  the  Pluton,  which  struck  her 
boiler.  There  was  a  rending,  tearing  sound,  and  a  volcano  of  steam 
and  black  smoke  rose  from  the  Vice-Admiral's  boat.  Another  shot 
from  the  Gloucester  destroyed  the  Pluton's  steering  gear  and  she  hung 
helpless,  close  up  to  the  beach,  toward  which  she  began  drifting  on 
the  tide.  Then  the  Gloucester  turned  her  bow  and  steamed  directly  to 
meet  her,  and,  the  Furor  coming  up,  she  ran  between  the  two,  deliver 
ing  both  broadsides.  The  New  York  had  come  up  speedily  to  the  chase 
of  the  Colon,  and  she  sent  two  shots  at  the  Furor.  The  Gloucester  held 
on  her  course  with  dauntless  courage,  straight  into  the  fire  of  the  de 
stroyers  and  under  the  guns  of  the  shore  forts.  Then  the  flag  came 
down  on  the  Pluton  as  she  went  ashore,  and  the  Furor,  with  fire  and 
smoke  pouring  from  her  deck,  wavered,  turned  shoreward,  struck  her 
colors,  and  went  down,  battered,  riddled,  and  sinking,  as  was  her 
companion. 

in. 

HUGGING  the   coast   ahead,  masked  by  smoke  and  flame,  urged  on 
by  desperation  and  hope,  the  Cristobal  Colon  and  Vizcaya  raced  to  the 
A  DEATH  CHASE     wes^'  with  the  Brooklyn,  Oregon,  and  Texas  off  shore  in 
ON  THE  hot  pursuit,  firing  as  they  raced,  with  the  Iowa  and  In 

diana,  foul  of  hulls,  laboring  behind  at  slower  speed.  On 
the  Oregon  and  Texas  full  speed  had  been  hard  to  attain.  Steadying  to 
the  task,  straining  every  human  power  on  board  to  increase  the  steam 
pressure,  the  two  ships  hung  upon  the  quarry  to  capture  or  destroy.  It 
was  a  terrific  race  of  steam  against  steam,  of  machinery  and  men  against 
machinery  and  men,  of  hunter  against  hunted,  of  hope  against  despair. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  159 

The  great  vessels  groaned  and  the  draughts  roared  as  if  the  ships 
were  alive  and  laboring  with  human  desire.  On  board  these  battle 
ships  it  was  like  that  other  race,  when  — 

••  The   Prairie   Belle   burnt  a  hole  in  the  nii^ht 

*  *  *  *  * 

With  her  furnace  crammed  with  rosin  and  pine." 

Except  the  Brooklyn,  it  was  heavy  battleships  against  swift  cruisers. 
Down  in  the  furnace  rooms  on  the  battleships,  stripped  to  the  skin, 
dripping  oily  sweat  from  their  shining  bodies,  the  stokers — those  ob 
scure  heroes,  without  the  inspiration  of  scene  or  objective  to  encourage 
them  —  were  true  Americans.  On  the  Brooklyn,  when  the  chase  began 
after  the  Cristobal  Colon,  Commodore  Schley  realized  the  position  of  the 
engine  room  and  furnace  men.  He  called  his  sailors,  formed  a  line 
down  the  stairs  and  sent  cool  beer,  kept  for  the  officers,  down  the  line 
to  cheer  the  faithful  workers.  In  addition,  an  ensign  stood  at  the 
hatchway  and  described  the  chase,  the  shots,  and  the  results,  to  the  first 
man  in  the  line.  The  message  was  thus  carried  down  to  the  depths 
of  the  hold  by  human  telegraph.  Every  point  of  our  success  was 
cheered  by  the  gallant  stokers,  who  worked  on  with  renewed  energy 
to  send  the  great  ship  with  greater  speed  than  even  her  builders  had 
expected. 

That  was  the  American  way. 

On  board  one  of  the  Spanish  vessels,  it  was  told  with  horror  that 
firemen  and  engineers  who  were  unable  to  endure  the  heat,  smoke, 
and  escaping  steam,  and  who  attempted  to  come  up,  were  pushed 
back  by  the  officers,  and  the  hatches  fastened.  That,  finally,  in  an  in 
sane  fury,  coal  oil  was  poured  over  the  hatches  and  ignited  when  the 
ship  was  about  to  drift  ashore — and  no  man  came  alive  out  of  that 
hell  under  the  water  line. 

That  was  the  Spanish  way. 

The  Colon  had  outstripped  the  Vizcaya,  and  now  the  pursuers  con 
centrated  their  fire  upon  the  latter,  with  an  occasional  shell  at  the 
Colon.  It  was  long-range  shooting  and  they  were  difficult  targets,  but 


160  HISTORY    OF    THE 

the  United  States  gunners  were  good  at  all  ranges  and  targets.  Six 
minutes  after  the  onslaught  began  on  the  Vizcaya,  that  vessel  was  on 
fire  astern,  her  gun-decks  swept,  her  sailors  dead  and  dying  strewing 
the  floors,  her  hull  was  riddled,  and  she  turned  and  lurched  headlong 
to  the  shore.  Her  flag  was  still  flying  at  the  gaff,  and  it  fluttered 
there  until  it  was  almost  burned  away  by  the  flames  that  were  leaping 
up  from  her  hull  and  upper  works.  A  boat  was  lowered  from  her  and 
men  leaped  overboard  on  every  side.  A  detachment  of  Cuban  insur 
gents  on  the  shore  were  firing  upon  the  unfortunates  in  the  water  and 
in  the  boats.  Captain  Evans  of  the  Iowa  fired  a  small  gun  over  the 
Cubans  to  warn  them  off,  and,  in  obedience  to  orders,  stopped  to  pick 
up  the  survivors,  38  officers  and  240  men.  The  Vizcaya  went  ashore 
at  Aserraderos,  fifteen  miles  west  of  Santiago. 

During  this  time  the  Cristobal  Colon  had  increased  her  lead  and 
was  flying  under  forced  draught  along  the  coast.  Flame  and  smoke 
came  from  her  funnels,  and,  under  cover  of  the  shore,  her  hull  was 
with  difficulty  observed.  After  her  sped  the  Brooklyn  in  advance,  well 
out  from  shore,  the  Oregon  next,  a  little  closer  in,  the  Vixen,  still  closer 
in,  and  the  Texas  astern.  It  was  the  quarter  of  an  ellipse  hemming  in 
the  flying  Spaniard.  Behind,  at  a  great  distance,  came  the  New  York, 
flying  like  the  wind.  As  she  passed  the  spot  where  the  Vizcaya  had 
been  destroyed,  she  passed  two  naked  men  in  the  water.  They  were 
Spanish  sailors  who  had  leaped  overboard  to  escape  from  the  burning 
ship.  The  first  was  a  magnificent  fellow,  physically,  and  an  expert 
swimmer.  He  was  heading,  apparently,  for  Santiago.  As  the  New  York 
approached  him  he  stood  up  in  the  water,  waving  both  arms  above 
his  head,  shouted  some  unintelligible  words,  and  smiled  terribly.  A 
life-preserver  was  hurled  toward  him.  for  which  he  struck  out  in  long, 
powerful  strokes.  The  second  man  was  passed  a  few  minutes  later 
heading  for  the  beach.  He  was  nearly  exhausted,  and  wasted  much 
of  his  remaining  strength  in  shouting  for  help  and  cursing  at  the  ap 
parent  delay  in  getting  it.  He  was  evidently  frightened.  Life- 
preservers  were  also  thrown  to  him,  but  it  could  not  be  seen  whether 
or  not  he  reached  them. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  161 

Minute  after  minute  the  chase  sped  on,  the  speed  of  the  Americans 
increasing,  that  of  the  Spaniard  not  improving,  until  the  Colon  began 
to  slip  back  to  the  inner  focus  of  the  terrible  ellipse  that  was  rush 
ing  to  embrace  her  in  destruction. 

Minute  after  minute  went  by.  The  Americans  had  ceased  to  fire 
and  were  intent  upon  capture  or  to  demonstrate  the  superiority  of 
our  ships  in  chase.  Mile  after  mile  the  great  engines  of  war  raced 
on.  On  the  Oregon  the  speed  was  seventeen  knots  an  hour  and 
she  was  keeping  up  with  the  Brooklyn  and  overhauling  the  Spaniards, 
while  the  Texas  was  also  exceeding  her  speed  record. 

Twenty,  thirty,  forty  miles,  were  run  and  now  the  doom  of  the  last 
of  Spain's  famous  squadron  appeared.  Far  ahead  the  dim  blue  out 
lines  of  Cape  Cruz  were  seen.  The  cape  jutted  out  from  the  coast  and 
the  Colon,  following  the  shore  line,  must  skirt  it.  The  Brooklyn,  sheer 
ing  off  the  coast,  steered  straight  for  the  Cape  Cruz  point,  making  the 
diameter  of  a  quarter  circle,  while  the  Colon  would  be  forced  to  make 
the  circumference.  The  Brooklyn  and  Oregon  drew  abreast  the  enemy; 
the  Texas  followed  the  quarry. 

The  men  on  our  ships  had  been  cheering,  and  were  gathered  on 
decks,  watching  the  chase  with  intense  excitement  and  with  that 
outflow  of  humor,  so  cynical,  yet  practical,  in  the  teeth  of  danger. 
Captain  Clark  signaled  from  the  Oregon  to  Commodore  Schley  on  the 
Brooklyn :  — 

"  A  strange  ship,  looking  like  an  Italian,  in  the  distance." 

This  was  an  allusion  to  the  fact  that  the  Colon  had  been  purchased 
from  Italy. 

Commodore  Schley,  sitting  on  the  edge  of  the  forward  eight-inch 
turret,  in  a  careless  attitude,  his  glasses  on  the  Colon,  smiled  as  the 
message  was  brought,  and  answered:  — 

"Tell  the  Oregon  she  can  try  one  of  those  thirteen-inch  railroad 
trains  on  her." 

There  was  a  terrible  roar  as  the  shell  went  by  the  Brooklyn,  a  mo 
ment  of  suspense  and  watching,  and  then  a  hearty  cheer  as  the  great 

projectile  struck  the  water  close  astern  the  Colon,  four  miles  away. 
11 


162  HISTORY   OF    THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

Another  was  tried,  which  reached  the  mark,  and  there  were  more 
cheers.  It  had  struck  the  bow  and  weakened  the  ship. 

Plainly  outraced,  the  Colon  slowed  up.  She  fired  one  shot  to  the 
rear  at  the  Texas,  hauled  down  her  colors,  which  were  left  in  a  limp 
huddle  at  the  foot  of  the  line,  turned  her  nose  to  shore  and  ran  aground 
at  Rio  Tarquino,  forty-eight  miles  west  of  Santiago  at  1:15  P.M. 

This  was  the  spot  where  the  crew  of  the  Virginius  had  landed 
and  had  been  massacred  by  the  Spanish,  thirty  years  ago. 

The  other  five  ships  had  been  destroyed  in  fifty-five  minutes,  but 
the  chase  of  the  Colon  lasted  three  hours  and  sixteen  minutes,  during 
which,  under  complete  preparation  and  forced  draught  most  of  the 
time,  she  had  made  less  than  sixteen  knots  an  hour,  while  our  ships 
under  disadvantages  in  respect  to  preparation,  removing  which  as  they 
steamed,  had  outsailed  and  destroyed  the  pride  of  Spain — a  cruiser 
rated  as  the  swiftest  in  the  world's  navy. 

Captain  Cook  of  the  Brooklyn  went  on  board  the  Colon  in  a  boat 
to  receive  her  surrender.  The  New  York  then  came  up  and  Commodore 
Schley  went  on  board  to  report  to  Admiral  Sampson.  While  doing  so 
the  Resolute  came  up  and  reported  a  strange  war  ship  off  Santiago. 
Schley  was  ordered  back  with  the  Brooklyn  to  meet  her.  It  proved 
to  be  the  Austrian  cruiser,  Maria  Teresa,  seeking  permission  to  take 
Austrian  refugees  from  Santiago. 


CHAPTER  THE   ELEVENTH. 

DESTRUCTION  OF  CERVERA'S  SQUADRON  (Continued). 

DREADFUL  SCENKS  ATTENDING  THE  RESCUE  OF  SURVIVORS  AND  THK  CAPTURE  OF  PRISONERS  — 
INCIDENTS    OF    THE    SURRENDER   OF   ADMIRAL   CERVERA   AND    CAPTAIN    EULATE  —  SPAN 
ISH    SHIPS    REDUCED   TO   WORTHLESS    HULKS    BY   THE    FURY   OF    OUR    ATTACK  — 
TREACHEROUS  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  "COLON"  —  ANECDOTES  OF  THE  ENGAGE 
MENT —  CONTRAST    OF    AMERICAN    AND    SPANISH    MEN    AND    METHODS 
—  THE    EFFECT    OF    THE  VICTORY    AND   THE   CREDIT   OF    IT. 


C 


I. 

APTAIN  COOK,  of  the  Brooklyn,  chief-of-staff  of  Commodore  Schley, 
who  had  boarded  the  Colon  to  receive  her  surrender,  bore 
from  his  commanding  officer  considerate  in-  WRECKED  SHIPS 
structions  to  permit  all  the  officers  of  the  AND  VAN- 

,   .  ,     .  ,      .  ml   .  QUISHED  MEN 

enemy  s  ship  to  retain  their  personal  effects.  This 
was  chivalrous  treatment  of  the  vanquished.  It  proved  to  be  entirely 
undeserved.  The  rules  of  warfare  provide  that  when  an  enemy  has 
hauled  dowrn  his  colors  and  run  up  the  white  flag  of  surrender,  the 
property  of  the  government  he  carries  and  the  arms  of  the  crew  are 
by  that  act  transferred  to  the  conquerors.  The  Colon  was  run  ashore 
at  high  speed  upon  a  rather  steep  beach,  from  which  she  slipped  back 
into  the  sea  by  the  working  of  the  waves.  Then  it  was  discovered 
that  the  sea-valves  of  the  vessel  had  been  treacherously  opened,  so 
as  to  render  it  impossible  for  her  to  float.  It  must  have  been  done 
after  she  had  surrendered,  or  she  could  not  have  made  the  swift  run 
that  carried  her  far  up  on  the  beach. 

The  Colon  was  not  much  injured  by  our  firing;  her  hull  was  not 
penetrated  below  the  water  line,  and  it  would  have  been  possible  to 
repair  her  at  small  cost  and  convert  her  into  a  valuable  addition 
to  the  United  States  navy.  It  was  doubtless  to  prevent  this  that  her 
commander  resorted  to  the  trick,  dishonorable  in  civilized  warfare,  of 
rendering  her  useless.  The  sea-valves  were  not  only  opened  but 

(163) 


164  HISTORY   OF   THE 

their  caps  were  heaved  overboard,  the  dead-lights  of  the  portholes 
were  smashed,  and  even  the  breech-plugs  of  the  guns  were  thrown 
into  the  sea. 

The  530  survivors  were  taken  on  board  the  United  States  ship 
Resolute,  and  the  captured  ship  was  examined.  Except  for  the  vandal 
ism  of  her  crew  she  could  have  been  saved.  But  she  swung  off,  and 
drifted  westward,  turning  her  bow  off  shore.  The  New  York  went  in, 
and  placing  her  prow  against  the  nose  of  the  Colon,  pushed  the  latter 
into  shoal  water,  where  she  turned  over  on  her  side  and  sank,  swallow 
ing  the  sand  and  refuse  of  the  coast,  an  almost  hopeless  wreck. 

The  Colon  had  but  two  serious  wounds  from  our  fire,  her  sides 
having  been  masked  by  the  Oquendo  and  the  Vizcaya  during  the  hot 
test  part  of  the  engagement. 

Meanwhile,  the  death-strewn  coast  of  Cuba,  from  Santiago  to  Aser- 
raderos,  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles,  the  scene  of  gigantic  work  of  de 
struction,  had  become  a  theatre  of  heroic  rescue.  It  was  as  if  the  angel 
of  Mercy  had  followed  upon  swift  wing  the  angel  of  Death. 

No  sooner  had  the  riddled  ships  run  ashore  than  the  American 
pursuers  changed  from  merciless  adversaries  to  unwearying  life  savers. 
When  Captain  Cook  ordered  a  boat  out  to  board  the  Colon,  his  men, 
half-naked  and  begrimed  with  powder,  ran  shouting  and  dancing  to 
their  work.  He  cautioned  them,  however,  to  show  no  signs  of  triumph 
or  exultation  to  the  vanquished,  and  the  crew  rowed  to  the  Colon  in 
silence.  As  they  approached  the  ship  the  Spaniards  called  out  "  Bravo 
Americanos!  "  and  then  our  men  returned  "Bravo  Espanoles!"  The  cabin 
and  gun-room  tables  of  the  Spaniard  were  littered  with  wine  and  brandy 
bottles,  and  the  men  were  half  drunk  and  dazed. 

Back  at  Aserraderos  the  Iowa  had  stopped  when  the  Vizcaya  was 
beached.  Five  boats  were  sent  out  to  rescue  the  Spaniards.  It  was 
a  frightful  scene.  Fire  was  raging  furiously  between  decks,  and  portions 
of  the  steel  hull  were  red  with  heat.  Men  were  hanging  to  chains 
or  other  grappling  points,  many  were  scrambling  ashore  through  the 
surf.  The  fire  was  threatening  magazines  and  projectiles,  but  the 
American  seamen  plunged  into  the  wreck,  seeking  the  wounded  that 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  165 

had  been  abandoned  to  a  horrible  fate  by  their  own  terror-stricken 
comrades.  Loaded  guns  were  now  and  then  being  discharged  by  the 
heat,  but  all  this  was  braved.  The  Ericsson,  torpedo  boat,  assisted 
at  this  rescue.  Ashore  Cubans  were  in  waiting  to  assail  the  wretched 
Spaniards  as  they  crawled  upon  the  beach,  but  the  arrival  of  the 
Americans  put  a  stop  to  the  barbarity. 

Captain  Antonio  Eulate  commanded  the  Vizcaya.  More  than  any 
other  Spanish  officer  he  typified  the  racial  pride  and  weakness  of 
his  nation.  He  had  been  especially  selected  to  bring  his  vessel  to 
New  York  harbor  in  a  show  of  defiant  courtesy  when  the  Maine  had 
been  sent  to  Havana.  While  he  was  yet  on  the  ocean  the  Maine  was 
destroyed  at  Havana  and  Captain  Eulate  did  not  discover  the  fact  until 
he  reached  New  York.  Then  he  entered  the  harbor  with  his  flag  at  half- 
mast,  without  music,  and  declined  all  invitations  to  be  entertained, 
giving  as  his  reason  his  sympathy  for  the  sailors  lost  on  the  Maine. 
He  displayed  no  fear,  and  his  conduct  in  all  ceremonious  acts  was  above 
reproach. 

He  remained  ten  days  in  New  York,  during  which  time  the  excite 
ment  over  the  Maine  tragedy  was  high,  and  then  he  sailed  away  to 
Havana.  After  he  had  gone,  one  of  the  boulevard  papers  of  Paris  printed 
a  ludicrous  story  which  was  attributed  to  an  officer  of  the  Vizcaya,  who 
was  said  to  have  written  the  account  home.  It  was  intended  to  illus 
trate  the  cowardice  of  the  Americans  and  their  trembling  fear  of  the 
Spanish.  The  story  was,  that  when  the  Vizcaya  raised  anchor  to  steam 
out  of  New  York  harbor,  the  piers  were  crowded  with  thousands 
of  "Yankee  pigs"  who  began  hooting  and  jeering  at  the  vessel.  Captain 
Eulate,  who  was  on  the  bridge,  heard  the  contemptuous  sounds  and 
became  white  with  passion.  Ordering  the  ship  to  stop,  he  had  his 
launch  lowered  and  manned,  and  then  called  for  his  second  officer, 
to  whom  he  said,  showing  a  revolver:  — 

"  If  you  hear  a  pistol  shot  from  me  on  shore,  you  will  at  once  open 
fire  and  bombard  the  city!" 

Then  he  went  in  his  launch  to  the  pier,  while  the  "Yankees"  con 
tinued  to  jeer  or  to  show  confusion.  He  mounted  the  stairs,  walked 


166  HISTORY   OF   THE 

along  the  front  of  the  pier,  revolver  in  hand,  while  the  "trembling  pigs 
of  Yankees'7  cowered  before  him  and  crushed  each  other  as  they 
huddled  back.  Captain  Eulate,  controlling  his  voice,  which  was  almost 
breaking  with  passionate  and  scornful  rage,  cried  out:  — 

"If  any  man  dares  to  jeer  the  ship  and  flag  of  Spain,  I  will  kill 
him!" 

Dead  silence  ensued  and  lasted  for  twenty  minutes,  during  which 
time  the  Spaniard,  with  frowning  brows,  paced  the  pier,  ready  to 
execute  his  threat.  At  last,  seeing  that  the  "rabble  of  Yankee  pigs" 
was  completely  cowed,  he  descended  into  his  launch  and,  without  a 
glance  backward,  boarded  his  ship  and  steamed  out,  while  the  thousands 
upon  thousands  of  frightened  "Yankees"  stood  in  respectful  silence. 

It  is  not  possible  that  Captain  Eulate,  or  any  of  his  officers,  was 
authority  for  this  ludicrous  romance.  It  was  doubtless  made  of  the 
fancy  of  some  Paris  scribbler,  for  the  amusement  of  the  Latin  preju 
dice  against  Americans.  But  it  had  been  translated  and  republished 
in  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States,  so  that  an  individual  and 
special  interest  was  felt  in  the  brave  Spaniard  who  had  borne  himself 
so  well  under  trying  circumstances  at  New  York. 

When  he  was  discovered  on  the  beach  by  the  Iowa's  crew,  he  was 
covered  with  blood  from  a  number  of  wounds  and,  it  afterward  ap 
peared,  was  suffering  some  mental  strain  or  aberration.  Yet  he  retained 
his  pride  of  office  and  race  as  he  was  taken  off  to  the  loiva.  As  he 
was  carried  up  the  battleship's  side,  unable  himself  to  mount,  Captain 
Evans  ordered  the  ship's  guard  to  parade  as  a  token  of  respect.  The 
Spanish  commander  was  deeply  affected  as  he  was  carried  aft,  where 
Captain  Evans  waited. 

Here  Captain  Eulate  stood  up,  drew  his  sword  from  its  scabbard, 
held  it  up  and,  with  tears  in  his  eyes,  kissed  the  blade.  Then  he 
stepped  forward  and  offered  the  hilt  to  Captain  Evans.  But  the 
American  Captain  with  a  gesture  pushed  it  back,  and  advancing  seized 
Captain  Eulate's  hand. 

"  Keep  your  sword,  sir,"  he  said ;  "  you  have  fought  like  a  brave 
and  gallant  officer." 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  167 

The  Spaniard  fairly  broke  down  in  gratitude  at  this  signal  courtesy. 
He  would  have  fallen  but  for  assistance,  and  was  borne  to  his  state 
room  in  tears,  crying,  "My  poor  Vizcaya —  lost,  lost!" 

He  was  the  only  officer  who  refused  parole  when  brought  to  Amer 
ican  soil.  To  accept  parole  from  the  enemy  is  against  the  regulations 
of  the  Spanish  army  and  navy,  justifiable  only  before  court-martial. 
It  was  also  said  that  he  was  the  only  officer  among  the  captured  who 
possessed  no  independent  income  and  was  solely  dependent  upon  his 
pay. 

It  was  darkly  hinted,  also,  that  his  mental  condition  of  moroseness, 
nervous  excitability,  and  depression,  was  due  to  remorse — that  he  had, 
with  his  own  hands,  pistolled  forty  of  the  Vizcaya  s  gunners  who  at 
tempted  to  desert  their  posts  during  the  terrible  h'ght.  This  was  not 
established;  it  was  most  probably  false  in  entirety,  one  of  those  grim 
manufactures  of  a  moment  opportune  to  the  hands  of  a  picturesque 
seeker  after  sensation.  But  Captain  Don  Antonio  Eulate  was  the 
most  strikingly  picturesque  figure  of  that  day.  He  tempted  the 
romancers  of  both  continents. 

From  the  Vizcaya  24  officers  and  248  men  were  rescued,  out  of  a 
crew  of  about  550.  Others  were  picked  up  later,  on  the  beach,  where 
they  were  hiding  from  the  Cubans.  But  more  than  150  were  killed  by  our 
fire,  drowned,  or  burned  on  the  ship.  Captain  Eulate  said  one  shell 
had  exploded  in  a  wardroom,  killing  90.  Of  the  survivors,  32  were 
wounded,  a  few  of  whom  died  afterward. 

Eight  and  a  half  miles  further  in  the  direction  of  Santiago,  the 
Almirante  Oquendo  lay  wrecked  on  Juan  Gonzales  Point,  and  a  few 
hundred  yards  further,  the  Maria  Teresa;  these  two,  the  last  and  first 
of  the  Spanish  cruisers  to  emerge,  and  first  to  be  destroyed. 

The  Indiana  and  Gloucester  were  here  engaged  at  rescue.  The  sur 
roundings  were  appalling.  Both  ships  were  glowing  like  furnaces, 
their  upper  works  an  array  of  twisted  and  distorted  beams  and  shat 
tered  walls.  Admiral  Cervera  had  leaped  overboard,  clad  in  his  under 
clothing  only,  and  his  son  had  assisted  him  until  a  life  raft  was 
reached.  The  Admiral  entreated  Lieutenant  Huse  of  the  Gloucester 


168  HISTORY    OF   THE 

not  to  go  aboard  his  burning  ship,  lest  explosions  should  kill  those 
attempting  to  rescue  the  wounded  on  board.  But  the  Americans  did 
not  hesitate.  They  scrambled  upon  the  decks  and  bore  the  wounded 
out  of  the  intense  heat  and  stifling  smoke,  and  transferred  them  to  our 
boats,  where  American  surgeons  attended  to  their  injuries  with  all 
the  skill  they  would  have  exerted  for  our  own  crews. 

Admiral  Cervera  was  conveyed  on  board  the  Gloucester,  where 
Captain  Wainwright  received  him  with  the  distinction  due  to  his 
rank.  The  Spanish  Admiral,  Don  Pascual  de  Cervera  y  Topete  Conde 
de  Jerez,  Marquis  de  Santa  Ana,  was  the  nephew  of  Admiral  Topete, 
one  of  Spain's  naval  heroes,  and  boasts  of  royal  blood.  He  was  about 
sixty-five  years  old.  His  first  campaign  was  the  Spanish  expedition 
to  Morocco  in  1859,  where  he  won  promotion.  He  was  once  naval 
attache  of  his  government  at  Washington,  and  speaks  English  fluently. 
He  was  sent  to  Cochin  China  in  1862,  and  in  1868  to  Peru,  as  captain 
of  a  war  ship.  Two  years  later  he  wTas  called  to  Cuba,  to  take  charge 
of  the  blockade,  but  later  went  to  Spain  and  became  Minister  of 
Marine.  When  he  retired  he  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Pelaijo, 
Spain's  only  first-class  battleship.  He  was  made  Admiral  in  1887. 
When  Spain  prepared  her  fleet  for  Cuban  waters  Cervera  was  placed 
in  command.  A  man  of  distinction  by  birth,  manners,  education,  and 
experience,  he  does  not  appear  to  have  possessed  abilities  equal  to  his 
opportunities.  On  the  Gloucester  he  was  given  a  stateroom  and  pro 
vided  with  apparel. 

"I  have  been  defeated,"  he  said  to  Captain  Wainwright,  "and  my 
career  is  ended.  I  thought  you  would  be  having  '  church '  on  your 
ships,  and  as  I  had  been  ordered  to  run  out  and  escape  to  Havana 
it  was  the  best  opportunity  to  be  expected.  My  ships  are  lost,  and 
all  I  have  is  lost.  Permit  me  to  give  you  my  autograph  —  all  I  can  — 
in  recognition  of  your  courtesy  and  humanity." 

Two  and  a  half  miles  nearer  Santiago,  the  Destroyers,  Pluton  and 
Furor,  had  sunk  near  the  beach.  Each  carried  72  men.  Only  39  of  the 
144  men  were  found  alive.  Among  the  dead  of  the  Pluton  was  Vice- 
Admiral  Fernando  Villamil,  an  expert  in  torpedo-boat  construction, 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  KJt) 

who  was  a  naval  officer  of  eminence,  well  known  in  Europe  and  Amer 
ica.  He  was  a  man  of  tenacity  of  purpose,  a  fine  drillmaster  and 
executive  aboard  ship,  and  of  very  agreeable  appearance,  bearing,  and 
manner.  He  enjoyed  the  personal  friendship  of  the  Queen-Regent 
Some  four  years  before  his  death,  while  a  Commodore,  he  was  ordered 
to  San  Sebastian,  the  summer  home  of  the  Spanish  royal  family,  to 
act  as  guard  for  the  youthful  King  and  the  Queen-Regent,  at  that  sea 
side  town.  His  appointment  aroused  the  envy  of  other  Spanish  naval 
officers  who  desired  the  opportunity  of  being  near  the  royal  family. 
At  that  time  Villamil  commanded  the  torpedo  boat  Destructor,  a  boat 
of  his  own  designing,  but  the  laughing  stock  of  the  Spanish  navy,  on 
account  of  its  small  size  and  low  freeboard.  The  Queen-Regent,  however, 
was  greatly  interested  in  this  new  fighting  craft  and  paid  frequent  visits 
to  it,  causing  much  heartburning  among  the  other  officers.  In  the 
middle  of  summer  she  and  the  King  decided  to  sail  to  Bilbao,  and 
chose  the  Destructor  for  the  voyage.  This  caused  a  great  outcry,  and 
the  Minister  of  Marine  begged  the  Queen-Regent  to  send  the  King 
on  another  boat,  so  that  in  the  event  of  an  accident  at  least  one  of 
them  would  be  saved. 

"Commodore  Villamil,"  asked  the  Queen-Regent,  "is  there  the 
slightest  danger?" 

"None,  your  Majesty,"  was  the  reply. 

"Then  we  will  both  sail  with  you,"  replied  the  Queen-Regent, 
much  to  the  discomfiture  of  the  Minister  of  Marine.  The  trip  was 
made  in  safety,  and  Villamil  was  shortly  afterward  raised  to  the  rank 
of  Admiral. 

The  Spanish  loss  was  about  300  killed,  150  wounded,  and  about 
1,600  prisoners.  The  four  cruisers  had  complements  of  about  550 
each,  but  these  were  doubtless  reduced  by  disease  and  accident;  and 
the  Destroyers  144  together.  There  were  at  least  2.250  men  on  the 
vessels,  and  it  is  believed  that  the  Cubans  killed  and  secreted  the  bodies 
of  a  number,  not  reported,  and  that  150  managed  to  find  their  way 
back  to  Santiago  through  the  jungle,  unless  they  were  picked  off  by 
Cubans  on  the  way. 


170  HISTORY   OF   THE 

II. 

THE  glory  of  our  ships  was  deservedly  great.  To  the  Oregon  was 
credited  the  first  alarm  of  the  enemy's  intention.  She  signaled  "  Think 
the  enemy  are  preparing  to  leave  the  harbor,"  and  fired  a 
OF  small  gun  to  attract  the  fleet's  attention  to  the  signal. 

On  the  authority  of  one  who  investigated  the  action,  who 
observed  it  from  the  New  York,  who  seems  to  have  been  a  naval  officer, 
and  whose  report  is  here  adopted  for  its  lucid  account  of  the  part  taken 
by  each  ship,  the  Oregon  was  the  first  of  our  battleships  cleared  for 
action,  and  she  engaged  every  Spanish  ship  in  order.  Her  13-inch  guns 
did  most  execution  among  the  enemy's  ships,  and  the  handling  of  the 
ship  herself  was  a  proof  of  her  excellence  in  every  particular.  Her 
station  was  south  of  the  Morro,  well  to  the  eastward  of  the  Vixen, 
Brooklyn,  Texas,  and  Iowa.  In  the  long  chase  after  the  Cristobal  Colon 
she  passed  all  these,  one  after  another,  except  the  Brooklyn,  and  did 
it  with  less  apparent  effort  at  speed  than  was  shown  by  any  other  ship. 
The  Cristobal  Colon's  funnels,  especially,  belched  out  immense  columns 
of  dark  smoke.  The  power  of  her  forced  draught  carried  even  flames 
at  times  from  the  stacks.  None  of  the  American  vessels  made  so  much 
smoke,  and  from  none  were  the  columns  so  continuous.  The  Oregon's 
smoke  was  not  heavy  at  any  time,  and  there  were  minutes  at  a  time 
when  only  the  faintest  haze  floated  from  her  funnels.  •  The  great  ship 
piled  up  a  big  foam-crested  billow  across  her  bows,  and  rushed  on 
as  though  dragged  by  a  hidden  force  of  incalculable  power. 

The  Gloucester,  formerly  the  pleasure  yacht  Corsair,  achieved  a  name 
for  herself  that  will  long  be  remembered.  She  had  the  slight  advan 
tage  of  a  harmless  appearance,  and  may  not  have  been  attacked  very 
fiercely.  Her  own  advances  were  straight,  quick,  and  fearlessly  under 
taken.  She  was  not  hit  during  the  action,  and  this  statement  alone 
is  convincing  proof  of  the  incomparably  poor  marksmanship  of  the 
Spaniards.  The  little  vessel  was  a  target  for  every  gun  mounted  on 
shore  and  for  the  broadsides  of  the  Colon,  Oquendo,  Furor,  and  Pluton, 
all  at  easy  range.  The  shells  flew  around  her,  landing  on  all  sides. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  171 

After  the  two  destroyers  had  shown  the  white  flag,  the  Gloucester  low 
ered  her  boats  and  gathered  in  as  many  prisoners  as  came  her  way. 
Some  she  rescued  as  they  swam,  a  few  she  took  directly  off  the  burning 
Pinion  with  that  vessel's  surrendered  colors,  and  some  she  took  from 
the  beach. 

The  Brooklyn  was  lying  at  the  western  and  outer  end  of  the  Ameri 
can  line  when  the  ships  came  out.  Her  first  sight  of  the  escaping 
enemy  was  when  the  Spanish  flagship  Teresa  rounded  the  head  of  land 
at  the  western  side  of  the  harbor  and  pointed  for  her,  firing  as  she 
came.  There  was  a  distance  of  at  least  three  miles  between  the  ships, 
but  from  the  direction  taken  by  the  Teresa  the  Brooklyn  expected  to 
be  rammed  at  any  moment  and  turned  her  own  strong  bow  to  meet 
the  enemy.  When  the  whole  Spanish  line  had  cleared  the  harbor 
entrance  and  headed  to  the  west,  the  Brooklyn  turned  off  too,  and 
started  to  head  off  the  escaping  ships.  She  fired  her  starboard  broad 
side  as  she  gathered  headway,  and  kept  up  an  intermittent  fire  until 
her  guns  grew  hot  and  several  of  them  were  put  out  of  commission. 
Her  turret  guns,  considering  the  range,  were  her  most  useful  arms. 
Only  two  of  the  Brooklyn 'n  boilers  were  in  commission  at  the  appear 
ance  of  the  enemy  and  it  was  some  time  before  fire  could  be  placed 
under  the  others.  Like  the  New  York,  however,  she  hurried  on,  increas 
ing  her  speed  by  coupling  on  fresh  boilers  as  fast  as  steam  was  up 
in  them.  Before  one  o'clock  she  had  six  and  her  auxiliaries  in  circuit. 
The  Brooklyn  was  slightly  in  advance  of  the  Oregon  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  long  chase  of  the  Colon,  but  when  the  Colon  finally  ran 
ashore  the  Brooklyn  turned  in  astern  of  the  battleship. 

The  Vixen,  formerly  the  yacht  Josephine,  was  on  the  extreme  western 
station.  The  course  of  the  Spanish  ships  was  outside  her.  For  several 
reasons  the  little  vessel  moved  quickly  out.  She  was  in  range  of 
the  American  ships  for  one  thing,  and  her  presence  might  interfere 
with  their  fire  at  the  enemy.  So  the  Vixen  raced  out  to  the  southward 
as  fast  as  she  could,  firing  valiantly  at  the  cruisers  as  she  went.  She 
followed  the  chase  to  the  westward  and  was  sent  back  from  Rio 
Tarquino  with  dispatches. 


172  HISTORY    OF   THE 

The  Texas,  which  had  met  with  many  accidents  of  navigation  in 
times  of  peace,  and  had  thus  earned  the  wardroom  sobriquet  of  "  The 
Old  Hoodoo,"  proved  herself  worthy  to  rank  in  the  first  class,  doing 
work  scarcely  less  effective  than  the  Oregon.  She  was  in  the  thick  of 
combat  from  beginning  to  end,  and  her  guns  engaged  every  one  of 
the  enemy's  ships.  The  shot  that  tore  open  the  boilers  of  the  Pluton 
is  credited  to  Ensign  Guise  of  the  Texas.  The  Spanish  commanders 
had  special  orders  to  sink  the  Brooklyn  and  Texas  if  they  could.  As 
the  Texas  drew  up  on  the  Oquendo  Captain  Phillip,  her  commander, 
left  the  bridge  and  went  to  the  conning  tower  to  direct  the  fighting. 
Scarcely  had  he  done  so  when  a  shot  passed  where  he  had  been 
standing.  She  was  several  times  struck,  one  shell  exploding  in  her 
smokestack,  but  no  shots  caused  serious  injury.  The  guns  of  the  Texas 
were  swung  in  so  many  directions  in  the  fury  of  fighting,  that  the 
concussion  caused  by  cross-deck  firing  deafened  most  of  her  men 
for  days.  One  was  hurled  down  a  hatchway  by  the  tremendous  impact 
of  the  rushing  air,  and  suffered  a  broken  arm. 

The  Indiana,  being  slow  and  unwieldy,  did  little  more  than  fire 
as  a  stationary  fort  as  the  ships  came  out  of  the  entrance.  After 
the  sinking  of  the  destroyers,  by  which  time  the  outcome  of  the 
action  was  already  pretty  evident,  she  was  ordered  back  to  the  harbor 
entrance  to  keep  watch  there.  On  the  way  she  lowered  boats  and 
joined  in  the  rescue  work. 

The  lotva  was  in  all  the  fighting  equally  with  the  Texas,  until  the 
sinking  of  the  Vizcaya,  when  she  was  ordered  back  to  take  part  in 
the  rescue  of  the  Spaniards. 

The  New  York  and  her  Admiral  took  no  part  in  the  fighting,  but 
the  ship  was  racing  to  the  assistance  of  the  Brooklyn,  Oregon,  and 
Texas,  after  the  Colon.  She  made  the  55  miles  under  the  handicap 
of  small  boiler  power,  but  arrived  only  half  an  hour  after  the  Colon 
was  beached. 

For  the  Spaniards  there  was  no  glory.  All  their  ships  had  met 
the  same  fate  but  the  Colon,  and  she  escaped  it  only  through  treachery. 
She  was  surrendered  in  order  that  her  own  men  might  destroy  her. 


THE   FLAGSHIP  NEW  YORK   UNDER  FULL  SPEED 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  173 

Her  officers  shrank  from  combat  only  to  take  refuge  in  the  vandalism  of 
cowardice.  For  these  acts  they  were  liable  to  punishment  by  death; 
but  no  notice  was  taken  of  it. 

A  correspondent  of  Harper's  Weekly,  describing  the  Spanish  wrecks 
a  day  after  their  destruction,  wrote  thus  of  the  Teresa  and  Oquendo, 
which  might  also  describe  the  Vizcaya:  — 

"They  lie  in  a  little  cove  a  few  hundred  yards  apart,  both  bows  on  to  a  hard 
sand  beach,  at  the  foot  of  high  hills  that  come  down  to  the  sea  less  steeply  than 
usual,  and  are  separated  from  the  water  by  a  stretch  of  flat,  low,  grass-grown  land 
adorned  with  tall  cocoanut  palms.  The  two  beaches,  neither  more  than  3(K)  yards 
in  length,  are  separated  by  a  bluff  of  precipitous  rock.  High  and  gloomy  hills  to 
the  north  shut  in  the  view,  while  the  heavy  ground-swell  rolls  in  its  heavy  voice 
against  the  shore.  This  cove,  five  and  one-half  miles  from  the  entrance  to  Santiago, 
was  most  opportune  for  the  two  hard-pressed  ships,  as  the  usual  coast  line  is  steep, 
rocky,  and  it  would  be  impossible  for  ships  or  men  to  have  survived  for  a  minute 
the  thundering  breakers. 

"  Smoke  still  poured  from  the  two  ships,  and  blew  away  in  a  thin  veil  against 
the  dark  hills;  the  surf  beat  along  their  sides  and  swept  in  and  out  through  the 
sternports  and  through  shot-holes  and  torpedo-tubes.  It  was  quite  a  climb  up  the 
tall  sides  of  the  Maria  Teresa,  and  once  in  the  gangway  the  scene  that  met  our 
eyes  was  one  of  utter  ruin.  Bad  as  the  ships  looked  from  the  outside,  the  paint 
all  burned  off,  or  hanging  in  folds  where  the  water  had  cooled  its  farther  progress, 
guns  slewed  every  which  way,  and  wire  rope  and  tackle  hanging  over  the  side  in 
wild  disorder,  the  scene  on  deck  was  so  much  worse  as  to  leave  one  speechless 
with  dismay. 

"  The  spar-deck  was  nothing  but  an  array  of  twisted  sagging  iron  beams,  set 
with  copper  bolts  that  had  held  the  deck-planking,  and  now  stuck  up  in  ragged 
rows  or  bent  over  as  the  fire  had  left  them.  Around  some  of  the  broadside  5-inch 
guns  bits  of  deck  still  remained  and  smoldered,  sending  up  wreaths  of  pale  blue 
smoke.  Around  the  guns  and  scattered  about  between  the  smokestacks  and  ven 
tilators  were  charred  bodies  that  gave  out  an  unpleasant  odor.  The  forward  military 
mast  had  fallen,  mixed  up  with  guns,  davits,  and  iron  plates,  on  the  starboard  side. 
The  bridge  was  a  mass  of  twisted  iron  and  brass.  Smokestacks  and  ventilators 
sagged,  and  some  of  the  latter  had  fallen  down  entirely.  There  was  a  great  hole 
where  the  magazines  had  been,  forward  and  aft;  they  had  exploded  from  the  bot 
tom  up,  in  the  line  of  least  resistance,  ripping  the  deck  and  beams  away  entirely, 
so  you  could  look  down  to  the  bottom  of  the  ship,  where  the  water  swashed  around. 
The  iron  deck  aft  was  bent  and  twisted  and  buckled  under  the  weight  of  the  big 
turret  and  11 -inch  gun.  The  main  deck,  made  of  iron  plates,  still  remained,  and 
was  covered  with  ashes  and  debris  fallen  from  above.  The  forward  part  of  the 


174 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


ship  was  full  of  dead,  and  was  too  hot  to  admit  of  much  investigation.  Sailors 
from  the  Texas  swarmed  over  the  vessel  while  we  were  there,  and  brought  up  from 
below  rifles,  cutlasses,  and  souvenirs  of  all  sorts.  One  man  had  a  hat  full  of  silver 
money  that  had  melted  and  stuck  together.  The  hammock  nettings  were  full  of 
burned  tin  boxes  that  had  held  canned  food;  wine  bottles  and  such  litter  were 
scattered  about,  and  from  forward  and  aft  were  brought  many  books  of  a  doubtful 
character." 

There  was  no  honor  for  the  Spanish  ships.  They  were  all  magnifi 
cent  vessels  of  their  type.  The  armament,  protection,  and  motive 
power  of  the  Maria  Teresa,  Oquendo,  and  Vizcaya  ranked  them  as  almost 
second-class  battleships  rather  than  cruisers.  The  Colon's  11 -inch  guns 
had  never  been  mounted,  and  they  were  missed.  Her  crew,  however, 
was  the  best  one  of  the  four,  and  had  had  charge  of  the  guns  of  the 
western  battery  at  Santiago,  that  had  done  the  most  effective  work 
against  the  blockading  fleet.  The  Furor  and  Pluton  were  of  the  latest 
type  of  the  torpedo-boat  destroyer  class,  and  had  been  much  feared, 
though  not  by  the  Americans.  The  engagement  at  Santiago  in  many 
respects  was  without  precedent. 


CHAPTER   THE   TWELFTH. 

DESTRUCTION  OF  CERVERA'S  SQUADRON  (Concluded). 

SPANISH    STORY    OK    THK   BATTLE   AS  TOLD    BY   SURVIVING    OFFICERS— IT   DOF.S   NOT   DIKKER 

IN    SUBSTANCE    FROM    THE   AMERICAN   ACCOUNT  —  INCIDENTS    AND    ANECDOTES    OF 

THE    ENGAGEMENT  —  How    THE    BATTLE    LOOKED    TO    OBSERVERS  — 

To    WHOM    DOES    THE    CREDIT    OF    VICTORY    BELONG? 


THE  Spanish  side  of  the  story  of  the  great  battle   is  a  part  of 
its  history  no  less  necessary  than  our  own.     Admiral  Cervera 
was  permitted  by  our  Government  to  make  up  and  forward 
his   official   report  to   Spain,  but  it  was  a  confidential   com 
munication,  and  its   character  was  not  indicated.     A  copy  is  in  the 
archives  of  the  United  States  Government.     The  Admiral  declined  to 
speak  publicly  of  the  battle,  and  the  officers  also  declined 
to  make  any  authorized  statement;  bat  during  their  pas-  STORY  OF 

sage  to  Annapolis  on  board  the  St.  Louis,  as  prisoners, 
they  spoke  freely  to  our  officers   of  the  experiences   of  their  ships. 
A  report  of  these  statements  was  carefully  made  up  and  published  in 
the  New  York  Sun,  from  which  this  summary  is  taken. 

Lieutenant  Gomez  Imas  of  Cervera's  staff  on  the  Maria  Teresa  said: 
"After  clearing  the  harbor  we  headed  to  the  westward  along  the  shore. 
We  fired  the  first  shot  of  the  battle,  aiming  at  the  Brooklyn,  then  about 
three  miles  away.  The  Texas,  Oregon,  and  Brooklyn  returned  our  fire, 
but  their  first  shots  all  fell  short.  As  the  distance  between  the  ships 
decreased  the  shells  commenced  to  strike  us  and  did  great  damage. 
First,  a  shell  exploded  in  the  Admiral's  cabin,  setting  fire  to  the  wood 
work  there.  A  signal  was  sent  to  the  engine  room  to  start  the  pumps, 
but  the  fire  mains  had  been  ruptured  by  an  exploding  shell,  so  that 
no  water  could  be  got  on  the  fire.  Another  shell  struck  the  main  steam 

(175) 


176  HISTORY   OF   THE 

pipe,  disabling  the  port  engine,  and  the  escaping  steam  killed  every 
man  in  that  compartment.  One  exploding  shell  killed  or  wounded 
eighty  of  our  men.  Our  fire  was  directed  principally  against  the 
Brooklyn.  The  fire  in  the  after  part  of  the  ship  had  driven  the  crews 
away  from  the  after  guns,  and  the  rapid-fire  guns  of  the  American 
ships  were  playing  havoc  with  our  men  and  riddling  the  upper 
works  of  the  ship.  Having  one  engine  disabled  and  the  whole  after 
part  of  the  ship  on  fire,  the  vessel  was  headed  toward  the  shore 
in  search  of  a  suitable  place  for  beaching.  The  Captain  said  to  the 
Admiral:  — 

"'  My. ship  is  in  flames,  my  engines  are  disabled,  my  men  have  been 
driven  from  the  guns  and  are  being  killed ;  ought  I  not  for  humanity's 
sake  to  surrender? ' 

"  The  Admiral  answered,  '  It  will  be  useless  to  fight  longer.' 

"The  flag  was  hauled  down  and  the  ship  run  on  the  beach. 
The  Captain  was  struck  and  severely  wounded  just  as  the  flag  was 
being  lowered.  The  fire  was  now  raging  aft  so  that  there  was  great 
danger  of  the  magazine  being  blown  up  at  any  minute.  The  Admiral 
and  those  of  the  officers  and  crew  still  alive  took  to  the  water,  the 
risk  of  drowning  being  preferable  to  the  certainty  of  being  burned  or 
blown  up.  Many  reached  the  shore,  but  some  were  drowned.  Admiral 
Cervera  stripped  to  his  underclothing  and  plunged  into  the  water. 
Two  of  the  sailors  secured  ropes  to  a  grating,  and  taking  the  other 
end  of  the  ropes  in  their  mouths  swam  to  the  shore  towing  the  grat 
ing,  the  Admiral  bearing  part  of  his  weight  on  it.  The  Admiral's 
son,  one  of  his  staff,  swam  along  behind  his  father  and  assisted  him 
as  best  he  could.  Had  it  not  been  for  this  assistance  Admiral  Cervera 
would  undoubtedly  have  been  drowned,  as  he  is  a  very  poor  swimmer. 
While  the  men  were  in  the  water  the  Cubans  on  shore  commenced 
firing  at  them  until  the  Iowa  put  a  stop  to  that  atrocity  by  firing  a 
shell  among  them  and  scattering  them." 

Captain  Eulate  of  the  Vizcaya  said :  "  When  the  Maria  Teresa 
headed  for  shore  I  passed  her,  and  I  had  the  Brooklyn,  Texas,  Iowa, 
and  Oregon  all  firing  at  me.  The  firing  from  these  ships  was  terrific; 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  177 

shells  were  bursting  all  around  us.  My  ship  was  set  on  fire  by  a 
shell  exploding  in  my  cabin.  My  engines  and  pumps  were  disabled, 
and  I  could  not  fight  the  fire.  My  men  were  being  killed  and  wounded 
in  large  numbers.  A  shell  finally  exploded  in  one  of  my  forward 
magazines  and  I  was  forced  to  head  for  the  shore.  When  I  went  into 
action  I  had  flying  at  the  masthead  a  large  embroidered  silk  flag,  which 
had  been  made  and  presented  to  the  ship  by  ladies  of  the  province 
of  Vizcaya.  When  I  saw  that  my  ship  would  be  lost,  I  had  this  flag 
hauled  down  and  burned,  and  hoisted  another  ensign  in  its  place. 
My  flag  was  shot  away  twice  during  the  engagement,  the  last  time 
just  as  the  ship  grounded.  The  boats  of  the  Iowa  picked  up  those 
of  my  officers  and  men  still  left  alive,  carrying  them  to  that  ship. 
When  I  went  on  board  the  Iowa,  1  took  off  my  sword  and  tendered 
it  to  Captain  Evans,  but  he  refused  it,  saying  that  I  had  fought  four 
ships  and  that  I  should  keep  my  sword.  That  was  the  proudest  moment 
of  my  life." 

The  Captain  of  the  Oquendo  committed  suicide,  and  the  second 
and  third  officers  were  killed  during  the  engagement.  The  following 
description  was  obtained  from  the  paymaster  of  the  Oquendo:— 

"When  we  came  out  of  the  harbor  we  were  fired  on  by  the  Iowa, 
Texas,  and  Oregon.  Our  fire  was  mostly  directed  against  the  Texas, 
for  we  had  seen  the  splendid  shooting  done  by  her  in  the  attacks  on 
the  batteries.  From  the  first  the  firing  was  terrific,  and  great  damage 
was  done.  The  after  part  of  the  ship  was  set  on  fire  by  bursting 
shell  and  could  not  be  put  out.  Finally,  fearing  that  the  magazines 
would  explode  and  everyone  be  lost,  the  ship  was  beached  and  the 
flag  lowered.  The  mortality  on  the  ship  was  great,  over  half  of  the 
crew  having  been  killed  and  wounded." 

Captain  Moreu  of  the  Cristobal  Colon,  said  to  have  been  by  far 
the  ablest  officer  in  the  fleet,  gave  an  account  of  his  ship.  He  did 
not  open  fire  at  first,  but  passed  inside  of  the  other  vessels.  When 
the  Vizcaya  headed  for  the  shore,  he  passed  her  and  then  opened  fire 
on  the  Oregon,  Brooklyn,  and  Texas,  which  ships  had  taken  up  the 

chase.    He  ran  to  the  westward,  close  to  the  shore.     The  heavy  guns 
12 


178  HISTORY   OF   THE 

intended  for  this  ship  had  never  been  mounted,  and  when  asked 
where  they  were,  the  Captain  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  said:  "Per 
haps  in  the  pocket  of  the  Minister  of  Marine."  Finally,  when  nearly 
fifty  miles  from  Santiago,  he  was  headed  off  and  hauled  down  his 
flag  at  1:20  P.  M.  There  was  no  serious  battle  damage  done  to  this 
ship,  and  but  one  man  killed  and  sixteen  wounded. 

Lieutenant  Diego  Carlier,  in  command  of  the  destroyer  Furor,  and 
Lieutenant  Pedro  Vasquez,  in  command  of  the  Pluton,  told  each  the 
same  story.  They  were  literally  riddled  by  the  rapid-fire  guns  of  the 
Oregon,  Iowa,  and  Texas.  Their  boilers  were  struck  and  exploded,  one 
after  the  other,  in  rapid  succession.  A  large  shell  struck  the  Pluton 
almost  amidships  and  exploded,  nearly  tearing  her  in  two.  She  sank 
almost  immediately.  The  steering  gear  on  the  Furor  was  shot  away, 
and  she  ran  into  shoal  water  and  sank.  These  vessels  each  carried 
seventy-two  men.  But  twenty-two  were  saved  from  the  Pluton  and 
but  seventeen  from  the  Furor.  The  officers  all  expressed  themselves 
amazed  at  the  rapidity  and  accuracy  of  fire  of  the  American  ships. 
They  all  expressed  the  hope  that  Spain  would  see  the  uselessness  of 
continuing  the  war. 

Another  officer  said:  "For  twenty  days  I  have  had  no  rest.  Every 
night  we  expected  some  kind  of  an  attack.  One  day,  when  you  bom 
barded  El  Morro,  a  shell  came  over  the  heights  and  wrecked  my  room. 
Ever  since  the  war  began  I  have  known  that  this  day  must  come. 
Particularly  since  May  29,  when  you  blockaded  us  in  Santiago  harbor, 
we  have  been  under  a  nerve  strain  such  as  the  knowledge  of  certain 
defeat,  deferred  from  day  to  day,  must  always  induce.  Imagine  to 
what  a  tension  our  nerves  have  been  wrought  up.  We  knew  per 
fectly  well  that  in  coming  out  of  the  harbor  we  were  coming  to  destruc 
tion,  but  it  was  a  sacrifice  that  we  had  to  make  for  our  honor  and 
our  country.  There  was  no  way  out  of  it,  and,  since  it  had  to  come, 
I  cannot  but  feel  relieved  that  it  is  over,  and  I  am  grateful  to  God 
that  we  have  fallen  into  such  kind  hands." 

An  American  officer  who  was  present  when  the  Spaniards  were 
taken  aboard  one  of  our  rescuing  ships,  bore  testimony  to  the  bravery 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAK  179 

displayed.  "About  thirty  of  the  prisoners,"  he  said,  "  were  wounded, 
all  of  whom  bore  their  suffering  with  most  admirable  spirit.  One 
poor  fellow  had  his  right  foot  knocked  off  above  the  ankle  and  another 
severe  wound  in  the  calf  of  his  leg;  but  our  surgeon  was  busy  trying 
to  stop  the  flow  of  blood  from  a  man  who  was  bleeding  to  death,  so 
the  heroic  sailor  said:  — 

"  *  Oh,  I'm  all  right ;  all  I  want  is  a  cigarette.'  Then,  having  smoked 
one,  instead  of  fainting,  he  actually  went  to  sleep!  No  man  could 
witness,  as  I  did,  the  patience  and  fortitude  displayed  by  these  poor, 
suffering  prisoners,  without  experiencing  increased  respect  for  them. 
Understanding  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Santiago,  notwithstanding 
that  our  forces  were  sure  to  administer  a  crushing  defeat  in  case  the 
enemy  came  out,  I  must  bear  witness  to  the  courage  of  Admiral  Cervera, 
his  officers  and  his  men.  It  was  a  cruel  fate.  They  knew  that  they 
were  offering  themselves  up  in  making  a  desperate  effort,  and  they 
chose  to  do  it  because  there  was  only  one  alternative — that  of  giving 
up  without  a  struggle.  They  played  their  last  card  and  lost.  I  must 
mention  how  the  Spanish  prisoners  behaved  when  we  fired  our 
national  salute  at  noon.  As  the  first  gun  was  fired  and  our  officers 
all  stood  up  and  uncovered,  the  Spanish  officers  did  likewise  and 
their  men  followed  the  example,  all  standing  in  respectful  silence  until 
the  last  gun  was  fired." 


ii. 

IN  THIS  great  naval  battle  off  Santiago,  Spaniard  and  "American 
mercenary  "  had  measured  themselves  again,  as  they  had  on  the  other 
side  of  the  world  when  Dewey  erased  the  squadron  of         INCIDENTS 
Montejo.    The  movement  was  reversed,  but  the  result  AND 

,  .,      ,       .     ,  ANECDOTES 

was   not   changed.     Dewey    had    sailed    into    unknown 
and  masked  dangers  and  had  annihilated  the  Spaniard  under  the  guns 
of  his  shore  forts,  without  the  loss  of  a  man.     At  Santiago  Cervera 
steamed  out  against  a  force  he  knew  perfectly  well,  with  four  cruisers 


180  HISTORY   OF   THE 

as  strong  as  battleships  in  armament,  and  much  higher  in  contem 
plated  speed.  Spanish  incompetency  with  machinery  and  Spanish  in- 
competency  at  the  guns  had  in  both  instances  gone  down  before  the 
unrivaled  skill  and  accuracy  of  American  engineers  and  gunners. 
Dewey  surprised  Monte  jo  in  his  own  fastness,  and  beat  him  by  celerity 
and  intrepidity  of  action.  Cervera  surprised  Schley,  but  yet  was 
beaten  by  the  celerity  and  intrepidity  that  could  recover  against 
all  odds.  Montejo  had  been  at  a  ball.  Schley 's  squadron  was  ex 
pected  to  be  "at  church."  It  was  the  living  against  the  dying  race. 

Nothing  could  illustrate  more  strikingly  their  racial  differences 
than  the  condition  and  conduct  of  the  men.  The  American  seamen 
were  all  sober;  the  Spaniards  were  all  stimulated  to  the  point  of  des 
peration  by  liquors — the  fashion  of  the  eighteenth  century.  When 
rescued,  the  Spaniards  at  first  trembled  at  the  expectation  of  death; 
the  Americans  risked  death  again  to  save  their  wounded  enemies. 
So  astonished  were  the  Spaniards  at  their  treatment  that  Admiral 
Cervera  cabled  to  General  Blanco:  "The  crews  are  very  grateful  for 
the  noble  generosity  with  which  they  were  treated."  The  prisoners 
were  taken  to  healthful  quarters  in  the  United  States,  supplied  with 
good  quarters,  clothing,  and  food,  the  officers  conveyed  to  Annapolis 
and  released  on  parole;  yet  they  expected  court-martial,  disgrace,  per 
haps  death,  because  they  accepted  this  ordinary  kindness.  The  Span 
iards  abandoned  their  own  wounded  to  the  fires  on  their  vessels; 
and  were  amazed  when  the  Americans  entered  these  burning  hells  to 
rescue  men  they  had  just  been  engaged  in  destroying. 

When  the  padre  of  the  Vizcaya  was  taken  aboard  the  Ericsson 
he  sat  down  upon  a  chest.  The  wounded  of  his  own  charge  were 
brought  in  and  he  was  asked  to  remove  from  the  chest  in  order  that 
a  wounded  Spaniard  might  be  placed  upon  it  for  treatment.  He 
coldly  refused  to  yield,  and  it  is  to  the  honor  of  Ensign  Edie  of  the 
rescuing  crew  that  he  promptly  seized  the  heartless  chaplain  and 
contemptuously  threw  him  upon  the  floor. 

These  are  not  natural  exhibitions  of  human  cruelty;  they  are  the 
outcome  of  caste,  that  institution  of  social  slavery  that  exists  in  Spain. 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  181 

Some  of  the  Spaniards  exhibited  the  highest  courage,  fortitude,  and 
nobility  of  conduct  under  their  misfortunes.  The  junior  surgeon  of 
the  Vizcaya  declined  to  have  his  wounds  dressed  until  his  men  had 
been  attended  to.  One  young  officer,  with  his  left  arm  broken  and 
helpless,  mounted  the  side  of  his  prison  ship  without  assistance,  and 
with  his  right  arm  saluted  the  deck  as  he  reached  it.  Captain  Eulate, 
Admiral  Cervera,  Captain  Maocochron,  and  others,  bore  themselves 
with  the  naturalness,  simplicity,  and  courage  of  brave  men.  When 
Captain  Eulate's  sword  was  refused,  and  he  burst  into  tears,  the  crew 
of  the  Iowa  burst  into  cheers  for  him  as  a  brave  man. 

When  the  Texas  had  riddled  the  Oquemlo  and  the  Spanish  colors 
came  down,  to  be  followed  by  a  great  explosion  that  marked  her  ruin, 
the  crew  of  the  American  started  to  cheer. 

"Don't  cheer,  boys!"  cried  Captain  Phillip,  "the  poor  devils  are 
dying!"  And  the  cheers  were  silenced  on  the  very  lips  of  the  con 
querors. 

When  the  Colon  surrendered,  the  same  crew  gave  three  cheers  and 
a  "tiger"  for  their  veteran  commander.  Instantly  Captain  Phillip 
called  all  hands  to  the  quarter  deck,  and,  with  bared  head,  thanked 
God  for  the  almost  bloodless  victory. 

"I  want  to  make  public  acknowledgment  here,"  he  said,  "that  I 
believe  in  God  the  Father  Almighty.  I  want  all  you  officers  and  men 
to  lift  your  hats  and  from  your  hearts  offer  silent  thanks  to  the 
Almighty." 

All  hats  were  off.  There  was  a  moment  or  two  of  absolute  silence, 
and  then  again  the  overwrought  feelings  of  the  ship's  company  relieved 
themselves  in  three  hearty  cheers  for  their  commander. 

The  engagement  was  almost  the  counterpart  under  reversed  plan 
of  that  at  Manila.  But  one  man  was  killed  on  the  American  ships 
at  Santiago.  He  was  George  H.  Ellis,  yeoman,  of  the  Brooklyn.  Ellis 
was  standing  with  Commodore  Schley,  when  the  Vizcaya  came  out  of 
the  harbor. 

"  Ellis."  said  the  Commodore  to  the  yeoman,  "  find  the  range  of  that 
ship." 


182  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Ellis  stepped  toward  his  place  to  comply,  when  a  shell  took  his 
head  off  so  quickly  that  the  body  remained  swaying  for  a  moment, 
until  companions  rushed  forward  and  caught  it. 

"Too  bad!"  cried  the  Commodore,  who  replaced  the  glasses  to  his 
eyes  and  resumed  his  watch  of  the  enemy. 

The  Brooklyn  was  struck  twenty-six  times  by  the  enemy's  shots, 
but  sustained  little  injury.  It  was  proof  that  the  Spaniards  concen 
trated  their  fire  upon  her.  The  Iowa  was  struck  five  times,  two  shells 
piercing  her,  one  starting  a  fire  that  was  quickly  extinguished.  The 
Texas  was  struck  three  times. 

The  Oquendo  received  greatest  punishment  from  our  gunners.  When 
examined,  part  of  her  hull  was  under  water,  but  in  that  portion  above 
it,  it  was  found  that  she  had  been  struck  sixty-six  times.  The  Teresa 
was  struck  thirty-three  times,  the  Vizcaya  twenty-four,  and  the  Colon 
eight.  All  had  distinct  wounds  in  their  hulls.  The  shots  were  from 
the  4-,  5-,  6-,  8-,  and  12-inch  guns.  One  big  shell,  a  12-incher  from  the 
Texas,  tore  a  hole  through  the  Oquendo.  There  were  other  shell  holes 
made  by  the  Brooklyn,  Oregon,  and  Iowa.  The  Vizcaya's  forward  tor 
pedoes,  which  had  their  war  heads  on,  exploded,  tearing  a  great  hole 
in  her  bow.  She  was  the  worst  wreck  of  all.  The  Oquendo 's  back 
was  broken  on  the  beach.  The  Teresa's  fire  mains  were  destroyed  at 
the  beginning  of  the  action.  She  was  set  on  fire  by  a  6-inch  shell 
immediately  and  could  not  put  it  out, 


in. 

TO  WHOM  THE  Fourth  of  July,  1898,  in  the  United  States  was 

THE°CREDIT?       no^  ^ess  gl°ri°us  to  our  national  pride  and  the  strength 
of  our   arms   than   the  first  Fourth  had  been  to  the 
struggling  hopes  of  the  Republic.    On  the  afternoon  of  the  3rd  Ad 
miral  Sampson  sent  the   following  cable  dispatch  to  Washington:  — 

SIBONEY,  July  3,  via  HAYTI,  July  4. 

The  fleet   under  my  command  offers  the  nation,  as  a  Fourth  of  July  present,  the 
destruction  of  the  whole  of  Cervera's  fleet — not  one  escaped.     It  attempted  to  escape 


SPANISH- AMERICAN   WAR  Is: I 

at  9:30  this  morning.  At  two  the  last  ship,  the  Cristobal  Colon,  had  run  ashore 
sixty  miles  west  of  Santiago  and  had  let  down  her  colors.  The  Infanta  Maria 
Teresa,  Oquendo,  and  Vizcaya  were  forced  ashore,  burned  and  blown  up  within 
twenty  miles  of  Santiago.  The  Furor  and  Pluton  were  destroyed  within  four  miles 
of  the  port. 

Our  loss,  one  killed  and  two  wounded.  Enemy's  loss,  probably  several  hundred 
from  gun  fire,  explosions  and  drowning.  About  1,300  prisoners,  including  Admiral 
Cervera.  The  man  killed  was  George  H.  Ellis,  chief  yeoman  of  the  Brooklyn. 

[Signed]     SAMPSON. 

This  message  reached  the  President  at  noon  on  Monday  the  4th 
following  quickly  the  information  briefly  printed  in  the  newspapers. 
It  filled  the  country  with  joy  and  exultation.  From  the  depression 
caused  by  the  heavy  losses  at  San  Juan  and  El  Caney,  national  spirit 
leaped  to  patriotic  heights. 

Immediately  on  the  receipt  of  Admiral  Sampson's  message  the  Presi 
dent  sent  the  following:  — 

EXKCUTIVE  MANSION,       ) 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  4.  \ 
Admiral  Sampson,  Playa  del  Este: — 

You  have  the  gratitude  and  congratulations  of  the  whole  American  people. 
Convey  to  your  noble  officers  and  crews,  through  whose  valor  new  honors  have  been 
added  to  the  American  navy,  the  grateful  thanks  and  appreciation  of  the  nation. 

WILLIAM   McKiNLEY. 

Secretary  Long  sent  the  following:  — 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  4. 
To  Admiral  Sampson,  Play  a  del  Este: — 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  sends  you  and  every  officer  and  man  of  your  fleet, 
remembering  affectionately  your  dead  comrade,  grateful  acknowledgment  of  your 
heroism  and  skill.  All  honor  to  the  brave!  You  have  maintained  the  glory  of  the 
American  navy.  JOHN  D.  LONG. 

As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  battle  of  Santiago  was  almost  a 
reversal  of  the  movement  at  Manila,  but  the  result  had  not  been  re 
versed,  and  wras  the  same  in  both  combats.  The  men  behind  the  guns, 
behind  the  ship,  behind  the  engines,  had  triumphed  over  Spanish 
incompetency,  in  each  instance,  with  scarcely  a  scar  to  show  for  it. 
At  Manila  we  had  eight  men  slightly  wounded;  at  Santiago  one  man 
killed  and  one  slightly  wounded. 


184  HISTORY    OF    THE 

In  the  two  engagements  the  enemy  had  lost  four  of  the  finest 
first-class  cruisers  of  the  world's  navies,  eight  unprotected  light  cruisers, 
six  gunboats,  and  two  of  the  most  valued  destroyers  of  her  great 
torpedo  fleet — -twenty  ships  in  all,  valued  at  about  $25,000,000.  The 
Colon  had  been  purchased  from  Italy  at  a  cost  of  $3,500,000  and  the 
three  original  Spanish  cruisers  cost  each  as  much  to  construct.  The 
Spanish  loss  in  men  in  both  engagements  was  about  1,100  killed,  2,400 
captured,  several  hundred  wounded  and  missing. 

The  United  States  had  not  lost  a  ship  or  a  ship's  boat,  and  the 
injuries  sustained  to  armor  and  machinery  were  trivial.  The  superiority 
of  our  men  could  have  received  no  more  signal  demonstration. 

Whose  was  the  victory  at  Santiago? 

That  was  the  question  to  spring  up  even  before  the  cheers  of 
national  exultation  had  ceased.  It  was  as  though  the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  unable  to  realize  the  vast  extent  and  the  glorious 
completeness  of  the  battle  in  detail.  The  report  of  Admiral  Sampson 
did  not  mention  the  name  of  an  officer  or  ship  of  our  navy,  but  gave 
the  glory  to  "the  fleet  under  my  command."  The  magnificent  per 
formances  of  the  Brooklyn,  Commodore  Schley's  flagship,  and  the  tem 
porary  absence  of  the  Admiral,  during  which  time  the  command 
devolved  upon  Schley,  gave  to  public  opinion,  heated  by  excitement 
and  passion,  seeking  for  heroes  and  resentful  of  any  appearance  of 
favoritism,  the  impression  that  Sampson  had  ignored  the  claims  of 
"the  fighting  Commodore." 

The  sudden  elevation  of  Sampson  had  caused  comment,  and  his 
position  was,  professionally,  embarrassing  and  delicate. 

Whose  was  the  victory  at  Santiago? 

It  was,  as  Sampson  said,  that  of  the  fleet  under  his  command.  It 
was,  as  Schley  said  in  his  report,  when  with  the  directness  of  an 
officer  of  courage,  loyalty,  and  thorough  discipline,  he  wrote  to  the 
Admiral,  "I  congratulate  you  upon  the  great  victory  to  the  squadron 
under  your  command,  ...  a  victory  that  seems  big  enough  for 
all  of  us." 

Who  would  care  to  alter  this  verdict  of  two  heroes? 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  185 

It  was  a  victory  ''big  enough  for  all" — from  the  Admiral,  on  his 
great  cruiser,  to  the  humblest  powder-monkey  on  the  Gloucester;  from 
the  gallant  Commodore  to  the  lowliest  stoker.  There  can  be  no 
effective  action  without  plan,  just  as  there  can  be  no  good  plan  estab 
lished  without  action.  It  is  not  the  true  nature  of  Americans,  except 
under  excitement,  to  underrate  the  value  of  that  patient,  silent,  loyal, 
brave,  and  far-seeing  Admiral,  who  made  no  mistakes  in  preparation 
or  disposition,  who  demonstrated,  in  the  difficult  and  burdensome  task 
to  which  he  was  called,  the  glory  of  the  genius  of  Republican  insti 
tutions;  the  genius  of  thoroughness  of  education  in  his  profession, 
of  untiring  industry  and  energy,  of  deliberate  preparation  for  the 
purpose  in  hand,  of  unflinching  responsibility  for  what  result  soever 
might  ensue,  and  the  calm  courage  and  willingness  to  set  his  life  upon 
the  outcome. 

Nor  could  they  fail  to  view  without  admiration  the  valiant  acts 
of  the  Commodore,  ready  in  his  place,  quick  and  dauntless  to  meet  the 
enemy,  with  his  life  in  his  hand,  and  who  was  the  conspicuous  figure  to 
lead  in  the  actual  fighting — the  figure  of  deathless  courage  that  all  the 
world  hails  as  a  hero.  His  work  could  not  have  been  better  done. 

The  victory  at  Santiago  belongs  to  Americans,  to  Sampson,  Schley, 
Clark,  Phillip,  Cook,  Evans,  Taylor,  Wainwright,  and  the  patriotic 
men  on  all  the  ships.  What  if  Sampson  was  away  at  the  beginning, 
upon  an  errand  of  highest  duty  —  was  he  not  there  at  the  finish?  If 
Schley  had  been  struck  down  by  the  first  shot,  can  Americans  be 
lieve  we  should  have  lost?  Were  there  not  Clark,  Phillip,  Evans,  Cook, 
and  Taylor?  Did  any  one  of  the  men  or  the  ships  act  in  such  manner 
as  to  indicate  that  the  stout  fabric  of  the  American  navy  was  woven 
about  a  single  thread,  to  unravel  and  fall  in  pieces  if  that  thread 
were  cut? 

To  credit  the  victory  to  any  but  "the  fleet  under  Admiral  Samp 
son"  is  to  discredit  all.* 


*  Lieutenant  Akijama,  naval  attacht  of  the  Japanese  Empire  at  Washington,  who  ac 
companied  our  fleet  for  observation,  was  questioned  by  the  New  York  Sun  on  his  return 


186  HISTORY   OF    THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

In  recognition  of  the  victory  the  President  soon  after  promoted 
Acting  Rear-Admiral  Sampson  to  be  Rear-Admiral,  and  Commodore 
Schley  received  the  same  advancement.  In  both  cases  the  reason 
recorded  was  "  for  eminent  and  conspicuous  conduct  in  battle."  Captain 
Phillip,  of  the  Texas,  was  made  a  Commodore,  and  all  the  other  com 
manders  were  advanced  in  the  order  of  their  rank  for  their  participation 
in  this  engagement,  and  that  at  Guantanamo. 


from  Santiago,  July  21.     He  had  witnessed  the  battle,  and  was  asked   if  he  had   formed 
any  opinion  upon  it. 

"Many,"  he  replied.  "First,  the  arrangement  of  the  American  fleet  by  Admiral 
Sampson.  It  was  complete.  It  was  without  fault." 

"You  think,  then,  that  Admiral  Sampson  deserves  the  credit  for  the  battle?" 

"Sincerely,  I  do.  The  officers  of  other  Governments  all  agree  with  me  that  the  great 
est  credit  is  for  the  Admiral.  He  made  the  plans.  He  gave  the  orders.  He  said  where 
each  ship  should  wait  for  the  Spanish.  The  Spanish  came.  The  result  was  the  most  com 
plete  victory  that  ever  was  known.  He  was  not  there.  He  was  unfortunate.  But  the  fight 
showed,  by  its  complete  victory,  that  his  plans  were  right.  If  the  flagship  had  been  in  the 
fight,  she  would  have  fought  as  well  as  the  other  ships.  The  seamanship,  the  crews  of  the 
American  ships,  the  directness  of  their  aim,  it  is  all  alike.  It  could  not  be  better. 

"Admiral  Sampson  was  fortunate  to  have  brave,  quick  officers  to  obey  the  commands 
he  had  given  to  them.  They  were  quiet,  waiting.  The  Spanish  came  and  made  a  sur 
prise.  The  Admiral  was  away.  It  was  a  good  test.  The  American  fleet  went  quickly  to 
meet  them.  It  was  as  if  they  knew  long  before  that  the  Spaniards  were  coming.  Com 
modore  Schley  fights  well.  He  led  the  fleet  with  great  dash.  They  fired  so  fast,  so 
fiercely,  so  accurately,  that  the  people  who  looked  thought  'the  American  ships  are  on 
fire.'  The  firing,  I  say,  was  so  great  that  the  Spaniards  were  [Here  the  Lieutenant  made 
a  downward  motion  of  his  hands  with  the  palms  outward,  more  expressive  than  words 
could  have  been.]  stopped  from  helping  themselves.  The  Spaniards  would  be  brave  in 
fight,  very  likely,  but  there  was  no  chance ;  your  fleet  was  too  good.  If  any  one  had  said 
before  such  a  victory  was  possible,  he  would  have  been  laughed  at. 

"The  smoke  around  your  fleet  was  very  great.  Shooting  straight  seemed  to  be  im 
possible.  But  the  shooting  was  very  straight.  All  the  foreign  officers  said  to  one  another 
often  on  the  Seneca:  'It  is  wonderful;  it  could  not  be  better.'" 

Asked  to  compare  the  naval  battle  of  Santiago  with  the  battle  of  the  Yalu,  Lieutenant 
Aki jama  said :  — 

"They  would  be  hard  to  compare,  because  the  character  of  the  fights  differed.  At  the 
Yalu  there  was  much  manoeuvring.  All  through  the  fight  the  position  of  the  ships 
changed.  At  Santiago  it  was  shoot,  advancing  on  the  Spanish.  When  the  Spanish  found 
themselves  overpowered  and  desired  to  escape,  it  was  follow  and  destroy.  It  was  simple, 
but  it  was  well  done.  If  it  had  not  been  well  done  it  would  not  have  been  simple,  but 
most  confused;  the  American  victory  would  not  have  been  with  only  one  man  killed." 

New  York  Sun,  July  22,  1898. 


CHAPTER  THE  THIRTEENTH. 

PROGRESS  OF  OUR  ARMY  AND  NAVY. 

GENERAL  SHAKTER    SURROUNDS   SANTIAGO  AND   DEMANDS   ITS   SURRENDER  — SINGULAR   PROGRESS 

OK  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  — EXCHANGE  OF    HOBSON  AND   His    MEN,  AN    EXCITING   INCIDENT 

—  THE    "ST.    PAUL"   SINKS   THE   TORPEDO   BOAT  "TERROR"  AT  SAN   JUAN  — THE 

••TEXAS"   SINKS  THE  "  REINA   MERCEDES"  IN  SANTIAGO   HARBOR — "ALFONSO 

XII."  SUNK   AT  MARIEL  —  THE  LUDICROUS  VOYAGE  OF  ADMIRAL  CAMA- 

RA'S    FLEET    THROUGH    THE   SUEZ    CANAL   AND    BACK    AGAIN. 


w 


HILE  our  navy  was  destroying  the  Spanish  sea  forces  that 
Sunday  morning,  our  soldiers,  haggard  and  exhausted  with 
battle  and  hunger,  yet  undismayed,  lay  be-    TIGHTENINO  THE 
fore  the  walls  of  Santiago,  tenaciously  hold-       CORD  ABOUT 
ing  every  foot  of  ground  that  had  been  won  by  their 
blood  and  valor.    Saturday  four  batteries  were  moved  up  into  posi 
tion  to  bombard  the  city    and  a   portion   of  the  entrenchments,  to 
aid  General  Ludlow  with  a  force  to  move  to  the  north  and  shut  in 
the  city  on  that  side.     The  same  day  Colonel  Escariel  arrived  in  San 
tiago  with  about  1,000  Spanish  reinforcements. 

The  condition  of  the  roads  to  the  rear  prevented  supplies  from  being 
brought  up,  and  our  troops  were  living  upon  scant  rations.  General 
Shafter  and  General  Wheeler  were  ill  with  fever,  General  S.  B.  M. 
Young  was  seriously  ill  and  had  to  be  sent  back  to  the  hospital  ship, 
although  he  protested  in  the  delirium  of  fever  his  desire  to  go  to 
the  front.  On  Saturday  night  a  council  of  war  was  held  and  misgivings 
were  expressed,  only  to  be  swept  away  by  the  tenacity  of  General 
Wheeler,  who  declared  that  not  an  inch  should  be  conceded.  General 
Shafter  cabled  to  Washington  for  reinforcements  to  support  the  ex 
hausted  army  and  was  promised  aid  as  quickly  as  troops  could  be 
dispatched.  The  council  decided  to  put  on  a  bold  front  to  the  enemy 

(187) 


188  HISTORY   OF   THE 

On  Sunday  morning,  while  Cervera's  fleet  was  leaving  the  harbor 
to  meet  destruction,  a  flag  of  truce  from  Shafter  entered  Santiago 
bearing  this  letter  to  the  commanding  General:  — 

To  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Spanish  Forces,  Santiago   de   Cuba:  — 

SIR:  —  I  shall  be  obliged,  unless  you  surrender,  to  shell  Santiago  de  Cuba.  Please 
inform  the  citizens  of  foreign  countries  and  all  women  and  children  that  they  should 
leave  the  city  before  ten  o'clock  to-morrow  morning. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  R.  SHAFTER,  Major-General  U.  S.  A. 

It  was  given  into  the  hands  of  General  Jose  Toral,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  to  command  through  the  wounding  of  General  Linares  and  the 
death  of  General  Vara  del  Rey,  second  in  command.  Toral  was  aware 
of  Cervera's  movement  and  hoped  that  its  success  would  weaken  our 
naval  forces  by  the  necessity  of  pursuit  of  the  Spanish  vessels.  With 
out  delay  he  sent  back  a  response  full  of  cool  defiance.  It  read:  — 

"  I  advise  the  foreign  women  and  children  that  they  must  leave  the  city  before  ten 
o'clock  to-morrow  morning.  It  is  my  duty  to  say  to  you  that  this  city  will  not  surren 
der,  and  that  I  will  inform  the  foreign  consuls  and  inhabitants  of  the  contents  of  your 


The  reply  was  brought  to  Shafter  at  6:30  in  the  evening,  and 
with  the  truce-messenger  came  a  deputation  of  foreign  consuls  who 
appealed  for  more  time  in  which  to  get  the  non-combatants  out  of 
the  city.  They  asked  leave  to  send  these  to  El  Caney  and  represented 
that  there  were  from  fifteen  thousand  to  twenty  thousand  persons 
anxious  to  leave,  many  of  them  old,  feeble,  sick,  and  helpless.  They 
were  also  without  food,  which  Shafter  could  not  promise  to  supply 
while  his  own  troops  were  hungry  and  supplies  were  coming  forward 
with  dangerous  slowness.  He  granted  to  the  refugees  permission  to 
go  to  El  Caney,  but  firmly  refused  to  allow  any  at  Siboney,  where 
it  was  determined  to  keep  our  hospitals  free  from  the  danger  of  in 
fection.  By  the  consuls  he  forwarded  the  following  to  General  Toral: 

The  Commanding  General  Spanish  Forces,  Santiago  de  Cuba:  — 

SIR:  —  In  consideration  of  the  request  of  the  consuls  and  officers  in  your  city 
for  delay  in  carrying  out  my  intention  to  fire  on  the  city,  and  in  the  interest  of  the 


SPANISH -AMERICAN    WAR  189 

poor  women  and  children,  who  will  suffer  very  greatly  by  their  hasty  and  enforced 
departure  from  the  city,  I  have  the  honor  to  announce  that  I  will  delay  such  action 
solely  in  their  interest  until  noon  of  the  fifth,  provided  during  the  interval  your 
forces  make  no  demonstration  whatever  upon  those  of  my  own.  I  am,  with  great 
respect,  your  obedient  servant,  W.  R.  SHAFTKK, 

Major-General    U.  S.  A.,  Commanding. 

General  Toral  consented  to  this  truce  and  the  evacuation  of  San 
tiago  by  the  miserable  refugees  of  war  began  next  morning.  Among 
them  were  the  Civil  Governor,  the  Mayor,  and  the  highest  officer  of 
justice.  They  had  been  forbidden  to  depart  by  Toral,  but  escaped 
in  the  rout,  a  most  significant  indication  to  our  authorities  of  the 
desperate  straits  in  the  city.  When  questioned  they  reported  the 
effects  of  the  siege  as  dreadful,  and  Spanish  losses  as  very  great.  The 
poorer  classes  were  at  the  point  of  starvation.  Food  was  very  scarce. 
Only  rice  and  black  bread  were  to  be  obtained.  The  food  was  all 
held  by  the  army,  and  was  given  out  in  smallest  quantities  by  officers. 
The  people  were  almost  ready  to  surrender  before  the  fight,  and  after 
that  they  were  anxious  to  capitulate.  These  civil  officers  had  favored 
surrender,  for  which  they  had  been  denounced  by  General  Toral, 
but  they  continued  to  urge  him.  The  Archbishop  of  Santiago,  the 
highest  ecclesiastical  authority  in  the  island,  was  in  favor  of  sur 
render,  and  he.  too,  had  pleaded  with  General  Toral,  who  continued, 
however,  to  maintain  his  stubborn  attitude.  They  did  not  believe 
Toral  could  hold  out  much  longer.  Pressure  upon  him  was  great 
from  citizens  and  soldiers.  The  foreign  consuls  had  confirmed  these 
reports  and  opinions. 

Not  fewer  than  18,000  men,  women,  and  children  marched  out  of 
Santiago  that  Monday  morning,  over  the  roads  deep  in  mire  that  led 
to  El  Caney.  The  village,  that  had  only  a  thousand  inhabitants,  was 
much  damaged  by  the  battle  on  the  preceding  Friday,  so  that 
the  massing  of  18,000  helpless  persons  there  meant  pitiful  hardships 
and  much  suffering.  The  sick  were  carried  on  litters,  many  of 
the  weak  women  succumbed  to  the  heat  and  fell  almost  dead  by 
the  roadside.  Many  women  were  widows,  wives,  or  mothers,  of  Spanish 


190  HISTORY   OF   THE 

soldiers.  Thousands  were  well  dressed,  some  of  the  women  of  the 
highest  class  handsomely  attired  in  silk  gowns.  These  volunteered 
as  nurses,  and  when  the  families  of  the  killed  or  wounded  discovered 
how  well  the  wounded  Spanish  were  being  cared  for,  they  became 
devoted  adherents  of  the  American  cause. 

At  noon,  on  Tuesday,  the  truce  would  expire.  That  morning,  how 
ever,  a  flag  of  truce  came  out  from  Toral.  The  bearer  of  it,  instead 
of  being  blindfolded,  as  usual,  to  prevent  observation  of  the 
strength  and  disposition  of  our  forces,  was  escorted  open-eyed  past 
our  batteries,  trenches,  and  lines,  so  that  he  might  be  impressed  with 
the  hopelessness  of  resistance.  Toral  had  heard  that  Cervera's  ships 
were  destroyed,  but  could  not  believe  it.  His  communication  to  Shafter 
was  lengthy.  He  asked  that  the  truce  be  further  extended,  as  he 
wished  time  to  communicate  with  the  Madrid  Government  concerning 
the  surrender  of  the  city.  He  also  asked  that  cable  operators  be  sent 
to  operate  the  line  between  Santiago  and  Kingston.  He  pledged  his 
honor  as  a  soldier  that  the  operators  should  not  be  asked  to  transmit 
any  matter  that  did  not  solely  bear  on  the  surrender,  and  that  he 
would  return  them  safe  to  El  Caney  when  a  final  reply  should  be  re 
ceived  from  Madrid.  This  request  for  operators  was  necessary  for  the 
reason  that  the  operators  of  the  Santiago  cable  were  British  subjects 
and  had  all  left  the  city  under  the  protection  of  the  British  Consul 
when  the  non-combatants  left.  The  commissioner  said  General  Toral 
desired  to  consult  the  authorities  in  Madrid  because  he  had  been 
unable  to  communicate  with  Captain-General  Blanco  at  Havana. 

It  was  finally  arranged  that  the  truce  should  be  extended  until 
Saturday,  and  the  cable  operators  were  sent  into  the  city. 

Toral's  commissioner  also  bore  to  his  commander  the  following 
letter  from  Shafter: — 

SIR: — 1.  In  view  of  the  events  of  the  3d  inst.,  I  have  the  honor  to  lay  before 
your  Excellency  certain  propositions,  to  which,  I  trust,  you  will  give  the  consider 
ation  which,  in  my  opinion,  they  deserve. 

2.  I  inclose  a  bulletin  of  the  engagement  on  Sunday  morning,  which  resulted 
in  the  complete  destruction  of  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet,  the  loss  of  600  officers  and 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  191 

men,  and  the  capture  of  the  remainder.  The  Admiral  and  General  Paredes  and  other 
officers  escaped  alive  and  are  now  prisoners  on  the  Harvard  and  /St.  Louis.  The 
latter  ship,  in  which  are  the  Admiral,  General  Paredes,  and  the  surviving  Captains 
of  all  the  vessels,  except  the  Captain  of  the  Almirante  Oquendo,  who  was  slain, 
has  sailed  for  the  United  States.  If  desired,  this  may  be  confirmed  by  your  Ex 
cellency  sending  an  officer  under  a  flag  of  truce  to  Admiral  Sampson  and  he  can 
arrange  to  visit  the  Harvard,  which  will  not  sail  until  to-morrow. 

3.  Our    fleet    is   now   perfectly   free    to    act.       I    have    the    honor   to    state    that 
unless  a  surrender  is  arranged   by  noon   of  the  9th   inst.   the   bombardment  of  the 
city  will   be   begun   and   continued   by   the   heavy   guns  of  our  ships.      The   city   is 
within    easy  range   of  these   guns,   the   8-inch   being    capable   of  firing   9,500   yards 
and   the   13-inch    much    further.     The   ships  can   so   lie   that   with   a   range   of  8,000 
yards  they  can  reach  the  center  of  the  city. 

4.  I   make  this  suggestion   in   a   purely  humanitarian   spirit.       I    do    not  wish   to 
cause  the  slaughter  of  more  men  of  either  your  Excellency's  forces  or  my  own,  the 
final    result,    under   circumstances    so   disadvantageous    to    your    Excellency,    being  a 
foregone  conclusion. 

5.  As  your  Excellency  may  wish   to  make  reference   of   so   momentous  a  ques 
tion   to  your  home   Government,   it  is  for  this   purpose   that   I   have   placed   the   time 
for   the   resumption   of   hostilities   sufficiently   far   in    the   future   to   allow   of   a   reply 
being  received. 

6.  I  beg  an  early  answer. 


Then  began  an  extraordinary  series  of  negotiations,  never  before 
heard  of  in  the  business  of  warfare.  Both  sides  were  not  averse  to 
gaining  time.  Toral  dared  not  surrender  without  authority  from  Blanco 
or  his  Government  at  Madrid.  Shafter,  whose  forces  were  suffering 
from  disease  following  hunger,  exposure,  and  exhaustion,  was  willing 
to  wait  for  6,000  fresh  troops  that  were  speeding  to  his  assistance 
with  General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  at  their  head. 
These  arrived  at  Baiquiri  on  the  day  the  truce  expired. 

Meantime,  Toral,  after  consulting  with  his  superiors  at  Madrid 
and  Havana,  suggested  terms  offering  to  evacuate  Santiago  if  Gen 
eral  Shafter  would  permit  him  to  depart  unmolested  with  all  his 
troops,  arms,  and  flags.  He  added  that  any  attempt  to  conquer 
the  city  must  cost  the  Americans  enormously  in  the  matter  of  lives, 
for  he  had  been  reenforced,  and  now  had  plenty  of  ammunition.  Re 
sistance,  he  said,  would  be  long  as  well  as  strong,  because,  by  sending 


192  HISTORY   OF   THE 

out  the  poor  of  Santiago  to  be  fed  by  the  Americans,  he  had  enabled 
himself  to  provision  his  garrison  for  an  indefinite  time. 

The  truce  was  again  extended  one  day.  Six  batteries  of  Ran 
dolph's  light  artillery  arrived  and  occupied  positions  overlooking  the 
Spanish  lines  and  the  city.  The  disposition  of  troops  composing  our 
line  was  about  as  follows:  On  the  right,  Lawton's  division  (Ludlow's, 
Chaffee's,  and  Miles's  brigades)  and  Wheeler's  cavalry  division  (First, 
Ninth,  Tenth,  and  Rough  Riders);  center,  Bates's  brigade;  left,  Kent's 
brigade.  It  was  reported  that  the  Spaniards  were  digging  trenches 
in  the  streets  of  Santiago,  and  otherwise  preparing  for  a  house-to-house 
fight. 

Sunday  the  10th  General  Shafter  notified  Toral  that  by  the  Presi 
dent's  directions  the  Spanish  proposition  to  surrender  was  rejected, 
and  that  the  United  States  would  accept  no  terms  but  unconditional 
surrender.  General  Toral  replied  in  effect  that  he  would  discuss  no 
other  terms  than  those  suggested  by  himself. 

The  attack  on  the  city  by  the  artillery  did  not  begin  until  after 
five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  Brooklyn,  Texas, .and  Indiana, 
lying  off  Aguadores,  threw  shells  over  the  cliffs  in  an  effort  to  reach 
the  city,  six  miles  distant  and  hidden  from  view.  Signals  from  shore 
announced  that  the  shells  fell  short  of  the  Spanish  position.  From 
Shafter's  lines,  the  Spanish  defenses  outside  the  city  were  fired  upon 
by  our  field  guns,  mortars,  Gatling  guns,  and  the  dynamite  gun  of 
the  Rough  Riders.  The  enemy's  reply  proved  to  be  less  vigorous  than 
was  anticipated.  On  our  side  Captain  Charles  W.  Rowell  and  one 
private  were  killed  and  four  wounded. 

On  July  11  Shafter's  available  forces,  counting  all  reinforcements, 
and  deducting  the  dead,  sick,  and  wounded,  was  about  22,500  fighting 
men.  This  is  based  on  an  estimate  of  15,337  men  in  General  Shafter's 
original  expedition,  and  a  little  more  than  10,000  in  various  expeditions 
which  had  since  gone,  making  in  all  25,500  men.  Bombardment 
was  resumed  that  day  until  a  flag  of  truce  was  raised  in  the  city  and 
negotiations  were  resumed. 


SPANISH   A.MKKK'AN     \VAK  J93 


II. 

THE  undeniably  brave,  if  desperate,  resistance  of  the  Spanish  troops 
had  earned  the  respect  and  admiration  of  the  United  States  forces. 
Whatever  the  incompetency  of  the  Spanish  navy,  none 

RELEASE  OF 

was  displayed  by  the  military  forces.  Spain's  troops  HOBSON  AND 
have  always  been  celebrated  for  courage  and  cruelty. 
They  cost  Napoleon  more  trouble  than  any  other  adversaries.  During 
the  truces  before  Santiago  there  was  some  fraternization  between 
officers  on  both  sides  and  our  men  recognized  the  courtesy  and  cour 
age  of  their  enemies. 

This  good  opinion  was  increased  when,  on  July  6,  Toral  agreed  to 
exchange  Lieutenant  Hobson,  the  hero  of  the  Merrimac  incident,  and 
his  seven  sailors,  for  an  equal  number  of  Spanish  prisoners. 

The  incident  was  picturesque  and  exhilarating  to  the  soldiers, 
wearied  by  long  service  in  the  trenches. 

At  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  agreement  having  been  con 
cluded,  the  Spanish  prisoners  to  be  exchanged  started  from  the  Amer 
ican  lines  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  John  D.  Miley  of  Shafter's  staff. 
Lieutenant  Miley  was  followed  by  three  Spanish  Lieutenants,  from 
whom  one  was  to  be  selected  to  be  exchanged  for  Lieutenant  Hobson. 
They  were  blindfolded  and  carried  in  a  covered  wagon.  The  officers 
were  followed  by  the  soldiers  for  whom  our  sailors  were  to  be  exchanged. 
The  road  led  up  a  hill  on  the  crest  of  which  our  firing  line  was  lying 
in  the  trenches.  Passing  through  the  line,  the  procession  moved  four 
hundred  yards  down  the  hill  toward  Santiago  and  turned  into  a  field. 
Here  the  bandages  were  removed  from  the  prisoners'  eyes,  and  all 
the  party  sat  down  under  a  tree  to  await  the  arrival  of  Hobson  and 
his  men,  who  could  already  be  seen  moving  out  of  the  city  with  a  white 
flag  floating  above  them,  accompanied  by  a  guard. 

When  the  two  groups  met  beneath  the  tree  the  eyes  of  both  armies 
were  upon  them.  The  Spanish  officer  in  charge  of  the  Americans 
talked  for  an  hour  with  Lieutenant  Miley  before  final  terms  of 

13 


194  HISTORY   OF   THE 

exchange  were  agreed  upon.  Lieutenant  Miley  told  the  Spanish  officer 
that  he  might  select  any  one  of  the  three  Spanish  Lieutenants  in 
exchange  for  Hobson.  Finally  Lieutenant  Arias  was  selected  for  the 
reason  that  he  was  wounded. 

Then  the  two  groups  saluted  and  each  turned  back  to  its  own  lines. 
As  the  Americans  came  up  the  hill  road,  Lieutenant  Hobson  was 
riding  in  advance  with  Lieutenant  Miley,  on  horseback.  The  soldiers 
recognized  him  by  his  uniform,  and  instantly  broke  into  deafening 
cheers.  The  party  moved  rapidly  forward,  and  when  they  were  well 
within  the  American  lines  the  sailors  cheered,  while  the  soldiers  waved 
their  hats  and  shouted  themselves  hoarse.  One  of  the  regimental 
bands  played  "The  Star-Spangled  Banner,"  whereupon  all  cheered 
again  and  again. 

Hobson  looked  somewhat  pale,  due,  perhaps,  to  his  confinement  in 
prison,  but  he  smiled  and  bowed  in  response  to  the  welcome  given 
to  him. 

The  ovation  to  the  sailors  equaled  that  given  to  Hobson.  The 
men  rode  in  the  wagon  that  had  conveyed  the  Spanish  prisoners. 
The  vehicle  was  constantly  surrounded  by  cheering  soldiers,  who  seized 
and  heartily  shook  the  outstretched  hands  of  the  released  heroes,  while 
the  band,  in  honor  of  the  seamen,  played  ''When  Johnnie  Comes 
Marching  Home." 

Lieutenant  Hobson's  account  of  his  imprisonment  of  a  month  gave 
to  our  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  a 
high  impression  of  the  courage  and  sincerity  of  Admiral  Cervera. 
The  Spanish  Admiral  had  made  their  comfort  and  care  his  personal 
responsibility  as  far  as  the  demands  of  his  position  permitted.  "If 
he  had  been  my  personal  friend,"  said  Lieutenant  Hobson,  "he  could 
not  have  been  more  solicitous  for  my  welfare."  The  prisoners  were 
in  the  Morro  fort  for  a  few  days,  after  which  they  were  removed  to 
Santiago.  They  had  been  sick  with  fever,  but  received  careful  med 
ical  attention,  and  Cervera  had  brought  to  bear  all  his  official  in 
fluence  to  secure  the  exchange  of  these  brave  men,  and  their  restoration 
to  the  fleet  they  had  so  greatly  honored  by  their  heroic  deed. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  195 

Hobson's  testimony  to  Cervera's  fine  conduct  was  sufficient  to  win 
from  the  United  States  a  display  of  popular  admiration  and  much 
kindness  to  the  unfortunate  Admiral  when  he  was  brought  to  An 
napolis  a  prisoner  of  war. 

On  the  second  night  before  Hobson's  exchange  the  Spaniards  made 
a  futile  attempt  to  imitate  his  exploit.  At  midnight  they  tried  to 
tow  the  dismantled  cruiser,  Reina  Mercedes,  into  the  entrance  and 
sink  her  across  the  channel  not  closed  by  the  Merrhnac.  It  was 
moonlight,  and  the  watch  on  the  battleship  Texas  observed  the  glint 
of  reflected  light  from  the  steel  sides  of  the  Mercedes.  Signal  was 
made  to  the  other  ships  of  our  fleet  and  then  the  Texas  opened  fire 
with  perfect  deliberation,  between  the  cliffs.  The  aim  was  so  true 
that  the  shots  drove  the  Mercedes  out  of  her  course  to  the  north  side 
of  the  channel,  where  a  13-inch  shell  struck  her  in  the  hull,  exploded, 
and  sank  her  in  shoal  water,  leaving  her  masts  and  upper  works  out 
of  water,  and  the  ship  far  out  of  the  channel. 

July  6  the  Spanish  cruiser  Alfonso  XII.  left  Havana  harbor  and 
proceeded  eight  miles  to  the  westward  before  she  was  discovered  by 
the  American  blockading  squadron.  The  latter  then  gave  chase.  The 
cruiser  attempted  to  enter  Marie! ,  but  stranded  at  the  entrance  of 
the  port.  We  fired  at  her  until  she  was  set  on  fire.  Detachments  of 
Spanish  infantry  and  artillery  hastened  to  the  shore  and  saved  her 
crew  and  part  of  her  cargo.  Two  of  her  crew  were  wounded.  The 
cruiser  was  a  total  loss. 


in. 

WHILE  the  army  was  waiting  before  Santiago,  the  prestige  of  our 
navy  was  to  be  advanced  even  more.     Captain  Sigsbee,  who  had  been 
commander  of  the  Maine,  was   placed  in  command  of    CAPTAIN  SIGSBEE 
the  auxiliary  cruiser  St.  Paul,  and  on  June  22  arrived      £™BTR™ER 
off  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  to  assist  in  the  blockade  of      "TERROR 
that  port.    The  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  while  lying  six  miles  off 
shore,  lookouts  discovered  a  ship  coming  out  of  the  harbor.     It  proved 


196  HISTORY    OF    THE 

to  be  the  Spanish  unprotected  cruiser  Isabella  II. ,  and  she  opened 
fire  on  the  67.  Paul  without  effect.  Captain  Sigsbee  waited  for  a 
nearer  approach,  but  the  Spaniard  stopped  as  if  trying  to  draw  our 
ship  under  the  guns  of  the  forts. 

At  this  moment  the  lookout  reported  that  the  destroyer  Terror,  the 
finest  of  the  Spanish  torpedo  boats,  was  coming  out  of  the  harbor, 
keeping  out  of  sight  behind  the  Isabella.  The  trick  was  now  appar 
ent.  The  cruiser  was  to  act  as  a  decoy  to  lure  the  Sf.  Paul  within 
striking  distance  of  the  destroyer.  The  Isabella  maintained  quick 
firing,  perhaps  to  cover  the  Terror  with  smoke.  The  latter  turned 
off  along  the  coast,  as  if  manoeuvring  to  come  out.  Captain  Sigsbee 
followed,  endeavoring  to  get  between  the  two  Spaniards  with  the  pur 
pose  of  keeping  the  Terror  in  the  trough  of  the  sea  if  she  headed 
for  an  attack. 

When  the  Terror  realized  that  she  was  being  outmanoeuvred,  her 
commander  sent  the  destroyer  around  in  a  circle  to  get  up  speed, 
and  then  headed  straight  for  the  St.  Paul.  It  was  a  perilous  moment 
now,  for  everything  depended  on  gunnery.  Unless  a  shot  stopped 
the  Terror,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  her  coming  near  enough  to 
launch  a  torpedo  and  destroy  the  St.  Paul.  The  American  gunners 
let  the  enemy  get  within  6,000  yards,  and  then  welcomed  her  with 
the  whole  starboard  battery — three  5-inch  guns,  two  6-pounders,  two 
Hotchkiss  rifles,  and  two  3-pounders.  All  guns  carried  the  range,  and 
several  shots  struck  the  Terror,  damaging  her  slightly.  She  stopped 
suddenly  in  her  onward  rush — she  was  coming  at  full  speed — and 
wheeling  around  fired  at  the  St.  Paul  without  effect. 

Both  Spaniards  now  seemed  anxious  to  retreat,  and  the  St.  Paul 
pursued,  shooting  away  the  rear  smokestack  of  the  Terror  and  landing 
several  shots  on  the  cruiser  that  now  ran  away,  another  gunboat 
coming  from  the  harbor  to  assist  her.  The  Terror  was  also  re 
treating,  firing  as  she  ran,  when  the  St.  Paul  sent  in  a  shell  from 
a  5-inch  gun  that  struck  the  enemy  on  the  port  side  astern.  It 
tore  through  the  engine  room,  killing  the  engineer's  assistant  and 
mortally  wounding  a  sailor,  completely  wrecked  the  engine  and 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  197 

steering  gear,  and,  going  out  through  the  hull,  left  her  in  a  sink 
ing  condition. 

The  Terror  began  drifting  and  signaling  for  help.  A  ship  ran  out 
to  her  assistance  as  she  was  now  well  under  the  guns  of  the  fort. 
It  was  too  late  to  tow  her  in.  She  was  pushed  towards  the  beach 
and  sank  fifty  yards  from  shore.  The  Isabella  and  her  consort  then 
retreated  into  the  harbor. 

Merchant  ships  coming  out  of  San  Juan  reported  the  ludicrous  side 
of  the  engagement.  The  Spaniards  mistook  the  St.  Paul  for  her  sister 
ship,  the  St.  Louis,  which  was  not  so  heavily  armed,  and  concluded 
to  sink  her  at  a  safe  distance.  The  Spanish  naval  officers  publicly 
announced  their  intention  to  engage  the  American  in  a  duel  for  her 
destruction.  The  populace  cheered  the  officers  wherever  they  appeared, 
until  finally  the  captain  of  the  Terror  made  an  address  in  the  public 
square.  He  was  going  out  to  sink  the  American  or  be  sunk  by  her, 
he  declared,  and  then  cordially  invited  the  people  of  the  city  to  mount 
the  hills  surrounding  the  harbor  and  watch  the  battle.  They  accepted 
the  invitation.  From  the  St.  Paul  hundreds  could  be  seen  watching  the 
battle  from  the  heights  above  the  city.  The  other  Spaniards  were  not 
much  injured. 


IV. 

ABOUT  the  same  time  a  new  Spanish  squadron,  the  third  and  last 
of  the  navy  possessed  by  the  enemy,  sailed  from  Cadiz,  ostensibly  to 
succor  the  beleaguered  capital  of  the  Philippines,  but  ADMIRAL  CAMA- 
really  for  the  desperate  hope  of  attempting  to  draw  f^o™  AND 
our  ships  away  from  Santiago  to  follow  and  thus  give  OPERA  VOYAGE 
Cervera  rather  more  chance  to  escape.  It  was  under  the  command 
of  Admiral  Camara,  and  consisted  of  the  battleship  Pdcnjo  (second 
class),  the  armored  cruiser  Emperador  Carlos  V.,  the  Rapida  and 
Pair  iota  (auxiliary  cruisers  like  our  St.  Louis),  the  Giralda,  a  steel 
pleasure  yacht  converted  into  a  destroyer  corresponding  to  our  Glouces 
ter,  and  three  torpedo  boats,  the  Audaz,  Osado,  and  Proserpina,  with  half 


198  HISTORY    OF    THE 

a  dozen  troop  ships  having  about  7,000  soldiers  on  board,  accompanied 
by  colliers  and  supply  ships. 

Never  in  modern  warfare  was  the  dispatching  of  a  force  against 
the  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  falling  upon  him  with  a  swiftness  amount 
ing  to  surprise,  attended  by  ostentatious  ceremonies  so  fully  displaying 
the  weaknesses  of  race.  The  politicians  who  were  governing  Spain 
knew  perfectly  well  that  the  war  was  hopeless,  that  neither  their  army 
nor  their  navy  could  cope  with  ours,  but  the  internal  dissensions  of 
factions,  the  perils  that  threatened  the  Alfonsine  dynasty,  the  uncon 
trollable  selfishness  and  vanity  of  party  leaders,  made  it  impossible 
at  that  time  to  publicly  acknowledge  the  truth.  Cervera's  squadron 
had  not  been  destroyed,  Santiago  had  not  been  attacked  by  land,  and 
therefore,  it  was  vitally  necessary  for  political  reasons  to  maintain  at 
home  a  warlike  front. 

The  departure  of  Don  Quixote  de  la  Mancha  to  assail  windmills 
was  not  more  solemnly  ludicrous  than  the  sailing  of  Camara's  fleet, 
but  the  latter  was  enveloped  in  magnificent  ceremonial.  The  ships 
were  splendid  offensive  machines  on  paper ;  practically  they  were 
distrusted  by  their  own  officers.  Their  seaworthiness  was  suspected, 
their  engines  were  out  of  order.  They  had  been  renovated  at  Ferrol, 
near  the  French  border,  by  French  engineers,  and  it  was  understood 
that  French  and  Austrian  gunners  and  machinists  were  secretly  en 
listed  to  secure  the  proper  management  of  the  engines  and  to  work 
the  guns. 

The  ceremonies  were  solemn  and  aroused  intense  enthusiasm  in 
Spain.  The  ladies  of  Cadiz  embroidered  a  flag,  which  the  Bishop 
blessed  aboard  the  Emperador  Carlos  V.,  for  which  vessel  the  flag  was 
made.  The  prelate  arrived  and  departed  accompanied  by  a  procession 
ofcf  choristers,  and  vestmented  youths  bearing  censers.  The  ceremony 
was  marked  with  all  religious  pomp.  The  choristers  led  the  crew 
of  the  war  ship  in  singing  hymns  of  hope  and  prayer. 

The  Minister  of  Marine  delivered  a  lyrical,  patriotic  oration.  He 
announced  that  the  reserve  squadron  would  no  longer  be  reserved, 
but  would  seek  danger  for  the  country's  sake.  It  was  a  privilege  to 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  H)9 

be  placed  in  a  situation  that  must  ennoble  the  humblest  sailor,  trans 
forming  him  into  a  hero.  The  officers  and  men  of  the  ships  visited 
the  cathedral,  and  amid  much  emotion,  all  kneeling,  made  the  custom 
ary  vow  never  to  surrender  to  the  enemies  of  Spain,  but  to  die  in 
her  service. 

Before  leaving  Cadiz  Seilor  Aunon,  Minister  of  Marine,  telegraphed 
to  the  Queen-Regent  that  "the  reserve  squadron  and  the  expeditionary 
troops,  who  are  quitting  Spanish  waters,  send  a  warm  and  enthusiastic 
salutation  to  your  Majesty,  avowing  their  determination  to  light  to 
the  death  for  the  honor  of  the  nation."  A  great  pretense  of  secrecy 
was  maintained  concerning  the  fleet's  destination.  The  Spanish  were 
not  permitted  to  know  whether  it  would  attack  Boston,  go  to  Cervera's 
relief,  or  to  Manila.  But  the  United  States  knew  perfectly  well  that 
it  was  to  sail  eastward  through  the  Suez  Canal. 

The  progress  of  Camara's  fleet  was  comparable  only  to  a  comic- 
opera  promenade.  Moving  slowly,  with  many  impressive  feints,  accom 
panied  by  vague  rumors  and  contradictions,  it  passed  Gibraltar  and 
entered  the  Mediterranean.  Then  it  put  in  at  Cartagena,  where  it 
was  met  with  the  announcement  that  the  United  States  were  assem 
bling  a  squadron  of  war  ships  under  Commodore  John  Crittenden  Wat 
son,  to  attack  the  seaports  of  Spain  and  ravage  them.  Camara's  project, 
as  a  reality,  was  thus  instantly  exploded.  Dewey's  fleet,  reenforced  by 
the  Charleston  and  the  monitor  Monterey,  was  strong  enough  to  destroy 
him;  yet  even  if  he  went  to  Manila,  the  Spanish  coasts  would  be  left 
undefended. 

But  Camara  dared  not  return  to  Cadiz.  At  a  farewell  public  ban 
quet  he  had  declared— for  the  purpose  of  impressing  the  populace  — 
that  he  would  never  return  until  his  flag  had  been  dyed  in  American 
blood;  and  Spanish  colors  were  waved,  the  band  played  national 
airs,  while  Spanish  emotion  and  French  champagne  mingled  themselves 
in  a  glorious  "fizz"  of  patriotism  and  excitement. 

For  political  purposes,  therefore,  our  threat  was  counteracted  with 
the  announcement  that  a  fourth  squadron  was  assembling  at  Cadiz, 
and  Senor  Sagasta  admitted  that  Camara  had  sailed  for  Manila. 


200  HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

And  so  he  had,  and  he  arrived  at  Port  Said,  the  northern  entrance  of 
the  Suez  canal,  on  June  26.  Then  ensued  a  series  of  amusing  difficul 
ties.  The  Egyptian  Government  refused  to  permit  him  to  coal  in  the 
harbor,  and  then  granted  to  him  the  permission,  only  to  withdraw 
it.  Then  he  was  permitted  to  coal  from  his  own  colliers,  and  again 
that  privilege  was  withdrawn.  Spain  accused  England  of  conniving 
at  and  fomenting  these  causes  of  delay  and  sent  a  note  to  the  Powers. 
Meantime,  the  United  States  had  purchased  all  the  private  coal  sup 
plies  at  Port  Said. 

When  at  last  Admiral  Camara  took  on  coal  of  his  own  and  made 
ready  to  enter  the  canal,  he  offered  a  draft  on  his  Government  for  the 
$260,000  necessary  to  pay  canal  tolls.  The  draft  was  politely  declined, 
and  gold  was  demanded.  After  vexatious  delay,  the  draft  was  guaran 
teed  by  French  financial  creditors  of  Spain,  and  the  fleet  passed 
through.  It  lay  off  Ismaila  until  July  9.  Cervera's  squadron,  mean 
while,  had  been  destroyed,  and  Toral  was  about  to  surrender  Santiago. 
Then  the  Spanish  Government  ordered  the  fleet  to  return  to  Cadiz,  paid 
another  $260,000  of  toll,  and  Camara,  turning  the  prows  of  his  terrible 
armada  to  the  north,  once  more  braved  the  dangerous  waters  of  the 
canal,  and  navigated  his  fleet  through  the  frowning  tempestuosities 
of  the  Mediterranean  safely  home  without  sustaining  the  loss  of  any 
thing  more  than  time  and  money. 

American  preparations  to  send  Commodore  Watson's  squadron 
against  the  Spanish  coast  were  meanwhile  continued,  and  knowledge 
of  it  filled  all  Spanish  seaports  with  terror.  The  towns  were  deserted, 
and  all  Spain  fled  inland  except  from  great  fortified  ports  such  as 
Cadiz,  Barcelona,  and  Cartagena.  It  was  our  purpose  to  carry  the 
war  to  Spain's  very  doors. 


CHAPTER  THE  FOURTEENTH. 
THE  DEATH  GRIP  AT  SANTIAGO. 

AN    OMINOUS    PAUSK   ON    BOTH    SIDES  —  THE    SPANISH   REINFORCEMENTS   OF   PESTILENCE   AND 

FAMINE  —  THE  SINISTER    MEANING    AND   HISTORY   OF   "THE  HONOR   OF  SPAIN" — TWENTY 

THOUSAND  STARVING  REFUGEES  TO  SUPPORT,  AND  YELLOW  FEVER  TO  COMBAT  —  SPANISH 

TROOPS  LOOT  THEIR  OWN  CITY  WITH  ATROCITY  —  SHAFTER  SENDS  A  SHARP  DEMAND 

TO  TORAL  —  PERSONAL  CONFERENCE  BETWEEN  THE  GENERALS—"  ITS  A  D— D  POOR 

SORT  OF  HONOR  THAT  MAKES  SOLDIERS  DIE  FOR  NOTHING"— TORAL  AGREES 

TO  SURRENDER  THE  CITY— WILD   REJOICING   IN   THE  AMERICAN   ARMY. 


T 


HE  gaunt  and  haggard  soldiers  of  the  United  States  still  kept 
sleepless  guard  over  every  rood  of  the  walls  and  trenches  that 
contained  Santiago.  Day  after  day  passed  with  gpAIN>s  ARMY  Op 
no  change,  except  that  the  patient  men  added  PESTILENCE 

,     .      .  AND  FAMINE 

to  their  earthworks,  or  moved  into  a  better  position, 
or  changed  a  battery.  Day  after  day  small  bodies  of  reinforcements 
arrived  from  Siboney  or  Baiquiri,  covered  with  the  mire  from  the 
red  roads,  worn  with  the  labor  of  wading  through  the  sticky  trail, 
climbing  up  hillsides,  and  along  the  rock-covered  beds  of  mountain 
torrents.  As  they  trudged  wearily  on  they  could  see  the  mute  signals 
of  heroism,  testifying  how  the  advance  army  had  fought  its  way. 

Through  jungles,  on  hillsides,  in  rank  grass,  and  strung  from  rock 
to  rock  in  gorges  and  streams,  the  terrible  coils  and  strands  of  barbed 
wire,  with  which  the  Spaniards  had  abatised  the  approach,  were 
discovered.  It  had  been  believed,  at  first,  that  these  obstacles  were 
merely  wire  fences  along  post  lines,  from  four  to  eight  feet  high,  but 
it  was  discovered  when  the  advance  was  made  on  Santiago  that  there 
were  not  only  fences  to  be  encountered,  but  all  the  forms  of  the 
barbed  torture  that  ingenious  Spanish  cruelty  could  invent.  The 
wire  was  stretched  from  tree  to  tree  at  irregular  heights.  Some 
times  a  strand  would  be  fastened  to  a  stump,  and  from  there  to  a 

(201) 


202  HISTORY    OF    THE 

height  of  eight  or  ten  feet  to  a  tree,  then  down  again  to  the  next 
tree  to  a  height  of  three  or  four  feet  from  the  ground.  In  this  way 
hedges,  with  six  or  eight  strands  of  barbed  wire,  were  strung  along 
for  miles,  the-  construction  being  so  irregular  that  the  soldiers  could 
not  learn  where  to  look  for  the  individual  strands. 

The  whole  formed  a  formidable  barrier  superior  to  the  abatis 
made  from  the  limbs  or  trunks  of  trees.  Wood  can  be  torn  away  by 
artillery  fire,  and,  once  down,  the  troops  can  pass  over.  Or  it  can  be 
set  on  fire  and  destroyed.  But  the  barbed-wire  barriers  had  to  be 
cut  with  shears,  or  beaten  down  carefully  with  clubs.  While  the  men 
were  halting,  the  wires  did  not  prevent  the  enemy's  bullets  from  mow 
ing  down  our  soldiers.  In  some  instances  the  strands  were  woven  so 
closely  together  that  the  clippers  could  not  be  inserted  between  them; 
yet  the  terrible  Mauser  bullets  came  through  with  deadly  ease. 

July  12  General  Miles  and  about  8,000  reinforcements  had  arrived 
at  the  front  and  General  Ludlow,  with  a  force  of  Americans  and  Cubans, 
had  occupied  the  town  of  Caimanes,  west  of  Santiago,  across  the  bay. 

But  the  army  of  Spain  meanwhile  had  also  developed  reenforce- 
ments,  and  these  had  invested  our  lines  as  effectually  as  our  troops 
had  invested  Santiago. 

This  new  Spanish  force,  though  it  flew  no  colors  of  Spain,  though 
it  marched  with  no  pomp  or  display,  was  yet  more  to  be  dreaded  than 
the  Spanish  army  in  Santiago  — it  was  more  terrible  than  a  thousand 
armies  with  banners.  It  was  massed  and  ordered  and  placed  by  malefi 
cent  veteran  purposes  that  had  served  as  allies  and  servants  of  Spain 
for  five  hundred  years  of  abandonment  of  power  to  cruelty  and 
treachery.  These  veteran  allies  had  marched  in  the  bloody  train  of 
Alva  in  Germany,  with  the  Duke  of  Parma  in  the  Netherlands,  with 
Cortez  in  Mexico,  with  Pizarro  in  Peru,  with  Philip  V.,  and  Charles 
III.,  when  Spaniard  fought  Spaniard  with  ferocity,  treachery,  and  evil 
cunning  that  equaled  themselves  on  both  sides  and  demonstrated  that 
good  faith  and  mercy  were  congenitally  absent  from  Spanish  character. 
The  cruelties  practiced  upon  prisoners  and  harmless  non-combatants 
are  forbidden  of  record  in  open  history. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  203 

They  are  still  practiced  where  Spanish  domination  is  safe  from 
the  inquisitive  eye  of  other  races.  Hideous  ingenuity  in  cruelty  drove 
the  native  Indians  of  Cuba,  by  thousands,  to  find  suicide  preferable 
to  life  in  the  power  of  Spaniards.  To  this  year  Spanish  soldiers  in  the 
Philippines  have  nailed  captive  revolutionists  to  walls  in  an  attitude 
of  crucih'xion,  and  lashed  them  to  death.  Within  two  years  General 
Weyler,  a  worthy  successor  of  Alva  and  of  Philip,  undertook  to  crush 
revolution  by  starvation.  He  had  placed  225,000  murders  to  his  account, 
when  the  United  States  forced  his  recall  to  Spain,  where  the  public 
received  him  as  a  hero. 

Wherever  the  army  of  Spain  has  passed,  it  has  left  behind  scars 
upon  the  fair  name  of  mankind  as  cruel  as  those  of  the  branding 
iron  upon  the  flesh  of  its  victim.  When  the  Spanish  soldiery  has 
relaxed  itself  it  has  been  in  the  pleasures  of  torturing  the  conquered, 
in  the  unspeakable  agonies  of  inquisition,  in  the  exercise  of  intrigue 
in  a  bottomless  sea  of  treachery,  or  in  public  corruption  that  has  made 
practical  government  impossible  among  them. 

In  any  monarchical  government,  buttressed  by  a  rich  and  powerful 
caste  of  nobles,  the  soldiers  of  its  standing  army  determine  the  character 
of  the  people.  The  soldier,  representing  everywhere  the  living  type 
of  courage,  is  the  hero  of  the  masses.  What  must  be  the  hereditary 
practices  of  Spanish  soldiers  is  reflected  ominously  to-day  in  the  pop 
ulace  of  Spain,  whose  vast  crowds  on  holidays  abandon  themselves 
to  blood-scent,  and,  as  the  fume  of  revolting  cruelty  rises  from  the 
sand  of  the  bull-ring,  it  envelops  every  tier — royalty,  nobility,  com 
monalty —  in  a  vaporous  madness,  such  as  the  barbarous  Greeks  and 
degenerate  Romans  entered  upon  during  their  "  mysteries,"  but  which 
in  Spain  evokes  a  frenzied  lust  for  murder  that  delights  in  the  sight 
of  physical  suffering. 

No  wonder  such  a  nature  seeks  concealment  beneath  the  garb  of 
a  chivalrous  etiquette,  and  masks  its  intentions  behind  the  accom 
modating  ambiguities  of  noble  language.  But,  behind  the  costume  and 
the  alluring  phrase,  have  alwrays  existed  the  pitiless  heart,  filled  with 
the  love  of  cruelty,  with  the  intricacies  of  fraud  and  treachery,  with  the 


204  HISTORY   OF   THE 

pride  of  a  limitless  selfishness  that  would  sacrifice  the  world  for 
its  own  vanity.  For  five  hundred  years  "the  honor  of  Spain"  has  been 
a  phrase  with  which  Spaniards  have  juggled  to  conceal  the  selfishness 
of  caste  pride.  The  "honor  of  Spain"  has  been  maintained  by  the 
sacrifice  of  every  virtue  and  noble  ideal  that  mankind  has  cherished 
as  a  factor  entering  into  honor. 

It  was  the  army  of  Famine  and  Pestilence  that  Toral  had  marched 
out  of  the  gates  of  Santiago,  led  by  the  spectral  veterans  of  old.  In 
the  garb  of  helplessness  and  innocence  it  passed  through  the  American 
lines  to  El  Caney.  Twenty  thousand  refugees  were  there,  or  scattered 
along  the  roads,  or  roaming  the  jungles  in  an  effort  to  reach  Siboney. 
It  was  the  beginning  of  the  season  of  the  fiore  amarilla,  the  yellow 
fever,  that  pestilence  of  filth  and  fetor,  which  Spanish  institutions  have 
allowed  to  persist  —  a  silent  witness  of  their  indifference  to  death  as  the 
alternative  of  cleanliness  and  industry.  For  a  hundred  years  Santiago 
de  Cuba,  Havana,  and  San  Juan  de  Puerto  Rico  have  been  centers  of 
this  deadly  disease,  which  has  ravaged  all  the  warm  and  tropical  coun 
tries  having  free  communication  with  them. 

It  was  even  showing  its  jaundiced  face  in  the  city  of  Santiago  when 
General  Shafter,  pursuing  the  tactics  of  civilized  warfare,  answering 
the  demands  of  humanity,  had  given  Toral  notice  of  assault  in  order 
that  the  non-combatants  might  retire.  "Good!"  was  the  reply  of  the 
Spaniard,  "we  shall  have  20,000  fewer  mouths  to  feed."  And  the  non- 
combatants  did  retire  —  retired  to  the  ranks  of  the  besiegers.  "Good!" 
Toral  might  have  said,  if  he  did  not  actually  say  it,  "we  send  you 
famine  and  the  fiore  amarilla  along  with  our  poor  and  helpless.  Feed 
them  and  nurse  them,  or  starve  and  die  with  them!"  For  Toral  knew 
that  the  hunger  and  disease  and  filth  and  despair  of  20,000  women  and 
children  in  Santiago  was  a  greater  and  more  terrible  army  threatening 
his  troops  than  the  22,000  Americans  standing  intrepid  and  unconquer 
able  sentries  at  every  door  by  which  escape  might  be  possible. 

The  Anglo-Saxon  —  to  whose  nature  cruelty  is  to  be  justified  only 
as  the  last  extremity  of  necessity,  to  whom  maleficent  treachery  is  a 
brand  of  the  unpardonable  infamy  —  must  turn  with  loathing  from  the 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  205 

thought  that  Toral  sent  the  poison  of  disease  to  the  adversaries  his 
soldiers  had  not  been  able  to  beat  back  from  impregnable  defenses. 
But  he  knew  the  disease,  the  season,  the  dangers,  and  the  effects.  He 
sent  his  helpless  dependants  to  the  magnanimous  invaders  —  in  return 
for  magnanimity  he  offered  the  horrors  of  pestilence  and  famine. 

And  now,  he  could  well  afford  to  temporize,  to  squirm  and  delay 
behind  the  old  sinister  pretense  of  "the  honor  of  Spain."  With  an 
army  20.000  strong  in  disease  and  starvation  in  our  rear,  and  an  army 
of  11,000  in  the  trenches  of  his  fortress,  every  day's  delay  for  Toral 
meant  hope.  Every  day's  delay,  while  the  cold  rains  fell  in  torrents, 
or  the  burning  sun  scorched  and  tortured  the  unacclimated.  hungry, 
and  exhausted  Americans,  gave  opportunity  for  infection  and  spread  of 
the  fever. 

Our  army  was  supporting  the  Spanish  army  of  pestilence.  Our 
own  troops  were  living  upon  half  rations  of  "hard-tack"  and  water, 
while  such  supplies  as  could  be  brought  up  were  divided  with  the 
starving  thousands  at  El  Caney.  Men,  women,  and  children,  20,000  of 
them,  with  two  hundred  houses  in  the  village.  They  huddled  in  the 
streets,  squares,  roads,  and  fields,  which  they  converted  into  a  vast 
lazaretto  of  despair. 

"Mttcha  hambre!"  wailed  the  women  and  children, "  I  am  so  hungry," 
and  the  food  for  the  army  went  to  the  helpless.  But  no  soldier 
of  the  United  States  complained  or  would  have  stopped  the  relief. 
The  Red  Cross  Society  sent  nurses,  medicines,  and  supplies  to  the 
refugees.  Flour  was  distributed — the  refugees  did  not  know  how  to 
make  use  of  it.  The  army  cooks  set  up  bakeries  and  made  bread  for 
the  starving,  while  the  soldiers  in  the  trenches  ate  "hardtack"  and 
took  courage  of  determination  against  the  Spaniard  hiding  in  the  city. 
Our  surgeons  and  physicians  and  nurses  attended  the  sick  of  the  refu 
gees  and  the  wounded  of  the  enemy,  while  the  wounded  troops  of 
the  United  States  tramped  back  on  foot,  or  were  jolted  in  ammunition 
wagons,  over  the  torturing  roads  to  Siboney. 

Even  to  Siboney  a  thousand  helpless  refugees  had  managed  to  pen 
etrate,  bringing  with  them  fever  and  deadly  hunger.  July  11  yellow 


206  HISTORY   OF   THE 

fever  had  appeared  at  the  hospital  base  there,  and  General  Miles  or 
dered  every  house  in  the  town  to  be  burned,  in  the  hope  of  staying 
the  infection.  The  torch  was  applied.  A  great,  drowning  torrent 
of  rain  extinguished  the  incipient  flames  and  drenched  the  houses 
to  a  degree  that  made  it  necessary  to  lose  another  day.  But  Siboney 
was  burned  on  the  12th. 

Out  in  the  trenches  before  Santiago  the  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
were  chafing.  There  was  no  complaint  at  the  hardships  that  humanity 
imposed  upon  them,  although  the  seasoned  regular  troops  were  weak 
ened  for  lack  of  good  food,  tents,  and  by  the  tension  of  hiding  in 
trenches.  Even  those  who  had  fought  over  the  hot  and  arid  plains  of 
the  West  were  appalled  by  the  deadly  humidity  of  this  Cuban  climate, 
a  steaming  suffocation  all  day,  that  gave  place  to  a  clammy  chill  all 
night. 

They  chafed  at  delay  and  inactivity.  They  wanted  to  fight,  and 
cursed  every  hour  that  did  not  bring  the  order  to  storm  the  enemy's 
works. 

General  Shafter  reflected  upon  the  cost  of  carrying  the  town  by 
assault.  Our  ships  could  not  enter  the  harbor  until  the  mines  there 
had  been  removed  or  destroyed.  The  long-range  bombardment  was 
a  slow,  difficult,  and  almost  impossible  task.  There  were  only  his 
soldiers,  then,  to  take  the  city.  To  order  these  brave  men,  who  had 
weakened  themselves  by  fighting  their  way  through  every  peril  and  dif 
ficulty  of  the  jungle,  and  by  hunger  and  toil  in  the  trenches,  to  assault 
the  artillery,  barbed-wire  abatis,  and  the  treachery  of  street-fighting 
in  Santiago,  was  a  serious  step  to  take.  Even  though  they  pleaded 
for  the  order,  the  cost  of  it  was  his  responsibility,  and  he  determined  not 
to  give  the  order  except  as  a  last  necessity.  And  General  Miles  agreed 
with  him. 


SPANISH    A.MKKITAN     \V.\IJ  207 


II. 

WHAT  our  soldiers  could  see  of  Santiago  from  their  lines  on  the  hill 
of  San  Juan  was  its  beauty  in  the  panoply  of  war.  They  could  look 

down  upon  its  ancient  red  and  yellow  houses,  gleaming 

THE  SPANIARDS 

in  the  sunlight  against  the  vivid  background  of  green        LOOT  THEIR 
on  the  mountains  behind.     The  red  and  yellow  Hags  of 
Spain  were  flying  from  walls,  roofs,  and   pinnacles.     The  white  flag 
of  the  Red  Cross  Society,  with  its  blood-red  Maltese  cross  in  the  center 
of  the   field,  flew  over  the   hospital   from  which  the  wounded  Span 
iards  could  see  our  troops  by  looking  out  the  windows. 

In  the  military  headquarters  on  the  Plaza  de  Armas  General  Toral 
devised  the  many  ingenious  ways  of  saying  "  To-morrow,"  by  which 
he  had  evaded  Shafter's  demands,  and  he  patiently  waited  for  the 
work  of  his  allies,  pestilence,  and  famine. 

The  Spaniard  was  doing  his  work  characteristically  in  the  old 
city.  Dreadful  stories  were  brought  out  by  refugees  and  deserters. 
Before  surrendering  the  city  they  were  sacking  it.  The  Spanish  soldier 
does  not  discriminate  when  he  begins  to  loot.  All  valuable  property 
of  civilians,  friends  and  enemies  alike,  is  his  by  right  of  taking  or 
destroying.  The  dwellings  and  storehouses  of  all  who  had  fled  were 
broken  into  and  despoiled. 

One  peculiarly  atrocious  crime  was  reported,  against  the  Seilora 
Rosa  Chacon  de  Odis,  a  wealthy  resident  who  had  refused  to  leave 
because  her  fortune,  which  consisted  of  gold,  silver,  and  securities  of 
various  kinds,  and  her  valuable  jewels,  were  kept  in  her  house.  She 
thought  the  property  would  be  safer  under  the  protection  of  Spanish 
soldiers  than  within  the  American  lines.  It  was  known  among  the 
Spanish  soldiers  that  she  had  much  property  in  her  house,  and  one 
night  some  of  them  went  to  her  residence  and  assassinated  her.  Then 
they  looted  the  house  of  everything  valuable. 

Churches  and  handsome  residences  were  invaded  and  everything 
of  convertible  value  carried  off,  fine  pictures  were  cut  out  of  the  frames 
or  defaced  and  slashed  with  swords,  windows  broken,  furniture  hacked 


208  HISTORY    OF    THE 

and  destroyed.  Banks  were  despoiled  of  money  and  nameless  barbar 
ities  of  violence  perpetrated  upon  the  few  defenseless  women  remain 
ing.  For  those  two  weeks  Santiago  de  Cuba  was  in  the  merciless 
clutches  of  the  fourteenth  century.  Only  those  things  were  left  un 
touched  that  were  necessary  to  the  comfort  of  the  Spanish  soldiery 
who  were  upholding  "the  honor  of  Spain,"  or  to  destroy  which  would 
necessitate  the  abandonment  of  indolence  and  a  resort  to  labor. 

In  the  San  Carlos  Club  on  the  Plaza  de  Armas,  the  resort  of  aris 
tocratic  society,  the  officers  off  duty  congregated  at  night  to  regale 
themselves.  Resplendent  in  gold  braid  and  decorations,  they  listened 
to  a  mechanical  musical  instrument  that  had  been  imported  from  the 
United  States  for  the  entertainment  of  the  club  membership.  Among 
the  airs  rendered  was  one  that  none  of  the  Spaniards  recognized,  but 
which  became  a  favorite.  It  was  "The  Star  Spangled  Banner,"  and 
its  rendition  always  called  out  applause  and  a  demand  for  repetition. 

And  so,  between  the  excitements  of  riot  and  luxury,  Toral  com 
municated  the  mysterious  evasions  contained  in  the  Spanish  word 
manana  ("to-morrow")  in  reply  to  Shafter's  demands.  The  fever  was 
very  slow  in  beginning  its  work. 

But  General  Toral  received  on  July  13  an  abrupt  notification  that 
if  Santiago  was  not  surrendered  unconditionally  without  further  delay 
the  ships  would  begin  a  continuous  bombardment  at  noon  next  day 
and  destroy  the  city  for  which  his  obstinacy  must  bear  the  respon 
sibility.  He  read  between  the  lines  of  that  message  that  if  he  sought 
to  escape  the  shells  of  the  ships  the  soldiers  he  had  so  long  irritated 
and  menaced  with  treachery  might  meet  him  with  terrible  retribution. 


in. 

COUNCIL  OF  WAR         THERE  was  a   council    of  war   before    Santiago    on 
J«T°TEm  ™w     July  13-    xt  was  Between  General  Miles,  General  Shatter, 

CAPITULATION 

General  Garcia,  and  Lieutenant  Hobson  of  the  navy,  rep 
resenting  Admiral  Sampson.  General  Garcia  counseled  a  heavy  and 
continuous  bombardment  if  the  next  answer  from  General  Toral  should 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  209 

be  a  request  for  further  delay  or  a  refusal  to  surrender.  He  declared 
that  the  Spaniards  could  not  hold  out  long,  and  that  the  best  action 
to  take  was  to  reduce  them  at  once  by  bombardment.  He  added  that 
if  General  Toral's  proposed  terms  of  surrender,  which  specified  that 
his  troops  be  permitted  to  retire  with  their  arms,  were  complied  with, 
the  Spanish  forces  would  immediately  join  General  Luque  at  Holguin, 
where  there  were  10,000  men  and  2,000,000  rations,  or  would  fall  back 
on  Puerto  Principe,  where  the  Cubans  had  many  head  of  cattle. 

It  was  declared  at  the  council  that  Captain-General  Blanco  was 
personally  opposed  to  the  surrender  on  any  terms,  and  wanted  the 
forces  there  to  hold  out  to  the  bitter  end. 

The  possibility  of  the  fleet  forcing  the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  steam 
ing  up  to  the  inner  bay  and  bombarding  the  city,  was  brought,  up  at 
the  council.  Many  army  men  had  insisted  that  it  was  Admiral  Samp 
son's  duty  to  go  to  the  city  with  his  battleships,  and  accusations  had 
been  made  that  the  navy  was  not  willing  to  accept  its  share  of  the 
dangers.  These  rumors  had  caused  ill-feeling,  but  they  were  untrue. 
Admiral  Sampson  had  told  the  military  authorities  that  it  would  be 
madness  in  him  to  try  to  pass  the  harbor  entrance  as  long  as  the 
forts  commanding  it  had  not  been  reduced.  Lieutenant  Hobson  ex 
plained  to  the  council  the  reasons  rendering  it  impossible  for  the  fleet 
to  get  into  the  harbor.  The  approach  from  the  sea  was  several  miles 
long,  and  was  mined  for  the  entire  distance. 

It  was  agreed  at  the  council  that  the  city  could  be  taken  by  the 
army  in  three  hours,  with  the  loss  of  1,000  men,  and  by  the  navy  with 
the  loss  of  one  ship.  It  was  also  agreed  that  such  losses  were  not 
necessary. 

When  the  council  adjourned  the  notice  to  Toral  that  caused  him 
to  act  was  at  once  dispatched.  An  answer  was  not  expected  until  next 
day;  but  Toral  replied  at  once  and  suggested  a  personal  conference  with 
Shafter.  Up  to  that  date  the  negotiations  had  been  carried  on  through 
aides. 

The  conference  was  held  under  the  shade  of  a  great  cottonwood 
tree,  midway  between  the  lines  of  the  two  armies.  General  Miles 

14 


210  HISTORY   OF    THE 

was  present,  in  his  character  as  commanding  general  of  the  armies, 
and  as  an  adviser.  General  Shafter  was  attended  by  Colonel  Maus 
and  Captain  McKittrick.  General  Toral  came  attended  by  Colonel 
Velasquez,  Mr.  Mason,  British  Vice-Consul  at  Santiago.  Senor  Men- 
doza  acted  as  Shafter's  interpreter.  The  two  groups  were  charac 
teristic  of  the  two  nations.  General  Miles  wore  a  plain  blue  field 
uniform,  while  Shafter  and  his  aides  were  attired  in  the  dirty  brown 
linen  blouse  coats  adopted  for  the  men  in  Cuba.  Toral  and  Velasquez 
were  magnificent  with  gold  lace,  braid,  and  medals. 

General  Toral  began  by  pointing  out  that  his  government  would 
not  permit  him  to  do  more  than  surrender  possession  of  the  city, 
marching  his  troops  with  their  arms  to  join  the  main  Spanish  army. 
General  Shafter  replied  that  the  United  States  Government  had  de 
clined  to  accept  anything  but  unconditional  surrender,  and  he  must 
insist  upon  it. 

To  this  General  Toral  politely  responded  that  each  General  must 
obey  the  orders  of  his  Government,  as  loyal  soldiers.  He,  himself, 
personally  regretted  that  his  government  left  him  no  discretion. 

General  Shafter  reminded  him  that  no  soldier  was  expected  to  de« 
stroy  his  army  when  nothing  could  be  gained.  He  pointed  out  the 
investment,  the  presence  of  the  ships,  the  unlimited  reinforcements 
that  could  be  brought,  the  starvation  of  the  refugees,  and  the  danger 
of  disease  that  threatened  all  alike.  That,  moreover,  it  had  been  de 
termined  to  immediately  assault  Santiago  by  land  and  sea,  at  all  cost, 
and  General  Toral  must  realize  that  it  could  be  taken. 

Personal  anecdotes  are  not  always  reliable,  but  when  they  are 
redolent  of  peculiar  character  they  gain  credence.  Such  an  anec 
dote  came  from  the  front,  growing  out  of  this  conference.  Genera] 
Shafter,  known  to  the  army  as  "Bull"  Shafter,  for  his  obstinate 
fighting  and  brusque  qualities,  was  also  celebrated  for  a  vocabulary 
rich  in  powerful,  if  profane,  emphasis.  A  self-made  man,  a  self-made 
soldier,  and  full  of  vigor,  he  had  learned  to  attend  strictly  to  busi 
ness  and  to  waste  no  time  upon  the  accomplishments  of  ceremonial 
etiquette. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  211 

When  General  Shafter  began  his  reminder  of  the  hopelessness  of 
the  Spanish  position  and  the  fact  that  the  place  could  be  taken  by 
assault,  Toral  answered  with  lofty  chivalry:  — 

"  Even  if  that  can  be  done,  yet  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  every 
soldier  in  my  army  is  ready  to  die  to  maintain  the  honor  of  my 
country." 

"Tell  him,"  General  Shafter  is  reported  to  have  said,  in  an  em 
phatic  outburst,  when  the  interpreter  had  translated  Toral's  remark : 
"tell  him,  I  say,  that  while  it  is  honorable  in  his  soldiers  to  be  will 
ing  to  die,  it  is  a  d d  poor  sort  of  honor  in  their  country  which 

requires  them  to  die  for  no  purpose.  We  call  it  murder.  It  is  no 
honor  for  my  soldiers  to  kill  his  for  nothing.  I  do  not  want  to 
kill  his  men  because  they  are  brave,  and  I  don't  want  my  men  killed 
for  nothing.  He  must  take  the  responsibility  before  the  world  for 
every  life  lost.  Humanity  and  the  common  sense  of  war  demands 
his  surrender  in  order  that  these  soldiers  and  helpless  refugees  may 
be  saved!" 

Senor  Mendoza,  himself  a  Spaniard,  accustomed  to  graceful  amen 
ities,  was  perhaps  struck  with  this  impetuous  and  blunt  presentation. 
It  is  not  known  whether  he  interpreted  the  Anglo-Saxon  directness  of 
the  speech  to  the  fiery  but  courteous  Toral.  Whatever  he  rendered  in 
its  place,  however,  proved  sufficient. 

Toral  hesitated,  the  conference  became  general,  and  the  Spaniard 
confessed  the  hopelessness  of  his  defense.  He  appealed  to  Shafter 
and  Miles,  however,  to  spare  his  army  humiliating  treatment.  Upon 
this  it  was  agreed  that  the  troops  should  deliver  up  their  arms  and 
ammunition  to  their  own  officers  in  the  city,  that  the  Spanish  officers 
might  retain  their  side  arms,  and  that  the  soldiers  would  be  marched 
with  military  honors  into  encampment  outside  the  city  and  transported 
to  Spain  as  quickly  as  possible  by  the  United  States  Government.  This 
was  done  to  avoid  epidemic  and  the  expense  of  supporting  and  guarding 
such  a  large  body  of  prisoners. 

After  agreement  the  conferees  separated  to  appoint  commissioners 
to  meet  and  draw  up  the  agreement  in  terms. 


212  HISTORY   OF   THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

The  truce  was  continued  until  these  commissioners  could  meet 
and  conclude  the  work. 

When  the  American  conferees  returned  to  our  troops  and  announced 
the  agreement  of  capitulation,  the  army  broke  into  wild  cheers  of 
delight.  They  began  in  the  center  and  spread  right  and  left  in  waves 
of  enthusiasm.  The  news  flew  to  the  rear  over  the  miry  roads  and 
telegraph  wires  and  the  "  Old  Doxology "  was  sung  along  miles  of 
bristling  entrenchments.  "Santiago  has  fallen!"  was  the  pass-word 
from  mouth  to  mouth  between  laughing,  cheering,  singing,  and  ex 
cited  veterans,  who  hugged  each  other  at  the  prospect  of  relief.  But 
no  sound  of  applause  came  from  the  ominous  trenches  in  front  of  them 
or  from  the  picturesque  city  that  lay  glowing  in  the  bright  sunlight 
in  the  valley  below. 


CHAPTER   THE   FIFTEENTH. 
SURRENDER  OF  SANTIAGO. 

TORAL   MAKES    A    DESPAIRING    EFFORT    TO    FIGHT   OFF  SURRENDER  BY    DELAY  —  THE   TERMS 
ENFORCED   WITH   COURTEOUS   FIRMNESS  — OCCUPATION   OF   THE   CITY  ON  SUNDAY  JULY  17, 
WITH    IMPRESSIVE    CEREMONIAL  AND  AMIDST   WILD  ENTHUSIASM  BY    OUR  TROOPS   AND 
THE  POPULATION — FRATERNIZATION  OF  SPANISH  AND  AMERICAN  TROOPS  —  DREAD 
FUL   CONDITIONS    PREVAILING   IN   SANTIAGO  —  SICKNESS,    INFECTION,    HUNGER, 
ANARCHY  —  WORK  OF  THE  AUTHORITIES  AND  THE  RED  CROSS — SKETCHES 
OF    GENERALS    SHAFTER    AND    WHEELER,    LEADERS    OF    OUR   ARMY. 


O 


I. 

N  THE  morning  of  July  15,  the  commissioners  from  each  army 
appointed  to  draw  up  and  sign  the  terms  of  surrender  met 
under  a  spreading  ceba  tree  between  the  lines. 
For    the    Americans    came    General    Joseph        THE 
Wheeler,  General  H.  W.  Lawton,  and  Lieutenant  Miley 
of  Shafter's  staff.      For  the  Spaniards  came  Colonel   Fontaine,  chief 
of  Toral's  staff,  General  Escariel,  and  Mr.  Robert  Mason,  British  Vice- 
Consul.     They  met  shortly  before  noon  and  our  commissioners  were 
courteously  invited  to  enter  the  city  and  complete  the  business  com 
fortably.     The  invitation  was  as  courteously  declined. 

At  the  very  outset  of  proceedings  a  misunderstanding  arose,  through 
the  presentation  of  a  letter  from  Toral,  which  General  Shafter  had 
referred  to  our  commissioners,  with  instructions  to  reject  its  proposition 
as  to  the  disposition  of  arms.  The  copy  here  given  is  a  literal  trans 
lation  and  is  a  curiosity:  — 

SANTIAGO  DK  Ct'BA,  July  15. 
To  Excellency,  Commander-in-Chiff of  the,  American  forces:  — 

EXCELLENT  SIR: — -I  am  now  authorized  by  my  Government  to  capitulate.  I 
have  the  honor  to  so  advise  you,  requesting  you  designate  hour  and  place  where 
my  representatives  should  appear  to  confer  with  those  of  your  Excellency  to  effect  the 
articles  of  capitulation  on  the  basis  of  what  has  been  agreed  upon  to  this  date.  In  clue 
time  I  wish  to  manifest  to  your  Excellency  my  desire  to  know  the  resolution  of  the 

(213) 


214  HISTORY   OF   THE 

United  States  Government  respecting  the  return  of  arms,  so  as  to  note  on  the  capitula 
tion;  also  the  great  courtesy  and  gentlemanly  deportment  of  your  Great  Grace's  Repre 
sentatives,  and  return  for  their  generous  and  noble  impulse,  for  the  Spanish  soldiers  will 
allow  them  to  return  to  the  Peninsular  with  the  arms  that  the  American  army  do  them 
the  honor  to  acknowledge  as  dutifully  descended.  JOSE  TOKAL, 

Commander-in-Chief,  Fourth  Army  Corps. 

The  misunderstanding,  it  was  thought,  was  due  to  a  failure  of 
exact  interpretation  on  the  previous  day.  At  that  time  the  inter 
preter,  translating  the  language  of  General  Toral,  had  given  Generals 
Shafter  and  Miles  distinctly  to  understand  that  Captain-General  Blanco 
had  consented  that  the  commissioners  should  have  plenary  powers  to 
negotiate  the  terms  of  surrender,  such  terms  as  agreed  upon  to  be 
binding  upon  both  parties.  Something  had  been  said  about  a  notifi 
cation  to  the  Madrid  Government,  but  General  Shafter  insisted  that 
the  capitulation  had  actually  been  agreed  upon,  and  that  no  further 
consent  of  the  Madrid  Government  was  required. 

The  Spanish  commissioners  combatted  vigorously  the  assumption 
that  Toral  had  already  capitulated.  The  consent  of  Madrid,  they  in 
sisted,  was  still  necessary;  but  at  the  same  time  they  declared  decisively 
that  it  would  be  forthcoming,  as  Captain-General  Blanco  had  authorized 
it  and  the  home  government  would  also  approve.  General  Toral,  who 
was  personally  present  and  who  directed  the  negotiations  on  his  own 
behalf,  said  he  had  never  been  overruled  by  the  Captain-General.  Still, 
he  added,  until  Madrid  had  sanctioned  it  Santiago  had  not  capitulated. 

All  this  was  extremely  unsatisfactory  to  our  commissioners,  who 
clung  tenaciously  to  the  understanding  General  Shafter  had  received. 
Leaving  the  question  still  open,  the  commissioners  proceeded  to  consider 
the  preliminaries.  Lieutenant  Miley  had  drawn  up  thirteen  articles  of 
a  general  nature  and  these  were  submitted  to  General  Toral  personally, 
who  made  a  strong  appeal  that  the  word  "  capitulation  "  be  used  instead 
of  the  term  "  surrender,"  and  that  his  army  be  allowed  to  march  out, 
the  officers  with  their  side  arms  and  the  men  with  their  small  arms.  He 
said  the  arms  could  afterward  be  sent  to  Spain,  either  in  the  same  ships 
with  the  troops  or  on  some  other  ships.  General  Toral  further  remarked 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  215 

that  he  expected  that  our  commissioners,  as  representatives  of  a  brave 
and  a  chivalrous  people,  would  not  seek  to  humiliate  his  army  or  make 
it  appear  that  he  was  vanquished.  As  brave  men,  his  soldiers  desired  to 
go  home  with  honor.  They  had  simply  yielded  to  superior  force,  and 
they  would  prefer  dying  to  going  home  without  their  honor. 

The  Americans  expressed  sympathy  at  this  appeal  but  declared 
it  was  beyond  their  power  to  change  the  terms  as  understood  and 
approved  by  the  President.  They  could  only  agree  to  recommend 
such  changes  in  detail  to  the  President,  at  Washington,  who  alone 
had  the  power  to  approve. 

At  two  o'clock  General  Toral  retired  to  Santiago  to  confer  with 
General  Linares  and  returned  shortly  with  suggestions  of  further  change 
in  details.  He  proposed  an  adjournment  until  next  morning  to  con 
tinue  the  negotiations.  General  Wheeler,  who  had  taken  the  lead 
in  the  discussion  for  the  United  States,  emphatically  declined  to  wait, 
and  insisted  that  terms  must  be  settled  before  the  day  closed.  There 
upon  a  recess  was  taken  until  four  o'clock,  when  a  few  alterations  of 
verbiage  were  agreed  to,  for  the  purpose  of  softening  expression  with 
out  changing  the  meaning. 

After  each  commissioner  had  been  asked  in  turn  if  the  agreement 
was  complete  and  satisfactorily  understood,  General  Wheeler  suddenly 
requested  them  all  to  sign.  It  was  a  test  of  Spanish  nature.  The 
enemy's  commissioners  had  agreed  to  the  articles,  but  they  were  plainly 
surprised  at  the  request  to  complete  it  by  their  signatures.  There  was 
no  excuse,  however,  and,  with  much  reluctance,  they  signed  the  two 
copies,  and  the  boards  separated  to  meet  the  next  morning  at  9:30 
o'clock.  In  the  meantime  each  side  was  to  report  the  terms  to  its 
own  government. 

Saturday  morning  Toral  received  approval  of  the  terms  from  his 
superior  officer.  The  Washington  Government,  however,  would  not 
approve  the  recommendation  of  its  commissioners  to  consent  to  return 
the  arms  of  the  Spanish  troops.  Shafter  had  been  particularly  in 
structed  not  to  so  agree,  and  the  commissioners  had  been  directed  by 
Shafter  to  the  same  purport.  But  the  commissioners,  after  avowing 


216  HISTORY    OF   THE 

their  inability  to  concede  the  demand,  had  consented  to  recommend 
it  as  a  matter  of  form,  to  hasten  the  conclusion.  The  President  was 
determined  to  retain  the  Spanish  rifles  and  ammunition  and  declined 
the  recommendation. 

The  articles  of  surrender  that  were  signed  may  be  thus  summar 
ized:— 

The  first  declares  that  all  hostilities  shall  cease  pending  the  agreement  of  final 
capitulation. 

Second — That  the  capitulation  includes  all  the  Spanish  forces  and  the  surrender  of 
all  war  material  within  the  prescribed  limits. 

Third — The  transportation  of  the  troops  to  Spain  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
each  force  to  be  embarked  at  the  nearest  port. 

Fourth — That  the  Spanish  officers  shall  retain  their  side  arms  and  the  enlisted  men 
their  personal  property. 

Fifth — That  after  the  final  capitulation  the  Spanish  forces  shall  assist  in  the  removal 
of  all  obstructions  to  navigation  in  Santiago  harbor. 

Sixth — That  after  the  final  capitulation  the  commanding  officers  shall  furnish  a  com 
plete  inventory  of  all  arms  and  munitions  of  war  and  a  roster  of  all  the  soldiers  in  the 
district. 

Seventh — That  the  Spanish  General  shall  be  permitted  to  take  the  military  archives 
and  records  with  him. 

Eighth — That  all  guerillas  and  Spanish  irregulars  shall  be  permitted  to  remain  in 
Cuba  if  they  so  elect,  giving  a  parole  that  they  will  not  again  take  up  arms  against  the 
United  States  unless  properly  exchanged. 

Ninth — That  the  Spanish  forces  shall  be  permitted  to  march  out  with  all  the  honors 
of  war,  depositing  their  arms  to  be  disposed  of  by  the  United  States  in  the  future,  the 
American  commissioners  to  recommend  to  their  Government  that  the  arms  of  the  sol 
diers  be  returned  to  those  "  who  so  bravely  defended  them." 

The  territory  surrendered  was  in  extent  somewhat  more  than  a 
third  of  the  province  of  Santiago,  including  the  military  jurisdiction 
of  the  Fourth  Corps  of  the  Spanish  army.  It  did  not  embrace  the 
important  towns  of  Manzanillo  and  Holguin,  where  there  were  many 
Spanish  troops,  nor  the  6,000  men  of  General  Pando's  corps,  that  had 
left  Manzanillo  to  succor  Santiago,  but  failed  to  reach  their  desti 
nation.  The  western  boundary  of  the  territory  surrendered  begins 
at  Aserradero,  a  town  near  the  coast,  west  of  Santiago,  thence  to 
the  town  of  Palma,  a  little  east  of  north  of  Aserradero,  and  about 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR 


217 


twenty-two  miles  distant,  thence  northeast  to  Sagua  de  Tanamo,  on 
the  north  coast,  a  town  at  the  head  of  the  Surgedero,  or  anchorage 
of  that  name,  and  almost  directly  north  of  Guantanamo.  It  includes 
an  area  of  8,000  square  miles. 

The  number  of  soldiers  surrendered  as  prisoners  of  war  was  esti 
mated  to  be  about  20,000,  but  when  the  muster  rolls  were  made  up 
there  were  22,789  in  and  about  Santiago,  and  between  1,000  and 


MAP  OF  CUBA. 
That  portion  of  Cuba  surrendered  with  Santiago  is  colored  black. 

2,000  additional  troops  were  reported  to  be  scattered  through  the 
zone  of  surrender — a  total  of  about  25,000  men,  mostly  in  well-forti 
fied  places,  protected  by  all  the  resources  of  the  country,  wholly 
surrendered  to  an  attacking  army  of  22,250  men,  only  16,000  of  whom 
were  effective  when  the  surrender  occurred.  Within  three  days  the 
Spaniards  had  turned  over  7,000  Mauser  rifles  and  10,000,000  rounds 
of  ammunition. 


218  HISTORY   OF   THE 


II. 

SUNDAY  morning,  July  17,  the  eleventh  Sunday  after  Manila,  the 
second  Sunday  after  Cervera's  annihilation,  and  the  second  Sunday 
RAISING  THE  after  the  first  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  city,  the 

FLAG  OVER          United  States  troops  marched  into  Santiago  to  take  DOS- 
SANTIAGO  .  „      „ 

session:     All  Saturday  swarms  of  refugees  had  tramped 

wearily  over  the  roads  returning  to  the  city,  many  to  find  their  homes 
despoiled,  all  to  find  hunger  awaiting  them. 

It  was  shortly  before  nine  o'clock  Sunday  morning,  when,  pursuant 
to  the  program  arranged,  General  Shafter,  accompanied  by  Generals 
Wheeler,  Lawton,  Kent,  Ludlow,  and  Ames,  with  eighty  other  officers, 
marched  out  of  the  American  lines  down  the  hill  to  the  tree  under 
which  the  negotiations  for  surrender  had  been  conducted.  The  mo 
ment  they  halted  under  the  tree  every  cannon  on  the  hillsides,  within 
the  city,  at  Siboney,  and  at  Aguadores,  boomed  the  national  salute  of 
twenty-one  guns  that  filled  the  echoing  valleys  with  the  magnificent 
thunder  of  victory  and  called  60,000  people  to  attention. 

From  one  end  to  the  other  of  the  eight  miles  of  American  in- 
trenchments,  our  troops,  standing  on  the  sand  bags,  waved  their  hats 
aloft  and  raised  cheer  upon  cheer  of  rejoicing. 

A  troop  of  colored  cavalry  and  the  Twenty-fifth  Colored  Infantry 
immediately  started  forward  to  join  General  Shafter  and  his  officers. 

A  few  moments  later  General  Toral,  in  resplendent  uniform,  at  the 
head  of  two  hundred  of  his  officers  in  full-dress  uniform,  left  the  gate 
of  the  city  and  marched  to  the  tree,  preceded  by  trumpeters.  There 
was  a  salute  of  bugles  on  both  sides,  after  which  General  Shafter  and 
General  Toral  saluted  each  other  formally  and  the  officers  on  both 
sides  exchanged  courtesies  and  introductions. 

When  these  ceremonies  were  concluded,  the  two  commanding 
Generals  met  in  front  of  the  lines.  General  Toral  spoke  in  Spanish, 
his  voice  trembling  with  feeling  as  he  concluded :  — 

"General,"  said  he,  "1  am  forced  by  my  fate  to  surrender  to  the 
possession  of  the  American  army  and  to  you  the  city  and  the  strong- 


THE  WERNER  COMP 


GENERAL  TORAL'S  SURRENDER  OF  SAN" 


TO  GENERAL  SMARTER  ON  JULY  13th,  1898. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  219 

holds  of  Santiago.  1  am  now  ready  to  do  so  formally  and  honorably  as 
agreed." 

As  he  finished  the  Spanish  officers  brought  their  swords  to  "  present 
arms." 

•'  I  receive  the  city,"  replied  General  Shafter,  briefly  but  courteously, 
"in  the  name  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America! " 

The  two  Generals  saluted,  after  which  General  Toral  turned  and, 
addressing  an  order  to  his  officers,  they  wheeled  about  and,  with  swords 
still  presented,  marched  toward  the  city  followed  by  the  American 
officers  and  the  troop  of  cavalry.  As  the  procession  entered  the  city, 
tremendous  cheers  broke  out  again  from  along  the  American  lines. 

Inside  the  walls  Spanish  troops  met  the  official  body  and  escorted 
it  to  the  Plaza  de  Armas,  in  front  of  the  Governor's  palace,  opposite 
which  stands  the  Cathedral.  The  square  was  filled  with  people.  The 
soldiers  drew  up  in  line  and  General  Toral  was  courteously  authorized 
to  salute  his  flag.  This  was  done  amid  silence  by  firing  twenty-one 
guns,  after  which  the  Spanish  flag  was  hauled  down  from  the  staff  over 
the  portico,  upon  the  front  of  which  stood  in  black  letters,  formed 
of  gas-pipe  for  illumination  at  night,  the  words:  — 

"  VIVA    DON    ALFONSO    XIII." 

General  Shafter  then  formally  presented  to  General  Toral  the  sword 
and  spurs  of  General  Vara  del  Rey,  who  had  been  killed  at  Kl  Caney. 
His  body  had  been  identified  and  given  respectful  burial  by  the  United 
States  troops.  General  Shafter  had  ordered  his  sword  and  spurs 
preserved  to  be  returned  to  General  del  Key's  family.  He  placed  them 
in  General  Total's  hands  for  that  purpose.  This  considerate  act  made 
a  deep  impression  upon  the  emotional  Spaniards. 

The  Spanish  troops  were  marched  to  the  arsenal  and  surrendered 
their  arms,  after  which,  accompanied  by  the  Americans,  they  were 
marched  out,  7,600  strong,  a  weary,  haggard,  disheartened  body,  to  a 
camp  provided  for  them  near  the  city. 

The  Americans  returned  to  Santiago  at  once,  accompanied  by  the 
Ninth  Infantry  Regulars,  who  were  drawn  up  in  the  Plaza. 


220  HISTORY    OF    THE 

The  American  officers  were  then  invited  to  the  palace,  where  they 
were  introduced  to  all  the  civil  officials,  the  Governor,  the  Mayor,  the 
Intendant  of  Police,  and  others.  The  Archbishop  of  Santiago,  Fray 
Jose  de  Sturrs  de  Isainz  y  Crespo,  the  highest  ecclesiastical  dignitary 
of  Cuba,  accompanied  by  his  chief  prelates,  came  in  a  body  and  paid 
their  respects  to  the  conquerors.  Luncheon  was  served  and  a  short  rest 
taken. 

A  few  minutes  before  twelve  o'clock,  the  Americans  and  their 
entertainers  left  the  palace  and  walked  into  the  Plaza.  Lieutenant 
Miley  had  ascended  to  the  roof  of  the  palace  with  a  great  new  silken 
flag  of  the  United  States.  Just  as  the  clock  was  striking  twelve, 
Lieutenant  Miley,  Lieutenant  Joseph  Wheeler,  Jr.,  and  Captain  McKit- 
trick  bent  the  flag  to  the  halyards,  ran  it  to  the  top  of  the'  staff  and 
broke  its  glorious  folds  wide  open  upon  a  strong  southwestern  breeze. 

Every  building  facing  the  Plaza  was  crowded  with  persons  and  the 
little  park  itself  was  filled  to  suffocation  with  eager  and  curious  hu 
manity.  As  the  flag  unrolled  its  stars  and  stripes  upon  the  breeze  all 
heads  were  uncovered,  and  the  soldiers  presented  arms.  As  the  last 
stroke  of  the  hour  tolled  out,  the  Ninth  Regimental  Band  played 
"  The  Star  Spangled  Banner,"  which  was  followed  by  cheers  from  the 
soldiers.  They  were  joined  by  more  than  half  of  the  people,  who  cried 
"Viva  los  Americanos."  The  crowd  was  composed  of  miserable  and 
half-starved  creatures  whose  appearance  told  plainly  the  sufferings 
they  had  undergone  since  the  siege  began.  They  all  seemed  grateful 
that  the  Americans  were  in  possession  of  the  city,  evidently  believing 
the  days  of  hunger  and  misery  were  over. 

The  Spanish  officers  and  members  of  the  San  Carlos  Club,  who  had 
been  applauding  "The  Star  Spangled  Banner,"  and  demanding  its 
repetition  by  the  orchestra  at  the  clubhouse,  were  much  astonished 
to  hear  our  band  playing  it  as  the  National  Hymn  of  the  United 
States.  They  looked  at  each  other  guiltily,  then  smiled,  and  finally 
told  the  story  with  laughter. 

As  the  American  flag  floated  over  the  city,  Captain  Capron's  bat 
tery,  at  the  right  center  of  the  American  line,  fired  a  national  salute. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  ._>._,j 

And  as  the  guns  thundered,  all  the  20,000  men,  from  the  Third  Regi 
ment  on  the  left  of  the  line,  to  the  Eighth  Regiment  far  off  on  El  Cobre 
road  on  the  right,  shouted,  cheered,  and  threw  their  hats  into  the  air. 
Following  the  salvos  of  cheering,  one  got  an  idea  of  how  completely 
Santiago  and  the  Spanish  army  were  hemmed  in.  Our  soldiers  stood 
on  the  crest  of  the  trenches,  which  they  had  won  at  the  cost  of  so 
many  lives,  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach. 

To  these  ceremonies  succeeded  fraternization  over  the  trenches 
between  men  of  the  opposing  lines.  Our  soldiers  had  been  forbidden 
to  cross  trenches  or  to  enter  the  city,  for  fear  of  infection,  but  the 
Spaniards  wrent  forward  from  their  near  camp  to  the  edge  of  the 
American  trenches,  shook  hands  with  their  captors,  expressing  admira 
tion  and  respect  for  those  with  whom  they  had  so  desperately  fought.* 
It  was  a  curious  spectacle.  Each  Spaniard  had  a  bottle  of  rum  or 
wine  in  his  haversack,  and  these  were  offered  to  the  Americans  to 
drink  "good  health."  In  return  our  soldiers  gave  their  recent  antag 
onists  "hardtack,"  which  was  received  with  gladness. 


*An  incident  that  stands  alone  in  the  history  of  wars,  occurred  upon  the  sailing  of  the 
Spanish   prisoners  for  their  homes  in   Spain.     A  Spanish  private   soldier,  Pedro   Lopez   de 
Castillo,  authorized  by  a  plebiscite  taken  of  his  11,000  fellow-prisoners,  sent  through  his 
officers  the  following  address  to  the  American  army  from  the  vanquished  side: — 
Major-General  Shaffer,  Commanding  the  American  Army  in  Cuba:  — 

SIR:  The  Spanish  soldiers  who  capitulated  in  this  place  on  the  Ifith  of  July  last, 
recognizing  your  high  and  just  position,  pray  that  through  you  all  the  courageous 
and  noble  soldiers  under  your  command  may  receive  our  good  wishes  and  fare 
well,  which  we  send  them  on  embarking  for  our  beloved  Spain.  For  this  favor,  which  we 
have  no  doubt  you  will  grant,  you  will  gain  the  everlasting  gratitude  and  consideration 
of  11,000  Spanish  soldiers,  who  are  your  most  humble  servants. 

[Signed.]     PEDRO  LOPEZ  DE  CACTILLO, 

Private  of  Infantry. 

The  letter  addressed  to  the  soldiers  of  the  American  army  was  as  follows: — 

SOLDIERS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  ARMY:— We  would  not  be  fulfilling  our  duty  as  well-born 
men,  in  whose  breasts  there  live  gratitude  and  courtesy,  should  we  embark  for  our  beloved 
Spain  without  sending  to  you  our  most  cordial  and  sincere  good  wishes  and  farewell. 
We  fought  you  with  ardor,  and  with  all  our  strength,  endeavoring  to  gain  the  victory, 
but  without  the  slightest  rancor  or  hate  toward  the  American  nation.  We  have  been 
vanquished  by  you  (so  our  Generals  and  chiefs  judged  in  signing  the  capitulation),  but 
our  surrender  and  the  bloody  battles  preceding  it  have  left  in  our  souls  no  place  for  re 
sentment  against  the  men  who  fought  us  nobly  and  valiantly.  You  fought  and  acted  in 
compliance  with  the  same  call  of  duty  as  we,  for  we  all  but  represent  the  power  of  our 


222  HISTORY   OF   THE 

That  afternoon  90,000  pounds  of  rations  were  served  to  the  Span 
ish  prisoners  from  our  commissariat.  These  soldiers  cared  nothing 
for  the  loss  of  Cuba,  and  were  overjoyed  at  the  thought  of  returning 
home.  They  had  received  no  pay  for  nearly  a  year,  had  been  poorly 
fed,  and  were  discouraged. 

Meanwhile,  Lieutenant  Marble  of  the  navy,  in  command  of  steam 
launches,  had  entered  the  harbor  in  the  morning,  by  permission  of 
Admiral  Sampson.  The  Spanish  gunboat  Alvarado,  was  surrendered  to 
him,  and  he  took  possession  of  other  vessels  in  the  harbor  that  had 
been  used  for  troop  ships.  Spanish  officers  accompanied  him  to  ex 
plode  or  remove  the  submarine  mines  in  the  bay,  a  task  accom 
plished  in  time  to  permit  the  Red  Cross  relief  boat,  State  of  Texas, 
to  enter  at  5  P.  M. 

From  the  Spanish  officers  was  heard  again  almost  incredible  state 
ments  of  the  dense  ignorance  in  which  the  home  government  had 
kept  its  most  trusted  officers  of  the  events  of  the  war.  Admiral  Cer- 
vera  and  his  captains  had  not  learned  of  the  annihilation  of  Montejo's 


respective  States.  You  fought  us  as  men,  face  to  face,  and  with  great  courage,  as  before 
stated,  a  quality  which  we  had  not  met  during  the  three  years  we  have  carried  on  this  war 
against  a  people  without  morals,  without  conscience,  and  of  doubtful  origin,  who  could 
not  confront  the  enemy,  but  hidden,  shot  their  noble  victims  from  ambush,  and  then  im 
mediately  fled.  This  was  the  kind  of  warfare  we  had  to  sustain  in  this  unfortunate  land. 
You  have  complied  exactly  with  all  the  laws  and  usages  of  war  as  recognized  by  the  armies  of 
the  most  civilized  nations  of  the  world,  have  given  honorable  burial  to  the  dead  of  the  van 
quished,  have  cured  their  wounded  with  great  humanity,  have  respected  and  cared  for 
your  prisoners  and  their  comfort,  and,  lastly,  to  us,  whose  condition  was  terrible,  you 
have  given  freely  of  food,  of  your  stock  of  medicines,  and  you  have  honored  us  with  dis 
tinguished  courtesy,  for  after  the  fighting  the  two  armies  mingled  with  the  utmost  harmony. 
With  this  high  sentiment  of  appreciation  from  us  all,  there  remains  but  to  express  our  fare 
well,  and  with  the  greatest  sincerity  we  wish  you  all  happiness  and  health  in  this  land  which 
will  no  longer  belong  to  our  dear  Spain,  but  will  be  yours,  who  have  conquered  it  by  force 
and  watered  it  with  your  blood,  as  your  conscience  called  for,  under  the  demand  of  civiliza 
tion  and  humanity,  but  the  descendants  of  the  Congo  and  of  Guinea,  mingled  with  the  blood 
of  unscrupulous  Spaniards  and  of  traitors  and  adventurers,  these  people  are  not  able  to  exer 
cise  or  enjoy  their  liberty,  for  they  will  find  it  a  burden  to  comply  with  the  laws  which  govern 
civilized  communities. 

From  11,000  Spanish  soldiers. 

[Signed.]     PEDRO  LOPEZ  DE  CASTILLO, 

Soldier  of  Infantry. 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  August  21,  1898. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  •_>•_>:; 

fleet  at  Manila  and  the  capture  of  Cavite  until  they  became  prisoners 
on  our  ships.  In  Santiago  the  Spanish  officers  and  troops  were  offi 
cially  informed  from  Madrid  that  Admiral  Montejo  had  won  a  glo 
rious  victory  over  Dewey.  No  other  information  had  been  permitted 
to  reach  their  army  and  navy.  They  admitted  that  if  they  had  known 
the  facts  they  would  not  have  fought.  At  Santiago  they  had  been 
informed  that  Camara's  fleet  was  coming  to  Cervera's  aid,  as  at  Ma 
nila  Augusti  had  been  informed  that  Cervera  had  destroyed  Samp 
son's  fleet,  was  ravaging  the  American  coasts,  and  that  Camara  was 
hastening  to  the  relief  of  Manila.  For  three  months  the  edifice  of 
colonial  resistance  had  been  supported  by  a  scaffolding  of  ingenious 
and  absolute  falsehood.* 

Upon  examining  the  harbor  forts,  Morro,  Socapa,  and  Estrella,  they 
were  found  to  be  knocked  to  pieces  and  of  no  strength.  Modern  guns 
from  the  Reina  Mercedes,  some  old  eighteenth-century  cannon,  rapid-fire, 
and  (Jatlings  were  half  in  place,  half  knocked  over.  The  harbor  en 
trance  could  have  been  passed  by  our  ships,  but  the  mines  were  the 
defenses  that  made  the  task  dangerous. 

In  the  city  our  Generals  were  astonished  at  the  ingenuity  of  the 
military  fortifications  and  barricades  erected  to  resist  assault.  General 
Wheeler  after  examining  them  admitted  that  the  army  could  have 
forced  its  way  through,  but  that  it  would  have  cost  great  loss  of  life 
to  the  Americans. 


•General  Shafter,  writing  under  date  of  August  17,  of  the  expedition  of  Major  Miley 
to  Baracor  and  Sagua  de  Tonamo  to  receive  the  surrender  of  7,756  officers  and  men,  says  :  — 

"These  troops  knew  nothing  whatever  of  the  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet,  the  fall  of 
Santiago,  or  any  later  events.  They  accepted  the  situation,  however,  and  appeared  to  be 
glad  at  the  opportunity  of  getting  home.  Major  Miley  says  that  on  the  door  of  the  com 
manding  officer  was  posted  a  bulletin  purporting  to  be  a  telegram  from  the  naval  commander 
at  Manila,  informing  Sagasta  of  his  great  victory  over  Dewey  at  Manila,  and  Sagasta's  thanks 
to  him  for  the  same." 


224  HISTORY   OF   THE 


ill. 

THE  city  was  in  a  horrible  condition  of  uncleanliness  and  disorder. 
Santiago  is  three  centuries  old ;  it  lies  upon  a  hillside,  sloping  to  the 
^ay-  Its  topography  invites  perfect  sewerage  and  sani- 
TION  OF  TEOOPS  tation  at  slight  cost.  But  the  Spanish  have  never 
paid  attention  to  sanitation.  The  narrow  streets,  with 
broken  curbings  and  unmasked  gutterage,  are  cleaned  only  by  the  co 
pious  rains.  At  night  all  sorts  of  garbage  and  refuse  are  thrown  into 
them  from  dwellings,  to  decay  or  to  be  carried  off  by  rains  —  it  matters 
not  which.  Even  dead  animals  lie  for  days,  poisoning  the  air  with 
stenches.  The  soil  of  the  yards  and  gardens  is  saturated  with  the 
refuse  of  centuries,  breeding  fevers.  It  had  been  determined  in  ad 
vance  not  to  allow  the  American  army  to  enter,  except  in  sufficient 
force  to  support  the  civil  authorities  pending  final  arrangements.  The 
main  army  was  ordered  back  to  the  hilltops  and  mountains  at  a 
distance,  and  only  necessary  communication  with  the  city  was 
permitted. 

Upon  taking  possession  General  Shafter  committed  the  civil  gov 
ernment  to  the  hands  of  the  autonomist  officials  already  in  office, 
who  were  to  perform  their  duties  under  the  supervision  of  the  United 
States  military  governor  designated  by  him.  The  first  military  gover 
nor  appointed  was  General  Chambers  McKibbin,  who  was  succeeded 
in  a  few  days  by  Brigadier-General  Leonard  Wood  of  the  Rough  Riders, 
who  had  been  promoted  from  Colonel  after  Las  Guasimas,  his  place 
as  Colonel  having  been  filled  by  the  promotion  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Roosevelt.  General  Wood's  selection  was  due  to  his  fine  practical 
knowledge  of  medical  and  sanitary  subjects,  very  important  for  the 
time,  and  also  for  his  executive  ability. 

There  were  1,800  patients  in  the  public  hospitals  and  every  house 
contained  its  sick.  On  top  of  this,  hunger  and  destitution.  There 
were  40,000  persons  for  the  Red  Cross  Society  to  supply  with  food. 
The  surrender  destroyed  at  once  the  value  of  Cuban  and  Spanish 
money.  Gold  was  demanded  until  the  value  of  American  silver  and 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  225 

paper  money  was  demonstrated.  For  two  weeks  citizens  of  the  high 
est  standing  and  means  had  been  forced  to  live  upon  rice,  tough  meat, 
and  occasionally  poor  vegetables.  Horses  killed  in  battle  were  turned 
over  to  the  butchers  for  the  soldiers. 

It  was  a  dreadful  condition  to  face  both  inside  and  outside  the 
city.  The  camps  of  the  prisoners  were  sure  to  become  a  threatening 
source  of  disease  and  infection.  The  most  strenuous  efforts  of  the 
military  executive  and  the  noble  labors  of  the  Red  Cross  Society 
were  necessary  to  mitigate  the  sufferings,  which  could  not  be  fully  re 
lieved.  The  helpless  populace,  the  prisoners,  our  own  army  in  the 
mountains,  the  thousands  of  sick  and  wounded  at  Santiago,  El  Caney, 
Siboney,  and  Baiquiri,  must  be  handled  under  circumstances  difficult 
enough  to  dismay  the  stoutest  heart  and  will. 

This  was  not  all.  Business  destroyed  by  the  siege  must  be  rees 
tablished,  commerce  must  be  reopened  with  all  its  tedious  regulations 
under  the  new  attitude  of  the  province  toward  our  government.  Order 
must  be  maintained,  jealousies  soothed,  appeals  heard,  and  over  all 
must  be  held  an  iron  hand  to  establish  the  unquestioned  authority  of 
the  United  States  in  all  questions  of  public  and  private  rights. 

The  President  at  once  transmitted  by  cable  to  General  Shafter  a 
proclamation  to  be  published,  declaring  the  intentions  of  the  United 
States  towards  the  territory  under  temporary  control  of  the  United 
States.  It  guaranteed  to  the  people  security  of  their  persons  and 
property  in  all  their  private  rights  and  relations,  without  regard  to 
party,  faction,  birth  or  religion.  The  municipal  laws  already  in  force 
were  to  be  continued  until  suspended  or  superseded  by  others.  The 
courts  were  to  continue  their  functions  under  the  judges  occupying 
their  seats  if  they  accepted  the  supremacy  of  the  United  States. 
Such  judges  would  administer  justice  under  the  law  of  land  as  be 
tween  man  and  man,  under  the  supervision  of  the  United  States  Mili 
tary  Governor,  who  was  empowered  to  establish  new  courts  of  com 
mon  justice  if  the  sitting  judges  failed  to  recognize  the  new  authority. 
All  public  property,  railways,  telegraphs,  schools,  churches,  homes  of 
art  and  science,  monuments  and  archives  were  to  be  guarded  and 

15 


226  HISTORY   OF    THE 

protected  ;  none  must  be  destroyed  except  as  an  urgent  military  ne 
cessity.  Private  property  was  to  be  carefully  protected  in  every  case 
and,  if  its  seizure  should  prove  necessary  for  military  purposes,  must  be 
paid  for  in  cash  at  a  fair  valuation.  The  revenues  payable  formerly 
to  Spain  were  to  be  collected  for  the  United  States.  All  ports  in  the 
surrendered  territory  were  to  be  opened  free  to  the  commerce  of 
neutral  nations  upon  the  payment  of  duties  in  force  at  the  time  of 
importation.* 


*The  President's  proclamation  is  a  historical  paper  of  great  interest.  It  is  the  first 
State  paper  ever  issued  from  this  government  containing  authorization  and  instruction 
for  the  government  of  captured  foreign  territory,  and  also  a  proclamation  to  the  people 
of  the  territory  of  the  intentions  of  the  government  regarding  them  and  their  interests. 
The  full  text  of  the  document  is  as  follows : — 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  / 
WASHINGTON,  July  18,  1898.     f 
General  Shaffer,  Santiago,  Cuba:  — 

The  following  is  sent  to  you  for  your  information  and  guidance.  It  will  be  published 
in  such  manner  in  both  English  and  Spanish  as  will  give  it  the  widest  circulation  in  the 
territory  under  your  control: — 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,        ) 
WASHINGTON,  July  18,  1898.  \ 
To  the  Secretary  of  War  :  — 

SIR  :  The  capitulation  of  the  Spanish  forces  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  in  the  eastern 
part  of  the  province  of  Santiago,  and  the  occupation  of  the  territory  by  the  forces  of  the 
United  States,  render  it  necessary  to  instruct  the  military  commander  of  the  United  States 
as  to  the  conduct  which  he  is  to  observe  during  the  military  occupation. 

The  first  effect  of  the  military  occupation  of  the  enemy's  territory  is  the  severance  of 
the  former  political  relations  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  establishment  of  a  new  political 
power.  Under  this  changed  condition  of  things  the  inhabitants,  so  long  as  they  perform 
their  duties,  are  entitled  to  security  in  their  persons  and  property,  and  in  all  their  private 
rights  and  relations.  It  is  my  desire  that  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  should  be  acquainted 
with  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  to  discharge  to  the  fullest  extent  its  obligations  in 
this  regard.  It  will,  therefore,  be  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  army  of  occupation 
to  announce  and  proclaim  in  the  most  public  manner  that  we  come  not  to  make  wrar 
upon  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba,  nor  upon  any  party  or  faction  among  them,  but  to  protect 
them  in  their  homes,  in  their  employments,  and  in  their  personal  and  religious  rights. 
All  persons  who,  either  by  active  aid  or  by  honest  submission,  cooperate  with  the  United 
States  in  its  efforts  to  give  effect  to  this  beneficent  purpose  will  receive  the. reward  of  its 
support  and  protection.  Our  occupation  should  be  as  free  from  severity  as  possible. 

Though  the  powers  of  the  military  occupant  are  absolute  and  supreme,  and  imme 
diately  operate  upon  the  political  condition  of  the  inhabitants,  the  municipal  lawrs  of  the 
conquered  territory,  such  as  affect  private  rights  of  person  and  property,  and  provide  for 
the  punishment  of  crime,  are  considered  as  continuing  in  force,  so  far  as  they  are  compat 
ible  with  the  new  order  of  things,  until  they  are  suspended  or  superseded  by  the  occupying 
belligerents,  and  in  practice  they  are  not  usually  abrogated,  but  are  allowed  to  remain  in 
force,  and  to  be  administered  by  the  ordinary  tribunals,  substantially  as  they  were  before 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  227 

The  conditions  prevailing  in  and  around  Santiago  were  crushing 
in  their  immediate  demands.  The  prevalence  of  rains,  the  precipitate 
advance  of  the  army  from  the  coast,  the  length  of  the  lines,  and  their 
thinness,  had  disorganized  and  demoralized  the  supply  trains,  and  in 


the  occupation.  This  tMilightened  practice  is,  so  far  as  possible,  to  be  adhered  to  on  the 
present  occasion. 

The  judges  and  the  other  officials  connected  with  the  administration  of  justice  may,  if  they 
accept  the  supremacy  of  the  United  States,  continue  to  administer  the  ordinary  law  of  the 
land,  as  between  man  and  man,  under  the  supervision  of  the  American  Commander-in-Chief. 

The  native  constabulary  will,  so  far  as  may  be  practicable, be  preserved.  The  freedom 
of  the  people  to  pursue  their  accustomed  occupations  will  be  abridged  only  when  it  is 
necessary  to  do  so. 

While  the  rule  of  conduct  of  the  American  Commander-in-Chief  will  be  such  as  has 
just  been  defined,  it  will  be  his  duty  to  adopt  measures  of  a  different  kind,  if,  unfortunately, 
the  course  of  the  people  should  render  such  measures  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of 
law  and  order.  He  will  then  possess  the  power  to  replace  or  expel  the  native  officials  in 
part  or  altogether,  to  substitute  new  courts  of  his  own  constitution  for  those  that  now 
exist,  or  to  create  such  new  or  supplementary  tribunals  as  may  be  necessary.  In  the  ex 
ercise  of  these  high  powers  the  commander  must  be  guided  by  his  judgment  and  his 
experience,  and  a  high  sense  of  justice. 

One  of  the  most  important  and  most  practical  problems  with  which  it  will  be  neces 
sary  to  deal  is  that  of  the  treatment  of  property  and  the  collection  and  administration  of 
the  revenues.  It  is  conceded  that  all  public  funds  and  securities  belonging  to  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  country  in  its  own  right,  and  all  arms  and  supplies  and  other  movable 
property  of  such  government  may  be  seized  by  the  military  occupant  and  converted  to 
his  own  use.  The  real  property  of  the  State  he  may  hold  and  administer,  at  the  same 
time  enjoying  the  revenues  thereof,  but  he  is  not  to  destroy  it  save  in  the  case  of  military 
necessity. 

All  public  means  of  transportation,  such  as  telegraph  lines,  cables,  railways,  and  boats 
belonging  to  the  State  may  be  appropriated  to  his  use,  but,  unless  in  case  of  military 
necessity,  they  are  not  to  be  destroyed.  All  churches  and  buildings  devoted  to  religious 
worship  and  to  the  arts  and  sciences,  all  schoolhouses,  are,  so  far  as  possible,  to  be  pro 
tected,  and  all  destruction  or  intentional  defacement  of  such  places,  of  historical  monuments 
or  archives,  or  of  works  of  science  or  art  is  prohibited,  save  when  required  by  urgent 
military  necessity. 

Private  property,  whether  belonging  to  individuals  or  corporations,  is  to  be  respected, 
and  can  be  confiscated  only  as  hereafter  indicated.  Means  of  transportation,  such  as  tel 
egraph  lines  and  cables,  railways  and  boats  may,  although  they  belong  to  private  individ 
uals  or  corporations,  be  seized  by  the  military  occupant,  but  unless  destroyed  under 
military  necessity  are  not  to  be  retained. 

While  it  is  held  to  be  the  right  of  the  conqueror  to  levy  contributions  upon  the 
enemy  in  their  seaports,  towns  or  provinces  which  may  be  in  his  military  possession  by 
conquest,  and  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  war,  this  right  is  to  be 
exercised  within  such  limitations  that  it  may  not  savor  of  confiscation. 

As  the  result  of  military  occupation  the  taxes  and  duties  payable  by  the  inhabitants 
to  the  former  government  become  payable  to  the  military  occupant,  unless  he  sees  fit  to 


228  HISTORY    OF   THE 

the  immensity  of  casualties,  sickness,  and  suffering  the  medical  and 
surgical  corps,  though  it  labored  with  unsparing  devotion,  was  wholly 
inadequate  to  the  task  confronting  it. 

The  army  was  cheered  up  by  immediate  acknowledgment  of  its 
great  triumph.  After  the  flag  had  been  raised  in  Santiago  at  noon, 
General  Shafter  received  and  had  read  to  the  troops  present  the  follow 
ing  telegram  from  President  McKinley:  — 

"The  President  of  the  United  States  sends  to  you  and  your  brave  army  the  pro 
found  thanks  of  the  American  people  for  the  brilliant  achievements  at  Santiago,  result 
ing  in  the  surrender  of  the  city  and  all  of  the  Spanish  troops  and  territory  under 
General  Toral. 

"  Your  splendid  command  has  endured  not  only  the  hardships  and  sacrifices  inci 
dent  to  campaign  and  battle,  but  in  stress  of  heat  and  weather  has  triumphed  over 
obstacles  which  would  have  overcome  men  less  brave  and  determined.  One  and  all 
have  displayed  the  most  conspicuous  gallantry  and  earned  the  gratitude  of  the  nation. 

"  The  hearts  of  the  people  turn  with  tender  sympathy  to  the  sick  and  wounded. 
May  the  Father  of  Mercies  protect  and  comfort  them." 

The  message  was  transmitted  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  sent 
with  it  a  telegram  of  congratulation. 

To  the  President  General  Shafter  replied:  — 

"  I  thank  you  and  my  army  thanks  you  for  your  congratulatory  telegram  of  to-day. 
I  am  proud  to  say  every  one  in  it  performed  his  duty  gallantly.  Your  message  will  be 
read  to  every  regiment  in  the  army  at  noon  to-morrow." 

Major-General  William  R.  Shafter  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  who 
was  in  command  of  the  forces  at  Santiago,  was  born  in  1835  on  a  farm 


substitute  for  them  other  rates  or  modes  of  contribution  to  the  expenses  of  the  govern 
ment.  The  moneys  so  collected  are  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  expenses  of 
government  under  the  military  occupation,  such  as  the  salaries  of  judges  and  the  police, 
and  for  the  payment  of  the  expenses  of  the  army. 

Private  property  taken  for  the  use  of  the  army  is  to  be  paid  for  when  possible  in  cash 
at  a  fair  valuation,  and  when  payment  in  cash  is  not  possible  receipts  are  to  be  given. 

All  ports  and  places  in  Cuba  which  may  be  in  the  actual  possession  of  our  land  and 
naval  forces  will  be  open  to  the  commerce  of  all  neutral  nations,  as  well  as  our  own,  in 
articles  not  contraband  of  war,  upon  payment  of  the  prescribed  rates  of  duty  which  may 
be  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  importation. 

WILLIAM  McKiNLEY. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  22'.) 

near  Galesburg,  Michigan.  He  was,  therefore,  sixty-three  years  old 
when,  at  the  head  of  the  army  of  invincibles,  he  invaded  Cuba.  He 
weighed  three  hundred  pounds  when  he  set  out  and  lost  fifty  pounds 
during  the  campaign  of  thirty  days.  General  Shafter's  history  is 
characteristic  of  American  life  and  opportunity.  He  was  reared  as 
a  plain  fanner's  boy,  doing  hard  work  in  the  field  and  getting  such 
schooling  as  he  could  obtain  between  crops  and  through  the  hard 
winters.  His  youth  was  one  of  plain  living,  hard  work,  modest  ambi 
tion.  When  he  was  grown  he  became  teacher  of  the  county  school, 
and  there  Lincoln's  first  call  for  volunteers  found  him  in  1860,  being 
then  twenty-five  years  old. 

He  quitted  his  occupations  and  ambitions,  went  into  town,  raised 
a  company  of  volunteers  for  the  Seventh  Michigan  Regiment,  and  was 
commissioned  First-Lieutenant.  His  record  in  the  Civil  War  was  a  fine 
one.  He  was  brevetted  Brigadier-General,  for  "  most  distinguished  gal 
lantry  in  action  at  Malvern  Hill,  Virginia,  August  6,  1862,  while  serving 
as  First-Lieutenant,  Company  I,  Seventh  Michigan  Infantry,  in  com 
mand  of  prisoners,  voluntarily  taking  an  active  part  in  that  battle  and 
remaining  on  the  field,  although  wounded,  until  the  close  of  the  engage 
ment."  At  Fair  Oaks,  before,  he  had  been  brevetted  Colonel  for  gallant 
conduct.  In  1864,  he  organized  the  Sixteenth  Regiment  of  colored 
troops  and  in  the  battle  of  Nashville  led  them  with  marked  success. 
At  Fair  Oaks,  General  Shafter  was  badly  wounded,  but  he  could  not 
be  persuaded  to  leave  the  field  until  the  battle  was  over.  He  then 
\vent  back  to  the  hospital  tent  for  treatment.  Shortly  after  the  battle 
he  was  promoted  to  be  Major  of  the  Nineteenth  Michigan  Regiment, 
and  in  a  few  months  he  was  made  Lieutenant-Colonel.  In  1866,  he  was 
mustered  out  of  the  volunteer  service,  and  then  began  a  struggle  to 
determine  what  he  should  do.  He  had  become  a  thorough,  well- 
disciplined  soldier,  and  dreaded  farm  life.  After  long  consideration 
he  entered  the  regular  army.  He  was  appointed  Lieutenant-Colonel 
of  the  Forty-first  United  States  Infantry.  After  the  consolidation  of 
regiments  in  1879,  he  was  promoted  to  be  Colonel  of  the  First  United 
States  Infantry.  He  obtained  his  star  as  Brigadier-General  in  1897. 


230  HISTORY   OF   THE 

With  the  development  of  plans  for  the  invasion  of  Cuba  the  President 
and  Secretary  of  War  began  to  seek  for  suitable  leaders.  Prominent 
among  them  was  General  Shafter.  President  McKinley  made  him 
a  Major-General,  and  he  was  assigned  to  command  the  troops  in  the 
Santiago  campaign. 

General  Shafter's  thirty  years  of  service  on  the  frontier  distin 
guished  him  as  a  splendid  soldier,  an  aggressive  and  daring  fighter 
of  Indians,  and  a  popular  officer  and  gentleman.  He  was  a  firm  but 
practical  disciplinarian,  caring  little  for  the  niceties  of  form  but  de 
manding  faithful  performance  of  the  spirit  of  discipline.  He  was 
full  of  geniality  and  humor  and  subject  to  quick  changes  of  temper. 
But  he  was  just  to  his  men,  who  stood  in  awe  of  him  and  who  loved 
to  follow  him  in  danger,  where  he  was  at  his  best.  Personally  a 
man  of  conspicuous  bravery,  he  was  very  active  and  liked  hard  work. 
His  great  bulk  was  never  in  his  way  until  the  terrible  climate  about 
Santiago  struck  him  down.  But  illness  did  not  make  him  cease  his 
purpose  with  the  army.  There  is  no  successful  general  who  can  escape 
criticism,  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  obstacles  to  be  overcome 
at  Santiago  were  so  enormous  that,  while  they  will  increase  the  criti 
cism,  they  will  increase  in  a  corresponding  degree  his  distinguished 
success  in  the  campaign.  It  was  characteristic  of  the  man,  blunt, 
unaffected,  violent  in  language,  brusque  in  manner  at  times,  that  he 
wrote  this  in  a  letter  home  from  the  front  at  Santiago:  "It  is  to  the 
gallant  soldiers  who  uncomplainingly  bore  every  privation  that  the 
country  is  indebted  for  its  victory." 

Major -General  Joseph  Wheeler,  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  coopera 
ting  with  General  Shafter,  second  in  command,,  was  a  distinguished 
leader  of  cavalry  in  the  Confederate  army  during  the  Civil  War. 
He  was  born  in  Alabama  in  1836  and  was,  therefore,  a  year  younger 
than  Shafter.  He  weighed  nearly  two  hundred  pounds  less.  He 
was  admitted  to  West  Point  Academy  in  1854,  when  eighteen  years 
old,  and  graduated  to  enter  the  regular  army  as  Second-Lieutenant 
in  a  regiment  of  mounted  riflemen  at  Fort  Fillmore,  on  the  Rio 
Grande. 


GENERAL  JOSEPH   WHEELER 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  281 

He  resigned  his  commission  April  22,  1861,  to  enter  the  service  of 
the  Confederacy.  He  was  attached  to  General  L.  P.  Walker's  staff 
with  the  rank  of  Colonel;  but  after  a  short  service  on  the  staff,  he 
went  back  to  Alabama  and  raised  a  regiment.  When  it  was  pro 
posed  to  make  him  a  Brigadier-General  in  the  Confederate  army,  ob 
jection  was  offered  on  account  of  his  youth,  but  the  objection  was 
overcome,  and  the  wisdom  of  the  appointment  was  justified  by  his 
results. 

He  became  a  daring  and  skillful  commander  of  cavalry,  dividing 
with  General  Forrest  the  honors  of  that  arm  of  the  service  on  his  side. 

Since  his  disabilities  were  removed  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War, 
General  Wheeler  has  been  continuously  in  Congress  from  the  Eighth 
Alabama  district.  He  left  his  seat  to  accept  a  commission  as  Major- 
General  of  Cavalry  in  the  war  with  Spain.  In  his  absence  the  Gov 
ernor  of  Alabama,  acting  upon  the  rule  prohibiting  any  member  of 
Congress  from  holding  employment  under  the  government,  declared 
his  seat  vacant,  and  ordered  an  election  to  be  held  to  till  the  vacancy. 
General  Wheeler's  constituents  met  in  convention  and  promptly 
nominated  him  to  fill  the  vacancy  by  unanimous  action. 

He  has  been  an  interesting,  active,  and  respected  Congressman. 
He  is  but  five  feet  two  inches  tall  and  weighs  one  hundred  and  ten 
pounds.  His  nervous  vitality  and  physical  restlessness  made  him  a 
marked  personage.  One  of  the  characteristic  stories  of  this  peculiarity 
is  told  of  the  Honorable  Thomas  B.  Reed,  then  Speaker  of  the  House, 
who  cherished  high  respect  for  General  Wheeler's  unswerving  integ 
rity  of  character  and  firmness  of  purpose.  After  the  death  of  an  old 
member  of  the  House,  a  group  was  discussing  those  left  alive.  General 
\Vheeler  was  present,  an  old  member,  and  one  of  the  group  observing 
him,  remarked,  ''  Well,  we  have  General  Wheeler  left."  "  Yes,"  re 
marked  the  Speaker  quickly,  "the  Almighty  has  never  been  able  to 
find  the  General  long  enough  in  one  place  to  lay  His  finger  upon 
him."  Nobody  enjoyed  the  epigrammatic  comment  more  than  the 
subject  of  it.  He  was  one  of  the  strongest  men  of  the  Ways  and 
Means  Committee.  When  asked  by  Mr.  Dingley  if  he  would  like  to 


232  HISTORY    OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

go  to  Manila  as  Military  Governor,  he  replied  that  he  wanted  to  go 
to  Cuba,  where  he  could  more  readily  help  to  bring  things  to  a  close. 
He  had  been  a  student  of  the  operations  of  the  Cuban  insurgents. 
At  sixty-two  General  Wheeler  displayed  at  Santiago  the  same  indom 
itable  spirit  that  distinguished  him  thirty-three  years  ago.  He  left 
his  sick  bed  and  went  on  horseback  to  the  front  of  the  line  all  day 
at  San  Juan,  and,  though  burning  with  fever  after  twelve  hours  of 
fierce  battle  and  exposure,  interposed  before  discouraged  officers  who 
were  suggesting  retirement  from  the  positions  already  won  and  that 
could  only  be  held  by  unflinching  bravery,  and  indignantly  refused  to 
hear  of  retreating  one  foot.  He  warned  General  Shafter  against  the 
proposal  and  by  his  splendid  and  fearless  courage  of  heart  and  deter 
mination  turned  the  disheartened  ones  the  other  way  about,  by  in 
fusing  his  own  tenacity  of  purpose  into  them. 

At  San  Juan,  during  the  hottest  fighting,  it  is  told  that  General 
Wheeler  forgot  his  whereabouts  on  the  calendar  of  time  for  a  mo 
ment  and,  as  the  enemy  showed  signs  of  weakening,  cried  out  impul 
sively  to  his  troops  :  — 

"  Give  those  Yankees  h-11  now,  boys ! " 

His  aides  and  those  standing  near,  burst  into  laughter  and  told 
him  what  he  had  said. 

"Oh,  well,"  he  explained  with  a  smile  of  deprecation,  "I  just  for 
got  a  moment  —  but  you  all  know  I  meant  the  Spanish.  I'm  a  Yankee 
myself,  now,  wearing  the  uniform  and  following  the  old  flag  of  the 
country  where  Yankee  and  Dixie  are  the  same  words  to  the  whole 
land." 

No  soldier  earned  more  distinction  than  General  Wheeler. 


CHAPTER  THE  SIXTEENTH. 
GAROIA'S  DISAFFECTION  AND  MANZANILLO. 

DISAPPOINTMENT  OF  THE  CUBAN  Al.LlES  WHEN   SANTIAGO   WAS   NOT  GlVEN    INTO  THEIR   CoN- 
TROL —  THE  STORY  OK  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  GENERALS  GARCIA  AND  SHAFTKR, 
AND  THE  WITHDRAWAL   OK   CUBAN    FORCES   INTO  THE   INTERIOR  —  CHARACTER   OK 
THE    SERVICES   RENDERED   BY   THE   CUBANS  IN   THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  — 
OUR  WAR  SHIPS  UNDER  TODD  SINK  AND  DESTROY  FIVE  SPANISH  GUN 
BOATS  AND  THREE  TRANSPORTS,    KILLING  a   HUNDRED  OF   THE 
ENEMY  —  NOT  A  MAN  OR  SHIP  OK  THE  AMERICANS  HURT. 


P 


I. 

OLITICAL  misunderstandings  with  the  armed  Cuban  forces  began 
with  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  and  added  for  the  moment  to 
the  difficulties  of  the  situation.  It  was  par- 

THE   INCIDENT 

ticularly  noticed  on  the  day  of  occupation  that        OF  GARCIA-S 

,.,,.,  .  DISAFFECTION 

no  Cuban  nags  were  raised  m  the  city.  A  party  01 
Cubans  mounted  the  hill  of  the  Morro  at  the  harbor  entrance  on  Sun 
day  morning  and  displayed  a  Cuban  flag  on  the  staff  over  the  walls, 
but  Admiral  Sampson  ordered  it  down  at  once  by  signal  to  his  shore 
forces.  The  only  Cubans  accompanying  General  Shatter  into  the  city 
to  take  possession  were  General  Joaquin  Castillo  and  an  aide  on  his 
staff.  They  went  as  personal  guests  of  the  American  General,  and 
did  not  take  official  part  in  the  ceremonies. 

General  Calixto  Garcia,  commanding  the  Cuban  allies  in  the  de 
partment  of  Eastern  Cuba,  had  been  engaged  in  all  the  operations 
around  Santiago  from  the  landing  of  the  United  States  troops  to  the 
surrender.  He  had  arrived  at  Aserradero  on  June  14  in  response  to 
a  communication  from  General  Miles  to  place  himself  under  the 
orders  of  the  American  commander  for  full  cooperation,  having  about 
4,000  troops  under  his  authority.  They  were  poorly  clothed,  and 
when  some  of  them  reached  the  American  fleet  and  camps,  were  so 
nearly  starved  that  a  number  died  in  a  few  hours,  after  voracious 

(233) 


234  HISTORY   OF   THE 

eating.  As  rapidly  as  possible  they  were  supplied  with  clothing, 
equipments,  food,  and  then  assigned  to  positions  in  the  United  States 
line  under  command  of  their  own  officers.  They  were  principally 
used  for  scouting  and  advance  skirmishers,  because  they  were  familiar 
with  the  country  and  the  Spanish  methods  of  fighting. 

General  Garcia  took  part  in  important  conferences  and  movements 
before  and  during  the  investment  of  the  city.  His  troops  fraternized 
with  the  Americans  in  good  spirit  at  first,  but  complaints  arose.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  ragged  and  unfortunate  insurgents  were 
wholly  undisciplined  according  to  our  ideas.  They  had  been  fight 
ing  for  three  years  after  guerilla  tactics,  and  had  no  training  in  the 
business  of  proceeding  by  regular  formation  and  with  cool  determi 
nation  to  assault.  The  overwhelming  numbers  of  the  United  States 
troops  and  the  display  of  power  and  preparation  in  ships,  munitions, 
and  supplies,  doubtless  served  also  to  make  these  half-starved  bush 
rangers  feel  some  discouragement  between  foes  and  allies  each  so 
much  greater  in  strength.  They  could  not  speak  English,  which  gave 
room  for  much  misunderstanding.  They  were  not  gluttonous  for  the 
hard  and  exhausting  labor  of  building  roads  and  fortifications.  They 
had  never  needed  either,  flying  light  in  their  campaigns  through 
jungles,  having  no  supply  trains  to  provide  for,  each  man  carrying  his 
all  on  his  horse  or  in  his  haversack. 

That  the  Cubans  rendered  valuable  services  during  the  Santiago 
campaign,  there  is  little  doubt.  General  Wheeler  said  that  while  they 
were  wholly  undisciplined  according  to  our  standard,  they  had  in  no 
instance,  to  his  knowledge,  refused  to  obey  any  order  or  respond  to 
any  request  made  upon  them.  On  the  contrary,  they  seemed  anx 
ious  to  do  everything  in  their  power,  and  where  there  were  miscar 
riages,  they  were  probably  due  to  lack  of  understanding  of  our  language 
and  inability  to  comprehend  just  what  was  wanted.  At  El  Pozo,  one 
of  the  points  in  the  Santiago  battle,  where  three  hundred  of  the  Cubans 
fought,  forty-seven  of  their  number  were  killed  and  wounded,  or  more 
than  fifteen  per  cent.,  as  high  a  percentage  of  casualties  as  any  other 
organization  could  show. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  235 

When  Santiago  was  evacuated  by  the  20.000  non-combatants,  and 
capture  or  surrender  was  inevitable,  the  Cuban  patriots  were  expectant 
of  the  immediate  triumph  of  their  cause  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
United  States  that  this  Government  intended  only  to  extinguish  Spanish 
sovereignty  on  the  island  and  establish  the  independence  of  the  people 
of  Cuba.  A  plebiscite  was  taken  quietly  among  the  non-combatants 
and  Cuban  troops,  which  resulted  in  the  selection  of  General  Deme 
trius  Castillo  for  Military  Governor  of  Santiago  when  the  city  should 
be  taken.  Accordingly,  the  name  of  General  Castillo  was  recom 
mended  to  General  Garcia  by  the  leaders,  and  in  a  conference  the 
recommendation  was  laid  before  General  Shafter.  The  Cuban  leaders 
maintained  that  at  the  first  conference  between  Garcia,  Sampson,  and 
Shafter  at  Aserradero,  Shafter  had  promised  to  turn  Santiago  over 
to  Garcia's  occupation  as  soon  as  it  was  surrendered.* 

If  such  a  promise  was  actually  made  it  was  singularly  unwise  and, 
under  the  light  of  conditions  that  prevailed  at  the  time  of  the  sur 
render,  General  Shafter  could  not,  under  the  President's  instructions, 
or  in  good  common  reason,  place  the  city  under  control  of  insurgent 
authorities.  At  that  time  it  was  an  imperative  necessity  that  the 
40,000  occupants  of  the  city  should  feel  the  strong  arm  of  United 
States  authority  for  the  prevention  of  panic  and  disorder.  The  rec 
ommendation  of  General  Demetrius  Castillo  for  Governor  was  therefore 
rejected  by  General  Shafter,  who  explained  that  the  capitulation  was 
to  the  United  States  forces  and  that  it  was  his  intention  to  continue 
the  autonomist  officials  in  place  until  further  orders  from  the  President. 

Upon  this  General  Garcia  declined  to  enter  Santiago  on  the  day 
of  surrender  or  while  it  was  administered  by  officials  that  had  re 
ceived  their  commissions  from  the  Spanish  Government. 

When,  therefore,  orders  were  issued  that  no  Cuban  or  American 
troops  should  enter  Santiago  for  occupation,  except  those  needed  to 
maintain  order,  and  that  no  Cuban  flag  should  be  raised  in  the  city. 
General  Garcia  and  his  staff  held  aloof  from  all  participation  and 


•Statement  of  General  Joaquin  Castillo.  Associated  Press  report,  August  24,  1898. 


236  HISTORY   OF   THE 

withdrew  to  a  distance  for  consultation.  A  few  days  afterward  Gar 
cia  sent  to  Shafter  a  letter  containing  a  statement  of  his  intention 
to  withdraw  from  the  campaign  and  his  reasons  therefor.  He  said:  — 

"  I  have  done  my  best,  sir,  to  fulfill  the  wishes  of  my  Government,  and  I  have  been 
until  now  one  of  your  most  faithful  subordinates,  honoring  myself  in  carrying  out  your 
orders  and  instructions  as  far  as  my  powers  have  allowed  me  to  do  it. 

"  The  city  of  Santiago  surrendered  to  the  American  army,  and  news  of  that  impor 
tant  event  was  given  to  me  by  persons  entirely  foreign  to  your  staff.  I  have  not  been 
honored  with  a  single  word  from  yourself  informing  me  about  the  negotiations  for  peace 
or  the  terms  of  the  capitulation  by  the  Spaniards.  The  important  ceremony  of  the  sur 
render  of  the  Spanish  army  and  the  taking  possession  of  the  city  by  yourself  took  place 
later  on,  and  I  only  knew  of  both  events  by  public  reports. 

"  I  was  neither  honored,  sir,  with  a  kind  word  from  you  inviting  myself  or  any 
officer  of  my  staff  to  represent  the  Cuban  army  on  that  memorable  occasion. 

"  Finally,  I  know  that  you  have  left  in  power  at  Santiago  the  same  Spanish  author 
ities  that  for  three  years  I  have  fought  as  enemies  of  the  independence  of  Cuba.  I  beg 
to  say  that  these  authorities  have  never  been  elected  at  Santiago  by  the  residents  of 
the  city,  but  were  appointed  by  royal  decrees  of  the  Queen  of  Spain. 

"  I  would  agree,  sir,  that  the  army  under  your  command  should  have  taken  posses 
sion  of  the  city,  the  garrison,  and  the  forts.  I  would  give  my  warm  cooperation  to  any 
measure  you  may  have  deemed  best  under  American  military  law  to  hold  the  city  for 
your  army  and  to  preserve  public  order  until  the  time  comes  to  fulfill  the  solemn  pledge 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  establish  in  Cuba  a  free  and  independent  govern 
ment.  But  when  the  question  arises  of  appointing  authorities  in  Santiago  de  Cuba? 
under  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  our  thirty  years'  strife  against  the  Spanish  rule,  I 
cannot  see  but  with  the  deepest  regret  that  such  authorities  are  not  elected  by  the 
Cuban  people,  but  are  the  same  ones  selected  by  the  Queen  of  Spain,  and,  hence,  are 
ministers  to  defend  against  the  Cubans  the  Spanish  sovereignty. 

"  A  rumor,  too  absurd  to  be  believed,  General,  ascribes  the  reason  of  your  measures 
and  of  the  orders  forbidding  my  army  to  enter  Santiago  to  fear  of  massacres  and 
revenge  against  the  Spaniards.  Allow  me,  sir,  to  protest  against  even  the  shadow  of 
such  an  idea.  We  are  not  savages  ignoring  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare.  We  are  a 
poor,  ragged  army,  as  ragged  and  as  poor  as  was  the  army  of  your  forefathers  in  their 
noble  war  for  independence,  but,  as  did  the  heroes  of  Saratoga  and  Yorktown,  we 
respect  too  deeply  our  cause  to  disgrace  it  with  barbarism  and  cowardice. 

"  In  view  of  all  these  reasons  I  sincerely  regret  to  be  unable  to  fulfill  any  longer 
the  orders  of  my  Government,  and  therefore  I  have  tendered  to-day  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Cuban  army,  Major-General  Maximo  Gomez,  my  resignation  as  com 
mander  of  this  section  of  our  army. 

"Awaiting  his  resolution,  I  withdraw  my  forces  to  the  interior." 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  237 

The  letter  was  transmitted  to  Washington,  by  General  Shafter 
and  it  was  accompanied,  according  to  reports  from  the  War  Depart 
ment,  with  comments  disparaging  to  the  Cuban  troops.  He  held 
Garcia's  troops  responsible  for  the  safe  arrival  in  Santiago  before  the 
surrender  of  General  Nario's  regiment  of  Spanish  regulars.  He  sent 
the  following  reply  to  General  Garcia : — 

"  I  must  say  that  I  was  tfery  much  surprised  at  the  receipt  of  your  letter  this 
morning,  and  regret  exceedingly  that  you  should  regard  yourself  as  in  any  way 
slighted  or  aggrieved. 

"  You  will  remember  the  fact  that  I  invited  you  to  accompany  me  into  the 
town  of  Santiago  to  witness  the  surrender,  which  you  declined. 

"  This  war,  as  you  know,  is  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  and  it  is  out 
of  the  question  for  me  to  take  any  action  in  regard  to  your  forces  in  connection 
with  the  surrender,  which  was  made  solely  to  the  American  army. 

"  The  policy  of  my  Government  in  continuing  in  power  temporarily  the  persons 
occupying  the  offices  is  one  which  I  am,  of  course,  unable  to  discuss.  To  show 
you  the  views  held  by  my  Government,  I  inclose  a  copy  of  the  instructions  re 
ceived  by  me  yesterday  from  the  President,  which  appear  to  cover  everything  that 
can  possibly  arise  in  the  government  of  this  territory  while  it  is  held  by  the  United 
States. 

"  Full  credit  has  been  given  to  you  and  your  valiant  men  in  my  report  to  my 
Government,  and  1  wish  to  acknowledge  to  you  the  great  and  valuable  assistance 
you  rendered  during  the  campaign. 

"  I  regret  very  much  to  know  of  your  determination  to  withdraw  yourself  from 
this  vicinity." 

As  has  been  said  before,  Shafter's  action  in  refusing  to  permit 
authority  to  the  Cubans  to  any  extent  was  entirely  proper  and  neces 
sary,  but  it  is  evident  after  reading  the  two  letters  that  he  had 
lacked  in  tact  and  in  proper  consideration  of  the  delicate  position  of 
those  despairing  and  long-hoping  patriots,  whose  impulsive  nature 
would  have  responded  to  kindly  candor. 

This  is  not  pointed  out  to  criticize  General  Shafter's  conduct  of 
the  war.  It  is  always  easy  to  point  out  mistakes  after  the  fact,  but 
in  haste,  difficulties,  and  confusion,  action  must  be  taken  without  delay 
and  in  the  temper  of  the  moment.  General  Shafter  was  in  bad  physical 
condition,  he  was  harassed  with  manifold  duties,  and  was,  moreover, 
a  man  of  brusque  and  quick  temper. 


238  HISTORY    OF    THE 

The  errors  of  detail  in  all  great  emergencies  are  many  and  are  of 
no  importance  if  they  do  not  affect  the  result  of  the  central  purpose. 
In  this  instance  the  disaffection  of  the  Cuban  leader  caused  the  Wash 
ington  administration  some  uneasiness. 

There  had  been  many  disparaging  criticisms  of  the  Cubans  made 
by  some  of  our  officers.  It  had  been  suggested  that  no  more  supplies 
or  arms  be  furnished  to  them.  Washington  authorities,  however,  were 
favorably  impressed  by  General  Garcia's  protest,  and  the  Cabinet  de 
cided  not  to  cease  its  efforts  to  retain  the  cooperation  of  the  allies. 

Immediately  after  sending  his  protest,  Garcia  sent  a  courier  to  Gen 
eral  Maximo  Gomez  of  the  Cuban  forces  with  his  resignation,  and  with 
drew  with  his  troops  toward  Jiguani,  fifty  miles  northwest  of  Santiago. 

The  influence  and  extent  of  the  feeling  aroused  by  this  incident 
could  not  be  estimated  at  the  time  it  occurred,  but  it  was  unfortunate.* 


n. 

THE  fall  of  Santiago  was  followed  in  two  days  by  another  naval 

victory  at  Manzanillo,  not  less   complete   than   those   at   Manila   and 

Santiago,   but   involving   fewer  and   smaller   ships   and 

A  FINE  NAVAL 

VICTORY  AT        lacking,  therefore,  that  factor  of  peril  upon  a  vast  scale 
which  invests  battle  with  magnificence  and  dramatic  dis 
play.     The  United  States  war  ships  on  blockade  duty  before  Manza 
nillo  on  the  east  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Guacanayabo,  about  one  hundred 


*  In  one  paragraph  of  his  report  on  the  Santiago  campaign  Inspector-General  Breckin- 
ridge  speaks  of  the  Cuban  allies  in  these  words:  "In  the  beginning  the  Cuban  soldiers 
were  used  largely  as  outposts  on  our  front  and  flanks.  There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discus 
sion  among  the  officers  of  this  expedition  concerning  the  Cuban  soldiers  and  the  aid  they 
have  rendered.  They  seem  to  have  very  little  organization  or  discipline,  and  they  do  not,  of 
course,  fight  in  the  battle  line  with  our  troops.  Yet  in  every  skirmish  or  fight  where  they 
were  present  they  seemed  to  have  a  fair  proportion  of  killed  and  wounded.  They  were  of 
undoubted  assistance  in  our  first  landing  and  in  scouting  our  front  and  flanks.  It  is  not  safe, 
however,  to  rely  upon  their  fully  performing  any  specific  duty,  according  to  our  expectation 
and  understanding,  unless  they  are  under  the  constant  supervision  and  direction  of  one  of 
our  own  officers,  as  our  movements  and  views  are  so  different  and  a  misunderstanding  or 
failure  so  easy." 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAK  23!) 

miles  west  of  Santiago,  were  the  WilminytuH,  Helena,  Scorpion,  7//W, 
Hornet,  Wanipatuck,  and  Osceola.  All  were  auxiliary  vessels  except 
the  Wilminyton,  under  command  of  Captain  Todd  (who  had  been  at 
Cienfuegos  when  the  Winsloir  was  badly  damaged  and  Knsign  Bagley 
was  killed),  and  the  Helena,  her  twin  gunboat.  Captain  Todd  was  the 
ranking  officer  in  command  of  the  Manzanillo  flotilla,  and  by  direction 
of  Admiral  Sampson  he  approached  the  harbor  at  seven  o'clock  on 
Tuesday  morning,  July  18,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  Spanish 
gunboats  and  transports  contained  in  the  harbor. 

At  7:30  o'clock  the  Wilmington  and  Helena  entered  the  northern 
channel  toward  the  city,  the  Scorpion  and  Osceola  the  mid  channel, 
and  the  Hixt,  Hornet,  and  Wampatuck  the  south  channel,  the  move 
ments  of  the  vessels  being  so  timed  as  to  bring  them  within  effective 
range  of  the  shipping  at  about  the  same  moment. 

At  7:50  fire  was  reopened  on  the  shipping,  and,  after  a  deliberate 
fire  lasting  about  two  and  a  half  hours,  three  Spanish  transports,  La 
Gloria,  Jost  Garcia,  and  La  Purieama  Conception,  were  burned  and  de 
stroyed.  The  pontoon,  which  was  the  harbor  guard  and  store  ship, 
probably  for  ammunition,  was  burned  and  blown  up.  Three  gun 
boats  were  destroyed.  One  other  was  driven  ashore  and  sunk,  and  a 
fifth  was  driven  ashore  and  was  believed  to  be  disabled. 

The  h'ring  was  maintained  at  a  range  beyond  that  of  the  shore 
artillery.  It  was  continued  until,  after  a  gradual  closing  in,  the  shore 
batteries  opened  fire  at  a  comparatively  short  range,  when  one  of  our 
ships  was  recalled,  the  object  of  the  expedition  having  been  accom 
plished.  No  casualties  occurred  on  board  any  of  our  vessels.  Great 
care  was  taken  in  directing  the  h're  that  as  little  damage  as  possible 
should  be  done  to  the  city  itself.  The  Spanish  loss  was  reported  to 
be  nearly  a  hundred  killed.  The  gunboats  destroyed  or  driven  ashore 
helpless,  were  the  Dalnado,  Guantanamo,  Ostralia.  Confinola.  and  Guar 
dian. 

If  the  Manzanillo  engagement  had  occurred  at  the  outset  of  war, 
it  would  have  taken  a  great  place  in  history.  It  is  only  smaller  in 
size  than  the  other  great  engagements  and  the  result  was  exactly 


240 


HISTORY   OF   THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


the  same — the  enemy's  ships  annihilated,  not  one  of  our  vessels  in 
jured,  and  not  an  American  sailor  injured. 

The  achievements  of  the  navy  up  to  July  19  were  extraordinary. 
The  two  squadrons  under  Dewey  and  Sampson  had  destroyed,  of  Spanish 
war  vessels,  four  armored  cruisers,  three  torpedo  boats,  seventeen 
unprotected  cruisers  and  gunboats,  and  four  transports,  and  had  captured 
nearly  thirty  merchant  prizes  of  considerable  value.  Our  only  loss 
was  the  damaged  Winslow,  six  men  killed,  and  seven  men  wounded. 
The  Spaniards  had  lost  about  twelve  hundred  killed,  six  hundred 
wounded,  and  two  thousand  prisoners. 

Commander  Todd's  triumph  at  Manzanillo  was  in  keeping  with  the 
glory  of  this  unparalleled  naval  record. 


CHAPTER   THE   SEVENTEENTH. 
SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  FALL  OF  SANTIAGO. 

EXTRAORDINARY  TKST  OK  THK   FIGHTING   DUALITIES  OK   AMKRICANS  HEKORE  THE  SURRENDER- 

THE  ENDURANCE,  COURAGE,  AND  INDIVIDUAL  SKILL  OK  OUR  TROOPS  AMAZED  ALL  FOREIGN 

MILITARY  OBSERVERS  —  OPINIONS  EXPRESSED  BY  SOME  OF  THE  EXPERTS  —  THE 

STORMING  OK  SAN  JUAN   CONSIDERED  AN  IMPOSSIIMLITY  IN  ADVANCE  — 

WHAT  THE  NAVAL  ENGAGEMENTS  DEMONSTRATED  TO  THE 

WORLD  —  EFFECT  OK  THE  COMBINED  OPERATIONS  — 

GREATER  IN  SIGNIFICANCE  THAN  ANY 

BATTLE  OK  THE  CENTURY. 


T 


HE  land  fighting  before  Santiago  was  dwarfed  by  the  spectacular- 
glory  of  the  naval  engagement  that  followed  swiftly  upon 
its  heels.  The  ocean  is  the  perfect  battlefield,  TEgT  op  QUR 
offering  no  natural  advantage  to  either  combat-  ARMY  BEFORE 
ant.  On  land,  the  limitless  opportunities  for  defense, 
concealment,  and  surprise  require  most  patient  investigation  both 
of  the  original  plan  of  a  battle  and  its  variations  in  execution,  in 
order  that  the  action  may  be  comprehended  and  explained.  All  that 
is  known  at  first  are  the  general  results  and  the  confused  mass  of 
individual  experiences  and  incidents  that  indicate  the  fighting  temper 
of  the  forces  engaged.  The  fighting  before  Santiago  on  July  1  and 
2  was  without  precedent,  and  was  involved  in  more  confusion  than 
any  other  modern  battle  of  respectable  scale.  The  destruction  of 
Cervera's  squadron  was  achieved  amid  all  the  surroundings  of  a  magnifi 
cent  theatrical  display.  Its  opening,  swift  progress,  and  final  tragedy, 
possessed  a  dramatic  completeness  of  effect  that  could  not  have  been 
surpassed  if  the  details  had  been  designed  and  rehearsed  in  advance. 
Yet,  splendid  as  the  achievement  was,  the  heroism  displayed  by  the 
soldiers  in  the  obscurity  of  the  inland  jungles  was  of  a  quality  that 
equaled  the  courage  and  skill  by  which  our  ships  were  brought  out 

16  (241) 


242  HISTORY    OF    THE 

victorious.  And,  at  the  moment  when  the  observers  of  the  land  bat 
tles  were  preparing  to  analyze  the  incidents  and  construct  the  great 
story,  the  naval  engagement  intervened  and  relegated  the  army's 
achievements  to  second  place.  It  was  not  until  two  weeks  had 
elapsed  and  Santiago  had  surrendered,  that  the  world  understood 
the  significance  of  the  American  fighting  at  San  Juan  and  El  Caney. 

The  discovery  was  momentous.  Upon  a  larger  field  16,000  men, 
against  the  same  odds  and  with  the  same  determination  of  unprec 
edented  courage,  devoid  of  any  quality  of  desperation,  had  repeated 
the  achievement  of  the  950  at  Las  Guasimas.  As  Sampson's  fleet 
demonstrated  that  Dewey's  victory  was  the  fruit  of  national  char 
acter  and  system,  and  not  chance,  the  forces  at  San  Juan  and  El 
Caney  enforced  with  equal  thoroughness  the  lesson  of  Las  Guasimas. 

It  established  the  quality  of  manhood  developed  by  free  govern 
ment,  which  the  monarchical  systems  had  persistently  denied.  The 
very  blunders  of  forecast  called  out  triumphantly  the  individual  re 
source  of  each  soldier,  apart  from  the  combination  in  bodies.  It  is 
doubtful  if  the  desperate  courage  of  the  Spaniards  had  been  under 
estimated  ;  but  certainly  the  deadly  Cuban  climate,  with  its  alternation 
of  burning  heat  and  nightly  chill,  its  drowning  tropical  rains,  the 
rankness  of  vegetation,  the  tangled  jungles,  and  the  absence  of  founda 
tions  for  road  building — certainly,  these  were  all  underestimated  or 
not  prepared  for.  Yet,  if  it  had  been  determined  to  overcome  these 
obstacles  before  attacking,  the  purpose  of  the  government  to  push 
the  war  to  a  quick  conclusion  could  not  have  been  achieved.  Cuba 
could  not  have  been  scientifically  invaded  and  the  war  ended  short 
of  twelve  months. 

It  was  thoroughly  characteristic  of  the  American  idea  of  "business" 
that  when  Shafter  perceived  the  heat  and  the  impending  of  the 
rainy  season  he  determined  without  hesitation  to  "beat  the  rains  to 
Santiago,"  and  do  the  necessary  fighting  while  the  health  and  spirits 
of  the  men  were  good.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  losses  in  battle 
were  greater  because  of  the  impetuous  advance.  The  losses  by  dis 
ease  later  demonstrated  the  wisdom  of  haste. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  -J|:; 

The  three  battles  on  the  journey  were  characteristic  of  what  Europe 
has  sarcastically  called  "American  enterprise."  Disregarding  tradi 
tion  and  precedent,  the  army  of  the  United  States,  provided  with  no 
Held  artillery  of  sufficient  power,  plunged  into  a  jungle  and  marched 
against  a  fortified  city  —  leaving  all  supplies  behind,  and  throwing 
away,  on  the  march,  every  pound  of  clothing  and  equipment  that 
was  not  necessary  for  actual  fighting. 

The  extreme  advance  guard  of  950  cavalrymen,  marching  and  fight 
ing  for  the  first  time  dismounted,  half  of  them  volunteers  of  two 
months'  training,  charged  an  enemy  two  or  three  times  greater  in 
numbers,  intrenched,  provided  with  artillery,  protected  by  barbed-wire 
entanglements,  in  a  familiar  jungle,  and  drove  him  back  after  an  hour's 
fighting.  It  was  called  an  "  ambush,"  and  at  home  amateur  critics 
of  war  attributed  to  desperation  the  valor  of  our  troops.  It  was  to 
be  discovered  later  that  from  Las  Guasimas  to  Santiago  the  same  am 
buscade  confronted  all  our  troops. 

Halting  only  to  fight,  rest,  and  permit  the  main  body  to  come 
up,  cut  off  from  provisions  and  hospital  relief,  with  quarter  rations 
for  empty  stomachs,  the  half  nude  and  weary,  but  determined,  army 
reached  the  outposts  of  Santiago  and  assaulted  them  with  a  spirit  that 
would  not  be  denied.  The  outposts  that  were  to  be  taken  in  two  days 
were  stormed  and  captured  against  overwhelming  odds  of  defense  in 
one  day,  after  ten  hours  of  ceaseless  fighting.  The  night  was  spent 
in  making  intrenchments  and  resisting  attempts  at  recapture,  and  the 
next  day  in  the  blazing  sunlight,  without  tents,  without  food,  without 
relief,  they  fought  the  enemy  back  to  his  last  ditch  and  held  the  city. 

Of  the  15,000  troops  engaged,  three  regiments  were  volunteers  practi 
cally  useless,  not  for  lack  of  fighting  qualities  —  the  stubborn  march 
disproved  that  —  but  because  their  rifle  ammunition  carried  black 
powder  and  the  smoke  menaced  our  troops  by  revealing  our  position 
at  every  discharge.  Of  the  remainder  one  regiment  was  of  volunteers 
with  smokeless  powder  ammunition  and  the  remainder  regulars,  one- 
third  of  whose  ranks  had  been  recruited  within  sixty-five  days.  One- 
third  of  that  army  was  practically  composed  of  volunteer  recruits. 


244  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  military  observers  present,  representing  foreign  nations,  were 
unanimously  of  the  opinion  before  the  attack  on  Friday  the  1st, 
that  the  storming  of  San  Juan  and  El  Caney,  without  the  aid  of  heavy 
artillery,  was  a  military  feat  impossible  of  accomplishment.  The  in- 
trenchments  of  the  enemy,  his  position,  his  advance  defenses,  his 
artillery  and  numbers,  rendered  him  impregnable  against  enormous 
odds.  Yet  all  this  was  swept  away  by  infantry  alone,  by  troops  thrown 
into  regimental  confusion  in  the  jungle,  some  without  brigade  or  reg 
imental  commanders,  yet  all  welded  into  substantial  cohesive  forma 
tion  by  the  instinct  of  self-reliance,  springing  from  intelligent  knowledge 
of  the  value  of  combination  and  organization. 

Captain  Lee  and  Captain  Paget  of  the  British  army  declared  that 
the  United  States  troops  had  performed  the  impossible  in  warfare. 
Count  von  Goetzen,  the  German  attache,  whose  opinion  will  scarcely 
be  suspected  of  too  much  leaning  to  the  side  of  the  United  States, 
said  the  fighting  of  the  Americans  was  wonderfully  well  done,  and 
that  the  storming  of  the  outposts  was  a  wonderful  feat  of  war. 
The  fighting  was  creditable,  he  declared,  to  both  sides,  but  he  did 
not  dream  how  formidable  San  Juan  was  until  after  it  had  been 
taken.  The  American  marksmanship  was  surprising.  The  vigorous 
way  in  which  our  troops  sprang  to  the  deadly  work  was  a  tremendous 
lesson  to  other  nations.  The  volunteers,  he  heard  from  other  expert 
observers  who  had  watched  them,  were  fully  up  to  the  regulars,  and 
the  dash  and  spirit  exhibited  were  marvelous.  Major  Grandprey,  of 
the  French  service,  who  has  been  quoted  elsewhere,  declared  that 
some  of  the  best-grounded  theories  adopted  in  Europe  were  over 
turned  by  the  achievements  of  the  American  soldiers.  The  Frankfurter 
Zeitung,  a  leading  newspaper  authority  of  Germany,  in  a  well-consid 
ered  article  from  a  military  contributor,  declared  that  the  United 
States  troops  before  Santiago  had  surpassed  all  precedent,  and  that 
the  susceptibility  of  the  American  citizen  to  quick  training  had  dem 
onstrated  that  our  volunteer  militia  was  a  much  more  reliable  force 
than  the  compulsory  reserves  of  Europe,  an  utterance  astonishing  in 
the  light  of  past  beliefs. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  245 

It  may  be  said  that  our  military  operations  against  Santiago  were 
marred  by  blunders  or  misfortunes,  without  raising  the  question  of 
cause  or  responsibility  for  them.  But  through  all,  the  intelligence, 
tenacity,  and  strong  character  of  the  American  citizen  found  an  un 
erring  way  to  victory  against  the  odds  of  the  enemy  in  front  and 
the  failure  or  impossibility  of  support  behind. 

The  courage  of  our  soldiers  was  matched  by  the  skill  of  our  seamen. 
The  naval  battle  of  Santiago  was  most  extraordinary  in  its  contrasts 
of  methods  and  men.  For  eighty-six  years  American  seamen  had 
engaged  no  foreign  adversaries.  Our  ships  were  regarded  as  too  light 
in  armor,  or  too  heavy  in  armament,  and  too  delicate  in  interior 
mechanism.  It  had  been  predicted  by  foreign  experts  that  our  battle 
ships  would  be  capsized  by  the  recoil  from  the  delivery  of  full  broad 
sides  from  the  great  and  small  guns.  These  theoretical  doubts  were 
dissipated.  The  battleships,  in  bombarding,  were  "listed,"  or  ca 
reened  to  one  side  by  running  the  heavy  guns  out  of  the  ports  and 
turrets,  in  order  to  gain  elevation  sufficient  for  the  guns  on  the  other 
side  to  throw  shells  over  the  hills.  Not  a  gun  exploded,  not  a  piece  of 
delicate  machinery  failed,  not  one  gloomy  prediction  was  realized. 

Our  methods  of  fighting,  like  our  methods  of  diplomacy,  were  start 
ling  to  the  enemy.  Europe  has  clung  to  the  conventions.  In  diplo 
macy,  Europeans  proceed  by  the  tortuous  paths  of  tradition  and  the 
etiquette  of  precedent.  They  pronounced  the  American  directness  of 
procedure  by  going  to  the  heart  of  the  subject  in  a  businesslike 
manner  as  "brutal"  and  "irritating."  At  San  Juan  the  Spanish  com 
plained  that  our  troops  charged,  when,  under  all  the  conventions  of 
warfare  by  accepted  tactics  they  should  have  run  away! 

In  the  naval  battle  our  commanders  wasted  no  time  in  vain  tech 
nical  parade  and  manoeuvre.  They  fell  upon  the  adversary  with  ail 
the  weight  of  metal  that  could  be  discharged,  pounding  the  amazed 
and  breathless  Spaniards  to  destruction  before  they  could  recover 
from  the  shock.  The  European  gunner  is  trained  to  shoot  on  the 
upward  roll  of  his  side  of  the  ship,  with  the  result  that  most  of  the 
Spanish  shots  were  hurled  harmlessly  over  our  ships.  United  States 


246  HISTORY   OF   THE 

gunners  are  trained  to  fire  on  the  downward  roll,  so  that  the  missile 
may  go  straight  to  the  enemy's  hull,  or  reach  it  on  ricochet.  The 
hulls  of  the  Spanish  cruisers  testified  to  the  deadly  efficacy  of  the 
method. 

n. 

THE  three  battles  of  this  century,  preceding  Santiago,  that  were 
enormously  greater  in  political  significance  than  important  as  mere 
military  operations,  were  Waterloo,  Gettysburg,  and  Se- 
SANTIAGO  ON  dan.  The  effect  of  Waterloo  was  the  destruction  of  the 
personal  power  and  threatened  political  supremacy  in 
Europe  of  Napoleon.  The  effect  of  Gettysburg  was  to  presage  the 
downfall  of  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  United  States,  and  the 
denial,  by  force  of  arms,  of  the  political  theory  of  the  right  of  a  State 
to  peacefully  withdraw  from  the  Federal  Union.  The  effect  of  Sedan 
was  the  ushering  into  immediate  power  of  the  German  Empire,  that 
Bismarck  had  patiently  constructed  from  the  petty  German  States,  the 
solidarity  of  which  was  committed  with  its  crown  to  the  keeping  of 
William  I.,  of  the  new  imperial  dynasty.  In  no  military  sense  are 
these  battles  comparable,  but  in  significance  they  are.  They  were  of 
momentous  effect  upon  the  nations  and  continents  whose  interests 
were  directly  concerned.  But,  to  the  round  world,  they  were,  after 
all,  more  or  less,  incidents  of  locality.  Waterloo  was,  perhaps,  great 
est  of  all ;  but  the  world  of  1814  was  much  smaller  than  the  world 
of  1898. 

In  respect  of  the  importance  of  the  forces  engaged  on  land  and  the 
display  of  recognized  scientific  military  operations,  the  land  battles 
before  Santiago  were  mere  skirmishes  beside  Waterloo,  Gettysburg, 
and  Sedan.  But  in  respect  of  the  revelation  resulting  from  measur 
ing  the  fighting  and  enduring  qualities  of  the  American  soldier  by 
the  standard  obtaining  in  the  standing  army  of  Spain,  the  result 
was  of  the  highest  significance.  Among  the  people  of  the  United 
States  it  confirmed  and  established  the  confidence  they  had  long 
cherished  in  the  efficiency  of  their  race.  It  was  more  important  to 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  _'I7 

us  than  Gettysburg,  in  that  while  it  erased  every  jarring  memory  of 
Gettysburg  itself,  it  sanctified  and  heightened  the  one  glorious  —  of 
the  valor  of  all  Americans  who  met  on  that  h'eld  of  heroic  struggle; 
and  that  the  reunited  devotion  to  one  country  and  one  flag  was  sealed 
in  sacrifice  of  blood  and  life  by  North  and  South  together  fighting 
side  by  side.  It  revealed  to  us,  as  by  inspiration,  the  strength  and 
character  of  our  population,  and  the  resourceful  intelligence  springing 
from  liberty  restricted  only  by  the  rights  of  man.  That  this  revela 
tion  was  understood  by  all  foreign  observers  was  confessed.  They 
were  sent  to  observe  both  sides ;  not  merely  the  tools  of  war,  but  the 
nature  and  power  of  the  men  who  wielded  them.  It  is  for  the  pur 
pose  of  studying  forces  as  possible  adversaries  that  such  observations 
are  made. 

When  the  combined  operations  of  the  army  and  navy  at  Santiago 
are  considered,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  Spanish  defeat  will  prove, 
by  future  results,  to  have  been  more  significant  than  any  other  battle 
or  the  century. 

The  overwhelming  and  quick  defeat  of  Spain  was  confidently  pre 
pared  for  and  expected  by  the  United  States.  The  progress  of  the 
war  did  not  appreciably  interrupt  the  regular  course  of  our  every-day 
life  or  business. 

It  was  also  conceded  by  all  other  nations  that  Spain  must  be  de 
feated,  if  the  prosecution  of  the  war  was  not  averted  by  the  inter 
vention  of  European  Powers.  But  some  grave  authorities  abroad  did 
not  dream  that  it  was  possible  for  Spain  in  a  hundred  days  to  be 
stripped  of  all  her  colonies,  her  splendid  fleet  annihilated,  her  ocean 
commerce  paralyzed,  her  finances  demoralized,  her  population  maddened 
to  the  point  of  revolution,  an  important  body  of  her  army  captured 
within  its  own  fortified  places  by  a  smaller  army,  and  the  prisoners 
transported  back  to  Spain,  at  the  expense  of  the  conquerors,  as  an 
act  of  compassionate  charity,  founded  upon  good  "Yankee  "economy. 

And  all  this  without  the  enemy  being  able  to  strike  a  single 
blow  in  return,  or  to  disarrange  in  any  particular  the  ordinary  course 
of  life  in  this  country. 


248  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  significance  of  Santiago  lay  in  this:  that  those  who  had  con 
sidered  Dewey's  action  at  Manila  to  be  a  miracle  of  good  fortune, 
saw  it  repeated  at  Santiago,  at  Manzanillo,  at  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico, 
and  at  Mpe.  Those  who  thought  the  950  at  Las  Guasimas  were  reck 
less  dare-devils,  who  won  out  of  sheer  audacity,  saw  the  same  quality 
of  indomitable  courage  repeated  by  increased  forces,  with  equal  suc 
cess,  at  San  Juan  and  El  Caney. 

When  Santiago  surrendered,  the  republic  of  the  United  States, 
so  long  scorned  by  Europe  as  a  nation  of  money-getters  and  sordid 
adventurers,  with  no  traditions  of  dignity  or  glory;  so  long  treated 
with  contempt  by  Europe  in  its  accredited  representatives  as  being  a 
government  of  ignorant  and  corrupt  politicians  and  mercenaries  — 
that  republic,  after  Santiago,  stood  before  the  world  suddenly  revealed 
in  its  real  strength,  taking  undisputed  place  in  the  first  rank  of 
nations,  unsurpassed  in  its  practical  ability  to  provide  for  offense  or 
defense,  and  with  a  capacity  for  future  influence  in  the  whole  wrorld, 
and  for  the  increase  of  its  strength  restricted  only  within  the  national 
purpose,  whatever  that  might  be. 

The  surrender  of  Santiago  was  the  deathblow  to  Spain,  and  sud 
den  warning  to  Europe. 

Even  after  the  destruction  of  the  Maine  the  Spanish  Government 
did  not  expect  war  with  the  United  States.  That  act  of  cruel  perfidy 
was  so  well  shrouded  in  mystery,  as  Spain  viewed  it,  that  it  might 
be  made  the  subject  of  endless  diplomacy,  or,  if  put  to  it,  the  "mercen 
aries  "  of  America  could  be  pacified  with  a  money  indemnity.  No 
allowance  was  made  for  the  existence  of  a  profound  public  sentiment 
in  the  United  States  aroused  by  the  murder  of  our  seamen.  Once  be 
fore  Spanish  authorities  had  shot  to  death  the  crew  of  the  Virginius, 
filibusterers  from  this  country  going  to  aid  Cuban  revolutionists,  and 
nothing  had  come  of  the  outrage.  The  idea  that  the  United  States 
possessed  any  actual  sympathy  for  Cubans  perishing  under  Spanish 
cruelty,  neither  Canovas  nor  Sagasta  could  comprehend  as  anything 
more  than  rhetorical  declamation  covering  a  pretense  to  forward  some 
scheme  of  sharp  practice  that  our  government  was  preparing  to 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  240 

present.  They  frankly  admitted  that  Spain  could  not  be  victorious  in 
a  war  with  the  United  States,  but  they  did  not  expect  war — diplomacy, 
and  money  indemnity,  at  the  proper  time,  would  dispose  of  American 
protestations  of  honorable  purpose  and  humane  motives. 

Curiously  enough,  England,  the  European  nation  best  able  to  know 
and  understand  the  spirit  and  power  of  the  United  States,  underrated 
the  situation  at  first.  Her  naval  and  military  authorities  did  not 
hesitate  to  prophesy  that  the  Americans  were  sure  to  be  victorious 
in  the  end,  because,  although  the  national  spirit  rose  slowly,  it  rose 
surely  under  adversity,  and  was  then  irresistible.  They  were  ready, 
however,  to  expect  the  first  successes  for  Spain,  whose  standing  army 
and  excellent  navy,  equipped  according  to  European  standards,  would 
be  superior  to  the  overloaded  and  lumbering  ships  of  our  fleet  and 
the  handful  of  soldiers  composing  our  standing  army,  which  would 
have  to  be  laboriously  recruited  from  raw  volunteers,  these,  naturally, 
of  the  lowest  classes  of  our  population. 

Even  after  Manila,  the  London  Times,  that  recognized  channel  of 
sound  conservative  opinion  in  England,  took  a  gloomy  view  of  our 
outlook.  "  In  time,  of  course."  it  said,  "  the  United  States  will  be  able 
to  bring  out  their  immense,  almost  inexhaustible  resources  of  military 
and  naval  strength,  but  for  the  moment  nothing  decisive  can  be  looked 
for  so  long  as  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet  is  in  being,  and  while  the 
American  army  is  in  process  of  manufacture."  All  that  had  then 
been  gained,  it  believed,  was  the  knowledge  that  European  interven 
tion  was  no  longer  practicable. 

"Intervention  by  the  Powers"  was,  in  fact,  the  trump  card  that 
Spanish  statesmen  believed  they  held  for  use  when  all  other  resources 
should  prove  futile.  It  was  not  possible  to  admit  that  a  republic  of 
"  pig-stickers,"  •'  railroad  builders "  and  "  tradesmen "  would  dare 
resist  the  dignified  wishes  of  the  "  Concert  of  Europe."  whose  mission 
was  the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power,  the  custodianship  of 
the  secrets  of  diplomacy  by  circumlocution,  and  the  division  of  the 
estates  of  deceased  governments  among  heirs  to  be  selected  for  the 
decedent. 


250  HISTORY   OF   THE 

It  was  to  the  Triple  Alliance  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and 
the  Franco-Russian  League  that  Spain  looked  for  assistance.  Great 
Britain  was,  as  usual,  independent  of  alliances,  a  solitary  among 
nations,  more  powerful  and  much  more  feared  than  the  United  States, 
but  yet  a  solitary,  as  we  have  always  been. 

When  Congress  had  taken  steps  that  left  no  doubt  of  immediate 
war,  Spain  recognized  that  her  own  diplomacy  was  ended.  She  turned 
immediately  to  Austria,  whose  Emperor  was  the  uncle  of  the  Queen- 
Regent  and  granduncle  of  Alfonso  XIII.,  to  the  Pope  and  to  France. 
The  mighty  mystery  of  the  "  intervention  of  the  Powers "  was  thus 
solemnly  invoked.  The  venerable  Leo  XIII.,  representing  in  his  pon 
tifical  character  and  personal  virtues  the  loftiest  mission  of  religion, 
made  overtures  to  the  President  that  were  acknowledged  with  interest 
and  respect  and  replied  to  with  open  frankness  of  explanation.  Then 
the  aged  pontiff  suddenly  learned  that  even  in  this  effort  to  preserve 
that  curious  national  pretense  called  her  "  honor, "  Spain  had  not 
hesitated  to  ascribe  his  action  to  the  wrong  initiative  and  to  repre-' 
sent  his  motives  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cover  his  high  office  with 
indignity  and  to  reflect  insult  upon  the  United  States.  Overcome 
with  grief  and  feeling  deep  humiliation,  Leo  XIII.  withdrew,  not  the 
less  respected  by  our  Government  and  the  world  that  recognized  his 
greatness  of  mind  and  nobility  of  purpose. 

During  this  time,  also,  the  Powers  of  the  continent  had  agreed  to 
make  united  "representations"  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States  through  their  ambassadors  and  ministers  in  a  body.  The  note 
was  intended  to  have  the  appearance  of  disinterested  anxiety  for  peace 
and  the  effect  of  a  menace  from  combined  Europe,  if  we  persisted 
in  the  determination  to  make  war  on  Spain,  and  to  destroy  her 
sovereignty  in  Cuba.  Italy  did  not  join  in  the  action. 

The  continent  having  agreed  upon  the  plan,  application  was  made 
to  Great  Britain  to  join  in  the  remonstrance.  The  continent  relied 
upon  the  ancient  feeling  of  jealous  dislike  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  and  the  recent  embroilment  over  the  Anglo- Venezuelan 
boundary,  as  causes  sufficient  to  move  the  Queen's  ministers. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAH  251 

Much  to  Europe's  surprise,  Great  Britain  declared  a  purpose  to 
take  no  step  unfriendly  to  Spain  or  the  United  States,  which  countries 
were  presumed  to  be  capable  of  managing  their  own  affairs.  But 
Mr.  Balfour,  in  the  Premier's  absence,  went  further  and  consented  to 
an  action,  the  significance  of  which  the  Powers  did  not  then  prob 
ably  fully  perceive.  He  desired  peace,  but  he  could  not  interfere. 
He  would,  however,  unite  with  the  Powers  in  presenting  to  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  an  address  expressing  the  hope  that  war 
might  be  averted,  and  offering  friendly  offices.  But  the  nature  of  the 
address  must  first  be  communicated  to  the  President  and  his  consent 
obtained  for  its  public  presentation. 

The  text  of  the  original  note  as  determined  upon  by  the  Powers 
is  not  known,  but  when  the  British  ambassador  at  Washington  en 
tered  the  White  House,  at  the  head  of  the  delegation  of  foreign  rep 
resentatives,  it  was  notice  to  the  world  that  the  President  had  dic 
tated  the  terms  of  the  joint  address  and  that  the  British  ambassador 
presented  it  as  the  friendly  and  courteous  suggestion  of  the  greatest 
European  Power,  and  that  his  presence  estopped  the  representation 
from  being  construed  as  a  menace,  upon  peril  of  its  repudiation  by 
the  British  Government,  and  the  danger  of  provocation  that  might 
attach. 


CHAPTER  THE   EIGHTEENTH. 
DEFEAT  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION. 

EFFECT   OF    ENGLAND'S    ATTITUDE   ON    CONTINENTAL   EUROPE  —  NEW    CUBAN    POLICY  AND  ITS 

COMPLETE  REVERSAL  IN  OUR  FAVOR  —  THE  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE  ACCEPTED  IT  AS  PROOF 

OF  AN  ALLIANCE  —  CHARACTER  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTAL  DIPLOMACIES  AND  THE  METH 

ODS    OF   THEIR   PROCEDURE  —  ACTION   AND  ATTITUDE   OF  ALL  THE  NATIONS 

WHEN    WAR    BEGAN  —  EFFECT    OF    DEWEY'S  VICTORY   AT    MANILA. 

I. 

THE    action    of    Great    Britain,  which    converted    the    intended 
menace  into  assurances  of  apologetic   anxiety,  and  thus   en 
abled    the    President    to    express,   under  terms    of  courteous 
acknowledgment,  the  unalterable  determination  of  the  United 
States  not  to  permit  interference  by  the  European  concert  in  any  of 
our  differences  with  Spain,  was  as  annoying  to  the  concert  as  it  was 
gratifying  to  the  American  people.     Our  old  fraternal 

REPULSE  OF  ,  ,.        „         ,  , 

PROPOSED  enemy  had  atoned  to  the  great  republic  for  the  wrongs 


inflicted  upon  the  colonies  before  1776.    At  the  oppor 
tune  moment  Great  Britain  had  chosen  between  aliens 
in  language  and  political  ideals  and  a  people  possessing  substantially 
those  she  possessed.     And  she  chose  her  own. 

Whatever  reasons  may  be  ascribed  to  England,  of  selfish  interest 
or  shrewd  foresight,  her  decision  cannot  be  impeached  as  lacking  in 
that  unerring  common  sense  and  high  intelligence  of  practical  pur 
pose  which  characterizes  what  are  known  as  the  Anglo-Saxon  people. 
There  is  nothing  permanent  in  the  effusions  of  impulsive  sentiment 
alone.  The  United  States  not  less  than  England  has  founded  her 
greatness  upon  practical  and  material  interests.  The  independence 
of  the  American  colonies,  achieved  against  gross  oppression  by  the 
mother  country,  has  been  of  vast  benefit,  not  alone  to  the  enfran 
chised  colonies,  but  to  the  people  of  England.  In  contrast  with  the 
Continental  and  South  American  republics,  —  mere  personal  or  organized 

(252) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  253 

autocracies  wearing  republican  costume, —  the  British  people  have 
studied  the  United  States,  and  have  themselves  erected  a  great  repub 
lic  attired  in  the  robes  only  of  monarchy  and  imperialism. 

The  first  result  of  England's  action  was  to  inflame  Europe  against 
her  and  intensify  the  feeling  against  the  United  States,  though  it  could 
not  be  expressed  in  overt  acts.  It  must  be  admitted  that  Europe  had 
abundant  reason  for  disappointment.  For  a  hundred  years  it  had  been 
England's  expressed  policy  to  maintain  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in 
Cuba  against  any  strong  maritime  rival,  particularly  the  United  States. 
Mr.  Canning  said  during  his  primacy  that  "the  possession  by  the  United 
States  of  both  shores  of  the  channel,  through  which  our  Jamaica  trade 
must  pass,  would,  in  time  of  war  with  the  United  States,  or,  indeed, 
of  a  war  in  which  the  United  States  might  be  neutral,  but  in  which 
we  continued  to  claim  the  right  of  search  and  the  Americans  to  resist 
it,  amount  to  a  suspension  of  that  trade  and  to  a  consequent  total  ruin 
of  a  great  portion  of  our  West  Indian  interests." 

The  utterance  was  made  in  support  of  his  proposal  to  send  a  squad 
ron  to  Havana  to  check  any  advances  the  United  States  might  be 
tempted  to  make  in  1822.  As  late  as  1852,  England,  foreseeing  the 
probable  construction  of  a  canal  through  the  Central  American  isthmus, 
served  notice  upon  the  United  States  of  its  expectations.  In  that  note 
was  this  paragraph:  — 

"  Now,  if  the  maritime  Powers  are,  on  the  one  hand,  out  of  respect  to  the  rights  of 
Spain,  and  from  a  sense  of  international  duty,  bound  to  dismiss  all  intention  of  obtain 
ing  possession  of  Cuba,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  are  they  obliged,  out  of  consideration  for 
the  interests  of  their  own  subjects  or  citizens,  and  the  protection  of  the  commerce  of 
other  nations,  who  are  all  entitled  to  the  use  of  the  great  highways  of  commerce  on 
equal  terms,  to  proclaim  and  assure,  as  far  as  in  them  lies,  the  present  and  future  neu 
trality  of  the  island  of  Cuba." 

So  tenacious  had  been  England's  purpose  to  guard  the  interests  of  her 
vast  maritime  commerce  in  the  West  Indies,  and  even  its  future  oppor 
tunities,  that  she  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the  United  States  an 
agreement  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  that  a  canal  through  the 
isthmus,  if  built,  should  be  open  to  ships  of  all  nations  upon  equal 


254  HISTORY   OF   THE 

terms,  in  times  of  war  as  well  as  peace,  and  that  the  United  States 
would  not  establish  any  fortifications  or  exert  any  control  in  violation 
of  that  pledge. 

In  view  of  these  facts  of  history,  the  continental  nations  naturally 
sought  reasons  for  the  sudden  volte-face  upon  a  question  of  the 
greatest  magnitude  to  the  supremacy  of  British  maritime  interests. 
France,  it  was  asserted,  had  taken  the  initiative  in  forming  the  con 
cert  and  in  seeking  England's  agreement  to  it.  If  this  is  true,  there 
was  very  good  reason,  because  France  and  England  had  been  closely 
united  in  Cuban  understandings.  Just  after  the  Mexican  War  these 
two  Governments  had  proposed  to  us  a  tripartite  agreement  of  self- 
denial  between  each  other  and  joint  denial  against  other  nations,  against 
taking  possession  of  Cuba  and  to  discountenace  attempts  toward  that 
purpose  on  the  part  of  Cubans  themselves,  though  it  was  not  to  prej 
udice  the  right  of  Cubans  to  assert  and  obtain  independence.  The 
treaty  was  rejected  by  the  Fillmore  administration  and  England  re 
tired  with  a  direct  notice  of  her  determination  to  exercise  her  free 
right  to  enforce  her  views,  if  occasion  arose,  by  combination  with 
other  interested  nations. 

The  expressed  intention  of  the  United  States  not  to  annex  Cuba 
or  to  do  more  than  establish  the  freedom  of  the  people,  and  their 
right  to  self-government  in  1898,  did  not  afford  any  explanation  of 
England's  attitude.  It  was  not  possible  for  continental  diplomats 
to  believe  that  the  declaration  of  such  magnanimous  purpose  was 
more  than  a  hypocritical  cloak  for  the  acquisition  of  rich  territory. 
Even  if  that  were  possible  it  did  not  explain  England's  purpose. 
During  the  Ten  Years'  War  in  Cuba  when  the  Virgin  his  affair  was 
agitating  the  United  States,  President  Grant  had  proposed  the  inde 
pendence  of  Cuba  to  Europe  through  diplomatic  overtures.  France 
remembered  that  England  had  then  urged  the  Powers  to  refuse,  and 
the  proposition  fell  lifeless. 

It  was  not  to  be  believed  that  England  relied  upon  the  self-deny 
ing  purpose  of  the  United  States  in  1898  more  than  in  1874  —  besides 
international  philanthropy  was  the  dream  of  utopian  people  only. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  255 

The  only  reason  practicable  under  continental  ideas  was  that  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  had  established  an  agreement  to  resist 
European  intervention,  or  coercion,  in  Cuban  affairs,  in  order  that  they 
might  take  and  hold  the  invaluable  island  for  themselves.  They  were 
confirmed  in  this  by  the  publication  in  an  English  newspaper  of  recog 
nized  authority  of  the  statement  that  the  Queen's  ministers  had  deter 
mined  to  remain  neutral;  that  if  any  combination  was  formed  to  in 
terfere  with  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  would  not  only  hold 
aloof  from  it,  but  would,  in  fact,  assist  the  United  States.  The  publi 
cation  was  not  upon  official  authority,  but  it  was  not  denied. 

The  view  continental  governments  took  of  these  movements,  in 
dicating  a  perfect  accord  between  the  two  nations,  was  of  profound 
significance.  An  alliance  of  English-speaking  nations  was  gigantic  in 
its  potentialities.  It  offered  elements  of  cohesive  strength  in  a  common 
language,  correlated  ideals  and  purposes,  and  in  material  wealth  and 
power,  that  was  incalculably  threatening.  The  continental  nations, 
speaking  diverse  languages,  accustomed  to  diverse  ideals  and  purposes, 
honeycombed  with  petty  jealousies,  the  masses  of  people  weakened 
in  faith  by  growing  temptation  to  emigrate  to  the  United  States  or 
the  British  Colonies,  whence  came  from  relatives  and  friends  estab 
lished  there  glowing  accounts  of  peace,  prosperity,  and  freedom  —  all 
these  constituted  elements  of  disintegration,  in  spite  of  the  perfection 
of  their  enormous  war  establishments. 

Besides,  if  there  actually  existed  an  Anglo-American  agreement, 
resistance  to  it  meant  the  precipitation  of  that  dreaded  evil  of  the 
century's  governmental  development  —  universal  war. 

The  failure  of  the  concerted  representation,  and  the  specters  evoked 
by  the  situation,  left  Europe  without  immediate  plan  of  action,  but 
the  pressure  to  force  intervention  grew  stronger  during  inaction. 


256  HISTORY   OF   THE 


II. 

WHEN,  therefore,  we  declared  war  with  Spain,  England  was  our 
acknowledged  friend ;  Russia  was  practically  the  unchanged  friend 
CHARACTERS  OF  of  all  previous  political  existence ;  France,  the  first  of 
MATicIPL°~  our  fr'ieilds  and  allies,  torn  by  distracting  interests 
CONTESTANTS  and  political  jealousies,  was  leading  the  opposition  to 
our  purpose ;  Germany,  bound  to  us  by  the  natural  strong  ties  created 
by  millions  of  faithful  and  excellent  citizens  come  to  us  from  all 
parts  of  the  sturdy  Fatherland  of  genius,  courage,  and  energetic  in 
dustry,  was  unfriendly  in  its  ruling  classes,  but  yet  to  be  relied  upon 
in  the  body  of  its  people ;  Austria,  of  course,  was  devoted  to  Spain 
with  feeble  power;  Italy  expressed  popular  approval  of  our  intentions; 
the  Spanish-American  republics  were  officially  loyal  in  the  fullest  degree 
to  their  continental  protector,  but  the  blood  and  language  of  Spain 
decided  the  sympathies  of  their  populations  against  us. 

The  narrative  of  the  adventures  of  these  governmental  interests 
during  the  war  is  not  less  interesting  than  the  story  of  actual  war  itself. 
For,  after  all,  one  nation,  among  all  the  nations,  is  as  one  person, 
made  up  of  the  types  of  its  population  composed  into  a  generalization 
of  their  traditions,  intelligence,  character,  wealth,  and  local  customs. 
The  capacity  of  a  nation  for  courage,  purpose,  and  ambition  is  ex 
pressed  as  it  is  in  one  man.  Pride  or  simplicity,  impulsiveness  or 
deliberation,  jealousy  or  trustfulness,  strength  or  weakness,  candor 
or  duplicity,  appear  in  nations,  and  are  as  distinctly  recognizable  as 
in  men. 

The  establishment  of  a  free  democracy  in  the  United  States  was 
upon  the  foundation  of  the  equal  political  rights  of  all  men,  and  the 
social  equality  of  all  men  to  the  extent  of  their  equipment.  To  the 
leadership  of  a  vast,  nervous,  energetic,  and  ambitious  population,  wre 
have  called  men  of  natural  genius  and  capacity,  without  regard  to  prec 
edent  or  origin.  It  is  not  form  so  much  as  substance  that  free  de 
mocracy  demands.  The  great  Liberator  and  profound  statesman  among 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  257 

our  leaders  began  life  as  a  rail-splitter ;  the  great  General,  twice  pres 
ident,  began  as  a  farm  boy  and  tanner.  We  have  honored  a  canal- 
boat  boy,  a  tailor,  farmers,  lawyers  —  there  is  no  presidential  caste 
excluding  any  male  child  born  in  the  United  States.  Those  of  our 
leaders  who  have  shown  greatest  genius  have  usually  been  those 
who  had  the  humblest  beginnings  in  life.  In  the  war  with  Spain 
every  leader  that  was  to  develop  sprang  from  the  common  average 
of  industrious  and  sturdy  citizenship. 

The  American  national  character  as  expressed  by  its  Government 
is  an  aggregation  of  directness  of  purpose,  disregard  of  details  that 
are  not  vital,  and  a  sort  of  energy  in  action  that  may  be  best  de 
scribed,  perhaps,  in  the  American  phrase  of  "  getting  down  to  business," 
with  the  intention  of  going  directly  to  the  point  without  evasion. 

In  monarchical  government  the  theory  of  the  power  of  royalty 
"by  the  grace  of  God"  demanded  through  many  centuries,  and  does 
yet  demand  in  a  modified  form,  that  the  idea  shall  always  be 
materially  presented  through  the  glamour  of  splendid  ceremonial, 
privileged  castes,  the  exclusion  of  subjects  from  the  -affairs  of  the 
sovereign,  who  is  the  state ;  consequently,  the  envelopment  of  state 
functions,  diplomatic  exchanges,  and  political  procedure  in  a  cloud  of 
ceremonious  formalities,  precedents,  mysterious  phrases,  and  time- 
consuming  leisureliness,  has  made  European  diplomatic  service  a  pro 
fession  open  to  those  who  have  mastered  the  cult  and  closed  usually 
to  those  who  have  only  the  capacity. 

It  is  because  representatives  of  our  government  at  these  centers 
of  etiquette  have  ignored  nice  distinctions  (that  could  only  delay 
progress)  in  order  to  conclude  a  simple  matter,  that  they  have  been 
regarded  with  terror,  Americans  generally  described  as  "  pigs,"  and 
our  whole  governmental  procedure  in  diplomacy  as  "  brutal."  Prince 
Bismarck,  the  greatest  man  of  the  century  in  intellectual  power  and 
clearness  of  foresight,  was  celebrated  as  one  European  diplomat  who 
brutally  told  the  truth,  while  others,  who  knew  thoroughly  well  the 
esoteric  verbiage  in  which  to  encase  a  fact  and  involve  it  in  tortu 
ous  uncertainties,  dreaded  to  meet  him  in  conference  or  negotiation. 

17 


258  HISTORY   OF   THE 

He  mastered  them  with  ease,  and  they  described  him  as  intolerably 
brutal  in  stating  his  demands.  But  Bismarck,  himself,  when,  at  the 
Berlin  Peace  Congress,  he  met  Disraeli, —  who  was  master  of  the 
etiquette  of  diplomacy,  as  well  as  of  the  power  of  direct  and  energetic 
pressure,  stripped  of  all  reservation  and  pretense, — said,  "I  do  not 
care  much  for  their  Lord  Salisbury,  who  is  merely  a  wooden  lath, 
painted  to  look  like  iron ;  but  look  out  for  that  terrible  Jew  —  he 
means  business." 

Of  all  European  governments  —  excepting,  of  course,  that  of  the 
Sultan — the  diplomacy  of  Spain  has  been  the  most  artful  and  un 
scrupulous  in  method.  Having  small  significance  among  nations, 
because  of  her  poverty  and  degeneration,  her  diplomacy  has  been  exer 
cised  by  dynasties  and  cabinets  upon  the  political  factions  of  the  Span 
ish  people,  upon  the  revolutionists  of  the  outraged  colonies,  and  guarded 
as  a  weapon  to  be  used  by  leaders  temporarily  in  power,  but  not  to  be 
betrayed  to  the  common  people.  The  chief  diplomatic  weapon  she  has 
used  in  times  of  revolution  was  magnanimous  promise,  canceled  by 
cruelest  treachery.  The  Ten  Years'  Revolution  was  brought  to  an  end 
by  the  promise  of  Marshal  Campos  that  Maceo  and  all  his  officers 
and  soldiers  should  be  permitted  to  leave  Cuba,  and  that  the  in 
surgent  slaves  should  be  emancipated  to  full  citizenship  without  pun 
ishment.  The  terms  were  accepted,  Maceo  left  the  island;  but  his 
officers  were  sent  prisoners  to  Ceuta,  and  the  slaves  were  not  emanci 
pated  until  most  of  them  had  died  under  punishment  from  masters 
against  whom  they  had  revolted.  In  the  Philippines  revolutionists 
have  been  soothed  by  decrees  of  chivalrous  amnesty.  When  they 
reported  to  surrender  arms,  they  were  massacred  in  cold  blood. 

Hundreds  of  instances  might  be  cited  of  Spain's  Machiavellian 
procedure.  The  revolutions  in  Cuba  that  devastated  the  island,  de 
stroyed  prosperity  and  trade,  and  involved  the  United  States  in  con 
tinuous  cost  and  hurt  by  the  necessity  of  suppressing  filibustering 
expeditions,  were  due  to  Spain's  utter  incompetency  to  govern.  Yet 
for  years,  by  the  exercise  of  the  most  adroit  diplomatic  duplicity,  by 
explanations  and  promises  limitless  in  ingenious  cunning,  she  was 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  259 

able  to  prevent  action  until  the  atrocities  of  Captain-General  Weyler 
revolted  our  common  instinct  of  humanity.  In  the  presence  of  the 
horror  she  had  aroused,  her  politicians  shifted  places  and  the  relentless 
cruelties  of  Canovas  were  succeeded  by  the  generous  promises  of 
Sagasta.  Autonomy  had  been  promised  often  before  with  the  knowl 
edge  that  it  could  be  suspended.  Hesitating  upon  that  memory 
the  doubt  of  the  United  States  was  answered  by  the  sacrifice  of  the 
Maine. 

Such  was  governmental  Spain  among  international  associates— 
the  persuasive  and  enticing  strumpet  of  diplomatic  morals,  whose 
idea  of  national  virtue  was  that  the  more  sincere  it  was  the  more 
it  would  cost  to  purchase.  What  more  could  be  expected  of  a 
country  whose  social  code  is  crowded  with  maxims  such  as  these:  — 

"Renounce  the  devil  and  thou  shalt  wear  a  shabby  cloak.  The  good  man's  son 
inherits  poverty.  Alas,  for  the  son  whose  father  went  to  heaven!  Blessed  is  the 
son  whose  father  went  to  the  devil.  The  official  who  cannot  lie  may  as  well  be 
out  of  the  world.  He  who  does  not  lie  does  not  come  of  good  blood.  Gold  is 
omnipotent,  and  the  ducat  is  his  lord-lieutenant." 

The  usages  of  diplomacy  in  Europe  rendered  the  continental  nations 
much  more  susceptible  to  influence  by  the  Spanish  procedure  than 
Great  Britain  or  the  United  States.  France,  especially,  with  vast 
financial  stakes  in  Spanish  securities,  and  Austria,  moved  by  ties 
of  family,  could  give  great  assistance  in  an  attempt  to  entice  Europe 
into  a  threatening  attitude  against  us. 


in. 

PUBLIC  manoeuvring  and  feinting  in  diplomacy  are  carried  on  along 
lines  of  phrases  calculated  to  hasten  or  delay  expected  action  by  others 
or  to  invite  expression  of  opinion.  Thus,  a  dispatch 

WHAT  WAS  DONE 

beginning,  "  It  is  reported  here  in  political  circles,"  etc.,       WHEN  WAR 
means  that  the  press  of  the  other  interested   country 
will  reveal  how  popular  opinion  receives  the  action  rumored  as  prob 
able.    Then,  there  is  the  phrase,  "An  attache  of  a  foreign  embassy, 


260  HISTORY   OF   THE 

of  high  standing,  declared  to-day,"  etc.  The  phrases  progress  in  defi- 
niteness  thus:  "It  is  rumored  that  the  Government  is  preparing  a 
decree";  "Unofficial  announcement  is  made";  Semi-official  statements 
appeared  to-day";  "Official  announcements  were  issued  by  the  Govern 
ment  to-day."  Usually  the  latter  is  final,  but,  if  a  loophole  is  vitally 
necessary,  it  is  possible  to  follow  the  official  deoree  with  this:  "The 
minister  of  war  has  advised  the  authorities  that  the  official  decree 
published  yesterday  is  subject,  of  course,  to  all  the  modifications  con 
sistent  with  the  decree  of  the  year  before  last,  defining  the  status  of 
the  governmental  bugbear,"  etc.  It  must  be  remembered  that  these 
are  mere  primary  phrases  in  the  diplomatic  Ollendorf.  When  one 
government  is  in  position  to  secure  the  dissemination  of  these  feints 
by  origination  in  the  news  center  of  another  country,  the  finesse  in 
creases  in  complication.  While  the  antagonist  is  occupied  in  delib 
erating  upon  the  intention  or  significance  of  the  feint,  much  may  be 
done. 

On  the  day  that  Sampson's  fleet  sailed  from  Havana,  "it  was 
reported"  from  London  that  Great  Britain  was  preparing  a  neutral 
ity  proclamation  for  immediate  issuance  and  that  the  cruiser  Albany, 
which  we  had  purchased  and .  were  outfitting  at  New  Castle  to  bring 
home,  and  the  torpedo  boat  Somers,  at  Falmouth,  would  not  be  able  to 
leave  those  ports  within  the  regulation  time,  and  therefore  must  remain 
until  after  the  war.  It  would  also  force  Dewey's  squadron  from 
Hong-Kong. 

Spain  had  war  vessels  in  French  docks  and  ports;  in  Italian  ports; 
her  finest  squadron  in  the  Portuguese  harbor  of  St.  Vincent,  Cape  de 
Verde  Islands,  in  Argentina.  If  England  chose  to  rush  into  neutrality 
before  official  declaration  of  war,  there  was  no  reason  why  France 
and  Portugal  need  hurry  to  disoblige  a  neighboring  government. 

The  United  States,  thus  reminded,  hurried  the  last  details  of  prepa 
ration.  Cargoes  of  ammunition,  of  sulphur,  of  various  war  supplies, 
were  cleared  from  all  ports  where  they  originated.  From  Washing 
ton  went  a  semi-official  statement,  that  if  England  took  such  hasty 
action  this  government  would  demand  of  Portugal  immediate  action 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  261 

to  compel  Cervera's  fleet  to  leave  St.  Vincent.  Cervera's  fleet  was  in 
distress  for  coal  and  supplies. 

Four  days  later  Washington  furnished  a  paragraph  that  "  the  War 
and  Navy  Department  officials  are  looking  forward  with  interest," 
to  the  official  publication  of  Great  Britain's  proclamation  of  neutrality; 
that  Dewey's  fleet  at  Hong  Kong  and  a  Spanish  torpedo  boat  at  Queens- 
town  had  been  ordered  to  leave  those  British  ports  in  advance  of  official 
publication,  that,  however,  the  United  States  would  probably  not 
make  demands  on  Portugal  until  Great  Britain's  action  was  formally 
announced.  From  London  "a  Berlin  correspondent  learned  "  that  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  would  not  interfere,  but  that  France  and  Austria, 
and  probably  Italy,  would  do  so  after  the  first  collision,  "even  if  it 
prove  quite  indecisive." 

The  next  day  in  the  British  Commons  Mr.  Balfour  announced  that 
the  proclamation  of  neutrality  would  soon  be  ready,  and  the  press 
dispatches  gave  information  that  "the  report  that  American  war  ships 
had  been  notified  to  depart  within  forty-eight  hours  is  incorrect." 
That  day  Congress  declared  that  a  state  of  war  existed,  and  the  next 
day  the  President  cabled  his  proclamation  of  that  declaration  to  all 
the  nations.  England  at  once  issued  neutrality  commands,  put  Dewey's 
fleet  upon  notice  to  sail,  and  the  Albany  and  Somers,  unprepared,  were 
locked  up  pending  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  President's  proclamation  granted  to  all  Spanish  merchant  ships 
in  our  harbors,  when  the  war  began,  a  period  of  thirty  days  for  safe 
clearance.  The  act  perplexed  Spain.  "What,"  asked  the  official  press 
"is  the  meaning  of  this  moderation  after  so  many  provocations?  Does 
America  want  to  gain  time?"  Spanish  military  and  financial  circles 
were  anxious.  They  translated  our  fairness  as  foreboding  an  intention 
to  prolong  preparations  until  autumn,  and  thus  wear  Spain  out  in 
expense  and  anxiety.  They  could  not  believe  we  were  eager  to  fight 
the  "  invincible  forces  of  Spain."  This  question  was  answered  the  same 
day  by  the  bombardment  of  Matanzas  and  the  death  on  the  field  of 
glory  of  Captain-General  Blanco's  historic  mule  of  Matanzas.  All  eyes 
were  thus  fixed  upon  Cuba. 


262  HISTORY   OF    THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

The  publication  by  Washington  that  Dewey's  fleet  had  withdrawn 
to  Mirs  Bay  and  would  sail  thence  to  Manila,  was  answered  by  dis 
patches  from  Madrid  that  the  American  squadron  that  was  going 
to  Manila  was  composed  of  vessels  of  no  importance  and  that  Manila 
was  enthusiastically  eager  to  receive  them,  and  all  preparations  were 
complete  to  destroy  them.  Two  days  later  Madrid  announced  "  it  is 
rumored  here "  that  Germany  had  officially  warned  the  United  States 
that  she  would  not  permit  bombardment  of  any  of  the  principal  towns 
in  the  Philippines  for  the  reason  that  German  interests  would  suffer 
greatly  from  such  an  act. 

Throughout  the  first  ten  days  the  British  Government  had  made 
no  sign,  but  popular  feeling  in  England  and  Canada  had  expressed 
itself  in  open  and  universal  enthusiasm  for  the  United  States. 
Messages  of  sympathy  and  hope  had  been  cabled  to  the  President 
from  societies  and  public  meetings,  and  the  newspapers  were  filled 
with  cheer.  To  a  London  correspondent,  admitted  to  an  interview, 
the  President  had  said,  for  publication  in  London,  in  answer  to  the 
question  whether  he  had  any  message  for  the  English  people: 
"  Tell  them  that  the  people  of  our  whole  nation  respond  to  their 
expressions.  And,"  he  added.  "  tell  them  we  will  not  forget." 

To  this  Madrid  replied  through  Paris  in  an  interview  with  the 
Conservative  leader,  Silvela,  in  which  he  declared  Spain's  intention 
to  convene  the  Powers  of  Europe  for  intervention  as  necessary  to 
continental  interests.  "England,"  he  said,  "has  sided  with  the  United 
States,  but  it  will  not  be  long  until  she  perceives  the  immensity  of 
her  mistake." 

The  very  next  day  the  explosion  of  Dewey's  shells  annihilating 
the  Spanish  fleet  in  Manila  Bay,  glorious  as  the  sound  was  to  this 
nation,  frightful  as  it  was  to  Spanish  hopes,  was  yet  merely  the  hiss 
ing  of  a  fuse  that  was  to  explode  the  greatest  international  political 
bomb-shell  of  the  century. 


CHAPTER   THE   NINETEENTH. 
THE  PHILIPPINES  QUESTION. 

DEWEY'S  VICTORY  AND  ITS  EFFECT  UPON  THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  IN  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS- 
LORD  SALISBURY'S  SPEECH  ON  LIVING  AND  DEAD  NATIONS  — EXPLANATION  OF  THE  EAST 
ERN   QUESTION  DEVELOPED  SINCE  THE  CHINESE-JAPANESE  WAR  — MR.  CHAMBER 
LAIN'S  STARTLING   SPEECH  SUGGESTING  AN  ANGLO-AMERICAN   ALLIANCE 
ON  THE  LINES  OF  COMMON  PURPOSES  —  THE  SENSATION  CAUSED 
IN    THE    WORLD    BY    His    UNEXPECTED    FREEDOM    OK 
SPEECH,   AGAINST  ALL  CABINET    PRECEDENTS. 


I. 


w 


ITHIN  forty-eight  hours  after   Dewey  had  hoisted   the   Star 
Spangled  Banner  over  the  arsenal  at  Cavite  international 
governmental  diplomacy  was  astounded  at 
the  interjection  of  the  Philippines  question       TURE  OF  THE 


into  the  complications  and  threatening  aspects  of  the 
Eastern  Question.  The  first  news  of  our  victory  called 
into  existence  in  the  United  States  a  new  spirit  that  from  various 
quarters  demanded  the  capture  of  the  entire  Philippine  Archipelago  and 
the  holding  of  the  islands  as  American  colonies.  This  was  echoed  by 
similar  suggestions  from  England  and  was  opposed  by  strong  elements 
in  this  country  as  well  as  by  intimations  from  continental  capitals 
that  such  action  was  impossible  in  view  of  the  political  policy  of  the 
United  States,  even  if  the  attempt  should  not  be  prevented  by  Europe. 
Before  the  final  reports  of  the  utter  destruction  of  Monte  jo's  squadron 
were  received,  the  situation  at  Manila  could  only  be  guessed  at,  but 
the  question  was  debated  fiercely. 

The  first  news  made  public  by  Spain  that  the  American  ships  had 
been  repulsed,  followed  by  reluctant  admissions  of  partial  Spanish 
defeat  and  intimations  of  injuries  to  the  Americans,  left  upon  Euro 
pean  minds  a  doubt  whether  Dewey's  victory  had  been  as  sweeping 
as  claimed  at  Washington.  The  cutting  of  the  cable  deepened  the 

(263) 


264  HISTORY    OF   THE 

perplexity  until  official  dispatches  could  arrive.  The  United  States 
nourished  no  doubts  of  the  superiority  of  our  men  and  ships,  and 
England  expressed  no  hesitation  to  believe  the  full  extent  of  our 
success.  But  England  expressed  fears  that  Dewey  could  not  hold 
his  advantage  for  lack  of  supplies  and  assistance,  to  obtain  which 
would  involve  delay,  during  which  continental  jealousy  of  America 
would  be  accentuated.  France  threatened  us  immediately  with  vague 
hints  of  interference,  and  all  Europe  was  cheered  by  the  fact  that  our 
Pacific  squadron  lacked  a  secure  base  of  operations. 

After  the  battle  at  Cavite  the  British  consul  at  Manila  offered  to 
take  the  Chinese  population  under  British  protection.  Spain  refused 
the  offer  with  an  outburst  of  resentment  toward  Great  Britain,  accus 
ing  her  of  attempting  to  inject  Chinese  politics  into  the  situation. 
From  Russia  came  reproachful  intimations  that  an  Anglo-American 
alliance  would  be  distasteful,  reminding  us  of  old  friendship,  and  the 
fact  that  she  had  long  looked  forward  to  an  eventual  Russo-Ameri- 
can  alliance.  Germany  maintained  silence  during  the  opening  dis 
cussion. 

It  was  on  May  5  that,  Lord  Salisbury  having  returned,  petulant 
exchanges  of  feeling  became  serious  apprehensions.  On  that  day  he 
delivered  an  address  to  the  Primrose  League  in  London,  in  which 
he  referred  to  the  all-engrossing  subject  in  the  manner  of  the  old- 
fashioned  English  statesman,  avoiding  direct  mention  but  giving  to 
his  allusions  mysterious  suggestion  of  weight. 

He  began  his  address  gravely  by  declaring  that  he  could  not  pass 
by  the  terrible  conflict  now  being  waged  between  two  highly  civi 
lized  nations.  He  could  only  hope  that  the  recollection  of  the  bless 
ings  of  peace  would  before  long  restore  the  tranquillity  of  the  world. 
"I  cannot  dwell  upon  the  subject,"  he  said,  "without  danger  of  de 
parting  from  that  attitude  of  strict  neutrality  which  it  is  my  duty, 
as  well  as  that  of  many  others,  to  maintain."  After  discussing  point 
edly  the  dangerous  relations  between  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France,  as  developed  in  the  Eastern  Question,  he  closed  with  a 
foreboding  criticism  that  was  to  enrage  Europe.  The  nations  of  the 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  •_)<;;, 

earth,  he  declared,  might  be  roughly  divided  as  the  living  and  the  dying. 
On  one  side  were  the  great  countries  of  enormous  power,  with  rail 
roads  giving  them  the  means  of  concentrating  at  one  point  the  whole 
military  force  of  their  population,  and  assembling  armies  of  a  mag 
nitude  never  dreamed  of  in  generations  gone  by,  with  weapons  grow 
ing  in  their  efficiency  for  destruction. 

By  the  side  of  these  splendid  organizations,  which  presented  rival 
claims  that  the  future  might  only  be  able  by  bloody  arbitrament  to 
adjust,  there  were  a  number  of  communities  which  he  could  only  de 
scribe  as  dying.  They  were  mainly  the  communities  that  were  not 
Christian,  but  he  regretted  to  say  that  this  was  not  exclusively  a 
fact.  In  these  States  disorganization  and  decay  were  advancing  al 
most  as  fast  as  the  power  of  the  others  was  increasing.  There  were 
other  countries  which  were  not  well  provided  with  leading  men  or 
ministers  in  whom  they  could  trust,  that  were  apparently  draw 
ing  nearer  and  nearer  to  that  fate,  and  yet  clinging  with  strange 
tenacity  to  the  life  they  had. 

Misgovernment,  he  said,  was  constantly  on  the  increase  there,  and 
their  administration  was  a  mass  of  corruption,  so  that  there  was  no 
firm  ground  on  which  any  hope  of  reform  or  restoration  could  be 
based,  and  in  other  degrees  they  were  presenting  a  terrible  picture 
to  the  more  enlightened  portion  of  the  world.  How  long  that  state 
of  things  was  likely  to  go  on,  he  would  not  attempt  to  prophesy.  All 
he  could  indicate  was  that  the  process  was  proceeding  and  that  the 
weak  States  were  becoming  weaker  and  the  strong  States  becoming 
stronger. 

He  did  not  think  it  was  necessary  to  go  into  any  detail,  but  only  to 
point  out  what  the  inevitable  result  of  that  process  must  be.  It  was 
that  the  living  nations  would  gradually  encroach  upon  the  territory 
of  the  dying  States  and  the  seeds  of  conflict  would  speedily  appear. 
Undoubtedly,  England  would  not  be  allowed  to  be  at  a  disadvan 
tage  in  any  rearrangement  that  might  take  place.  On  the  other 
hand,  England  would  not  be  jealous  if  desolation  and  sterility  were 
removed  by  the  aggrandizement  of  a  rival  Power. 


266  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  studied  care  with  which  Lord  Salisbury  refrained  from  desig 
nating  the  governments  decaying  in  public  corruption,  was  the  old- 
school  manner  of  lending  profound  significance  to  the  countries 
obviously  in  point.  China,  threatened  with  dismemberment;  France 
in  the  throes  of  fear  through  the  intimations  of  unspeakable  corrup 
tion  in  her  legislative  and  military  oligarchy,  exposed  by  glimpses  of 
the  Dreyfus  case;  Spain,  honeycombed  with  dishonest  administrators 
and  helpless  to  govern  at  home  or  abroad  —  these  were  some  of  the 
interesting  names  with  which  to  fill  the  blanks. 

As  if  to  add  emphasis  to  Salisbury's  warning,  the  Chinese  Minister 
to  the  Court  of  St.  James  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  spoke  at 
a  public  dinner  with  cordial  welcome  to  Great  Britain.  He  said  the 
only  way  China  could  survive  in  competition  with  the  world  was  by 
combining  with  Great  Britain,  to  whom  she  offered  a  free  field  for 
her  commerce.  China,  hitherto,  had  been  the  most  exclusive  country 
in  the  world,  acting  on  the  principle  of  excluding  outsiders.  This  was 
now  the  principle  of  only  her  common  people.  The  educated  classes 
were  prepared  to  welcome  British  trade  and  desired  that  the  friendship 
of  the  two  countries  be  consolidated  on  the  widest  basis,  socially,  politi 
cally,  commercially,  and  economically.  He  referred  to  the  opening 
of  the  Chinese  waterways  and  the  impending  construction  of  railroads, 
and  said  he  hoped  that  every  obstacle  to  the  expansion  of  British  trade 
in  China  would  soon  be  removed. 

Four  days  after  the  glorious  first  day  of  Maj%  therefore,  Great 
Britain's  first  minister  and  the  Chinese  voice  had  thrust  upon  Europe 
the  Philippines  question  wrapped  in  the  Eastern  Question. 

Further  significance  was  given  by  the  preparations  already  hurry 
ing  in  the  United  States  to  send  Major-General  Merritt  with  troops 
to  the  aid  of  Admiral  Dewey. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  267 


n. 

THE  Eastern  Question,  that  is,  the  aspect  of  it  that  interposed  itself 
between  the  United  States  and  any  practical  interference  by  Europe 
with  our  seizure  of  the  Philippines,  may  be  briefly  sum- 

THE  EASTERN 

marized.  It  was  the  outgrowth  of  the  Chinese-Japanese  QUESTION  IN 
War.  The  Chinese  Empire  had  been  opened  to  the  com 
merce  of  the  world  many  years  ago  by  the  persistence  of  British  com 
mercial  interests.  What  are  called  "open  ports"  were  established  by 
England  through  which  all  commercial  exchanges  must  pass.  No  for 
eigner  was  permitted  to  enter  the  Empire  through  any  closed  port. 
The  Anglo-Chinese  treaty  pledged  England  against  attempting  to  ac 
quire  any  territorial  rights  beyond  the  coaling  station  and  commercial 
base  of  Hong-Kong,  and  it  pledged  China  not  to  alienate  to  any  other 
Power  any  portion  of  the  rich  and  productive  basin  of  the  Yang-tse- 
Kiang  River,  which  contains  half  of  the  400,000,000  inhabitants  of  the 
Empire. 

The  terms  of  the  treaty  were  kept  in  good  faith  and  other  nations 
made  treaties  with  China  by  which  they  were  permitted  to  extend 
their  commerce  through  the  open  ports  on  equal  terms  with  "the  most 
favored  nation."  Great  Britain's  maritime  preponderance  and  the 
close  relations  established  with  the  Chinese  administrators  gave  her 
great  advantages  of  good  will,  and  when  the  war  with  Japan  began 
the  value  of  her  trade  with  China  was  about  $200,000,000  annually, 
with  the  United  States  next  in  importance. 

Russia,  which  had  been  steadily  increasing  her  Asiatic  territory, 
seeking  an  open  harbor  on  the  Pacific  below  the  winter  ice  line,  had 
gradually  penetrated  down  the  coast  until  Korea  was  reached.  More 
advance  was  contemplated,  but  the  strength  of  Great  Britain  was 
feared. 

That  Great  Britain  did  not  exert  her  good  offices  to  avert  the  war 
between  China  and  Japan  was  surprising  to  European  governments. 
She  wras  friendly  with  both,  might  have  composed  the  grievances,  or, 
as  a  last  resort,  was  strong  enough  to  have  compelled  arbitration. 


268  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Her  failure  to  act  awoke  European  suspicion  of  her  wisdom  and  deter 
mination.  When,  therefore,  in  1893,  the  treaty  of  peace  between  China 
and  Japan  had  been  concluded  at  Shimoniseki,  to  the  dissatisfaction 
of  the  defeated  nation,  by  yielding  Korea  to  Japan,  and  England  looked 
on  without  making  a  sign,  Russia  invited  Germany  and  France  to  in 
tervene  with  her.  The  result  was  that  the  Shimoniseki  treaty  was 
revised  by  them,  Japan  was  permitted  to  hold  Korea  as  a  guarantee 
only  until  China  should  pay  over  the  money  indemnity  for  the  cost 
of  war  as  agreed.  Great  Britain  made  no  protest  and  Japan  was 
compelled  to  renounce  the  advantages  gained  by  war  and  to  give  up 
all  hope  of  enlarging  her  industries  and  relieving  her  population  by 
having  a  foothold  on  the  mainland. 

The  weakness  displayed  by  Great  Britain  in  that  incident  set  in 
play  the  resources  of  impenetrable  Muscovite  diplomacy.  She  did 
not  make  the  first  move  — she  never  does — but  there  is  always  pro 
duced  a  capable  instrument  to  precede  and  open  the  way.  Two  or 
three  years  had  elapsed  when  two  German  missionaries  were  mur 
dered  by  a  Chinese  mob.  The  German  Emperor  sent  some  war  ships 
to  Kiao-Chou  Bay  on  the  west  coast  of  the  Yellow  Sea,  between  Korea 
and  Shantung  Province,  and  seized  the  port  and  bay  as  an  indem 
nity.  He  followed  that  by  demanding  a  cession  of  the  bay  and  a 
small  territorial  district  on  the  terms  upon  which  Great  Britain  held 
Hong-Kong. 

This  was  German  initiation,  but  the  Muscovite  justification  was 
established.  The  Czar  promptly  seized  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan, 
commanding  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Pe-chi-li,  within  reach  of 
Pekin  itself.  France  followed,  taking  the  island  of  Hainan  off  the 
south  coast,  protecting  the  French  colonies  of  Tongking  on  the  main 
land. 

These  successive  blows  to  the  prestige  of  Great  Britain  were  suffi 
cient  to  destroy  Chinese  confidence  in  her  strength.  Russia  at  once 
took  energetic  measures  to  complete  a  Manchurian  branch  of  the 
Trans-Siberian  railway  to  Port  Arthur,  and  began  to  acquire  actual 
ownership  of  land  by  purchasing  the  ground  in  Port  Arthur.  Alarmed 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAH  269 

by  these  proceedings  Great  Britain  obtained  from  the  Chinese  Emperor 
the  port  of  Wei-Hai-Wei,  commanding  the  approach  through  Korea 
Bay  to  Port  Arthur. 

The  situation  was  full  of  serious  menace  to  English  industries 
and  British  commerce.  The  Northern  Chinese  provinces,  now  within 
the  influence  and  under  the  fear  of  Russia,  could  be  crossed  with 
railways,  while  the  German  sphere  of  influence  south  of  Wei-Hai-Wei 
could  be  opened  through  similar  concessions.  The  promise  of  China 
that  the  valley  of  the  Yang-tse-Kiang  and  the  treasures  of  the  Middle 
Kingdom  should  never  be  alienated  to  any  other  Power  was  of  no 
importance,  if  the  territory  could  be  drained  of  and  supplied  with 
vast  commerce  through  flanking  encroachments. 

When  the  Spanish-American  war  opened,  therefore,  Great  Britain 
was  placed  between  the  alternatives  of  making  war  against  the  Russo- 
Franco-Germanic  Power,  or  of  surrendering  her  old  power  and  being 
undermined  of  her  great  commercial  trade  in  the  East.  She  could 
not  fully  rely  upon  Japan  as  an  ally,  although  the  two  nations  were 
well  able  to  defeat  the  three  in  opposition  on  the  sea.  English  manu 
facturers  and  shipowners  were  in  despair  at  the  prospect,  and  British 
politics  were  taking  on  threatening  aspects. 

This  was  why  Dewey's  victory  at  Manila,  and  the  instant  demand 
on  the  part  of  a  strong  body  in  the  United  States  to  hold  the  Philip 
pines,  were  so  enthusiastically  received  by  all  England.  Since  this 
country  had  at  stake  the  next  greatest  value  in  commerce  with  China, 
the  acquirement  by  us  of  vast  colonial  interests  in  the  Philippines 
would  increase  our  commerce  and  effectually  check  the  encroachments 
of  Russia,  Germany,  and  France.  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
could  be  depended  upon  to  maintain  open  doors  to  every  port  in 
China. 


270  HISTORY   OF    THE 


III. 

THE  resentful  protest  excited  in  continental  Europe  by  the  scarcely 

veiled  allusions  in  Lord  Salisbury's  speech  was  as  nothing  compared 

„  with  the  uproar  created  by  the  unexpected  and  remark- 

ANGLO- AMERICAN 

ALLIANCE  is  able  utterances  of  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain,  Colonial 
Secretary  in  the  English  cabinet,  on  May  13.  Mr.  Cham 
berlain's  speech  was  delivered  at  Birmingham  and  was  received  with 
great  outbursts  of  enthusiasm  by  the  vast  assemblage  that  listened 
to  it. 

Mr.  Chamberlain's  speech  was  as  remarkable  for  its  method  in  de 
parting  from  all  recognized  conventions  of  restraint  by  cabinet  ministers 
as  it  was  for  the  boldness  of  the  views  he  expressed,  views  that  amazed 
Europe — not  because  they  were  held,  but  because  the  etiquette  of 
cabinets  was  thus  rudely  destroyed.  Lord  Salisbury  had  uttered  dis 
agreeable  reflections,  but  he  had  uttered  them  in  correct  form,  so  that 
no  "  gentlemanly "  government  could  find  fault  with  the  manner. 
Mr.  Chamberlain,  on  the  other  hand,  was  telling  the  truth  so  directly 
and  plainly  as  to  be  offensive  to  all  the  governments  in  opposition. 

Mr.  Chamberlain  began  by  declaring  that  the  time  had  come  for 
English  leaders  to  leave  off  the  old  ideas  of  fifty  years  ago  and  speak 
plainly  to  the  great  public,  instead  of  keeping  mysteriously  silent. 
Then,  after  explaining  and  commenting  upon  Great  Britain's  long- 
continued  policy  of  isolation,  he  continued:  — 

"A  new  situation  has  arisen,  and  it  is  right  that  the  people  of  this  country  should 
have  it  under  their  consideration.  All  the  powerful  States  of  Europe  have  made  alli 
ances,  and  as  long  as  we  keep  outside  these  alliances,  as  long  as  we  are  envied  by  all, 
and  suspected  by  all,  and  as  long  as  we  have  interests  which  at  one  time  or  another 
conflict  with  the  interests  of  all,  we  are  liable  to  be  confronted  at  any  moment  with  a 
combination  of  Great  Powers  so  powerful  that  not  even  the  most  extreme,  the  most  hot 
headed  politician  would  be  able  to  contemplate  it  without  a  certain  sense  of  uneasiness. 
That  is  the  situation  which  I  want  you  to  have  in  view,  which  you  must  always  have  in 
view,  when  you  are  considering  the  results  of  the  foreign  policy  of  any  Government  in 
this  country.  We  stand  alone,  and  we  may  be  confronted  with  such  a  combination  as 
that  I  have  indicated  to  you.  What  is  the  first  duty  of  a  Government  under  these  cir 
cumstances?  I  say,  without  hesitation,  that  it  is  to  draw  all  parts  of  the  empire  closer 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  271 

together,  to  infuse  into  them  a  spirit  of  united  and  of  imperial  patriotism.  We  have 
not  neglected  that  primary  duty.  We  have  pursued  it  steadfastly  and  with  results  that 
are  patent  to  all  the  world.  Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  British  Empire  have  the 
ties  which  connected  us  with  our  great  colonies  and  dependencies  been  stronger;  never 
before  has  the  sense  of  common  interests  in  trade  and  in  defense  and  in  war — never 
before  has  the  sense  of  these  interests  been  more  strongly  felt  or  more  cordially 
expressed. 

"What  is  our  next  duty?  It  is  to  establish  and  to  maintain  bonds  of  permanent 
amity  with  our  kinsmen  across  the  Atlantic.  They  are  a  powerful  and  a  generous 
nation.  They  speak  our  language,  they  are  bred  of  our  race.  Their  laws,  their  litera 
ture,  their  standpoint  upon  every  question  are  the  same  as  ours;  their  feeling,  their 
interest  in  the  cause  of  humanity  and  the  peaceful  development  of  the  world  are  iden 
tical  with  ours.  I  do  not  know  what  the  future  has  in  store  for  us.  I  do  not  know 
what  arrangements  may  be  possible  with  us,  but  this  I  know  and  feel  —  that  the  closer, 
the  more  cordial,  the  fuller,  and  the  more  definite  these  arrangements  are  with  the  con 
sent  of  both  peoples,  the  better  it  will  be  for  both  and  for  the  world.  And  I  even  go 
so  far  as  to  say  that,  terrible  as  war  may  be,  even  war  itself  would  be  cheaply  purchased 
if  in  a  great  and  noble  cause  the  Stars  and  Stripes  and  the  Union  Jack  should  wave 
together  over  an  Anglo-Saxon  alliance.  Now,  it  is  one  of  the  most  satisfactory  results 
of  Lord  Salisbury's  policy  that  at  the  present  time  these  two  great  nations  understand 
each  other  better  than  they  have  ever  done  since  more  than  a  century  ago.  They  were 
separated  by  the  blunder  of  the  British  Government. 

"It  is  not  in  this  connection  that  our  foreign  policy  has  failed;  it  is  in  regard  to  the 
East,  and  especially  to  the  Far  East." 

After  discussing  the  comparative  situation  of  Great  Britain  in  China 
and  the  perils  that  threatened  British  interests  there,  Mr.  Chamberlain 
closed  with  this  declaration:  — 

"No,  there  was  only  one  alternative  to  the  policy  of  the  Government  —  the  policy  of 
war.  Let  us  consider  the  alternative.  We  might  have  declared  war  on  Russia.  We 
might  for  a  year  or  two  have  held  Port  Arthur  against  Russia,  but  we  have  no  military 
force  there  to  back  us  and  no  frontier  in  China.  I  am  one  of  those  who  think  that  for 
any  country  there  are  worse  things  than  war ;  there  is  loss  of  honor ;  there  is  loss  of 
those  interests  which  are  so  vital  to  the  security  of  the  existence  of  the  nation.  But,  in 
any  case,  I  hope  I  am  sensible  enough  never  to  give  my  voice  for  war  unless  I  can  see 
at  the  commencement  of  the  war  a  fair  probability  that  at  the  end  of  the  war  the  objects 
of  the  war  will  have  been  obtained.  Now,  what  does  history  show  us  ?  It  shows  us  that 
unless  we  are  allied  to  some  great  military  power,  as  we  were  in  the  Crimean  War,  when 
we  had  France  and  Turkey  as  our  allies,  we  cannot  seriously  injure  Russia,  although  it 
may  also  be  true  that  she  cannot  seriously  injure  us.  If  that  is  the  case,  it  is  a  case 
which  deserves  the  serious  consideration  of  the  people  of  this  country.  It  is  impossible 


272  HISTORY   OF   THE 

to  overrate  the  gravity  of  the  issue.  It  is  not  a  question  of  a  single  port  in  China  — 
that  is  a  very  small  matter.  It  is  not  a  question  of  a  single  province;  it  is  a  question  of 
the  whole  fate  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  and  our  interests  in  China  are  so  great,  our  pro 
portion  of  the  trade  is  so  enormous,  and  the  potentialities  of  that  trade  are  so  gigantic 
that  I  feel  that  no  more  vital  question  has  ever  been  presented  for  the  decision  of  a  Gov 
ernment  and  the  decision  of  a  nation,  and  for  my  part  I  have  tried  to-night  to  state 
clearly  and  without  exaggeration  the  conditions  of  the  problem  that  we  have  before  us. 
I  think  you  will  see  that  it  is  complicated  enough  to  preclude  all  hasty  judgment.  One 
thing  appears  to  me  to  be  certain.  If  the  policy  of  isolation,  which  has  hitherto  been 
the  policy  of  this  country,  is  to  be  maintained  in  the  future,  then  the  fate  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  may  be,  probably  will  be,  hereafter  decided  without  reference  to  our  wishes  and 
in  defiance  of  our  interests.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  determined  to  enforce  the 
policy  of  the  open  door,  to  preserve  an  equal  opportunity  for  trade  with  all  our  rivals, 
then  we  must  not  allow  Jingoes  to  drive  us  into  a  quarrel  with  all  the  world  at  the  same 
time,  and  we  must  not  reject  the  idea  of  an  alliance  with  those  Powers  whose  interests 
most  nearly  approximate  to  our  own.  I  have  thought  it  right  to  warn  you  of  the  dangers 
ahead.  But  I  have  a  great  confidence  in  the  future  of  this  country,  and  I  do  not  doubt 
that  an  issue  will  be  found  out  of  all  the  difficulties  which  will  be  worthy  of  our  tradi 
tion  and  our  race." 

The  day  before  this  startling  declaration  was  made  by  Mr.  Cham 
berlain,  the  official  papers  in  Germany  had  printed  an  official  com 
munication  from  the  Emperor's  Government,  called  out  by  rumors  in 
the  French,  English,  and  Austrian  press  that  German  sailors  and 
naval  officers  were  openly  fraternizing  with  the  Spanish  and  that 
Germany  would  oppose  American  seizure  of  the  Philippines.  The  com 
munication  declared  that,  after  the  Emperor's  declaration  in  the  speech 
from  the  throne,  upon  closing  the  session  of  the  Reichstag,  nobody 
could  doubt  that  Germany's  neutrality  would  be  loyal,  complete,  and 
strict.  Let  this  be  said  also  of  the  French,  English,  and  Austrian 
newspapers,  it  continued,  which  were  endeavoring  to  represent  the 
German  Government  and  public  opinion  as  taking  a  part  against 
policy.  Unless  there  should  be  imperative  reasons  for  force,  Germany 
would  do  nothing  to  disturb  the  friendship  existing  for  a  hundred 
years  with  a  country  where  millions  of  Germans  have  found  a  second 
fatherland. 

Mr.  Chamberlain's  advocacy  of  Anglo-American  alliance  in  terms 
of  eloquence  amounting  to  sentimental  enthusiasm,  had  come  as  if  in 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  273 

quick  response  to  the  German  Emperor's  calm  diplomatic  reserve. 
Spain  resented  it  bitterly,  and  Sefior  Sagasta  observed  that  if  he  had 
given  utterance  to  sentiments  so  full  of  feeling  Europe  would  have 
regarded  him  as  a  reckless  statesman.  The  Spanish  press  said,  "it 
was  believed"  Spain  would  appeal  to  Europe  to  oppose  an  Anglo- 
American  alliance,  and  that  the  day  such  a  document  was  signed 
would  be  the  date  of  the  conflagration  of  universal  war. 

The  organ  of  the  Social  Democracy  in  Germany  published  this 
comment,  which  was  significant  of  popular  German  opinion,  because 
no  prosecution  followed  it:  — 

"  Into  the  putrid  swamp  of  European  politics  has  been  cast  a  stone,  and  the 
turbid,  slimy  waters  spout  up.  The  great  Republic  on  yonder  side  of  the  ocean, 
without  castles,  nobles,  or  a  standing  army,  has  suddenly  sprung  out  of  her  posi 
tion  of  neutrality  to  Europe,  and  one  European  State  which  has  slaughtered 
myriads  of  men  wrestling  for  freedom  is  undone.  Old  Europe,  in  consequence,  is 
shaken  to  her  foundations.  It  is  a  new  power  — no  militarism,  no  huge  fleet,  yet 
a  mighty,  an  overwhelmingly  mighty,  elemental  power. 

"  In  Asia  the  same  phenomenon  has  appeared.  The  new  power  has  become  the 
balance  of  the  scales.  Even  if  an  alliance  with  England  comes  to  nothing,  the  new 
American  position  in  the  Far  East  crosses  every  combination  hitherto  effected." 

The  German  Government  made  no  sign,  but  expressed  surprise  that 
a  cabinet  minister  should  speak  with  such  unreserve.  The  French 
journals  considered  it  as  foreboding  designs  against  the  French  fleet 
and  then  against  Russia,  seeking  thus  to  alarm  her  Muscovite  ally  into 
action. 

The  semi-official  press  of  Moscow  assumed  for  Russia  a  strong  pro- 
Spanish  attitude.  It  denounced  the  Americans  as  pirates,  whom  only 
Great  Britain's  attitude  saved  from  having  to  face  the  coalition  of 
Europe.  It  was  jubilant  over  a  report  that  two  Spanish  vessels  had 
beaten  five  American  war  ships.  It  heartily  hoped  that  Spain  would 
be  the  victor  in  the  war. 

Other  papers  were  much  more  guarded  in  their  expressions,  though 
they  generally  displayed  a  pro-Spanish  tendency. 

Even  the  English  press  was  astonished  at  the  unexpected  candor 
of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  revelations,  and  hastened  to  explain  that  his 

18 


274  HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

declarations  would  be  construed  by  other  governments  so  as  to  find 
in  them  what  they  desired  to  find.  Lord  Salisbury  in  the  House  of 
Lords  said  the  importance  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  remarks  depended 
upon  their  interpretation,  and  in  the  Commons  Mr.  Balfour  said  the 
Government  would  not  discuss  them. 

In  the  United  States  the  speech  was  received  with  popular  enthu 
siasm.  The  possibility  of  such  a  governmental  alliance  was  scarcely 
considered,  but  the  evident  intention  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  speech,  to 
call  out  an  expression  of  race  feeling,  was  successful.  In  numerous 
public  meetings  in  the  United  States  and  Canada,  the  American  and 
British  colors  were  displayed,  entwined  together,  evoking  tremendous 
enthusiasm.  The  Queen's  birthday  was  celebrated  by  American  and 
British  orators,  speaking  at  the  same  boards,  each  extolling  the  com 
mon  race  virtues  as  displayed  by  the  other's  Government  and  national 
history. 


CHAPTER  THE  TWENTIETH. 
"  IMPERIALISM  " — "  EXPANSION  " —  ANNEXATION. 

THE  UNEASINESS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  CAUSED  BY  THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  "  IMPERIALISM' 
AND  "EXPANSION"— THE  COURSE  OF  THE  DISCUSSION  AND  A  COMPARISON  WITH  EURO 
PEAN  DREAD  OF  OUR  APPEARANCE  IN  ASIATIC  WATERS  — THE  IMMEDIATE  EXTENT 
OF  NEW    MEASURES   PROPOSED  — THE  NICARAGUA   CANAL,    HAWAII,    NAVAL 
AND  ARMY   ENLARGEMENT  — THE  ANNEXATION   OF   HAWAII,  AND    THE 
HISTORY    OF    THE    MEASURE   IN   CONGRESS  — THE   CAPTURE    OF 
GUAM   IN   THE   LADRONE   ISLANDS  — A   COMEDY   OK   WAR. 


T 


I. 

HE  Philippines  question,  as  discussed  in  the  United  States  from 
the  moment  the  extent  of  Dewey's  victory  was  comprehended, 
was  called  "  Imperialism,"  or  "  The  Policy  of  Ex- 

IMPERIALISM 

pansion."  But  the  uneasiness  it  caused  in  the  AND 
United  States  was  not  comparable  to  the  consternation 
into  which  it  plunged  all  European  politics.  It  was  well  understood 
when  war  began  that  our  Government  would  not  stop  at  securing  the 
independence  of  Cuba.  It  was  the  full  purpose  to  seize  Porto  Rico  and 
all  the  islands  of  Spain  in  the  West  Indies.  This  was  a  necessity. 
The  presence  of  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies  was  not  a  cause 
of  political  fear,  but  the  destructive  wars,  the  cruelties  practiced,  and 
the  apparent  incompetence  of  Spanish  administrators,  rendered  her 
presence,  in  Cuba  at  least,  unendurable  for  humanitarian  and  eco 
nomic  reasons.  Her  presence  in  Porto  Rico,  if  Cuba  were  taken  from 
her,  would  not  be  so  annoying  and  not  at  all  to  be  feared  in  itself. 
But  if,  after  the  war,  she  should  sell  Porto  Rico  to  England  or  to  some 
other  powerful  nation,  our  southern  seaboard  would  be  menaced,  and 
we  should  have  a  very  vulnerable  front  in  maintaining  our  South 
American  and  Central  American  interests.  The  sound  alternative  was 
to  expel  Spain  altogether  from  the  continent,  and  seize  her  possessions 
for  security  and  as  our  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  war. 

(275) 


276  HISTORY    OF    THE 

This  situation  as  it  applied  to  our  interests  was  reversed  in  the 
Philippines.  If  we  should  hold  them  permanently,  it  meant  to  three 
of  the  greatest  European  Powers  the  intrusion  of  a  new  and  dangerous 
rival  in  a  position  of  great  strategical  importance,  at  the  very  doors 
of  their  Eastern  interests.  It  meant  to  them  politically  what  it  would 
mean  to  the  United  States  if  Germany  or  Russia  acquired  Porto  Rico, 
and  could  inject  the  jealousies  and  perils  of  European  affairs  into  our 
home  waters.  But  it  also  meant  to  them,  in  an  economic  sense,  far 
more  than  the  alternative  would  mean  to  the  United  States. 

The  long-inherited  feuds  of  European  monarchies  at  home,  and 
their  acquired  feuds  in  colonial  experiments,  have  necessitated  stand 
ing  armies  and  naval  establishments  upon  such  a  great  scale  that 
taxation  has  become  among  them  not  only  oppressive  in  amount  but 
irritating  in  the  trivial  and  numberless  methods  of  its  application. 
If  the  United  States  intended  to  permanently  occupy  the  Philippines 
and  annex  them  as  national  territory,  the  defensive  power  of  Eng 
land,  Russia,  Germany,  France,  and  Japan,  would  of  necessity  have 
to  be  largely  augmented  by  each  of  the  nations,  not  upon  terms  of 
cordial  alliance  with  us.  If  all  were  on  equal  terms,  then  the  power 
of  all  would  have  to  be  increased. 

To  the  United  States,  comparing  her  population,  vast  wealth,  and 
unlimited  natural  resources  ( already  in  process  of  rapid  development 
under  her  free  industrial  system)  with  those  of  the  other  countries, 
the  increased  burden  would  be  inconsiderable.  It  would  crush  the 
others,  except  Great  Britain.  The  national  debt  of  the  United  States  is 
very  small  when  compared  with  the  nations  she  might  meet  in  East 
ern  rivalry.  However  small  the  debt  or  however  light  the  tax  rate, 
no  increase  of  either  is  ever  desirable  by  those  who  have  dealings  with 
the  tax  collector.  But  at  the  point  where  Americans  would  merely 
grumble  and  pay,  the  continental  taxpayers  would  be  driven  to  revolu 
tion  or  ruin.  This  was  the  secret  of  European  consternation  and  the 
secret  of  Great  Britain's  prompt  offices  in  our  behalf.  Next  to  the 
United  States  she  possesses  the  greatest  reserve  power  of  wealth;  but 
her  taxation  is  great.  In  proportion  to  national  wealth,  the  taxation 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  277 

and  debt  of  the  United  States  is  trivial  as  compared  with  European 
States.  The  common  language  and  common  business  purposes  of  the 
two  English-speaking  nations  would  render  their  alliance,  in  the 
sense  of  sympathy,  a  natural  and  perfect  solution  of  the  situation  for 
Great  Britain.  The  only  other  possible  allies  she  could  then  count 
upon  in  the  last  extremity  were  Germany  and  Japan  — neither  made 
to  the  purpose  by  nature. 

It  must  be  acknowledged,  also,  in  fairness,  that  when  Great  Britain 
offered  her  friendship  to  induce  the  United  States  to  take  territory  in 
the  East  and  be  a  supporter  in  keeping  open  to  commerce  the  ports 
of  China,  she  was  well  aware  that  this  country  would  have  a  hostage 
to  hold.  Canada,  with  its  great  railway  system,  giving  England  com 
munication  with  Hong-Kong  and  Australia,  of  great  importance  in 
conceivable  times  of  difficulty,  lies  beside  the  United  States,  full  col 
lateral  to  secure  the  performance  of  honest  obligations.  In  that  re 
spect  alone,  if  for  no  other  reason,  Great  Britain  was  the  best  of  possible 
allies  for  the  purposes  urged  upon  the  United  States,  as  this  Govern 
ment  was  responsively  her  best  ally. 

The  preparations  of  the  President  to  send  reenforcements  of  war 
ships,  and  an  army  corps  under  General  Merritt,  to  the  assistance  of 
Admiral  Dewey,  were  approved  with  enthusiasm.  The  popular  move 
ment  in  favor  of  seizing  the  Philippines,  which  immediately  followed 
the  fall  of  Cavite,  was  the  natural  impulse  of  a  people  full  of  exulta 
tion  and  pride  over  the  completeness,  without  precedent  in  naval  wars, 
of  the  victory  that  Dewey  had  achieved  with  a  skill  and  intrepidity 
that  conferred  splendor  upon  American  arms.  It  was  the  spontaneous 
outburst  of  simplest  patriotism  to  ask  that  the  flag,  so  valiantly 
planted,  might  float  there  forever  in  memory  of  the  heroes  who  raised 
it.  But  popular  outbursts  are  not  always  the  safest  gales  for  ships  of 
state  to  sail  before. 

Political  leaders  and  students  of  national  policy  grew  uneasy.  There 
was  no  party  alignment  upon  the  question.  Each  spoke  for  himself,  or 
for  the  expressed  views  of  his  constituency,  as  he  could  ascertain  and 
interpret  them. 


278  HISTORY   OF    THE 

It  was  admitted  that  if  the  United  States  annexed  the  Philippines 
for  colonial  territory  the  act  would  involve  very  serious  responsi 
bilities  and  a  radical  departure  from  the  traditions  and  customs  of 
national  policy.  But  it  was  contended  that  traditions  and  customs  of 
national  policy  were  good  only  when  they  promoted  good  ends;  that 
when  they  interposed  between  the  country  and  the  manifest  high 
destiny  of  its  influence  to  confer  freedom  and  civilization  upon  the 
oppressed,  they  ought  to  be  given  up  for  better  policies  and  ideas. 

The  warning  contained  in  Washington's  "Farewell  Address"  against 
entangling  foreign  alliances,  was  met  with  the  completion  of  the  sen 
tence  advising  that  such  alliances  should  be  contracted  only  as  needed 
to  serve  our  purposes. 

The  difficulties  of  governing  and  properly  controlling  "conquered 
peoples,"  elicited  the  rejoinder  that  there  had  been  very  little  trouble 
in  governing  Louisiana  and  Texas,  both  conquered  from  aliens.  But, 
was  the  interruption,  the  Filipinos  were  mostly  in  primal  savagery, 
to  which  retort  was  made  that  they  could  not  be  expected  to  emerge 
from  that  condition  under  the  sinister  rule  of  Spain,  and  the  United 
States  had  a  similarly  savage  population  when  the  country  was  first 
settled,  and  results  had  justified  the  methods  of  civilization. 

It  was  urged  as  prudent  national  economy  to  reserve  merely  coal 
ing  stations  in  the  islands  and  return  the  sovereignty  to  Spain.  To 
this  Imperialists  interposed  the  declaration  that  as  we  were  encour 
aging  the  native  revolutionists  for  our  own  advantage,  justice  and 
humanity  would  be  revolted  at  the  consequences  of  turning  these 
natives  back  to  face  the  pitiless  vengeance  of  Spain. 

It  was  suggested  that  the  islands  might  be  turned  over  to  one  of 
the  Powers  of  Europe.  Against  this  it  was  pointed  out  that  to  do  so 
would  provoke  war  among  European  Powers ;  that  as  the  United 
States  was,  by  the  fortune  of  war,  in  practical  possession  of  the 
islands,  all  considerations  of  national  duty  to  republican  governmental 
ideas  forbade  her  to  throw  the  responsibility  upon  others ;  she  must 
inculcate  the  principles  of  liberty  and  education  in  the  Philip 
pines. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  279 

The  opponents  of  "  Imperialism "  argued  that  the  possession  of  the 
Philippines  would  require  a  vast  addition  to  our  naval  strength  to 
defend  the  islands ;  the  maintenance  of  a  large  standing  army  to  pre 
serve  order  during  the  years  necessary  to  convert  the  population  to 
American  ideas  of  law  and  order;  that  the  United  States  would  be 
come  embroiled  in  the  quarrels  of  other  nations;  that  there  was 
enough  territory  at  home  to  fully  occupy  the  government  and  the 
energies  of  the  population. 

The  advocates  of  "  expansion "  answered  that  the  enlarged  revenues 
from  the  islands  (although  taxation  would  be  greatly  reduced  from 
the  Spanish  exactions)  would  pay  for  the  increase  in  cost  of  the 
army  and  navy ;  that  the  encouragement  of  industrial  activity  under 
decreased  taxation  would  soon  make  the  islands  valuable ;  that  the 
United  States  ought  to  take  her  place  as  an  international  power  with 
out  fear  of  embroilment ;  that  she  had  successfully  defended  herself 
from  colonial  infancy  to  magnificent  national  maturity ;  that  she 
had  become  responsible  for  the  islands  through  an  accident,  not 
through  intention,  and  the  American  people  were  entirely  capable  of 
developing  and  governing  them  without  lessening  the  progress  of  the 
United  States;  that  the  islands  were  necessary  to  protect  our  com 
merce  in  the  East,  threatened  by  Russia,  Germany,  and  France ;  that 
the  decline  of  England's  trade  with  China  in  the  past  two  years  omi 
nously  foretold  the  fate  of  American  trade  if  it  were  not  defended 
with  determination,  backed  by  a  display  of  power  ready  for  use ;  that 
the  first  cost  of  colonial  establishment  was  not  to  be  considered  as  a 
loss,  for  the  reason  that  the  loss  of  trade  certain  to  follow  a  failure 
to  occupy  the  Philippines  would  be  enormously  greater  than  the  cost 
of  occupation,  and,  moreover,  would  be  a  permanent  loss. 

Anti-expansionists  quoted  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  long  and 
determined  enforcement  by  the  United  States  as  being  in  itself  an  im 
plied  pledge  that  our  country  would  not  seek  to  plant  a  republican 
form  of  government  on  other  continents.  Imperialists  answered  that 
the  expressed  pledge  was  not  to  interfere  with  the  "  internal  affairs " 
of  foreign  countries,  and  pointed  out  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 


280  HISTORY   OF    THE 

only  the  declaration  of  our  purposes  and  had  never  been  approved 
by  Europe,  and  could  be  upheld  by  the  United  States  by  force  only, 
as  was  intimated  in  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute,  and  that  Great 
Britain  agreed  to  arbitration  without  assenting  to  the  doctrine. 


ii. 

WHILE  the  arguments  thus  briefly  outlined  were  the  simple  prin 
ciples  of  the  differences  of  political  opinion,  the  unknown  lengths  to 
which    a    policy    of    expansion   by   colonial   acquisition 
HORIZON  OF  THE  would  commit  the  United  States  were,  after  all,  the  real 
POLICY  OF  EX-      cause  of   uneasiness.      The  immediate  horizon  of    the 

PANSION 

necessities  of  such  a  policy  was  plainly  visible.  If  the 
Philippines  were  to  be  held,  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  was  logic 
ally  necessary  for  strategic  and  economic  reasons.  Manila  was  7,500 
miles  from  San  Francisco.  Honolulu  was  2,000  miles  out  on  the  path 
to  Manila.  Our  ships  would  need  the  Hawaiian  Islands  for  all  pur 
poses.  It  would  be  equally  necessary  to  have  stopping  places  between 
Honolulu  and  Manila,  a  distance  of  5,500  miles.  More  than  this, 
fortified  coaling  stations  on  the  Asiatic  mainland  would  be  a  require 
ment. 

From  another  point  of  view  arose  the  necessity  of  completing  the 
Nicaraguan  Canal  or  of  securing  coaling  stations  along  the  route  from 
the  Atlantic  seaboard  by  way  of  the  Suez  Canal  to  the  Philippines. 
The  ownership  of  the  Spanish  West  Indies,  if  independent  Cuba 
should  ultimately  be  annexed  on  her  own  request,  would  give  perfect 
security  to  the  canal  and  increase  the  volume  of  traffic. 

Commodore  A.  S.  Crowninshield,  U.  S.N.,  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Nav 
igation,  an  officer  of  experience,  keen  observation,  and  capacity,  out 
lined  the  possibilities  and  advantages  of  the  Nicaraguan  project  in  a 
congressional  publication,*  early  in  May. 

"We  Americans,"  he  said,  "pride  ourselves  upon  the  rapid  develop 
ment  of  our  country,  upon  its  great  trade  and  commerce,  which  have 

*  Senate  Document  No.  263,  issued  May  16,  1898. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  -jsj 

arisen  from  its  wonderful  resources  through  the  activity  and  business 
qualities  of  our  people.  But  there  is  a  country  whose  development 
has  been  much  more  rapid  than  ours,  a  country  which  remained  for 
untold  centuries  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  but  which,  within 
the  past  few  years — mainly  through  our  aid  and  example,  it  is  true  — 
has  burst  the  web  of  ignorance  and  inactivity  which  bound  it,  and 
emerges  to-day  before  the  eyes  of  the  world  as  a  civilized  nation^ 
making  quick  progress  in  all  that  proves  a  people  strong.  Suddenly, 
therefore,  we  are  brought  to  face  the  fact  that  a  new  power  has 
arisen  in  the  Pacific,  that  Japan  is  already  claiming  imaginary  rights 
within  the  Hawaiian  Islands  —  islands  civilized  and  peopled  by  those 
of  our  own  blood,  whose  intelligent  citizens  speak  our  mother  tongue 
—and  we  realize  on  the  instant  that  here  is  a  power  with  which  we 
must  reckon  in  the  settlement  of  serious  questions. 

"Hawaii  is  3,400  miles  from  Japan,  but  there  are  now  20,000  of 
the  Mikado's  subjects  settled  in  Hawaii,  and  the  interest  of  Japan  in 
the  status  of  these  people  is  so  great  that  it  has  caused  her  to  pro 
test  vigorously  against  the  suggestion  of  the  annexation  of  these 
islands  to  the  United  States.  In  thus  recognizing  the  necessity  of 
possessing  a  powerful  fleet  of  war  vessels  as  a  factor  in  defense  or 
aggression,  her  statesmen,  themselves  apt  students  of  history,  have 
read  to  us  a  lesson  which  we  might  well  commit  to  memory  and  to 
practice. 

"Beyond  Japan,  a  few  hundred  miles  to  the  west,  lies  the  Chinese 
Empire,  with  its  four  hundred  millions  of  people.  While  Japan  has 
advanced,  China  has  remained  dormant.  But  will  this  continue?  Given 
new  rulers,  a  new  form  of  government,  and  the  adoption  of  Western 
ideas,  China  will  throw  off  its  yoke  of  conservatism,  and  then  our 
Pacific  States  will  be  confronted  with  a  second  Asiatic  power  many 
times  greater  than  Japan.  With  these  possibilities  to  be  considered, 
it  behooves  this  country  to  make  itself  strong  where  it  is  now  weak. 
In  other  words,  it  should  be  our  first  effort  to  develop  our  Pacific 
coast  States.  Let  us  glance  for  a  moment  at  the  effect  of  an  isthmian 
canal  upon  this  development. 


282  HISTORY   OF   THE 

"As  a  political  factor  in  increasing  the  influence  and  power  of 
this  country  in  the  Pacific,  the  canal  will  be  far-reaching.  To-day,  if 
the  United  States  were  forced  into  a  war  with  Japan  over  possession 
of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  which  to  her  are  stepping-stones  to  our  con 
tinent,  we  should  be  placed  at  a  great  disadvantage ;  for  it  is  a  fact 
that  at  this  moment  Japan's  naval  force  is  greater  than  our  own 
Pacific  and  Asiatic  squadrons  combined.  To  reenforce  our  Pacific 
fleet  we  should  be  obliged  to  send  ships  from  our  Atlantic  squadron, 
forcing  them  to  make  a  voyage  of  12,000  miles,  thus  consuming  many 
weeks,  whereas,  with  the  canal  in  existence,  our  powerful  North  Atlantic 
squadron  could  be  put  into  the  Pacific  within  a  week.  Thus  would 
the  canal  enable  us  to  more  than  double  our  naval  strength  in  the 
Pacific. 

"From  every  point  of  view,  whether  political  or  commercial,  it  is 
plain  that  the  Nicaragua  Canal  is  a  necessity  to  the  United  States. 
It  will  build  up  our  Pacific  coast  States  as  they  must  be  built  up  if 
we  are  to  properly  face  the  Orient.  It  will  add  immeasurably  to  our 
naval  power,  and  it  will  increase  our  influence  not  only  far  out  into 
the  Pacific  Ocean,  over  the  islands  and  waters  of  that  vast  region,  but 
also  over  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  adjacent  waters. 

"It  is  undoubtedly  a  fact  not  only  that  the  American  people  be 
lieve  that  any  canal  that  shall  connect  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  shall 
be  controlled  by  the  United  States,  but  that  our  government  has 
given,  upon  more  than  one  occasion,  expression  to  this  sentiment. 

"  We  should  be  wise  in  our  generation,  and,  by  legislation  and  such 
other  steps  as  may  be  necessary,  inaugurate,  without  further  delay, 
the  work  of  completing  the  Nicaragua  Canal.  Let  us  pierce  the 
isthmus  at  the  one  spot  which  nature  has  already  pointed  out,  and 
thus  fulfill  what  has  been  for  centuries  the  hope  of  commerce  and  the 
dream  of  navigators." 

The  Nicaragua  Canal  had  not  been  merely  the  dream  of  navigators. 
It  had  been  one  of  the  dreams  of  international  avarice  and  the  subject  of 
governmental  activity  and  fear.  In  the  failure  of  the  United  States  to 
encourage  it,  France  had  undertaken  the  Panama  Canal  project.  For 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  -_N:| 

years  the  Nicaraguan  project  had  been  a  cause  of  bitter  dispute  in 
Congress.  It  was  antagonized  by  corporations  of  great  wealth  whose 
interests  were  involved  by  the  competitive  strength  of  a  short  water  way 
of  carriage.  Its  cost  was  estimated  at  from  $115,000,000,  by  its  advo 
cates,  to  $200,000,000,  by  its  opponents. 

The  annexation  of  Hawaii  had  also  been  resisted  by  industrial  inter 
ests  and  the  traditional  influences  of  governmental  policy  strong  in 
parties.  The  writings  of  Captain  Mahan,  U.  S.  N.  (retired),  on  the 
influence  of  sea  power  upon  the  history  of  nations,  had  made  a  profound 
impression  upon  Europe,  but  were  estimated  at  their  key  value  by 
the  men  of  our  navy  only.  They  had  pointed  out  the  modern  changes 
and  necessities  of  naval  armament  and  support.  Great  Britain,  espe 
cially,  had  applied  his  theories  and  occupied  many  small  Pacific  islands 
for  future  emergencies  of  her  sea  power. 

The  discussion  of  these  projects  in  the  United  States  during  times  of 
peace  had  been  accompanied  by  much  rancor  and  exaggeration  and  had 
the  effect  of  giving  to  them  an  ominous  importance  in  respect  to  cost 
and  the  evils  to  be  feared.  The  influence  of  this  effect  still  remained, 
but  to  popular  sentiment- the  changed  position  of  the  country  dwarfed 
reasons  that  had  once  been  gigantic  in  argument.  There  was  no 
question  that  the  great  preponderance  of  popular  sentiment,  excited  by 
splendid  achievements  and  buoyed  up  by  pride,  was  favorable  to  ex 
pansion  as  it  appeared  at  the  time. 


in. 

IMMEDIATELY  after  the  announcement  that  ships  and  troops  were 
to  be  hurried  to  Manila  to  enable  Dewey  to  occupy  the  city,  the  sen 
timent  in   favor  of  expansion  was  cheered  by  two  sig 
nificant  intimations  from  the  President.     One  was  that     ^TwA™*  °F 
the  first  expedition  to  Dewey's  relief  at  Manila  would 
pause  on  the  way  and  seize  the  chief  island  of   the   Ladrones  group, 
belonging  to  Spain.     The  other  was,  that  Congress,  upon  the  expressed 


284  HISTORY   OF   THE 

desire  of  the  President,  would  take  determined  action  to  annex  the 
Hawaiian  Islands. 

Since  the  native  monarchy  had  been  overturned  by  the  revolution 
which  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  a  republic  under  President 
Dole,  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  had  caused  bitter  contention  in  Con 
gress.  President  Harrison  sent  to  the  Senate  just  before  he  retired 
from  office  a  treaty  of  annexation,  and  one  of  the  first  acts  of  Presi 
dent  Cleveland  was  to  withdraw  the  proposed  treaty  and  advise  the 
reinstatement  of  the  monarchy,  on  the  ground  that  the  revolution 
was  aided  and  abetted  by  forces  from  the  United  States  war  ship  in 
the  harbor  at  the  time  and  that  without  that  aid  the  revolution 
would  not  have  been  successful.  He  contended  that  reparation  should 
be  made  to  the  native  government.  His  efforts  failed,  and  upon  his 
retirement  President  McKinley  sent  to  the  Senate  the  treaty  of 
annexation  for  confirmation.  A  two-thirds'  vote  of  the  Senate  was 
required  to  approve  the  treaty.  There  was  no  possibility  of  obtaining 
the  necessary  majority  and  the  treaty  remained  in  committee  without 
action. 

The  lower  house  was  known  to  be  largely  in  favor  of  annexation, 
but  the  minority  was  very  strong  in  influential  leadership  and  the 
measure  threatened  to  produce  party  dissensions  and  disturb  align 
ment.  The  House  could  not,  of  course,  take  action  on  the  treaty,  but 
it  could  promote  and  effect  annexation  by  a  joint  resolution  accepting 
the  application  of  the  Republic  of  Hawaii  to  become  territory  of  the 
United  States.  The  resolution  required  a  majority  vote  only  in 
the  House  and  Senate  and  would  thus  evade  the  necessity  for  a  two- 
thirds  Senate  vote  to  approve  the  treaty. 

Preparations  for  dispatching  the  first  reinforcements  to  Manila 
revealed  the  inconvenience  of  possessing  no  coaling  station  in  the  Pa 
cific  and  the  sore  need  of  colliers  to  accompany  and  supply  our  men- 
of-war  and  the  troop  ships  in  convoy.  This  was  the  opportunity  of 
the  annexationists  and  on  May  17  the  government  of  Hawaii  decided 
to  render  assistance  unconditionally  to  the  United  States  against 
Spain  and  offered  the  use  of  her  harbors  as  a  base  of  supplies.  The 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  285 

acceptance  of  the  offer  would  commit  the  little  mid-Pacific  republic 
to  a  breach  of  neutrality  and  bind  the  United  States  to  defend  her 
against  all  consequences  arising. 

The  offer  was  accepted  by  the  President  as  an  executive  act  rendered 
necessary  by  war.  On  May  18  a  joint  resolution  introduced  in  the 
House  by  Mr.  Newlands,  of  Nevada,  was  reported  favorably  by  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Affairs.  Among  the  reasons  advanced  by  the  com 
mittee  for  its  adoption  were  these :  — 

"  We  must  face  the  future  in  dealing  with  this  proposed  annexation.  It  is  im 
possible  for  the  republic  of  Hawaii  to  maintain  a  permanent  existence,  preserving 
in  force  the  influences  which  are  now  in  the  ascendant  there  and  which  are  cordial 
and  friendly  to  the  United  States.  Of  its  mixed  population  of  109,000  a  powerful 
element  is  Japanese  —  24,407, —  of  whom  19,212  are  males,  almost  all  of  them  grown 
men,  for  they  are  not  divided,  as  ordinary  populations  are,  in  the  usual  proportions 
of  men,  women,  and  children. 

"  They  are  a  far  stronger  element  of  physical  force  than  the  native  race,  which 
has  diminished  until  there  are  now  only  thirty  odd  thousand,  of  whom,  by  the  usual 
proportions  of  population,  there  are  not  over  8,000  grown  men.  The  native  Hawaiian 
race  cannot  in  any  contingency  control  the  island.  It  must  fall  to  some  foreign 
people. 

"The  Japanese  are  intensely  Japanese,  retaining  their  allegiance  to  their  empire 
and  responding  to  suggestions  from  the  Japanese  officers.  Very  many  of  them  served 
in  the  recent  war  with  China.  The  Japanese  Government  not  long  ago  demanded 
of  the  Hawaiian  Government,  under  their  construction  of  a  treaty  made  in  1871, 
that  the  Japanese  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  should  have  equal  privileges  with  all 
other  persons,  which  would  include  voting  and  holding  office.  This  claim  was  made 
when  a  flood  of  Japanese  subjects,  under  the  supervision  of  the  government  of  that 
country,  of  from  1,000  to  2,000  per  month,  were  being  poured  into  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  threatening  a  speedy  change  of  the  government  into  Japanese  hands,  and 
ultimately  to  a  Japanese  possession.  The  demand  was  resisted  by  the  little  Repub 
lic,  and  a  treaty  of  annexation  with  the  United  States  arrived  at  for  a  time." 

After  reciting  the  history  of  Japan's  protest  against  the  treaty, 
the  advantages  of  its  reciprocal  clauses  to  our  commerce,  and  the 
fact  that  the  rights  of  the  United  States  to  the  privileges  of  Pearl 
Harbor  would  cease  with  the  termination  of  the  treaty,  the  commit 
tee's  report  continued:— 

"  With  the  Japanese  element  in  the  ascendant  and  the  government  under  Jap 
anese  control,  the  treaty  would  be  promptly  terminated,  and  with  it  our  special 


286  HISTORY   OF   THE 

rights.  This  would  be  the  first  step  taken  by  that  active  and  powerful  government 
toward  the  complete  incorporation  of  the  islands  into  the  Japanese  Empire  and  their 
possession  as  a  strategic  point  in  the  northern  Pacific,  from  which  her  strong  and 
increasing  fleet  would  operate.  The  Japanese  Government  is  now  friendly,  but  that 
would  be  the  manifest  dictate  of  enlightened  self-interest  to  a  wise  Japanese  states 
man. 

"  Annexation,  and  that  alone,  will  securely  maintain  American  control  in  Hawaii, 
Resolutions  of  Congress  declaring  our  policy,  or  even  a  protectorate,  will  not  secure 
it.  The  question  of  protectorate  has  been  successively  considered  by  Presidents 
Pierce,  Harrison,  and  McKinley,  in  1854,  1893,  and  1897,  and  each  time  rejected 
because  a  protectorate  imposes  responsibility  without  control.  Annexation  imposes 
responsibility,  but  will  give  full  power  of  ownership  and  absolute  control. 

"In  the  struggling  interests  that  have  recently  come  into  play  in  the  Pacific, 
the  separate  existence  of  the  Hawaiian  Government  is  liable  at  any  time  to  raise 
complications  with  foreign  governments,  as  in  the  case  mentioned  above  of  the 
recent  interposition  of  Japan.  An  independent  feeble  government  is  a  constant 
temptation  to  powerful  nations,  in  the  stress  of  contending  interests,  to  intermeddle 
and  disturb  the  peace.  Once  incorporated  into  the  territory  of  the  United  States, 
all  this  is  done  away  with. 


"It  has  been  objected  that  the  constitution  does  not  confer  upon  Congress  the 
power  to  admit  territory,  but  only  States.  The  same  objection  was  raised  to  the 
acquisition  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  in  1803,  because  there  was  nothing  in  the  consti 
tution  expressly  authorizing  such  admission  and  treaty,  and  Jefferson  himself,  who 
made  the  purchase,  shared  the  doubt.  But  we  have  made  eleven  such  acquisitions 
of  territory,  and  the  courts  have  sustained  such  action  in  all  cases.  Texas  was  annexed 
by  joint  resolution  of  Congress,  similar  to  the  one  proposed  now.  The  island  of 
Navassa,  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  many  others,  have  been  made  territory  of  the 
United  States  under  the  act  of  August  18,  1856,  authorizing  American  citizens  to 
take  possession  of  unoccupied  guano  islands.  They  are  United  States  territory,  sub 
ject  to  our  laws.  So  Midway  Island  in  the  Pacific,  1,000  miles  beyond  Hawaii, 
was  occupied,  and  Congress  appropriated  $50,000,  which  was  expended  trying  to 
create  a  naval  station  there.  The  manifest  principle  is  that  the  power  to  acquire 
territory  is  an  incident  of  national  sovereignty. 

"  The  acquisition  of  these  islands  does  not  contravene  our  national  policy  or 
traditions.  It  carries  out  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  excludes  European  powers 
from  interfering  on  the  American  continent  and  outlying  islands,  but  does  not  limit 
the  United  States,  and  this  doctrine  has  long  been  applied  to  these  very  islands  by 
our  government.  As  Secretary  Blaine  said  in  1881,  the  situation  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  giving  them  strategic  control  of  the  North  Pacific,  brings  their  possession 
within  the  range  of  questions  of  purely  American  policy. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  287 

"  The  annexation  of  these  islands  does  not  launch  us  upon  a  new  policy  or  depart 
from  our  time-honored  traditions  of  caring  first  and  foremost  for  the  safety  and  pros 
perity  of  the  United  States." 

The  opposition  to  annexation  was  deep-seated,  and  involved  so  much 
delay,  that  in  the  Senate  ten  days  later  Senator  Lodge  of  Massachu 
setts  and  Senator  Morgan  of  Alabama,  resorted  to  the  extremity  of 
offering  amendments  to  the  war  revenue  bill,  thus  making  resources 
for  war  depend  upon  annexation.  Mr.  Lodge's  amendment  was  the 
Newlands  joint  resolution.  This  proceeding  quickly  forced  the  lower 
house  to  an  agreement  to  permit  early  and  free  discussion  and  action 
upon  Hawaii. 

Debate  did  not  begin  in  the  House  until  June  12.  Eleven  days 
before,  the  first  military  expedition  to  the  Philippines  had  arrived 
at  Honolulu,  outward  bound.  The  soldiers  were  welcomed  with  lavish 
kindness.  Two  Hawaiian  native  princes  boarded  the  Charleston  and 
presented  to  the  ship  two  American  flags  on  behalf  of  the  ex-Queen 
Dowager,  widow  of  King  Kalakaua.  The  United  States  troops  paraded 
through  the  city  and  were  reviewed  by  President  Dole.  A  great  public 
dinner  was  prepared  at  which  the  3,500  soldiers  were  entertained. 
Natives  and  aliens  all  joined  in  the  demonstration. 

During  the  day  the  Spanish  consul  sent  a  protest  to  the  government 
against  the  violation  of  neutrality.  Foreign  Minister  Cooper  replied 
as  follows:  — 

"  In  reply  to  your  note  of  the  1st  inst.,  I  have  the  honor  to  say  that,  owing  to  the 
intimate  relations  now  existing  between  this  countuy  and  the  United  States,  this  coun 
try  has  not  contemplated  a  proclamation  of  neutrality,  having  reference  to  the  present 
conflict  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  but,  on  the  contrary,  has  extended  to  the 
United  States  privileges  and  assistance,  for  which  reason  your  protest  can  derive  no 
further  consideration  than  to  acknowledge  its  receipt." 

The  Gordian  knot  of  opposition  was  disposed  of  by  the  force  of 
events.  The  joint  resolution  quickly  passed  the  House  by  an  over 
whelming  majority,  and,  in  spite  of  determined  delay  in  the  Senate, 
was  adopted  by  that  body  on  July  6  by  a  vote  of  42  to  21,  exactly 
the  two-thirds  needed  for  treaty  confirmation. 


288  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  joint  resolution  as  adopted  is  as  follows:  — 

Joint  resolution  to  provide  for  annexing  the  Hawaiian  Islands  to  the  United 
States. 

WHEREAS,  The  government  of  the  republic  of  Hawaii,  having  in  due  form  sig 
nified  its  consent,  in  the  manner  provided  by  its  constitution,  to  cede  absolutely 
and  without  reserve  to  the  United  States  of  America  all  rights  of  sovereignty  of 
whatsoever  kind  in  and  over  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  their  dependencies,  and  also 
to  cede  and  transfer  to  the  United  States  the  absolute  fee  and  ownership  of  all 
public,  government,  or  crown  lands,  public  buildings  or  edifices,  ports,  harbors,  mil 
itary  equipment  and  all  other  public  property  of  every  kind  and  description  belonging 
to  the  government  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  together  with  every  right  and  appurte 
nance  thereunto  appertaining  ;  therefore, 

Itesolved,  etc.,  That  said  cession  is  accepted,  ratified,  and  confirmed,  and  that  the 
said  Hawaiian  Islands  and  their  dependencies  be  and  they  are  hereby  annexed  as  a 
part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States  and  are  subject  to  the  sovereign  dominion 
thereof,  and  that  all  and  singular  the  property  and  rights  hereinbefore  mentioned 
are  vested  in  the  United  States  of  America. 

The  existing  laws  of  the  United  States  relative  to  public  lands  shall  not  apply 
to  such  lands  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  but  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  shall 
enact  special  laws  for  their  management  and  disposition,  provided  that  all  revenue 
from  or  proceeds  of  the  same,  except  as  regards  such  part  thereof  as  may  be  used 
or  occupied  for  the  civil,  military,  or  naval  purposes  of  the  United  States,  or  may 
be  assigned  for  the  use  of  the  local  government,  shall  be  used  solely  for  the  ben 
efit  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  for  educational  and  other  public 
purposes. 

Until  Congress  shall  provide  for  the  government  of  such  islands,  all  the  civil, 
judicial,  and  military  powers  exercised  by  the  officers  of  the  existing  government 
in  said  islands  shall  be  vested  in  such  person  or  persons,  and  shall  be  exercised  in 
such  manner  as  the  President  of  the  United  States  shall  direct ;  and  the  President 
shall  have  power  to  remove  said  officers  and  fill  vacancies  so  occasioned. 

The  existing  treaties  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  with  foreign  nations  shall  forth 
with  cease  and  determine,  being  replaced  by  such  treaties  as  may  exist,  or  as  may 
be  hereafter  concluded,  between  the  United  States  and  such  foreign  nations. 

The  municipal  legislation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  not  enacted  for  the  fulfillment 
of  the  treaties  so  extinguished,  and  not  inconsistent  with  this  joint  resolution,  nor  con 
trary  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  nor  to  any  existing  treaty  of  the  United 
States,  shall  remain  in  force  until  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  shall  otherwise 
determine. 

Until  legislation  shall  be  enacted  extending  the  United  States  customs  laws  and 
regulations  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  the  existing  customs  relations  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  with  the  United  States  and  other  countries  shall  remain  unchanged. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  -Js'.l 

The  public  debt  of  the  republic  of  Hawaii,  lawfully  existing  at  the  date  of  the  pas 
sage  of  this  joint  resolution,  including  the  amounts  due  to  depositors  of  the  Hawaiian 
Postal  Savings  Bank,  is  hereby  assumed  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  but 
the  liability  of  the  United  States  in  this  regard  shall  in  no  case  exceed  $4,000,000.  So 
long,  however,  as  the  existing  government  and  the  present  commercial  relations  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  are  continued  as  hereinbefore  provided,  said  government  shall  con 
tinue  to  pay  the  interest  on  said  debt. 

There  shall  be  no  further  immigration  of  Chinese  into  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  except 
upon  such  conditions  as  are  now  or  may  hereafter  be  allowed  by  the  laws  of  the  United 
States;  and  no  Chinese,  by  reason  of  anything  herein  contained,  shall  be  allowed  to 
enter  the  United  States  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

The  President  shall  appoint  five  commissioners,  at  least  two  of  whom  shall  be  resi 
dents  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  who  shall,  as  soon  as  reasonably  practicable,  recommend 
to  Congress  such  legislation  concerning  the  Hawaiian  Islands  as  they  shall  deem  neces 
sary  or  proper. 

SEC.  2. —  That  the  commissioners  hereinbefore  provided  for  shall  be  appointed  by 
the  President  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 

SEC.  3. —  That  the  sum  of  $100,000,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary,  is 
hereby  appropriated  out  of  any  money  in  the  treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated,  and 
to  be  immediately  available,  to  be  expended  at  the  discretion  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  this  joint  resolution  into  effect. 

Possession  of  Hawaii  was  not  taken  until  August  12,  by  which  time 
the  Hawaiian  legislature  had  ratified  the  action  of  the  United  States. 
The  flag  was  raised  over  the  executive  building  with  brief  ceremonies 
in  the  presence  of  a  great  concourse.  United  States  Minister  Sewall 
and  President  Dole  had  exchanged  the  ratification  documents,  and  Ad 
miral  Miller  with  a  force  of  marines  took  formal  occupation. 


IV. 

MEANWHILE,  the  first  Philippines  expedition,  convoyed  by  the  cruiser 
Charleston,  commanded  by  Captain  Glass,  had  taken  possession  of  Guam, 
the  principal  island  of  the  Ladrones  group,  about  1,200  THE  CAPTURE  OF 
miles  east  from  the  Philippines.  The  original  name  of  GUAM  OF  THE 

.  .     ,      ,  ..      ,    .    ,  LADRONES 

this  group  of  numerous,  but  mostly  uninhabited  islands, 

was  "  Mas  de  las  Velas  Latinas"  or,  Islands  of  the  Lateen  Sails,  chosen 

by  Magellan,  their  discoverer;  but  his  sailors  preferred  to  call  them 

19 


290  HISTORY    OF   THE 

"Islands  of  Thieves,"  and  the  nickname  has  survived  the  memory  of 
the  more  poetical  designation. 

The  Charleston,  with  three  transports  under  convoy,  arrived  off 
Umata  Harbor  on  the  morning  of  June  20.  Protecting  the  entrance 
to  the  harbor  frowned  the  ancient  stone  forts  of  St.  lago  and  Santa 
Cruz.  The  latter  is  on  an  island  in  the  middle  of  the  harbor.  The 
weather  was  misty  and  rainy,  but  it  was  soon  made  out  that  St. 
lago  was  not  manned,  but  that  Santa  Cruz  presented  a  dark  air  that 
seemed  to  mean  business,  probably  because  of  the  thickness  of  its 
walls  and  the  depth  of  embrasures  and  ports  in  which  the  guns 
might  be  masked. 

After  a  reconnoissance  that  failed  to  discover  the  presence  of  the 
enemy,  Captain  Glass  fired  a  5-inch  shell  at  the  fort.  It  fell  short, 
but  a  dozen  more  chipped  holes  in  the  walls  and  scarred  the  tower. 
No  response  was  made,  and  no  human  being  was  to  be  seen. 

After  waiting  some  time  a  rowboat  was  seen  coming  around  the 
island.  It  contained  the  Spanish  naval  captain  of  the  Port  of  San 
Luis  d'Apra,  the  town  at  the  head  of  the  little  harbor ;  the  surgeon 
of  the  Spanish  garrison,  and  a  merchant  who  had  once  lived  in  the 
United  States,  and  could  speak  English. 

These  Spanish  officials  and  the  merchant  came  aboard  the  Charles 
ton  and  apologized  with  great  courtesy  for  being  unable  to  return  the 
salute.  They  explained  that  there  were  no  cannon  and  no  powder  at 
San  Luis  and  they  were  unaccustomed  to  receiving  salutes. 

To  say  the  least,  the  situation  was  one  not  fitted  to  the  grim-visaged 
surroundings  of  war.  When  Captain  Glass  informed  them  that  he  had 
been  bombarding  their  fortress  and  not  saluting  the  flag — that  their 
country  and  his  were  at  war,  the  Spaniards  were  astounded.  The 
last  mail  had  been  received  early  in  April  and  contained  no  intimation 
of  war.  The  mail  was  received  every  two  months  and  the  June  steamer 
was  two  weeks  overdue.  When  they  heard  of  Montejo's  destruction, 
their  wonder  increased.  Their  ignorance  was  complete,  as  was  Cer-. 
vera's,  Augusti's,  and  ToraPs  concerning  Spanish  defeats.  Only  victo 
ries  are  published  by  Spain. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  291 

The  officers  were  set  at  liberty  to  communicate  with  Governor  Ma 
rina,  at  Agana,  the  capital  of  the  island,  four  miles  from  the  port,  and 
arrange  for  surrender.  Next  day  the  Governor,  his  officers,  fifty-four 
Spanish  soldiers,  and  fifty-four  native  soldiers,  were  disarmed  and  the 
Spaniards  taken  aboard  ship,  prisoners,  to  be  carried  to  Cavite\  The 
natives  were  released.  The  downfall  of  the  Spaniards  was  very  popular. 
The  Stars  and  Stripes  were  hoisted  over  the  fort. 

The  merchant,  Francisco  Portusac,  was  a  naturalized  American  citi 
zen.  He  said  it  was  useless  to  leave  a  garrison;  that  the  Chamorros 
or  natives  were  honest,  mild,  and  orderly.  He  had  the  largest  pecuniary 
interest  at  stake  and  he  could  trust  them.  Upon  learning  this,  the 
Charleston  and  her  consorts  sailed  away  to  Manila.  The  island  of 
Guam  has  from  8,000  to  10,000  inhabitants,  and  in  the  remainder  of  the 
group  there  is  a  population  estimated  at  16,000. 

Thus,  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  and  the  seizure  of  Guam  were  links 
in  the  chain  across  the  ocean.  Guam  is  1,200  miles  from  Manila,  4,300 
miles  from  Honolulu. 


CHAPTER  THE  TWENTY-FIRST. 
ANGLO-AMERICAN  ALLIANCE. 

REMARKABLE  REVERSAL  OF  THE  OLD  ATTITUDE  OF  AVERSION  BETWEEN  AMERICANS  AND  BRITONS  — 
CONTINUATION  OF  THE  RESPONSE  TO  MR.  CHAMBERLAIN'S  SPEECH  —  UTTERANCES  AT  THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN    DINNER    IN    LONDON  —  PARTY    LEADERS    ON    BOTH    SIDES    IN 
PARLIAMENT    COMMIT    THEMSELVES    TO    FRIENDSHIP    AND    UNION    WITH 
UNITED    STATES    INTERESTS    IN    A    MEMORABLE    DEBATE  —  RE 
MARKABLE  FOURTH  OF   JULY  CELEBRATION  IN  LONDON. 

I. 

No  ASPECT  of  the  war  was  more  surprising  than  this  sudden  re 
versal   of   the    official  and   popular   attitude   of   British   and 
American  relations.      For  a   hundred   and  twenty-two   years 
feelings  of  cordial  and  open  aversion  had  been  expressed  and 
maintained  between  the   two   peoples.     The   vigorous  dislike  of   the 
people  of  the  United  States  for  England  had  compelled  official  expression 
BRITISH  RESPONSE  °^  ^  ^Y  representative  leaders.     That  feeling  was  ac- 
TO  THE  PROP-      tively  reciprocated  by  the  English  Government  and  the 
English  people.     The  growth  of  American  sentiment  in 
favor  of  the  Irish  agitation  for  Home  Rule  and  the   ample   financial 
support   contributed   to   the    Irish   organizations,   had   intensified  that 
feeling  of  aversion  which  cannot  be  called  hatred,  but  may,  perhaps, 
be  described  as  a  condition   of  jealous  pride,  that  found  expression 
in  an  attitude   of  scornful  aloofness  and  in  continual "  nagging."     To 
"twist  the  tail  of  the  British  lion"  was  political  capital  to  an  American 
politician. 

At  the  bottom  of  the  feeling,  however,  was  an  instinct  of  profound 
respect  that  each  held  for  the  national  strength,  intelligence,  and 
practical,  homely  wisdom  of  the  other.  The  United  States  consti 
tution  is  founded  upon  the  essential  common-law  principles  of  Eng 
land,  with  no  caste  exceptions.  Our  national  democracy  is,  in  its 
nature,  much  like  the  charter  of  the  corporation  of  the  city  of  London. 

(292) 


HISTORY    OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  293 

Although  we  have  received  a  very  great  proportion  of  immigrants 
from  Germany,  Scandinavia,  France,  and  Ireland,  these  have  assimi 
lated  the  Anglo-Saxon  ideas  of  individual  freedom  and  have  not 
changed  in  appreciable  degree  the  original  political  character  of  the 
population.  It  might  almost  be  said  that,  in  proportion  as  the  immi 
grant  has  understood,  accepted,  and  exercised  the  Anglo-Saxon  aspi 
ration  for  liberty  under  the  common  laws  of  order,  he  has  become 
prominent  and  successful.  This  curious  influence  of  American  citizen 
ship  upon  the  foreigner  may  be  observed  everywhere  in  localities 
where  natives  of  the  same  foreign  country  are  not  gathered  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  form  a  separate  quarter,  where  they  are  often  tempted  to 
continue  alien  customs  and  ideas.  The  Germans  and  Irish  have  adapted 
themselves  marvelously  to  a  free  democracy.  Their  ties  of  sentimental 
affection  for  and  family  relations  with  the  Fatherland  are  strong  and 
unwavering,  but  their  loyalty  to  their  new  home  has  been  demonstrated 
to  be  as  firm  as  if  they  were  native  Americans. 

So  it  is  that  the  United  States  and  the  British  peoples  are  one  at 
bottom,  despite  the  infusion  here  of  other  races  and  the  differences  that 
climate  has  produced.  All  possess  the  patriotism  that  finds  expression 
in  an  arrogant  national  pride.  But  it  is  the  pride  of  conscious  intelli 
gence  of  strength.  The  English-speaking  people  study  their  rivals 
carefully,  in  order  to  discover  and  possess  themselves  of  the  strength 
of  their  rivals,  and  to  ascertain  their  weakness  also.  And  they  study 
their  own  strength  and  weakness,  and  their  pride  is,  therefore,  the 
confident  expression  of  knowledge.  The  "  dying  nations,"  on  the  con 
trary,  have  the  fatal  habit  of  ignoring  the  rival  as  one  incapable  of 
furnishing  valuable  suggestion,  and  their  pride  is  born  of  ignorance  and 
blind  self-confidence. 

When  the  details  of  Dewey's  victory  came  from  Manila,  Great 
Britain  recognized  the  significant  difference  between  American  and 
Spanish  men  and  methods.  She  had  long  taunted  us  with  ruinous  cor 
ruption  in  politics,  pretending  to  deduce  the  result  that  we  had  be 
come  degenerate  through  wealth  and  self-pride.  Twice  had  England 
fought  us.  Twice  had  England  found  us  to  be  good  fighting  men  and 


294  HISTORY   OF   THE 

most  dangerous  marksmen.  She  saw  again  exhibited  at  Manila  the 
same  qualities,  developed  and  augmented,  exercised  with  modern 
implements  of  war.  She  required  no  further  test  to  be  convinced 
that  the  only  change  was  improvement. 

A  few  days  later  Mr.  Chamberlain  spoke.  He  spoke  for  an  hour  and 
a  half  in  order  to  make  a  declaration  for  the  United  States  in  ten  lines. 
This  declaration  with  apparent  carelessness  was  placed  near  the  middle 
of  his  address.  The  remainder  was  devoted  to  home  politics  and  Euro 
pean  neighbors.  Let  us  see,  was  the  inquiry  contained  in  Mr.  Chamber 
lain's  brief  reference  to  the  United  States,  whether  these  Americans, 
who  can  fight  so  well,  are  strong  enough  in  common  sense  and  political 
wisdom  to  turn  their  backs  on  past  animosities.  Both  nations  are 
big  enough  to  look  into  each  other's  affairs  and  its  own  at  the  same 
time. 

The  popular  response  to  Mr.  Chamberlain's  declaration  was  prompt 
and  astonishingly,  unanimous,  in  England  and  her  distant  colonies, 
in  Canada,  and  in  the  United  States.  Australian  sailors  applied  to  be 
received  into  our  navy,  public  meetings  in  Canada  indorsed  alliance, 
and  within  ten  days  the  popular  attitude  of  brotherly  aversion  had 
been  reversed. 

In  London  on  June  3  a  public  "Anglo-American"  dinner  was  given, 
attended  by  six  hundred  persons,  prominent  in  public  attention,  but 
not  connected  with  the  government.  A  large  majority  were  English 
men,  the  remainder  American  residents  and  visitors.  It  was  arranged 
for  the  definite  purpose  of  "promoting  closer  relationship  between 
the  two  countries." 

Lord  Coleridge  presided  and  in  proposing  the  first  toast,  "Our 
Kinsmen  beyond  the  Sea,"  he  said  that  he  had  seen  the  motives  of 
America  in  the  Spanish  War  question.  There  were  always  people  who 
disbelieve  in  the  possibility  of  national  probity  and  honor;  but  he  was 
foolish  and  ignorant  enough  not  to  share  in  this  disbelief,  but  even 
if  he  did,  none  the  less  he  would  desire  victory  to  wait  upon  the  Ameri 
can  banner.  He  would  wish  it  in  the  interest  of  America  and  of  Spain, 
and,  higher  than  all,  in  the  interest  of  common  humanity.  He  did  not 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  295 

applaud  without  reserve  all  the  contests  in  which  America  had  engaged. 
Twice  only  had  she  fought  with  all  her  soul  and  strength;  first  with 
England,  and  she  fought  for  freedom.  That  contest  was  forced  upon 
her  by  the  folly  of  a  king  and  the  imbecile  subserviency  of  his  min 
isters,  and  America  was  right.  This  sentiment  was  received  with  great 
applause.  Her  second  great  contest  was  also  for  freedom,  and  the  spirit 
which  prompted  her  to  those  great  struggles  is  with  her  yet.  Why, 
then,  should  the  countries  not  draw  together?  They  were  the  only  two 
nations  on  the  earth  which  knew  how  to  combine  public  order  and  pri 
vate  freedom.  He  did  not  ask  a  public  alliance,  offensive  or  defensive. 
What  Englishmen  sought  was  personal  and  international  friendship. 

The  Bishop  of  Ripon  made  an  eloquent  address,  in  the  course  of 
which  he  said:  "Some  nations  use  the  word  liberty,  but  hardly  know 
the  thing.  But  England  and  America  have  lived  too  long  in  freedom 
to  misunderstand  its  meaning.  There  are  some  causes  worth  paying 
any  price  for,  and  freedom  is  one  of  them." 

On  the  day  preceding,  at  Washington,  a  conference  had  been  held 
between  commissioners  from  Canada  and  our  State  Department,  for 
the  purpose  of  reopening  negotiations  for  the  composition  of  many  old 
differences  concerning  the  Fisheries  question  and  customs  annoyances 
between  the  two  countries.  It  had  resulted  in  the  signing  of  an  amic 
able  protocol  for  full  settlement  by  commission.  This  announcement 
was  received  with  cheers,  and  the  dinner  resulted  in  the  organization 
of  an  Anglo-American  Society  for  the  promotion  of  international  friend 
ship. 

In  the  British  Parliament  a  remarkable  debate  occurred,  precipitated 
by  Sir  Charles  Dilke  of  the  Liberal  party.  In  attacking  the  Salisbury 
goverment  he  insisted  that  the  only  success  Lord  Salisbury  could  be 
said  to  have  attained  during  his  ministry  was  that  he  had  secured 
better  relations  with  the  United  States.  That  success,  however,  could 
not  be  ascribed,  he  maintained,  to  the  ministerial  policy.  Especially 
rash  and  feeble  had  it  been  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  seeing 
that  only  three  years  ago  Lord  Salisbury  had  rejected  the  principle 
of  arbitration  laid  down  by  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  Venezuela, 


296  HISTORY   OF   THE 

and  afterward  had  accepted  it.  That  better  relations  now  obtained 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  the  speaker  attributed 
exclusively  to  the  conduct  of  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  Ambassador  at 
Washington,  and  to  the  action  of  the  opposition,  the  leader  of  which 
had  discouraged  debate  on  the  Venezuelan  question  at  a  most  critical 
period. 

Another  eminent  Liberal,  Mr.  Asquith,  who  was  Home  Secretary  in 
the  last  Gladstone  cabinet,  and  in  the  Rosebery  cabinet,  declared  that 
he  entirely  agreed  with  what  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  said  in  Birming 
ham  when  he  declared  that  the  closer  union  of  Great  Britain  and 
America,  not  only  in  sympathy  of  thought,  but  in  political  coopera 
tion,  is  no  longer  merely  the  ideal  of  those  who  see  visions  and 
dream  dreams.  Mr.  Asquith  believed  that  such  cooperation  was  des 
tined  to  be  one  of  the  great  civilizing  forces  of  the  twentieth  century. 

Sir  William  Vernon  Harcourt,  the  leader  of  the  opposition,  heartily 
concurred  in  the  strong  language  in  which  Mr.  Chamberlain  had 
expressed  the  desire  for  closer  and  more  permanent  relations  with 
the  United  States.  Ever  since  he  had  had  anything  to  do  with  pub 
lic  life,  his  great  and  foremost  object  had  been  the  cultivation  of 
good  relations  with  the  United  States.  He  had  seen  attempts  to  rep 
resent  that  there  was  a  difference  between  the  two  parties  in  the  parlia 
ment  upon  that  subject.  There  was  no  such  difference.  There  was  no 
member  of  the  Liberal  party,  any  more  than  there  was  of  the  Unionist 
party,  who  did  not  place  friendship  or  alliance,  in  the  sense  of  cordial 
friendship, —  of  an  entente  cordiale, —  with  the  United  States,  in  the  very 
forefront  of  English  foreign  politics. 

Mr.  Curzon,  the  political  Under-Secretary  at  the  Foreign  Office,  said 
that  he  was  glad  to  hear  Sir  Charles  Dilke  express  the  feeling  of  satis 
faction  shared,  as  he  believed,  by  both  sides  of  the  House,  "  at  the 
friendly  relations  now  existing  between  the  American  Government  and 
people  and  ourselves." 

The  only  members  who  opposed  the  idea  of  an  alliance  or  even  a 
cordial  understanding  between  the  two  countries  were  the  Irish  nation 
alists. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  297 


Mr.  Chamberlain,  Colonial  Sccn-tary.  in  a  S|MM>.-II  pnict  ic;ill\ 
the  debate,  referred  to  an  assertion  by  Mr.  Morley  that  no  positive 
alliance  was  desirable.  Mr.  Chamberlain  said  :  "  Nothing  in  the  nature 
of  a  cut-and-dried  alliance  is  proposed.  The  Americans  do  not  want 
our  alliance  at  this  moment  ;  they  do  riot  ask  for  our  assistance,  and 
we  do  not  want  theirs.  But  will  any  one  say  that  the  occasion  may 
not  arise  when  Anglo-Saxon  liberty  and  Anglo-Saxon  interests  will  be 
menaced  by  a  great  combination  of  other  Powers?  I  think  that  such 
a  thing  is  possible,  and  in  that  case,  whether  it  be  America  or  Eng 
land  that  is  menaced,  I  hope  that  blood  will  be  found  to  be  thicker 
than  water." 

Mr.  Chamberlain's  concluding  sentence  was  received  with  loud  cheers 
from  both  of  the  British  parties,  but  with  expressions  of  dissent  from 
the  Irish  Nationalists.  It  ran  as  follows  :  "  Meanwhile,  I  say,  with 
out  forcing  this  opinion  upon  either  party,  or  desiring  that  either 
nation  should  enter  into  an  alliance  with  which  the  majority  of  both 
nations  would  not  thoroughly  sympathize,  —  I  repeat  what  I  said  at 
Birmingham,  —  the  closer,  more  definite,  and  more  clear  the  alliance 
between  the  United  States  and  ourselves,  the  better  it  will  be  for 
both  nations  and  for  the  civilized  world." 

It  was  apparent  to  statesmen  and  leaders  in  both  nations  that  no 
alliance  was  possible  in  the  sense  of  formal  compact  of  offense  and 
defense  as  understood  in  Europe.  The  temper  of  both  nations  and  the 
nature  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  were  opposed  to  any 
political  alliance  beyond  that  growing  out  of  immediate  sympathy, 
interest,  and  common  purposes.  The  popular  response  to  the  so-called 
proposition  of  "alliance"  was  the  manifestation  of  the  ready  purpose 
of  Great  Britain  to  help  us  if  any  European  combination  threatened 
interference.  Successful  interference  would  injure  England's  interests 
quite  as  much  as  those  of  the  United  States.  The  common  sense  and 
common  interests  of  the  two  governments  were  thus  brought  into 
much  closer  relations  by  the  general  expression  of  opinion. 

Throughout  the  period  of  the  war  there  was  no  change  in  the  at 
titude  of  the  two  countries.  When  our  war  revenue  bill  was  discovered 


298  HISTORY   OF   THE 

to  press  heavily  upon  the  maritime  tonnage  of  British  commerce,  a 
reminder  of  that  fact,  by  the  Salisbury  government  was  met  by  a 
prompt  revision  of  the  clause  by  Congress,  entirely  to  the  satisfaction 
of  England. 

The  Fourth  of  July  was  celebrated  this  year  in  England,  Canada,  and 
the  United  States,  with  equal  enthusiasm.  The  flags  of  both  nations 
were  displayed  at  public  meetings.  The  American  Society  in  London 
gave  a  public  dinner  at  which  many  Englishmen  of  eminence  and  great 
influence  were  present.  Admiral  Sampson's  telegram,  announcing  the 
victory  over  Cervera,  arrived  just  before  the  guests  were  seated,  and 
its  reading  was  greeted  with  indescribable  excitement  and  enthusiasm. 

The  addresses  were  all  tinged  with  cordial  congratulations  to  both 
nations.  The  Marquis  of  Ripon  impressively  pointed  out  that  the 
United  States  was  now  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  The  responsibility 
of  President  McKinley,  he  said,  was  greater  than  that  of  any  President 
save  Lincoln.  He  must  face  a  greater  problem  than  that  of  war,  a 
problem  which  would  determine  the  history  of  America.  Continuing, 
he  said:  "The  interests  not  only  of  your  country  but  of  this  are  in 
volved,  and  the  decision  to  a  large  extent  will  shape  the  destinies  of 
the  world."  He  and  all  the  other  English  speakers  affirmed  that  Great 
Britain  awaited  without  jealousy  or  envy  the  decision  of  the  United 
States  to  become  a  great  international  Power,  carrying  the  blessings 
of  liberty,  knowledge,  and  peace  to  other  quarters  of  the  earth. 

The  Earl  of  Dufferin  recalled  the  ties  binding  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  There  were,  he  said,  dominant  responsible  forces 
which  must  in  the  long  run  unite  the  two  countries  in  honorable 
and  generous  friendship.  He  rejoiced  at  the  fresh  symptoms  necessary 
to  amity.  Whether  these  feelings,  in  the  face  of  the  unstable  condition 
of  the  world,  would  eventually  take  a  concrete  form  might  be  regarded 
as  a  matter  for  pleasant  speculation. 

United  States  Ambassador  Hay's  reply  in  response  to  the  friendly 
utterances  was  received  with  great  cheering  and  enthusiasm.  His 
very  first  sentence  evoked  a  deafening  burst  of  cheers.  "To-day,"  he 
said,  "a  new  splendor  fills  the  span  of  the  earth  from  Santiago  to 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  299 

Manila."  The  passing  year,  he  continued,  would  be  memorable  for 
nothing  of  greater  significance  than  the  lucid  recognition  by  both  the 
American  and  British  peoples  that  the  way  of  pleasantness  between 
them  was  the  way  of  wisdom,  and  that  anything  like  variance  would 
be  folly  and  madness.  This  recognition  was  no  mere  passing  emotion 
born  of  a  troubled  hour,  but  had  been  growing  for  many  quiet  years.  It 
only  needed  rough  weather  to  show  it  to  the  world.  Now  that  a  cordial 
and  clear  understanding  had  come,  there  was  no  reason  why  it  should  not 
last  forever.  It  injured  none  and  threatened  none.  All  its  ends  were 
peaceful  and  beneh'cent.  Recalling  the  day,  he  contended  that  it  ever 
had  been  a  day  of  good  augury  to  mankind.  He  predicted  that  the 
nation  would  show  the  same  efficiency  and  promptness  in  war  and 
the  same  clemency  and  generosity  in  its  hour  of  triumph  as  in  days 
of  old.  The  nation  that  ended  a  vast  rebellion  without  a  single  exe 
cution  or  bill  of  attainder  might  safely  be  trusted  to  be  considerate 
and  magnanimous  in  victory;  and  when  the  bitterness  of  the  present 
troubles  had  passed,  both  sides  would  be  found  to  have  profited  from 
the  issue. 

Mr.  James  Bryce,  a  Scots  member  of  Parliament,  distinguished  for 
his  critical  writings  on  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  said:  "In 
1776  there  was  on  one  side  a  monarch  and  a  small  ruling  caste,  on  the 
other  side  a  people.  Now,  our  Government  can  no  longer  misrepresent 
the  nation,  and  across  the  ocean  people  speak  to  a  people.  The  At 
lantic  is  ten  times  narrower  now  than  it  was  then,  and  the  passage  of 
men  to  and  fro  has  increased  a  thousandfold;  and  through  the  per 
sonal  knowledge  of  Americans  by  Englishmen  and  of  Englishmen  by 
Americans  there  has  been  laid  the  best  foundation  for  good  will  and 
mutual  understanding  between  the  nations.  We  have  both  come,  and 
that  most  notably  within  the  last  few  months,  to  perceive  that  all 
over  the  wrorld  the  interests  of  America  and  of  England  are  substan 
tially  the  same,  and  in  recognition  of  this  fact  we  see  a  solid  basis 
for  a  permanent  cooperation." 

The  public  celebration  of  the  day  in  London  called  out  demonstra 
tions  of  popular  fervor  unprecedented  in  the  celebration  of  the  day 


300 


HISTORY   OF    THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 


outside  of  the  United  States.     London  streets  were  filled  with  Ameri 
can  and  British  colors  intertwined. 

The  usual  reception  at  the  American  embassy  was  attended  by 
15,000  persons.  Lord  Salisbury  called  personally,  an  unprecedented 
Fourth  of  July  compliment,  and  the  function  was  also  attended  by 
almost  the  entire  diplomatic  corps. 


CHAPTER  THE  TWENTY- SECOND. 
ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA. 

THE  CURIOUS  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES  — THE  DESPERATE  CAUSES 
OK  HER  UNFRIENDLY  ATTITUDE  TOWARDS   Us  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OK  WAR  — MISTAKES 
AND  FOLLIES  OK  THE  PARISIAN  PRESS  AND  PARISIAN  POPULACE  —  ABSURD  COMPAR 
ISONS  OF  SPAIN  AND  AMERICA  —  REPRISALS  PROPOSED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
THAT   CAUSED   A    SWIFT    CHANGE   OF    ATTITUDE  —  RUSSIA    AND   HER 
CONNECTION    WITH    THE    ANTI- AMERICAN   CONCERT  —  A    NEGA 
TIVE  ACT  ATONED  FOR  BY  LONG,  UNBROKEN  FRIENDSHIP, 
AND    FRESH    MANIFESTATIONS    OF    GOOD    FEELING. 


1 


I. 

T  is  not  exaggeration,  perhaps,  to  say  that  the  United  States  as  a 
nation  has  entertained  for  France  a   feeling  of  warmer  friend 
ship  than   for  any  other   country  on  the  globe. 
There  was  a  strong  element  of  almost  sentimental       LATIONS  WITH 
affection  in  our  regard  for  France  as  an   abstraction,       FRANCE  AND 

THE   FRENCH 

and  equally  for  the  French  people.  La  Fayette  was 
not  nearly  so  clothed  with  national  devotion  at  home  as  he  was  in 
the  United  States.  The  feeling  for  the  French  people  can  scarcely 
be  described.  Absolutely  alien  in  temper,  taste,  ideals,  and  race,  yet 
that  they  were  our  friends  in  the  first  death-struggle  for  independ 
ence  was  enough.  The  fact  had  given  us  courage.  It  awoke  in 
the  heart  of  America  that  fervid  gratitude  which  a  competitor  in 
any  struggle  feels  springing  up  at  the  sight  of  one  face  in  a  strange 
multitude  that  cheers  him  with  a  look  of  encouragement  and  sym 
pathy. 

But,  truth  to  tell,  no  man  ever  received  more  monument  in  pro 
portion  to  actual  deserving  than  did  La  Fayette  from  America.  His 
abilities  as  a  soldier  and  statesman  were  not  above  mediocrity.  He 
was  a  good  man  and  a  brave  man,  and,  as  an  aristocrat,  sympathizing 
with  humanity,  his  position  was  striking.  To  the  American  colonies 
his  sympathy  was  inspiring.  What  if  he  did  not  show  himself  a 

(301) 


302  HISTORY  OF   THE 

Hannibal  in  battle,  or  a  great  statesman  in  the  closet,  was  he  not 
the  loyal  and  loved  friend  of  Washington  ?  He  was  to  Americans, 
and  is  yet  to  many,  the  Washington  of  France.  No  good  American 
would  take  back  one  word  of  all  the  affection  and  reverence  that 
this  nation  has  uttered  about  him. 

In  La  Fayette  we  saw  the  French  people  —  that  look  of  sympathy 
at  the  critical  moment.  After  independence,  the  affectionate  feeling 
for  France  grew,  despite  quarrels  and  petty  disagreements. 

For,  we  reasoned,  was  not  the  ever-increasing  intensity  of  her  in 
herited  hatred  of  "  perfidious  Albion  "  most  satisfying  to  our  national 
susceptibilities?  Americans  have  been  able  to  enjoy  English  jibes  and 
sneers  at  the  French  ;  but,  laughing,  we  none  the  less  loved.  Was  not  a 
friend  privileged  to  have  all  the  faults  and  foibles  convenient  to  and 
necessary  for  happiness? 

But  there  was  much  more  than  the  La  Fayette  heroic  myth  at  the 
bottom  of  American  friendship  for  France.  He  was  merely  the  sym 
bol  of  an  idea.  The  genius  of  French  philosophical  letters  at  the 
period  of  our  independence  was  of  much  more  value  to  us  than  her 
arms.  The  desperate  excesses  that  attended  her  reaction  against  the 
long  tyranny  of  the  Capets,  not  less  than  her  declared  views  of  human 
rights,  were  of  service.  The  one  warned  this  new  republic  against  li 
cense  ;  her  theories  of  natural  rights  applied  by  the  fathers  of  America, 
with  cooler  blood  and  calmer  vision,  inspired  the  infant  republic  of 
the  United  States  with  wisdom  and  forethought. 

Our  friendship  for  France  constantly  grew.  American  people  were 
amused  but  not  offended  at  the  French  idea  of  us:  that  we  were  a 
race  of  monster  millionaires,  great  giants  of  fellows,  more  amiable  and 
tractable  than  Englishmen,  but,  also,  even  more  vulgar  and  ignorant. 
They  had  no  doubt  that  La  Fayette  had  enabled  us  to  conquer  the 
English.  Without  La  Fayette  all  would  have  been  lost.  Yet  at  home 
La  Fayette  was  known  to  be  esteemed  as  not  among  the  first  of 
France's  sons  of  genius.  But,  as  he  had  enabled  the  amiable  and  nov 
elty-mad  Americans  to  beat  "perfidious  Albion,"  they  were  proud  of  and 
amused  with  their  protege. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  :;n;; 

The  French  have  never  quite  understood  the  American  feeling  of 
gratitude  that  ignored  passing  differences.  Even  though  she  sought 
to  interfere  in  our  Civil  War,  the  act  was  overlooked. 

The  United  States  did,  however,  deliver  one  serious  and  overwhelm 
ing  blow  at  French  pride.  It  was  made  necessary  by  the  invasion  of 
Mexico,  concerted  by  Napoleon  III.  and  Austria  during  the  Civil  War. 
It  was  at  the  zenith  of  the  third  empire's  glory,  when  Paris  was 
glowing  with  the  splendors  of  imperial  extravagance  and  display  pro 
moted  by  Eugenie.  The  Emperor  attempted  to  inflame  the  patriotism 
and  pride  of  his  people  after  the  manner  of  his  illustrious  uncle,  by 
kindling  military  glory  abroad. 

Acting  with  Austria  he  determined  to  erect  a  Franco-Austrian 
empire  in  Mexico,  with  Maximilian  on  the  throne.  Our  State  De 
partment  protested,  but  European  Powers  had  never  quite  considered 
United  States  diplomacy  as  having  serious  weight,  and  Napoleon  III. 
ignored  the  protest. 

When  the  Civil  War  was  ended  and  the  United  States  free  to  turn 
its  attention  to  neighboring  relations,  the  expulsion  of  France  and 
Austria  from  Mexico  was  determined  upon.  An  ultimatum  was  drawn 
up,  setting  forth  fully  and  conclusively  the  reasons  for  the  demand  that 
French  troops  be  at  once  withdrawn  from  the  American  continent. 
It  was  the  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  clearly  and  firmly  repeated. 
The  Atlantic  Cable  was  then  newly  laid  and  tolls  were  costly,  but  the 
document  in  entirety  was  transmitted  over  the  cable,  by  Secretary 
Seward,  to  the  French  Foreign  Minister  in  Paris,  at  a  cost  of  $15,- 
000.  The  imperative  nature  of  the  demand  was  emphasized  by  the 
cost  of  its  transmission  —  enormous  and  unprecedented  at  the  pe 
riod —  and  Napoleon  III.  awoke  with  a  shock  to  the  realization  that 
"L'Oncle  Sam,"  good,  aimable,  but  yet  awkwardly  strong,  "meant 
business." 

He  was  embarrassed,  since  it  was  no  part  of  his  expectation  or 
intention  to  fight  the  United  States.  Prussia,  growing  under  Bismarck, 
was  a  threatening  and  immediate  danger.  He  must  yield.  The  army 
of  France  was  immediately  withdrawn  from  Mexico  and  the  fate  of 


304  HISTORY   OF    THE 

Maximilian  and  Carlotta  added  to  the  humiliation  of  France  an 
element  of  terrible  tragedy. 

Howsoever  seriously  statesmen  viewed  that  action  of  France,  it 
is  undeniable  that  the  mass  of  our  people — perhaps  because  the  inci 
dent  was  entirely  diplomatic  and  not  active  —  did  not  change  in  their 
feelings  toward  France.  The  French  were  French,  excitable,  erratic, 
impulsive  ;  but  the  French  had  been  our  friends  and  what  quarrels 
we  might  have  with  her  must  be,  of  course,  friendly  quarrels. 

But  to  France  and  the  French  people  the  blow  struck  at  their 
military  and  national  pride  was  too  severe  to  be  forgotten.  French 
leaders,  who  succeeded  to  the  control  of  the  nominal  republic  that  was 
to-day  exerting  imperial  authority,  to-morrow  relapsing  into  the  effu 
sive  simplicities  of  free  democracy,  inherited  the  imperial  resentment. 

But  it  would  be  grossly  unfair  to  France  —  and  no  American  will 
ingly  would  do  injustice  to  France — to  declare  that  while  our  war 
with  Spain  impended  and  after  it  had  opened,  her  action  was  dictated 
by  nothing  more  than  vain  resentment.  Her  situation  was  very  dis 
tressful,  her  needs  distracting.  With  pitiless  accuracy,  Lord  Salis 
bury's  description  of  dying  nations  and  the  symptoms  of  their  decay 
applied  to  France.  The  bursting  of  the  vast  bubble  of  Napoleonic 
pretense  and  extravagance  in  1870  had  staggered  the  faith  of  the  French 
people  in  all  leaders.  Under  Thiers  and  MacMahon  there  seemed  to  be 
recovery,  but  it  was  to  be  rudely  interrupted  by  an  explosion  of  cor 
ruption  in  the  parliament;  in  the  shady  but  fashionable  financial 
enterprises,  in  which  needy  nobles  found  great  profits  from  lending 
their  names;  and  in  the  representative  press.  The  shameful  revela 
tions  of  the  Panama  Canal  inquiry,  smothered  down  in  order  that 
other  nations  might  not  learn  the  full  disgrace,  destroyed  again  the  faith 
of  the  industrious  millions  in  the  integrity  of  representative  leaders. 

The  French  citizen  is  always  vulnerable  in  his  patriotic  pride. 
When,  therefore,  scapegoats  of  the  Panama  affair  had  been  solemnly 
offered  up  upon  the  altar  of  "national  honor,"  the  victims  of  the 
swindle  were  persuaded  to  wait.  The  canal,  they  were  told,  would  be 
completed  as  soon  as  confidence  could  be  restored.  They  were  urged 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  :;<>:, 

to  hold  to  their  stock  certificates,  the  value  of  which  their  children 
would  realize,  even  if  the  present  holders  should  not.  The  habit  of 
thrift  in  France,  which  in  the  provinces  has  attained  almost  the 
eminence  of  a  national  parsimony,  was  soothed.  The  stock  was  put 
by  for  the  inevitable  dot  in  marriage  settlements. 

But  the  Dreyfus  incident,  which  in  1SD4  had  made  the  army  glo 
rious,  was  to  return  in  1897,  threatening  to  expose  in  the  general 
military  staff  corruption  so  revolting  and  cruel  as  to  make  the  world 
stand  aghast.  At  the  moment  when  the  United  States  was  electri 
fied  by  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  all  civilization  outside  of  France 
looked  with  amazement  at  the  spectacle  of  the  French  Government, 
the  French  army  staff,  the  French  ministry  of  justice,  and  the  French 
press,  engaged  in  a  duel  with  the  author,  Zola,  and  Colonel  Picquart, 
head  of  the  secret  service  of  the  army,  resorting  to  the  most  desper 
ate  quibbles  of  law  to  destroy  these  two  champions  of  honest  jus 
tice,  who  were  ready  to  prove  the  innocence  of  Dreyfus.  But,  if  this 
should  be  permitted,  the  military  corruption  of  France  would  be  naked 
before  the  nation  and  the  whole  world. 

Once  more  patriotic  pride  was  appealed  to.  The  army,  at  least, 
must  be  trusted.  Was  it  possible  that  Frenchmen  would  permit  sen 
sational  writers  and  egotists,  acting  perhaps  with  foul  motives,  to 
traduce  the  army?  Could  not  a  court-martial,  conducted  by  the 
general  staff  upon  the  "honor  of  a  soldier."  be  definitive  until  its 
findings  should  be  revised  and  ratified  by  foreign  opinion  and  mere 
writers  for  the  newspapers?  And  patriotic  pride  stood  firm  once  more. 
Zola  was  overthrown  in  form;  but  he  had  succeeded  in  convincing  the 
world  that  Dreyfus,  the  most  pathetic  figure  in  the  history  of  political 
exile,  was  probably  innocent,  and  that  the  general  staff  was  guilty. 

Under  the  blistering  criticism  and  denunciation  of  the  press  of 
civilized  countries,  France  was  shrinking  before  war  began.  The  press 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  was  keenest  and  most  search 
ing  in  its  indictment  of  the  injustice,  cowardice,  and  impotence,  of  the 
French  Government,  as  displayed  in  sacrificing  Dreyfus  through  fear 
of  learning  too  much  truth,  and  doing  too  much  justice. 

20 


306  HISTORY   OF   THE 

A  much  stronger  nation  than  France  would  have  been  distracted 
by  the  dangers  confronting  her.  Her  people  held  4,000,000,000  francs 
($800,000,000)  of  Spanish  bonds,  many  of  them  secured  by  pledges  of 
the  revenues  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines.  Her  financial 
institutions  and  capitalists  were  heavily  interested  in  Spanish  railway 
and  industrial  stocks,  and  much  capital  was  employed  in  commercial 
operations  between  the  two  countries.  In  addition  to  this  the  enor 
mous  capital  involved  in  the  Panama  Canal  scheme,  which  had  been 
contributed  by  popular  subscriptions,  and  which  holders  of  the  cer 
tificates  clung  to  upon  promises  of  future  redemption,  would  be  lost 
forever,  if  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  could  reach  an  under 
standing. 

Involved  in  a  fog  of  despair  over  the  integrity  of  their  entire  offi 
cial  system,  with  the  loss  of  immense  capital  threatened,  what  could 
be  expected  of  a  people  but  bitter  resentment  and  hostility  to  the 
foreign  country  whose  actions  might  cause  such  losses  ?  The  thrifty 
population  was  certainly  excusable  in  wishing  that  Spain  might  triumph; 
while  a  ministry  that  had  been  unable  to  deal  with  the  Dreyfus  out 
rage  could  not  be  expected  calmly  to  examine  the  future. 


ii. 

UNDER  the  circumstances,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  French  pop 
ular  press  and  her  people  generally  would  sympathize  with   Spain. 
It  was  inevitable,  also,  that  the  Government  wTould  do 

MISTAKES  AND 

FOLLIES  OF  so,  but  with  circumspect  concealment.  For  weeks  be 
fore  and  after  the  first  act  of  war,  the  popular  press 
was  filled  with  editorials  denouncing  the  United  States,  misrepre 
senting  our  motives ;  it  printed  all  sorts  of  false  news  derogatory  to 
the  dignity  and  integrity  of  Americans,  and  contained  interviews,  real 
and  imaginary,  calculated  to  arouse  against  us  the  rage  and  anger  of 
their  readers.  The  cause  of  Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  was  defended 
for  its  righteousness,  and  sympathy  for  her  was  manufactured  to  a 
vast  extent  and  fanned  to  ardent  heat. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  307 

The  immediate  popularity  of  this  abuse  and  scorn  proved  that  such 
utterances  reflected  popular  sentiment  accurately.  Many  persons  of 
prominence  and  influence,  some  officials,  or  occupying  semi-official 
posts,  expressed  through  the  newspapers  bitter  resentment  against  the 
United  States.  A  Rear-Admiral  declared  that,  in  his  opinion,  the 
officers  composing  the  Maine  Board  of  Inquiry  "were  not,  under  the 
circumstances,  to  be  believed  on  oath."  The  value  of  his  opinion, 
as  it  defined  his  prejudice  only,  without  accurate  knowledge  of  the 
subject,  may  be  estimated  from  an  additional  declaration  he  made 
that,  "  there  is  not  an  officer  in  the  United  States  navy  capable  of 
commanding  a  vessel,  and  the  navy  included  few  vessels  worthy  of 
command !" 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  these  opinions  were  expressed  prior 
to  Manila  and  Santiago.  But  they  were  entertained  not  alone  by  the 
Rear-Admiral.  Many  other  naval  officers  in  Paris  declared  in  inter 
views  that  our  naval  officers  were  incompetent,  inexperienced,  ig 
norant!  That  discipline  was  lax,  that  instruction  was  ignored,  and 
that  the  crews  were  mostly  mercenaries  kicked  out  of  all  other  na 
vies  for  drunkenness,  or  were  deserters.  One  officer's  opinion  was  that 
Spain's  navy  was  three  times  as  powerful  as  ours  in  ships,  but  when 
the  efficiencies  of  command,  crew,  and  discipline  were  considered,  the 
Spaniards  were  ten  times  stronger. 

A  Spanish  Admiral,  who  at  Madrid  consented  to  be  interviewed 
for  the  purpose  of  suggesting  a  plan  for  their  naval  campaign, 
said:  "With  immediate  vigor.  I  should  advise  the  sending  of  a 
fleet  against  Washington  first ;  then,  after  reducing  the  city,  the  fleet 
should  proceed  to  Chicago  and  bring  it  to  terms."  This  was  equaled 
by  sentences  in  a  French  naval  Captain's  published  article,  accom 
panied  by  diagrams  suggesting  also  a  plan  of  campaign.  "As  Cuba,"  he 
wrote,  "is  not  far  from  Havana,  it  would  be  easy  for  the  United  States 
to  transfer  its  fleet  in  the  secondary  movement  from  the  one  to  the 
other."  He  placed  the  Philippines  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  the  Canary 
Islands  in  the  Chinese  Sea,  and  the  Carolines  in  the  spot  occupied  on 
the  Atlantic  chart  by  the  Canaries. 


308  HISTORY   OF   THE 

These  were  not  burlesque  or  humorous  articles,  but  were  intended 
as  serious  contributions  to  the  discussion. 

In  La  Patrie,  a  very  popular  Paris  paper,  appeared  an  interview 
evidently  concocted  by  some  scribbler,  and  pretended  to  give  the  views 
of  a  Canadian  army  officer.  Nothing  could  better  expose  the  igno 
rance  of  the  reporter  or  of  the  editor  who  could  write  or  accept  such 
absurdities.  Some  of  the  views  are  reproduced  for  amusement: — 


"  The  United  States  are  in  no  condition  to  sustain  a  war  with  Spain.  A  war, 
even  if  they  were  victors,  would  bring  such  disaster  to  American  commerce  that  it 
would  be  equivalent  to  their  ruin. 

"  With  the  exception  of  two  or  three  armored  ships  the  United  States  navy  is 
absolutely  valueless.  The  officers  who  command  it  may  be  decent  enough  engi 
neers  in  theory,  but  they  are  entirely  ignorant  of  the  method  of  fighting  guns.  As 
to  the  sailors,  they  have  never  been  drilled  to  fight  ;  they  are  worthless  as  artiller 
ists. 

"  The  United  States  army  does  not  exist.  There  are,  to  be  sure,  some  22,000 
men  under  arms,  but  they  are  not  soldiers.  Doubtless,  one  could  get  recruits,  but 
in  order  to  raise  an  army  of  100,000  of  them  an  enormous  amount  of  money  would 
be  required,  and  it  would  take  several  months.  Still  they  would  be  only  mercen 
aries,  who  would  draw  bounties  at  the  recruiting  station  and  then  desert.  During 
the  war  of  secession  every  recruit  got  a  bounty  of  $3,000  ;  and  I  have  known  per 
sonally  of  one  man  who  drew  this  bounty  three  times  within  a  week,  and  then  im 
mediately  fled  to  Quebec,  where  he  went  into  business  on  the  money. 

"  The  American  soldier,  the  typical  American  soldier,  is  not  what  one  would 
call  a  soldier  in  Europe,  where  one  expects  a  man  to  be  amenable  to  discipline, 
intelligent  and  docile  in  the  hands  of  his  chiefs.  Individually,  he  is  a  good  marks 
man  and  capable  of  withstanding  fatigue,  but  he  is  of  no  use  as  a  component  of  a 
body  of  troops,  where  he  would  have  to  learn  tactics.  However,  the  American  officers 
are  not  tacticians,  and  are  absolutely  ignorant  of  the  art  of  war.  Remember,  too, 
that  I  am  now  speaking  of  the  standing  army  of  22,000  men.  You  may  judge 
from  this  what  the  recruits  would  be. 


"  There  is  Jingoism  in  the  United  States,  but  no  patriotism  whatever,  as  that 
word  is  understood  by  other  peoples.  Americans  will  work,  and  sometimes  fight, 
but  only  for  money.  That  is  the  one  consideration,  no  matter  what  circumstance 
arises.  Perhaps  if  the  United  States  were  to  undertake  a  war  of  pillage  in  Cuba 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  309 

they  would  be  able  to  raise  armed  bands,  who  would  fight  in  exchange  for  the 
proceeds  of  the  robberies  they  could  perpetrate.  Otherwise  not. 

"  All  the  ports  of  the  United  States,  from  New  Orleans  to  New  York,  from 
Florida  to  Newfoundland,  are  entirely  open  and  unprotected.  Not  one  has  a  single 
gun  or  a  soldier  for  defense.  A  small  fleet  of  Spanish  gunboats  could  bombard  all 
the  principal  cities,  one  after  the  other,  and  soon  bring  the  Yankees  to  terms.  It 
would  be  the  work  of  a  few  days  only. 

"  In  conclusion,  the  resources  of  America  might  prolong  the  conflict  and  make 
the  outcome  doubtful.  But  there  are  many  unforeseen  things  to  take  into  account. 
We  must  remember  that  it  would  be  a  war  between  a  valiant,  courageous  people 
on  the  one  side,  and  a  horde  of  mercenary  cowards  on  the  other." 

The  volume  of  execration  poured  out  upon  everything  American 
at  last  produced  a  condition  of  excitement  that  exposed  Americans,  vis 
iting  Paris  for  pleasure  or  business,  to  insults  and  annoyance. 

The  few  serious  and  dignified  journals  did  not,  of  course,  descend 
to  the  level  of  the  popular  press,  but  they  dared  not  take  the  initiative 
to  restrain  the  popular  feeling.  They  did  not  excite  malignant  igno 
rance,  but  they  displayed  more  discretion  than  information.  It  was 
hopeless  to  stem  the  tide  when  the  Government  was  secretly  leading 
in  an  attempt  to  checkmate  the  United  States. 

The  vanity  of  French  leaders  renders  them  prone  to  be  induced 
to  take  initiative  when  others  hesitate.  It  has  been  declared  upon 
good  authority  that  France  acted  as  the  organizer  of  the  attempt  to 
form  a  concert  for  intervention.  The  belief  that  her  interest  with 
England  in  opposing  the  Nicaragua  Canal  and  the  significance  of  her 
willingness  to  throw  over  her  old  friend  in  America,  in  order  to  draw 
Great  Britain  into  an  alliance  that  would  "teach  America  a  lesson," 
could  not  be  resisted.  The  fact  that  Germany  had  declined  to  act 
unless  Great  Britain  joined,  was  ominous  to  all  the  Powers  except 
France.  The  consequence  of  her  failure  inflamed  her  afresh  against 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

All  France  believed  in  the  incompetence  of  our  army  and  navy, 
because  all  France  was  wishing  for  incompetence.  When  Dewey  had 
won  his  unprecedented  victory,  France  believed  it  was  an  accident, 
because  France  wished  it  to  be  an  accident.  She  transferred  her  faith 


310  HISTORY   OF   THE 

to  Cervera,  to  the  Offenbachian  Camara,  and  her  sneers  and  jibes  to 
Sampson,  Schley,  and  Shafter. 

At  this  time,  however,  France  began  to  feel  a  new  agony.  The 
preparations  for  the  Paris  World's  Fair  of  1900  were  greatly  advanced. 
Our  State  Department  had  prepared  plans  and  an  appropriation  bill 
for  $1,000,000,  through  which  the  representation  of  the  United  States  at 
her  fair  would  be  an  impressive  feature.  Opposition  to  the  appropria 
tion  appeared  in  Congress,  and  the  bill  languished.  In  many  cities  and 
towns  of  the  United  States  clubs  had  been  formed  for  the  purpose  of 
saving  funds  in  advance  for  the  expense  of  visiting  the  fair.  These 
clubs  began  to  disband. 

In  a  number  of  cities  organizations  were  projected  and  some  were 
formed  by  women,  for  the  purpose  of  systematically  refusing  to  pur 
chase  any  articles  imported  from  or  made  in  France,  and  for  notifying 
merchants  that  if  they  carried  French  articles  of  stock  it  would  be 
considered  cause  sufficient  for  a  withdrawal  of  patronage.  Agitation 
in  such  direction  was,  of  course,  mere  ebullition  of  resentment,  and 
no  more  to  be  justified  than  the  action  of  the  Franch.  It  was  quickly 
abandoned,  discouraged  and  ridiculed  by  newspapers  generally.  But 
it  was  reported,  and  it  had  its  effect  upon  French  conduct. 

The  large  reduction  in  the  number  of  American  tourists  in  Paris 
and  other  European  centers  began  to  cause  consternation.  Americans 
are  credited  with  spending  upon  pleasure  $150,000,000  a  year  in  Europe. 
France  and  particularly  Paris  receive  the  greatest  proportion  of  these 
750,000,000  francs  annually.  It  seemed  to  the  Paris  tradesman  as  if  the 
economic  cataclysm  were  at  hand. 

Then  France  came  to  her  senses.  Commissioners,  representing 
boards  of  trade,  bringing  with  them  letters  of  commendation  from 
the  Government,  came  to  Washington  and  gravely  issued  explanations 
prepared  for  the  purpose  of  convincing  the  United  States  that  the 
French  people  had  been  grossly  maligned  by  a  mercenary  and  frivolous 
press,  representing  no  actual  sentiment.  The  French  people  loved  the 
American  people  and  were  natural  enemies  of  Spain.  The  appeal  was 
full  of  pathos,  and  faultless  in  diction. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  311 

While  this  was  making  its  effect,  the  "incompetent"  Captains  of 
our  fleet  and  their  "undisciplined  and  uninstructed  crews  of  merce 
naries"  repeated  before  Santiago  the  miracle  that  Dewey  had  per 
formed  at  Manila  —  and  against  Spanish  ships,  commanders,  and  crews 
that,  according  to  French  estimates,  ought  to  have  equaled  sixty  of 
our  ships. 

And  our  soldiers,  who,  by  French  account,  were  "absolutely  igno 
rant  of  the  art  of  war,"  had  fought  at  Las  Guasimas,  San  Juan,  and  El 
Caney  against  enormous  preponderance  of  the  enemy  in  position  and 
force.  When  the  Spanish  surrendered  27,000  troops  and  a  fortified 
city  to  about  16,000  available  Americans,  France  was  not  yet  con 
vinced,  perhaps,  but  her  courtesy  of  speech  was  much  improved,  and 
the  tone  of  her  newspapers  greatly  changed. 

There  was  much  in  the  acute  distresses  of  France  to  excuse  her 
attitude,  the  knowledge  of  which  caused  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  to  exert  every  effort  to  mitigate  the  strain  of  the  situation, 
and  to  refrain  from  any  act  calculated  to  increase  the  probability 
of  widening  the  breach. 

in. 

THAT  Russia  consented  to  act  in  the  anti-American  concert  proposed 
by  France,  is  true,   unless  the   concert  itself  is  wholly  a  myth.     It 
was  the  first  unfriendly  act  of  that  Government  towards 
the   United   States,   and  its   unfriendliness  was   plainly       ™  ^ss™15 
negative.     Since   Catherine   II.  had   quickly   recognized 
our  independence  of  England,  Russia  had  been  not  only  friendly  to 
America,  but    had    given    active    and    prompt    proofs    of   it.     Under 
all  circumstances  she  remained  steadfast,  recognizing  that  in  the  re 
mote  republic,  with  its  well-defined   insular  policy,  there  existed  no 
patent  rivalry  with  her  own  purposes. 

She  had  acted  as  the  determined  friend  of  the  United  States  dur 
ing  the  Civil  War  when  France  and  Great  Britain  concerted  interference 
in  our  home  affairs.  Even  then  France  was  the  active  proposer  of 
interference.  When  Andrew  G.  Curtin  was  United  States  minister  to 


312  HISTORY   OF    THE 

Russia,  he  was  shown  by  Prince  Gortschakoff  the  original  autograph 
letter  of  Napoleon  III.  to  Alexander  II.,  proposing  the  action.  Alex 
ander,  in  an  autographic  reply,  declared  that  "the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  a  Government  of  their  own  choice,  which  they 
are  defending  with  their  best  blood  and  treasure,  and  I  will  never 
do  anything  to  weaken  them."*  He  followed  this  up  by  sending  a 
Russian  fleet  to  American  waters  ready  to  resist  with  force  any  attempt 
by  Great  Britain  and  France  to  interfere. 

In  1898  Russia  was  involved  in  serious  national  distresses.  Her 
gigantic  strides  towards  the  Pacific,  involving  vast  works  of  in 
ternal  construction  and  an  expansion  of  military  and  naval  forces, 
had  strained  her  resources  at  a  time  when  she  was  preparing  to 
adopt  a  gold  basis  for  her  currency  system.  Her  rapid  progress  east 
had  intensified  the  distrust  and  hatred  of  Great  Britain,  and  the 
possibility  of  a  resort  to  war  had  been  imminent  several  years  before. 
In  that  crisis  she  looked  about  for  a  friend.  Germany  was  not  avail 
able  because  of  the  blood  ties  between  William  II.  and  Victoria.  An 
Anglo-German  alliance  was  more  probable  than  a  Russo-German 
agreement.  France,  friendly  to  Russia,  committed  to  enmity  against 
England  and  Germany,  presented  an  opportunity.  She  was  dis 
tressed  by  isolation.  The  Franco-Russian  alliance  was  formed,  offensive 
and  defensive.  When  Germany  had  been  induced  to  seize  Kiao-Chau, 
and  Russia  had  followed  it  up  by  taking  Port  Arthur,  France  sup 
ported  the  movement  by  sitting  down  at  Hainan. 

Now,  when  France  proposed  the  anti-American  concert  the  obliga 
tions  of  an  ally  committed  Russia  to  acquiesce.  It  was  the  fortune 
of  international  politics  and  European  diplomacy,  and  it  must  be 
confessed  that  Russia's  part  in  the  negotiations  was  mere  acquiescence. 
As  soon  as  the  concert  failed  and  the  formal  diplomatic  represen 
tation  of  peaceful  wishes  had  been  made  at  Washington,  the  Rus 
sian  Government  resumed  and  maintained  its  old  position  of  friendly 
neutrality. 


*  Jeremiah  Curtin,  communication  published  July  22,  1898. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  813 

The  enthusiastic  response  of  the  people  of  England  and  the  United 
States  to  the  suggestion  of  an  Anglo-American  alliance,  was  a  shock 
to  Russian  feeling.  A  staff  correspondent  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Now 
Vrenn/a,  the  leading  Russian  newspaper,  who  was  sent  to  study  the 
feeling  of  this  country  towards  Russia  and  England,  said  in  a  pub 
lished  interview :  "  It  cannot  be  denied  that  a  most  painful  impres 
sion  has  been  produced  on  Russian  public  opinion  by  the  language  of 
a  part  of  the  American  press  advocating  an  Anglo-American  alliance 
against  Russia  in  the  Far  East.  Should  the  American  nation  follow 
such  advice  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  would  be  deeply  resented  by 
Russia,  which  is  determined  not  to  yield  one  inch  of  her  legitimate 
position  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific. 

"Fortunately,  the  admirable  good  sense  and  the  clear-headedness 
of  the  Americans  do  not  admit  a  possibility  of  adopting  such  a  policy. 
In  the  Far  East,  England  and  the  United  States,  as  the  two  greatest 
industrial  nations,  are  natural  competitors,  struggling  for  a  predomi 
nance  in  the  Chinese  markets.  The  part  of  Russia  in  Manchuria  and 
Korea,  as  well  as  in  China,  is  that  of  a  protector  of  less  civilized  peo 
ples,  which,  by  their  origin  and  history,  are  nearer  to  us  than  to  West 
ern  nations.  It  is  generally  recognized  that  Russia  has  occupied  Port 
Arthur  merely  in  order  to  counteract  the  pernicious  consequences  of 
Germany's  violent  seizure  of  Kiao-Chau.  Russian  policy  in  the  Far 
East  ought  to  be  particularly  applauded  by  the  Americans,  for  it  cre 
ates  a  boundless  field  for  American  enterprise.  Undoubtedly,  the 
development  of  Russian  influence  in  Manchuria  will  open  a  consider 
able  area  to  American  trade  and  industry.  The  only  necessary  con 
dition  of  fully  profiting  by  these  most  favorable  prospects  is  the  ces 
sation  of  playing  at  a  policy  which  might  alienate  an  old  and  trusty 
friend  without  being  able  to  transform  a  natural  and  traditional 
opponent  into  a  disinterested  ally." 

It  is  admitted  everywhere  that  in  the  exercise  of  her  impenetrable 
diplomacy  Russia  has  been  more  successful  than  she  has  ever  been 
with  arms,  and  that  her  diplomacy  has  been  more  profitable  than 
the  armed  successes  of  some  other  nations.  The  declaration  of  her 


314  HISTORY   OF   THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

journalistic  envoy  was  obviously  authoritative.  Open  political  opinions 
are  not  proclaimed  by  Russians  except  at  their  peril.  This  appeal  to 
the  old  American  hostility  against  Great  Britain  had  been  expressed 
in  the  St.  Petersburg  Viedomosti  more  than  a  month  before,  with  in 
genious  and  strong  arguments  to  support  it,  and  with  bitter  warn 
ings  to  Great  Britain.*  The  general  tone  of  the  Russian  press  was 
most  cordially  expressive  of  friendliness  to  the  United  States. 
•  In  June  the  first  Russian  Ambassador  to  the  United  States  was 
presented  to  the  President  at  Washington.  Previous  representatives 
had  borne  the  title  of  Minister.  The  Ambassador  was  Count  Cas- 
sini,  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  accomplished  diplomats  of  the  Rus 
sian  Government.  He  had  long  been  her  representative  in  China, 
but  had  served  at  important  European  capitals.  His  transfer  from 
Pekin  to  Washington  was  considered  at  the  time  to  be  significant. 
In  his  address  to  the  President  he  referred  to  the  unbroken  friend 
ship  between  the  two  countries.  The  neutrality  of  Russia,  after  the 
first  negative  act,  was  full  and  satisfactory.  Indeed,  the  friendliness 
of  her  people  remained  unchanged. 


*"But  there  is  still  another  point  showing  the  usefulness  and  expediency  of  the  Rus 
sian-American  friendship.  Let  us  be  candid.  Sincere  as  the  assertions  of  a  few  Russo- 
philes  on  the  banks  of  the  Thames  and  Anglophiles  on  the  banks  of  the  Neva  may  be, 
our  relations  with  England  must  inevitably  come  to  a  bloody  outcome.  The  war  will  not 
break  out  to-morrow,  not  after  a  month,  undoubtedly  not  even  after  one  year,  but  it  is 
bound  to  come.  The  historical  march  of  events  tends  toward  it.  The  eternal  antagonism 
of  Russian  and  English  interests  shows  it.  Show  us  the  nook  in  which  Russia  could 
tender  England  the  hand  of  friendship  without  hiding  in  the  other  hand,  behind  its  back, 
the  murderous  dagger  !  There  is  no  such  nook  in  existence.  Russia  advances  toward 
the  Pamirs,  England  does  the  same ;  Russia  endeavors  to  extend  its  influence  in  neigh 
boring  Afghanistan,  England  sets  to  work  the  springs  of  its  immense  political  mechanism 
in  order  to  paralyze  such  influence.  Russia  occupies  Port  Arthur ;  England  installs  itself 
at  Wei-Hai-Wei.  Of  Europe,  the  history  of  which  is  full  of  innumerable  Anglo-Russian 
conflicts,  it  is  needless  to  speak.  In  a  word,  there  is  no  place  in  the  whole  world  in 
which,  as  in  a  common  sea,  the  course  and  the  tendencies  of  both  empires  are  merged, 
and  thus,  sooner  or  later,  war  is  inevitable.  Once  such  a  war  starts,  what  immense  help 
the  United  States  ports  would  be  to  Russia !  The  sympathetic  neutrality  of  the  United 
States  would  be  for  Russia  more  than  a  welcome  find,  and  the  possibility  of  even  indirect 
assistance  by  the  American  fleet,  which  is  even  now  pretty  strong,  and  will  become  more 
so  during  the  impending  war  with  Spain.  We  have  not  yet  forgotten  the  great  help 
given  us  by  the  United  States  in  1878,  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Congress,  when  in  view 
of  the  very  probable  military  conflict,  cruisers  were  manned  by  Russian  sailors  in  the 
very  ports  of  the  United  States."  —  St.  Petersburg  Viedomosti,  April,  1898. 


CHAPTER  THE  TWENTY-THIRD. 
DEWEY   AND  THE  GERMANS. 

VERY  UNFRIENDLY  AND  HOSTILE  OPPOSITION  TO  AMERICA  BY  THE  EMPEROR  AND  THE  AGRARIAN 
PARTY  — THE  COMMERCIAL  ANTAGONISMS  THAT  PRODUCED  IT  — ADMIRAL  DEWEY  RECEIVES 
AN   APOLOGY    FROM   PRINCE   HENRY,  THE  EMPEROR'S   BROTHER  — THE   IRRITATING   IN 
TERFERENCE   OF  THE  GERMAN   WAR    SHIPS    AT    MANILA  — DEWEY   DEMANDS  THAI- 
ADMIRAL    VON    DlEDERICHS    SHALL    ANSWER    WHETHER    HE   WANTS    PEACE    OR 

WAR  — THE  GERMANS  "CALLED  DOWN"  AT  LAST  — DIPLOMATIC  EXPLANA 
TION*  AND  ASSURANCES  — CHANGE  OF   TONE   OF  THE  GERMAN   PRESS. 

I. 

THE   attitude   of  the   German    Empire    and   the  German   people 
towards  the  United  States  was  expressed  in  four  languages. 
The  diplomatic  records  will  show  that  it  was  OERMANA 
one  of  "friendly   neutrality  to  both   nations."     RIAN HOSTILITY 
The  semi-official  German  press  spoke  the  language   of 
open  hostility  and  enmity.     The  masses  of  German  people,  who  have 
millions  of  kinsmen  in  the  United  States,  attracted  here  by  the  limi 
tations   of  life   at  home,   were   cordially    friendly,  and  their  popular 
press  bore  witness  to  the  fact.     The  court  and  the  Agrarian  party,  the 
latter    composed    of    the    hereditary    landowners,    the    stiffest-necked 
aristocracy   of   continental   Europe,  were   bitterly  hostile  to  us,  and 
through  many  channels  gave  vent  to  their  feelings. 

There  has  been  a  deadly  commercial  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  for  some  years.  The  tariff  theories  of  the  two 
countries  clashed,  and  Germany  was  greatly  incensed  by  the  adop 
tion  of  the  McKinley  tariff  in  this  country.  England  succeeded  to 
the  trade  lost  to  Germany.  American  farm  products,  manufactures, 
provisions,  and  other  articles,  could  be  set  down  in  Germany  so  cheaply 
that  the  landowners  complained  that  America  would  destroy  land 
values  in  Germany.  The  Agrarian  party  was  formed  to  conduct  a 
tariff  policy  that  would  close  the  German  markets  to  the  United  States. 

(315) 


316  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  land  barons,  ever  the  buttresses  of  the  throne,  contrived  that  court 
influence  should  be  hostile  to  the  Washington  government,  while  the 
official  record  would  remain  correct  throughout. 

The  United  States  did  not  expect  or  desire  sympathy  from  the 
German  Emperor,  bat  we  were  fully  prepared  to  stop  any  effort  at 
intervention.  The  first  intimation  of  hostility  was  a  curt  remark 
reported  to  have  been  made  by  the  Emperor  at  a  mess  dinner  with  a 
party  of  officers.  "It  will  not  be  too  bad,"  he  was  quoted  as  having 
said  in  substance,  "if  America  shall  very  soon  require  Europe  to  teach 
her  the  proper  place  for  her."  After  some  delay  the  utterance  was 
officially  denied  with  the  additional  declaration  that  the  Emperor's 
feeling  for  the  United  States  was  not  hostile. 

When  Dewey  sailed  from  Hong  Kong  to  attack  Manila,  it  was  an 
nounced  by  the  Spanish  Government,  unofficially,  that  Germany  had 
determined  to  prevent  the  bombardment  of  the  city  because  of  the 
large  German  interests.  The  annoyances  of  the  German  war  ships  at 
Manila  after  the  great  battle,  brought  to  light  a  personal  incident 
highly  interesting  at  a  time  when  excitement  was  high,  and  also 
indicative  of  the  German  court  and  semi-official  attitude. 

A  private  citizen  of  good  repute  and  prominence,  residing  in  Chi 
cago,  was  at  Hong  Kong  in  March,  when  preparations  were  making 
for  possible  war.  He  had  completed  a  tour  of  the  Orient  and  was 
then  homeward  bound.  All  the  sentiment  he  had  heard  expressed 
was  favorable  and  friendly  to  the  United  States,  except  that  coming 
from  German  officials  and  naval  officers.  These,  he  said,  spoke  sar 
castically  of  the  United  States. 

Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  brother  of  the  German  Emperor,  had  ar 
rived  at  Hong  Kong  shortly  before  on  his  mission  to  represent  the 
German  government  as  Admiral  of  the  navy  in  affairs  growing  out 
of  the  Kiao-Chau  seizure.  Immediately  after  his  arrival,  so  the  story 
ran,  Prince  Henry  gave  a  banquet  to  the  representative  officers  of  all 
the  fleets  in  port.  Among  those  present  was  Commodore  Dewey. 
After  dining  Prince  Henry  proposed  the  usual  national  toasts.  These 
are  regulated  as  to  order  of  precedence  by  etiquette  well  understood 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  317 

in  the  navies.  When  the  Prince  reached  the  place  of  the  United 
States  in  the  list  he  passed  it  for  another  nation.  Hut  when  he  pro 
ceeded  to  the  second  omission,  it  meant  wilful  intention,  ignorance, 
or  gross  carelessness.  Commodore  Devvey  left  the  banquet  without 
ceremony.  Finally,  just  before  the  entertainment  closed,  the  Prince 
toaMiMl  the  1  nitrd  States. 

Next  morning  Prince  Henry  sent  an  aide  to  Commodore  Dewey 
with  the  explanation  that  the  omission  had  been  wholly  inadvertent, 
and  was  not  meant  as  a  discourtesy  to  the  United  States  or  her  rep 
resentative  commander.  Dewey  thanked  the  aide  for  the  courteous 
manner  in  which  he  conveyed  the  message  from  his  Admiral,  but  in 
reply  requested  him  to  inform  Prince  Henry  that  the  incident  was  one 
that  called  for  a  written  or  a  personal  apology  from  the  Prince.  Ger 
man  sarcasm  was  thus  put  to  the  test.  Very  soon  Prince  Henry  called 
in  person  and  apologized,  saying  that  the  omission  was  caused  by 
neglect  in  writing  the  American  toast  in  its  proper  order,  and  that 
he  had  intended  to  put  no  slight  upon  the  United  States.  The  Prince 
later  gave  a  great  entertainment,  to  which  Dewey  received  invitation, 
but  which  he  did  not  attend. 

Incidents  of  the  character  described  in  the  anecdote  are  consid 
ered  in  official  etiquette  as  having  occurred  in  cutnrra,  and  the 
traveler  who  made  it  public  acknowledged  that  he  understood  it  was 
an  incident  in  camera  when  the  facts  were  related  to  him  by  an 
officer  of  the  American  fleet.  He  made  it  public  in  order  that,  at  the 
critical  moment,  when  the  Germans  were  annoying  Admiral  Dewey 
after  the  battle,  and  before  assistance  could  reach  him,  the  American 
people  might  feel  reassured  of  the  quiet  and  unobtrusive,  but  very 
firm  and  decided,  character  of  the  fleet  commander  representing  our 
forces  at  Manila.  The  story  was  not  denied. 


318  HISTORY    OF   THE 


II. 

THE  hand  of  a  strong  man  was  undoubtedly  needed  at  Manila  after 

the  capture  of  Cavite.     Admiral  Dewey  was  in  a  position  of  very  great 

responsibility,  requiring  the  utmost  patience,  courage, 

DTHE^ERMAN          and  abilities  of  the   highest  order.     He  had  to  estab- 


an(*  maintam  an  effective  blockade  against  a  city 
of  300,000  people,  walled,  fortified,  and  well-garrisoned 
by  Spanish  troops.  He  was  expected  to  lend  encouragement  to  and 
exert  restraint  upon  the  insurgent  forces  just  sufficient  to  keep  them 
up  to  the  attitude  of  harassing  the  garrison  without  storming  the  city. 
He  was  almost  cut  off  from  knowledge  of  Spanish  movements  else 
where,  and  must  keep  vigilant  guard  against  possible  Spanish  reen- 
forcements  for  Manila.  It  was  hopeless  to  expect  troops  or  ships  for 
his  own  support  short  of  six  weeks'  time. 

The  situation  called  for  tension  of  nerve  and  constant  watchfulness. 
And  this  was  aggravated  by  petty  proceedings  on  the  part  of  German 
naval  commanders  calculated  to  irritate  him  beyond  the  point  of 
patience. 

There  were  war  ships  of  Great  Britain,  Russia,  France,  Japan,  and 
Austria,  in  Manila  Bay,  observing  the  blockade;  but  these  nations  were 
content  to  send  but  one  vessel,  or,  at  most,  two  were  sometimes  present. 
But  there  were  five  of  the  Germans  constantly  in  attendance,  and  occa 
sionally  seven,  comprising  the  whole  of  the  German  fleet  in  Asiatic 
waters.  The  Deutschland,  commanded  by  Prince  Henry,  and  her  sister 
ship,  the  Kaiser,  the  flagship  of  Admiral  von  Diederichs,  were  heavily 
armored  cruisers  of  7,700  tons  each,  carrying  eight  10-inch  guns,  with 
secondary  batteries  of  8-  and  6-inchers.  The  other  ships  were  the 
Kaiserin  Augusta,  Irene,  Princess  Wilhelm,  Giffon,  and  Cormoran.  In 
numbers,  in  armor,  and  in  guns,  the  Germans  were  stronger  than  the 
Americans  whose  six  vessels  were  unprotected  cruisers  and  small 
gunboats. 

Upon  establishing  his  blockade,  Admiral  Dewey  drew  up  a  code 
of  regulations  which  he  considered  necessary  for  shutting  up  Manila 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  319 

without  causing  more  inconvenience  than  the  conditions  required  to 
the  foreign  vessels.  The  imaginary  line  of  the  blockade  cordon  was 
drawn  from  Cavite  across  the  bay  to  Malibon  harbor,  leaving  abundant 
room  for  foreign  ships  to  enter  the  bay  and  observe  the  blockade. 

Among  the  regulations  was  one  common  to  all  blockade  codes. 
It  was  that  there  should  be  no  movement  of  any  foreign  vessels  or 
boats  about  the  bay  after  sunset,  without  the  knowledge  and  expressed 
permission  of  the  blockade  commander. 

The  Germans,  as  soon  as  their  ships  arrived,  began  to  ignore  and 
violate  the  rule.  They  sent  launches  out  at  night  as  it  suited  their 
inclination  or  whim.  Admiral  Dewey  instructed  his  patrol  launches 
to  turn  back  the  intruders.  Admiral  von  Diederichs  protested  vigor 
ously.  Dewey  sent  back  word  with  firmness  that  his  regulations  must 
be  observed. 

But  the  Germans  had  no  intention  of  making  their  presence  agree 
able.  The  launches  were  started  off  later  at  night  to  convey  German 
officers  to  the  clubs  in  Manila.  Dewey  turned  the  searchlights  of  his 
ships  on  that  part  of  the  bay  and  swept  it,  with  the  result  that  the 
launches  were  detected  and  ordered  back.  Persisting,  the  Germans 
began  to  send  one  or  two  decoy  launches  in  one  direction,  while  others 
moved  out  under  cover  of  darkness  in  another.  Then  Dewey  turned 
his  searchlights  on  the  German  war  vessels  and  covered  them,  to  prevent 
any  boat  leaving  at  night  without  his  knowledge. 

In  naval  etiquette  it  is  particularly  offensive  to  the  pride  of  a  com 
mander  to  have  his  ships  made  the  target  of  a  searchlight  from  another. 
Admiral  von  Diederichs  sent  word  to  Admiral  Dewey  that  he  objected 
to  having  the  ships  of  his  fleet  subjected  to  indignity.  Admiral  Dewey 
returned  a  courteous  message  regretting  that  the  conduct  of  von 
Diederichs'  ships  made  it  necessary  to  keep  their  movements  at  night 
under  observation.  He  added,  with  some  sarcasm,  that  perhaps  the 
Germans  had  not  fully  understood  whether  the  blockade  was  main 
tained  by  their  own  or  American  ships. 

This  caused  a  change  of  tactics.  One  or  two  of  the  German  vessels 
were  kept  at  Mariveles  harbor,  opposite  Corregidor  Island,  at  the 


320  HISTORY   OF   THE 

entrance  of  the  bay.  The  Germans  now  began  to  have  their  ships 
change  position  frequently,  sending  one  from  the  blockade  line  to 
Mariveles  while  another  would  steam  down  the  bay  to  replace  it.  With 
out  knowledge  of  what  Spain  could  send  against  him,  it  was  one  of 
the  responsibilities  of  Dewey's  situation  to  guard  closely  against  sur 
prise.  The  movements  of  the  Germans,  therefore,  were  well  calculated 
to  increase  the  nervous  tension  of  the  American  commanders. 

As  soon  as  it  became  apparent  that  the  manoeuvres  were  intended  to 
cause  irritation,  Dewey  directed  that  a  launch  or  large  vessel  be  sent 
to  meet  every  incoming  ship  of  the  Germans,  to  speak  it  and  demand 
to  know  its  nationality,  its  last  port  and  its  destination.  Every  ship 
was  thus  required  to  heave  to  and  reply  to  all  questions  before  pro 
ceeding  further.  This  is  an  international  rule  of  warfare. 

Von  Diederichs  protested  with  much  vehemence  and  asked  if  Dewey 
proposed  to  enforce  the  right  of  search.  The  American  Admiral 
replied  that  under  the  rules  he  had  the  right  to  demand  the  name, 
nationality,  and  purpose  of  every  ship  that  came  into  the  bay  while 
the  blockade  was  in  force. 

Von  Diederichs  replied  that  the  Americans  knew  quite  well  the 
character  of  each  of  his  ships  and  that  the  formal  enforcement  of  the 
right  to  question  was  intended  to  annoy  him. 

Dewey  replied  with  firmness  that  the  flying  of  the  German  flag 
was  not  proof  that  a  ship  was  a  German  ship,  since  it  was  recog 
nized  in  international  law  that  a  warship  had  the  right  to  fly  any 
colors  she  desired  in  war  for  the  purpose  of  surprising  the  enemy. 
To  the  German  flag  lieutenant  who  brought  the  protest,  Admiral 
Dewey  said :  — 

"  Tell  Admiral  von  Diederichs  that  there  are  some  acts  that  mean 
war,  and  his  fleet  is  dangerously  near  those  acts.  If  he  wants  war, 
assure  him  that  he  may  have  it  here,  now,  or  at  the  time  that  best 
suits  him." 

Von  Diederichs  regretted  that  his  actions  had  been  misunderstood, 
and  disavowed  any  intention  to  violate  proper  usages  or  to  interfere 
with  Dewey's  blockade  regulations. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  321 

He  added  that  he  must  refer  Dewey 's  letter,  which  he  construed 
as  maintaining  the  right  of  search  to  the  commanders-in-chief  then 
in  the  harbor.  Accordingly,  he  called  on  Captain  Chichester  of  the 
British  war  ship  Itnniortalite,  senior  commander,  and  asked  what  were 
his  intentions  with  respect  to  obeying  the  rigorous  regulations  laid 
down  by  Dewey. 

Captain  Chichester,  suspecting  an  entanglement,  concluded  to  rebuff 
the  German  by  pretended  concealment. 

"Admiral  Dewey  and  I,"  he  answered,  "have  a  perfect  understand 
ing  on  that  point."  Then  waiting  for  a  few  moments  for  his  caller 
to  enjoy  fully  the  disturbance  his  reply  created,  he  added  :  "  I  will  show 
you,  however,  as  I  did  Admiral  Dewey,  the  instructions  in  which  I  have 
been  ordered  to  do  precisely  what  Admiral  Dewey  has  been  contend 
ing  you  are  required  to  do." 

Von  Diederichs'  last  contention  was  thus  destroyed,  but  he  had  no 
intention  of  ceasing  his  annoyances.  He  did  not  report  to  Dewey 
the  result  of  his  conference. 

When  our  troop  ships  arrived  at.  Corregidor  channel,  the  Germans 
in  Mariveles  harbor  saluted  them.  The  Kaiserin  Augusta  instantly  got 
under  way,  steamed  up  the  bay,  passing  closely  alongside  each  trans 
port  in  turn,  and  then  saluted  before  the  Oh/wpia  again,  running  up 
American  colors  as  she  did  so.  It  was  ostentatious  impertinence,  since 
a  single  salute  would  have  been  sufficient.  The  irritation  was  increased 
by  formal  applications  to  permit  launches  to  go  ashore  after  night. 
Reports  came  to  Admiral  Dewey  that  the  Germans  were  lending 
material  assistance  to  the  Spaniards.  They  were  reported  to  have  landed 
flour  and  other  supplies,  and  even  to  have  landed  guns.  Their  officers, 
it  was  said,  had  visited  the  Spanish  front,  and  inspected  Spanish  fortifi 
cations.  The  Admiral  heard  from  indisputable  authority  that  the  Ger 
man  consul  had  been  told  in  the  club  at  Manila  that  the  Germans 
were  landing  supplies,  and  that  Spaniards  of  reputation  and  position 
were  ready  to  confirm  the  fact,  and  the  German  consul  was  unable  to 
deny  it.  Upon  this,  permission  to  go  ashore  at  night  was  refused,  to 

the  humiliation  of  the  Germans. 
21 


322  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  situation,  already  very  strained,  was  much  inflamed  on  July  8. 
The  native  insurgents  had  captured  a  Spanish  ship,  on  which  they 
embarked  a  number  of  their  troops,  and  dispatched  them  to  attack  the 
Spanish  garrison  on  Isla  de  Grande  in  Subig  Bay.  The  ship  returned 
July  7,  and  the  commander  of  the  troops  reported  to  Aguinaldo  that 
upon  arriving  at  Isla  de  Grande  he  found  the  German  war  ship  Irene 
close  off  the  island;  that  the  German  had  not  only  refused  to  permit 
the  insurgents'  attack,  but  had  compelled  the  transport  to  haul  down 
the  insurgent  colors  and  run  up  a  white  flag.  Aguinaldo  reported  the 
incident  to  Dewey. 

The  moment  seemed  at  hand  when  the  strained  cord  must  break, 
or  one  end  of  it  be  released.  Admiral  Dewey  instructed  the  Raleigh 
and  Concord  to  proceed  at  once  to  Isla  de  Grande,  demand  its  immediate 
surrender,  or  to  take  it  by  force,  at  all  hazard,  if  necessary.  The  gar 
rison  consisted  of  600  Spanish  soldiers. 

The  Raleigh  and  Concord  sailed  at  night,  and  arrived  in  Subig  Bay 
next  morning.  With  decks  cleared  for  action,  the  two  ships  steered 
for  Isla  de  Grande  at  8:15  A.  M.  As  they  steamed  into  the  channel 
on  one  side  of  the  island,  the  Irene  steamed  out  on  the  other  side 
at  full  speed.  The  garrison  surrendered  without  resistance,  and  623 
prisoners,  600  rifles,  and  a  large  supply  of  ammunition,  fell  into  our 
hands. 

As  the  Irene  was  returning  to  Manila,  the  United  States  ship  Mc- 
Cullough  was  waiting  to  speak  her.  She  sent  a  blank  shot  across  the 
Irene's  bow,  and  discharged  the  formal  duty  of  inquiring  her  name, 
nationality,  and  purpose. 

The  rage  of  von  Diederichs  flamed  up.  He  sent  a  strong  protest 
to  Admiral  Dewey  against  the  hauling  up  of  his  ships  as  if  they  were 
the  ships  of  an  enemy. 

The  response  of  Dewey  was  sharp  and  not  to  be  misunderstood. 

"I  desire  to  ask,"  he  said,  ''whether  it  is  peace  or  war  between 
your  country  and  mine.  If  there  is  war  I  wish  to  be  informed.  If 
there  is  peace,  the  conduct  of  your  fleet  must  be  changed.  It  is  not 
the  part  of  friendly  neutrality  to  obstruct  and  distress  the  duty  of  a 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  'J23 

friendly  nation.  But  the  proper  way  to  make  war  is  to  clear  ship 
and  go  at  it." 

There  could  be  no  mistaking  the  purport  of  such  a  message.  In 
laconic  phrase,  the  German  was  "called  down"  and  must  meet  the  issue. 
His  response  was  an  explanation  and  an  apology.  He  denied  that 
the  Irene  had  interfered  against  the  insurgents,  but  admitted  that 
she  had  refused  to  answer  signals  until  the  insurgent  ship  had  sub 
stituted  a  white  flag  for  the  native  colors,  because  to  do  otherwise 
would  have  had  the  effect  of  recognizing  the  insurgents'  flag,  which 
would  have  constituted  an  act  unfriendly  to  Spain. 

The  German  Admiral  was  now  facing  the  dead-line  of  conduct. 
If  he  advanced  he  must  take  the  consequences;  if  he  retired  his  pride 
would  be  mortified.  He  resorted  to  correspondence.  Meanwhile,  the 
news  of  Cervera's  destruction  reached  Manila  a  few  days  later,  the 
Charleston  arrived,  the  Monterey  was  approaching,  and  the  Monadnock 
was  contained  in  the  prospect.  Von  Diederichs  relapsed  into  sulky 
obedience  to  regulations,  and  bided  his  time. 


in. 

IN  THE  United  States  and  Germany,  reports  of  the  irritating  conduct 
of  von  Diederichs  were  complicated  with  frequent  declarations  through 
anti-American  or  anti-German  channels  abroad  that 

DIPLOMACY,   DI8- 

Germany  was  determined  to  resist  acquisition  by  the  AVOWALS,  AND 
United  States  of  the  Philippine  Archipelago.  The  Em 
peror,  it  was  said,  had  instructed  von  Diederichs  to  land  a  force  of 
marines  at  Manila  under  the  pretense  of  protecting  German  subjects 
and  German  interests.  The  deduction  to  be  made  was  obvious.  It 
would  mean  that  Germany,  having  gained  a  foothold  in  Manila,  would 
be  in  position  to  involve  in  confusion  the  claims  of  the  United  States 
to  possession  through  war.  The  landing  of  marines,  therefore,  with 
out  permission  from  Admiral  Dewey  under  perfectly  defined  terms, 
would  be  equivalent  to  an  act  of  war,  upon  which  Dewey  would  un 
doubtedly  act. 


324  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Suggestions  were  thrown  out  that  Germany  and  France  had  made 
arrangements  with  Spain  by  which  she  conceded  to  them  coaling 
stations  in  the  Philippines  at  points  beyond  the  American  blockade. 
But  subterfuges  of  that  sort  did  not  deceive  the  government  at 
Washington. 

Reports  that  Germany's  war  ships  were  lending  aid  and  comfort  to 
the  Spaniards  at  Manila,  called  for  interrogatories  and  replies.  The 
German  Ambassador  at  Washington  called  on  the  President  and 
assured  him  that  a  firm  attitude  of  friendly  neutrality  was  observed, 
notwithstanding  the  flying  reports,  for  which  the  German  Emperor 
was  in  no  wise  responsible.  The  Foreign  Minister  at  Berlin  assured 
the  American  Ambassador  that  such  rumors  were  mere  absurdities; 
that  the  presence  of  so  many  war  ships  at  Manila  was  necessary  to 
the  interests  of  German  subjects,  of  whom  there  were  more  in  the 
city  than  of  any  other  nation  except  Spain;  that  the  Subig  Bay  in 
cident  wras  a  mere  act  of  humanity  to  prevent  non-combatants  on 
the  island  from  massacre  by  insurgents.  This  did  not  agree  entirely 
with  von  Diederichs'  explanation,  which  was  that  the  Irene  did  not 
interfere  at  all.  It  was  affirmed  that  the  German  Government  had 
no  knowledge  that  von  Diederichs'  launches  had  violated  regulations 
of  the  port  blockade  or  that  any  of  the  petty  acts  of  interference 
as  reported  had  occurred.  If  such  complaints  were  true,  the  govern 
ment  would  prevent  a  recurrence  of  them. 

The  tone  of  the  German  press  changed  decisively  after  the  events 
at  Santiago.  The  semi-official  Berlin  Post,  in  answer  to  an  article  in 
a  Paris  paper  urging  that  it  was  time  the  Powers  took  extreme  meas 
ures  to  prevent  the  proposed  dispatch  of  Commodore  Watson's  squad 
ron  to  Europe,  and  to  end  the  war,  uttered  the  warning  that,  before 
summoning  Europe  to  resist  the  United  States,  and  predicting  a  quad 
ruple  alliance  in  the  Mediterranean,  it  would  be  well  to  ask  Great 
Britain's  consent  to  yoke  the  European  Powers  to  one  car.  The 
Agrarian  papers  denounced  the  change  of  tone  in  the  radical  press,  and 
insisted  that  the  Spaniards  were  thorough  artillerists,  but  had  lacked 
material  at  Santiago.  They  considered  the  surrender  of  Santiago 


SPANISH- AMERICAN   WAR  :;•_>;, 

unimportant,  and  spoke  of  the  danger  of  yellow  fever  in  a  tone  of 
dread  that  seemed  to  express  great  hopes  of  the  ultimate  safe  burial  of 
the  whole  American  army. 

There  was  no  mistaking  the  strong  and  open  friendliness  of  the 
great  journals  of  the  German  people.  The  Frankfurter-Zeitung,  in  an 
elaborate  review  of  the  operations  on  land  and  sea  at  Santiago,  de 
clared  that  they  had  brought  many  disillusions  to  the  despisers  of 
militia  armies.  The  German  newspaper  strategists,  especially,  who 
jeered  at  "the  militia  generals  going  into  the  field  in  elegant  dress," 
had  become  more  cautious  in  their  criticism  since  the  tights  before 
Santiago.  When  it  was  considered  under  what  unfavorable  circum 
stances  the  American  soldiers  had  been  obliged  to  tight,  the  reviewer 
declared  that  they  had  exhibited  an  endurance  and  bravery  that 
could  not  be  surpassed  by  any  troops,  no  matter  how  well  trained. 
Dismounted  cavalrymen  had  been  employed  to  storm  a  strong  posi 
tion;  a  preparation  for  the  infantry  attack  by  artillery  fire  had  been 
impossible,  as  there  had  been  no  artillery ;  the  men  suffered  from 
lack  of  food,  because  the  commissariat  had  to  struggle  with  great 
difficulties  of  transportation;  the  preliminary  preparations  for  the  care 
of  the  wounded  had  proved  very  defective.  All  this  was  known  to  the 
soldiers,  who,  nevertheless,  advanced  with  undiminished  courage.  The 
positions  the  Americans  gained  on  both  days  of  battle  they  not  only 
retained,  but  later  won  still  more  ground. 

Continuing,  the  reviewer  spoke  thus  of  the  American  demonstration: 

"  The  Spanish  troops,  whose  military  qualities  are  valued  very  highly  by  the  op 
ponents  of  the  militia,  were  stationed  in  excellent  strong  positions,  had  with  them 
sufficient  artillery,  made  use  of  smokeless  powder,  were  superior  in  number  to  the 
Americans,  and  were  commanded  by  officers  experienced  in  war.  Why  did  not 
these  European-trained  troops  sally  out  of  Santiago  and  simply  drive  the  Americans 
into  the  sea?  Why  does  not  Marshal  Blanco,  who  is  said  to  have  at  his  command 
a  well-armed  army  of  at  least  100,000  men,  accustomed  to  the  climate  and  to  fight 
ing,  make  his  superiority  felt? 

''The  value  of  troops  does  not  depend  merely  on  the  military  drill,  such  as  is  usual 
in  Europe.  There  is  militia  and  militia.  A  popular  army  like  the  Swiss,  with  its 
full  equipment  ever  ready  for  war,  represents  a  stronger  power  at  the  beginning  of 


326  HISTORY   OF    THE 

a  war  than  the  American  State  militia,  which  is  not  intended  for  foreign  service, 
and  out  of  which,  when  war  breaks  out,  an  army  must  first  be  formed.  In  spite  of 
all  these  disadvantages*  and  difficulties,  the  Americans  have  set  an  army  on  foot  in 
a  few  weeks  which  was  obliged  to  take  the  field  under  unfavorable  circumstances, 
and,  nevertheless,  has  shown  itself  therein  not  merely  equal,  but  superior  to  its  well- 
trained  adversary. 

"  Almost  as  instructive  as  the  combats  on  land  have  been  the  sea-fights.  .  .  . 
As  in  the  battle  of  the  Yalu,  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese,  superiority  in 
marksmanship  decided  the  fight  off  Santiago.  The  Spanish  vessels  were  in  part  su 
perior  in  speed  to  the  American;  the  valor  of  the  Spanish  sailors  is  much  praised 
by  the  Americans;  experienced  officers  commanded  the  ships,  but,  nevertheless,  they 
were  defeated  without  doing  much  damage  worth  mentioning  to  the  enemy.  It  is 
well  known  that  for  years  the  Americans  have  kept  up  industriously  target  practice, 
and  that  they  expected  good  results  from  this  themselves.  Good  guns  without  good 
gunners  are  useless  in  a  fight.  The  Spaniards  shot  poorly  and  the  Americans  shot 
well.  The  result  was  that  the  Spanish  vessels  caught  fire  and  were  therefore  com 
pelled  to  run  ashore.  How  far  better  armor  influenced  the  outcome  of  the  fight 
cannot  be  determined  with  certainty.  One  thing,  however,  is  settled.  Her  speed 
could  not  save  even  the  Cristobal  Colon  from  the  sure  aim  of  the  Americans.  Be 
sides  this,  the  American  material,  missiles  as  well  as  armor  plate,  seems  to  have 
shown  itself  to  be  much  better  than  the  Spanish.  American  experts,  indeed,  believe 
that  in  this  respect  they  are  superior  even  to  the  English." 

There  can  be  no  question  of  the  patriotism  and  loyalty  of  the 
German  people,  but  love  of  the  Fatherland  does  not  blind  their  intelli 
gence.  The  German-born  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  their 
descendants,  are  strong  upholders  of  American  pride.  In  all  their 
duties  as  citizens,  defenders,  soldiers,  the  German-Americans  have 
proved  their  devotion  whenever  the  call  has  been  made  upon  them. 

It  must  be  remembered,  also,  that  Germany  occupied  a  peculiar 
position.  She  had  no  alliance  with  England  in  the  East,  while  Russia 
and  France  (the  hereditary  enemy),  were  leagued.  The  Triple  Alliance 
was  serviceable  to  Germany  only  in  case  of  continental  war,  when 
armies  and  the  possession  of  the  country  separating  Russia  from  France 
would  be  an  advantage.  If  her  diplomacy  was  intended  to  remind 
England  that  Germany  could  exert  the  balance  of  power  in  the  East 
ern  Question,  and  draw  from  Russia  and  France  satisfactory  assur 
ances  on  their  side,  it  was  justifiable  in  international  politics  as  an 
act  of  self-defense. 


SPANISH    AMKIilCAN     \\.\i; 


327 


True,  there  was  Japan  still  to  be  reckoned  with,  the  only  nation 
whose  army  was  as  convenient  for  Eastern  operations  as  her  navy.  The 
new  Oriental  power  was  in  the  best  position  for  effective?  decision. 
She  expressed  herself  openly  as  the  friend  of  the  United  States,  at 
the  moment  her  ministers  perceived  the  popular  enthusiasm  with 
which  the  proposition  of  "Anglo-American  alliance"  was  received. 
England,  at  least,  had  been  guilty  only  of  negative  unfriendliness.  But 
from  Russia,  Germany,  and  France  wounds  had  come.  The  position  of 
Japan,  therefore,  operated  to  hold  Germany  stiff-necked  to  the  last. 


CHAPTER  THE   TWENTY-FOURTH. 
DEWEY,  AGUINALDO,  AND  AUGUSTI. 

THE  REMARKABLE  STORY  OF  YOUNG  AGUINALDO,   LEADER  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  THE  PHILIP- 
PINES  —  RISING  FROM  A  SERVANT  TO  BE  THE  POPULAR  IDOL,  AND  AMBITIOUS  OF  IMPERIAL 
POWER  AND  HONORS  —  ACCOUNT  OF  His  CRAFTY  PROCEEDINGS  WITH  THE  AMERICANS 
AND  SPANIARDS  —  PROCLAIMS   HIMSELF    PRESIDENT-GENERAL    OF   THE    PROVI 
SIONAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  PHILIPPINE  REPUBLIC  — AUGUSTI  AND  His 
INTRIGUES    AND    DEPOSITION    FROM    OFFICE  —  DEWEY    AND    His 
CAREFUL   DIPLOMACY   AND    RESERVE  — THE    DECLINE    OF 
AGUINALDO'S   POWER  —  GENERAL   MERRITT'S    AR 
RIVAL   AND    PREPARATIONS   FOR  ASSAULT. 

I. 

THE  victory  of  Dewey  over  Monte  jo,  brilliant  as  it  was,  fruitful  of 
such  great  possibilities,  arousing  such  world-wide  interest,  and 
causing  vast  changes  in  international  relations,  was  enforced 
by  the  victory  of  Sampson's  fleet  and  Shafter's  army  at  San 
tiago.     The  splendid  valor  and  endurance  of  the  United  States  army 
and  the  unsurpassed  skill  of  Sampson's  squadron  swept  away,  as  by  a 
breath,  the  scornful  idea  of  Europe  that  Dewey's  great 
TIQF  GENERAL          performance  was  accidental. 
AGUINALDO,  In  his  turn  he  was  to  display  at  Manila  the  quali- 

INSURGENT  .  .  ., 

LEADER  ties   or    tenacious     courage,    endurance,   silence,    and 

power,  in  himself  and  his  officers  and  sailors,  in  no  less 
degree  than  Shafter  concentrated  and  exhibited  with  his  American 
soldiers  before  Santiago. 

The  Germans  were  only  irritating  and  annoying.  Dewey's  great  task 
of  dealing  with  the  Spaniards  and  the  Malayan  native  insurgents  was 
one  in  which  he  was  to  exhibit  the  highest  abilities  of  statesmanship, 
diplomacy,  generalship,  and  executive  judgment.  In  destroying  the 
Spanish  fleet  and  capturing  Cavite  stronghold,  he  had  executed  the 
lightest  of  his  tasks,  even  though  that  alone  astonished  the  world. 

Without  sufficient  force  to  maintain  order  or  secure  life  and  prop 
erty  in  Manila,  he  could  neither  conquer  it  nor  demand  its  surrender. 

(328) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  :;•_>'.) 

He  was  7,500  miles  from  his  nearest  home  port,  and  no  preparation 
had  been  made  to  reinforce  or  support  him  with  ships  or  troops.  There 
was  nothing  to  do  but  await  these  aids. 

Foreseeing  this  possibility  he  had  conferred  at  Hong  Kong  with 
the  insurgent  leader,  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  whom  he  encouraged  by  the 
offer  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  support,  to  return  to  the  island  of 
Luzon  and  organize  native  troops  to  seal  up  Manila  in  the  rear,  and 
hold  the  city  in  siege  until  American  troops  could  arrive. 

Aguinaldo  was  at  this  time  the  central  figure  of  the  revolutionary 
movement,  brave,  intelligent,  ambitious.  The  agreement  with  him 
must  be  made'  without  making  promises  that  the  United  States  could 
not  redeem.  It  was  not  a  part  of  the  character  of  a  man  of  Admiral 
Dewey's  mold  to  deceive.  He  could  only  assure  Aguinaldo  that  the 
United  States  Government  would  give  protection  to  the  islands  and  to 
the  people,  and  that  the  faith  and  purposes  of  the  American  people 
were  known  of  all  men. 

The  details  of  the  understanding  have  not  been  made  known,  but 
Aguinaldo  took  the  field  immediately  after  the  naval  battle,  and  organ 
ized  his  army. 

Thus,  Admiral  Dewey,  with  2,000  men  and  his  ships,  was  to  hold 
under  control  the  open  enemy  and  the  impenetrable  but  ostensible 
friend.  The  Spaniard  and  the  Malay  are  opposing  extremes  of  the 
same  type.  The  Spaniard  is  the  highest  development  of  trained,  cul 
tivated,  and  cold  unscrupulousness;  the  metaphysician  of  duplicity. 
The  Malay  is  the  most  dangerous  natural  type  of  superstitious 
craft  and  cruelty;  without  education,  he  is  a  fatalist  whose  purpose 
never  extends  beyond  the  immediate  object.  The  Mestizos,  cross-breeds 
of  these  extremes,  may  be  imagined.  With  inherited  adaptability  to 
the  trained  guile  of  one  and  with  the  unerring  instinct  of  opportunity 
and  swift  action  of  the  other,  they  possess  subtle  duplicity  and  absence 
of  fear  are  peculiar  to  them. 

From  this  half-breed  race  sprang  Aguinaldo,  the  child  of  a  thrifty 
peasant,  ambitious  for  his  son.  The  stories  related  of  Aguinaldo's  origin, 
youth,  ambitions,  and  adventures,  are  numerous;  all  have  the  flavor 


330  HISTORY    OF   THE 

of  superstitious,  half-barbarous  tradition — stories  that,  with  slight 
changes,  are  related  of  all  the  heroes  of  wild  and  uncontrollable  peo 
ples.  It  seems  quite  sure,  at  least,  that  his  father  confided  him  to  a 
benevolent  and  kindly  old  Jesuit  priest  when  Emilio  was  a  child,  with 
the  hope  that  the  boy  might  find  a  place  in  the  religious  establishment. 
He  was  the  servant  of  this  priest,  who,  observing  the  unusual  intelligence 
and  quickness  of  the  boy,  stepped  aside  from  the  rule  of  the  govern 
ment  and  performed  the  mission  of  his  sacred  office — he  gave  to 
the  young  Aguinaldo  the  best  education  he  could.  The  pupil  learned 
rapidly  and  was  eager  for  knowledge.  The  old  priest  thought  he  saw  in 
his  character  an  instrument  of  good  influence  over  the  wild  natives, 
and  continued  to  teach  him,  hoping  to  induct  his  pupil  into  orders. 

But  the  church  had  no  place  in  the  dreams  of  Aguinaldo.  He 
mastered  all  he  could  learn  in  the  priest's  house  and  familiarized  him 
self  with  the  clerical  offices  and  manners.  When  he  could  learn  no 
more,  he  concluded  to  go  to  Hong  Kong  and  study  medicine.  There 
he  saw  another  world,  of  Europeans  and  subtle  Orientals,  of  broad 
and  changing  ideas  and  objects.  Of  pleasing  address,  agreeable,  and  open 
in  manner,  with  ready  adaptability  to  circumstances,  he  was  soon  well 
known  and  enjoyed  excellent  opportunities  for  acquiring  the  polish 
as  well  as  the  Oriental  pretenses  of  that  society. 

As  there  has  always  been  a  state  of  revolution  in  the  Philippines, 
a  Junta  was  in  perpetual  existence,  with  headquarters  at  Hong  Kong. 
There  ehibittered  exiles  and  hunted  leaders  met,  and  from  them 
Aguinaldo  became  infected  with  that  mysterious  brain  taint,  peculiar 
to  genius  and  ambition  —  the  restless  and  boundless  desire  to  do  great 
things  and  be  a  leader  of  men. 

He  was  intellectually  superior  to  the  members  of  the  Junta,  and 
was  popular  with  his  people  because  of  his  attainments.  He  took  the 
threads  of  the  raveled  revolution  in  hand,  knitted  them  together  into 
a  new  plan,  and  was  sent  to  Luzon  to  set  on  fire  the  hearts  of  the 
oppressed.  His  youth,  his  dauntless  courage,  his  ready  wit,  his  superior 
knowledge  of  the  world,  soon  made  him  the  popular  idol.  The  rev 
olution  sprang  up  in  every  province  where  Spaniards  could  be  looted 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  331 

and  massacred.  Captain-General  August!  offered  $20,000  for  the  head 
of  Aguinaldo.  It  was  usual.  The  bribe  had  been  offered  many  times 
during  four  hundred  years  of  Spanish  rule.  It  was  in  the  direction 
of  economy.  If  a  native  or  Mestizo  traitor  yielded  to  the  temptation 
and  brought  in  the  desired  head,  it  always  happened  that  the  claimant 
was  proved  guilty  of  some  previous  act  of  treason  to  Spain.  It  was 
more  practical  to  punish  treason  than  to  reward  treachery.  The 
claimant  was  usually  executed  after  a  rapid  trial,  and  the  reward  was 
saved.  The  families  of  attainted  subjects  could  not  inherit,  and  the 
money  could  not  be  paid  to  the  dead  man.  Thus,  bookkeeping  was 
simplified,  and  the  treasury  profited. 

A  story  is  recorded  of  Aguinaldo's  first  revolution  that  illustrates 
the  character  of  the  government  and  the  natives.  It  may  not  be  true; 
it  reads  very  like  that  fiction  of  which  it  is  said  truth  is  stranger. 
Yet,  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  China  and  the  Philippines  much 
obviously  false  in  other  countries  may  be  peculiarly  true. 

The  story  runs  that  when  Aguinaldo  and  4,000  or  5,000  of  his  sup 
porters  were  hidden  in  a  swampy  retreat,  the  Governor-General,  Sefior 
Don  Basilio  Augusti  y  Davila,  offered  his  reward  for  Aguinaldo.  Within 
a  week  he  received  a  note  from  the  insurgent  chief,  saying:  "I  need 
the  sum  you  offer  very  much,  and  will  deliver  the  head  myself." 

Ten  days  later  the  southeast  typhoon  was  raging.  It  was  raining 
as  it  can  rain  only  in  the  Orient,  a  sheet  of  black  water  flooding  the 
earth.  The  two  sentinels  at  the  Governor-General's  gate  made  the 
usual  reverent  sign  as  a  priest  entered,  who  asked  if  his  Excellency 
was  within  and  unengaged.  They  answered  "  Yes,"  to  both  questions. 
Don  Basilio  did  not  turn  his  head  as  some  one  entered.  It  was  his 
secretary,  he  supposed,  come  to  help  prepare  an  eloquent  statement 
upon  the  condition  of  the  colonies.  It  was  not  the  secretary,  but  a 
priest,  who  said  :  "  Peace  be  with  you,  my  son." 

The  cleric  locked  the  door,  and  dropping  his  cloak,  cried  :  "  Do  you 
know  me?" 

Don  Basilio  did  not  know  him.  It  was  Aguinaldo,  also  a  twenty- 
inch  bolo,  a  native  knife —answering  to  the  Cuban  machete, —  sharp  as 


332  HISTORY    OF    THE 

a  razor,  carried  by  every  Malayan  in  time  of  trouble.  With  it  he 
can  lop  off  an  arm  with  a  single  stroke. 

"  I  have  brought  the  head  of  Aguinaldo,"  the  chief  said,  touching 
the  edge  of  his  jewel-hilted  bolo  to  ascertain  its  condition,  "  and  I 
claim  the  reward  !  Hasten,  else  I  shall  have  to  expedite  the  matter 
myself." 

Don  Basilio  was  entrapped.  He  had  to  open  his  desk  and  count  out 
the  sum  in  Spanish  gold.  Aguinaldo  punctiliously  wrote  a  receipt, 
coolly  counted  the  money,  and  walked  backward  toward  the  door. 
He  suddenly  opened  it  and  dashed  out,  just  ahead  of  a  pistol  bullet 
that  cut  his  locks  on  the  temple.  Captain-General  Polavieja  offered 
Aguinaldo  and  Atachio,  his  lieutenant,  a  pardon  and  $200,000  each,  to 
quit  the  colony.  They  accepted  and  got  the  money,  only  to  learn  that 
they  were  both  to  be  assassinated  the  next  night  at  a  fiesta.  The  two 
men  who  had  undertaken  the  deed  were  found  dead,  stabbed  to  the 
heart,  in  their  own  beds.  On  the  kris  handle  was  a  bit  of  paper  with 
a  line  saying :  "  Beware  of  the  Malay's  vengeance." 

Aguinaldo  was  then  twenty-five  years  old.  He  and  his  lieutenant 
soon  discovered  that  the  revolution  was  doomed.  Such  revolutions 
are  always  doomed  when  the  oppressor  charges  up  against  and  draws 
the  sinews  of  war  in  taxes  from  the  insurgents.  In  accordance, 
therefore,  with  Oriental  custom,  the  two  leaders  agreed  to  accept  the 
bribe  and  deprive  the  insurrection  of  its  leadership.  True,  they 
were  leaving  their  followers  by  hundreds  to  cruel  execution  and  the 
grind  of  the  taxgatherer;  but  that  was  the  custom.  Four  hundred 
years  of  Spanish  colonial  rule  teaches  much. 

The  amount  of  the  bribe  offered  was  variously  reported  at  from 
$100,000  to  $500,000.  In  the  Orient  the  nudity  of  virgin  Truth  is  looked 
upon  as  an  impropriety,  dangerous  to  public  morality.  She  is  repre 
sented,  therefore,  as  bearing  butterfly  wings,  brilliant  with  many  colors, 
draped  in  a  scarf  woven  from  the  delicate  threads  of  vivid  imagina 
tion,  and  the  great  temple  of  her  resort  and  worship  is  described  as 
extending  far  beyond  the  municipal  limits  and  even  penetrating  the 
suburban  additions  of  the  city  of  Utica. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  ;;;;:; 

The  acceptance  of  the  bribe  was  justified  to  the  faithful  by  the 
promise  that  the  sum  was  to  be  applied  to  purchasing  arms  and 
munitions  to  be  used  when  the  flame  of  faith  should  rise  again,  when 
the  natives  should  have  saved  up  fresh  means  for  the  struggle. 

This,  then,  was  the  young  revolutionary  leader  with  whom  Admiral 
Dewey  was  now  to  deal.  Twenty-eight  years  old,  alert,  confident,  with 
boundless  ambition  and  the  determination  to  find  his  way  to  leader 
ship  and  power  past  every  obstacle  that  duplicity  could  evade  or  piti 
less  treachery  and  cruelty  could  remove. 

He  had  a  personal  feud  with  General  Augusti,  and  could  be  trusted 
to  seal  up  Manila  inland.  He  had  a  great  respect  for  the  American 
Admiral,  who  had  so  swiftly  destroyed  from  the  face  of  the  ocean  the 
naval  power  of  Spain.  But  the  genuine  devotion  of  his  heart  was 
expended  upon  Don  Emilio  Aguinaldo,  and  the  honors  and  fortune 
he  could  see  awraiting  himself.  The  description  of  the  man  —  myth 
or  truth,  half  fact  or  half  fancy,  whatever  the  reports  may  be  —  deserves 
the  setting  of  Italy  in  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries,  when 
guile  and  poison  went  hand  in  hand  with  brute  mastership  and  the 
bloody  sword. 

n. 

THE  story  of  the  siege  of  Manila  will  not  be  told  until  some  of 
those  who  can  shall  have  escaped  the  consequences  of  telling  it,  by 
death  in  a  natural  manner.  The  mysteries  involved  in  TH£  NUT  TQ  B£ 
the  ostensible  jealousies  and  feuds  between  Governor-Gen-  CRACKED  IN 
eral  Augusti,  the  Archbishop  of  Manila,  and  the  Vice- 
Governor  Jaudenes,  the  negotiations  between  Spaniards  and  Aguinaldo's 
emissaries,  the  secret  arrangements  with  the  German  Admiral,  the 
miraculous  restoration  of  Augusti's  family  by  the  insurgent  leader. — 
apparently  through  motives  of  humanity,  — these  are  incidents  that  can, 
in  narration,  produce  only  the  effect  which  one  who  is  stone  deaf  must 
experience  as  he  views  the  passing  scenes  of  an  acted  drama. 

It  was  about  two  weeks  after  the  naval  battle  when  Aguinaldo 
landed  on  Luzon  and  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  natives,  admitting 


334  HISTORY   OF   THE 

that  he  had  surrendered  two  years  previously  because  all  resources  were 
exhausted;  but  he  had  returned  now  to  punish  Spain  for  failing  to  keep 
her  promises  to  him;  that  he  brought  aid  and  arms  for  the  struggle. 

All  the  provinces  around  Manila  at  once  rose  in  insurrection  and 
joined  Aguinaldo.  Governor-General  Augusti  issued  a  proclamation 
offering  $25,000  reward  for  the  head  of  Aguinaldo. 

Within  two  weeks  the  insurgent  army  had  flocked  into  the  country 
around  the  capital,  and,  acting  under  Aguinaldo's  shrewd  plans,  began, 
on  May  28,  a  simultaneous  assault  upon  Imus,  Cavite  province,  and 
Bakoor.  The  steady  advance  of  the  insurgents  along  the  coast  was 
supported  by  the  American  gunboat  Petrel,  and  the  Spaniards  in  the 
outlying  districts  took  refuge  in  Manila.  The  insurgents  soon  held  five 
important  positions  within  ten  miles  of  Manila,  and  in  capturing  them 
killed  five  hundred  Spaniards.  The  Spanish  outposts  were  reenforced 
by  the  addition  of  4,000  troops,  but  on  May  31  they  were  forced  back 
along  the  whole  line  by  hand-to-hand  fighting  of  the  most  desperate 
character,  in  which  the  aggregate  loss  of  the  enemy  was  upward  of  a 
thousand  men.  The  fighting  lasted  seventy  hours.  A  typhoon  raged 
fiercely  during  the  whole  time  and  the  torrential  rain  rendered  the 
rifles  of  the  contestants  almost  useless.  The  insurgents  almost  invari 
ably  fought  at  close  quarters  and  used  their  knives  with  terrible  effect. 

Malibon,  Tarlac,  and  Bakoor  were  in  possession  of  the  insurgents, 
who  also  made  an  attack  upon  Santa  Mesa  and  Malate,  on  June  1. 
Aguinaldo,  who  had  been  rendered  more  desperate  and  daring  by  the 
price  put  upon  his  head,  was  most  anxious  to  make  a  rush  upon 
Manila  at  once,  but  Admiral  Dewey  refused,  from  a  humanitarian 
point  of  view,  to  permit  this,  fearing  that  the  passions  of  the  semi- 
civilized  natives  might  lead  them  to  excesses.  The  Admiral,  therefore, 
insisted  that  Aguinaldo  wait  until  the  arrival  of  the  United  States 
troops.  In  pursuance  of  that  policy  he  forbade  the  insurgents  to  cross 
the  Malate  River,  seven  miles  south  of  Manila,  and  Aguinaldo  established 
his  headquarters  at  Cavite,  where  his  prisoners  were  brought  in. 

It  was  expected  that  troops  would  arrive  from  San  Francisco  not 
later  than  June  15,  and  Aguinaldo  was  patient  in  expectation  of  their 


SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR  .;:;;, 

arrival.  He  adopted  the  humanitarian  policy  that  Dewey  had  not 
only  proclaimed  but  practiced,  and  issued  orders  to  his  army,  forbidding 
them,  under  pain  of  severe  penalties,  to  destroy  or  injure  the  lives 
or  property  of  any  foreigners,  or  of  Spanish  non-combatants.  He 
also  indicated  his  desire  to  establish  a  native  administration  under 
an  American  protectorate,  holding  a  dictatorship,  with  an  advisory 
council,  until  the  islands  were  conquered.  Then  a  Republican  Assem 
bly  wrould  be  called. 

A  singular  incident  of  war  occurred  in  the  early  actions.  The 
swift  descent  of  the  insurgents  upon  the  Spanish  towns  resulted  in 
placing  in  the  hands  of  Aguimildo  as  prisoners  the  wife  and  children 
of  General  Augusti,  who  had  offered  a  price  for  Aguinaldo's  head. 
They  were  treated  with  great  respect,  and  held  as  hostages  to  secure 
proper  treatment  of  native  prisoners  in  Spanish  hands  for  a  time. 
Admiral  Dewey  conveyed  to  Aguinaldo  a  suggestion  of  the  moral  effect 
to  be  produced  by  returning  the  helpless  captives  to  Augusti  and  re 
lieving  the  distress  of  all.  Accordingly,  the  Augusti  family  was  conveyed 
to  Manila  harbor  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  German  Admiral, 
who  took  them  secretly  into  the  city  to  the  Governor-General.  What 
ever  explanation  of  their  return  was  made  by  the  Germans  or  believed 
by  Augusti,  the  Spanish  dispatches  declared  that  the  members  of  the 
family  had  succeeded  in  effecting  their  escape  from  the  insurgents 
and,  after  encountering  distressful  hardships,  were  able  to  board  a  Ger 
man  war  ship  and  were  smuggled  into  Manila.  The  Spanish  account 
of  any  fact  affecting  their  pride  is  usually  surprising  to  others. 

The  successes  of  the  insurgents  were  so  complete  and  rapid  that 
the  first  week  in  June  saw  Manila  entirely  invested,  with  constant 
skirmishing  in  the  suburbs.  The  water  supply  fell  into  insurgent  hands, 
but  Dewey  gave  instructions  that  it  must  not  be  cut  off  because 
of  the  great  distress  it  might  cause  the  helpless  non-combatants  and 
foreign  residents.  Their  successes  inflamed  the  insurgents.  They  leaped 
to  the  conclusion  that  they  were  masters  of  the  situation.  It  was 
boldly  declared  that  the  independence  of  the  Philippines  was  achieved 
and  a  republic  would  be  established.  At  Singapore  a  delegation  of 


336  HISTORY   OF   THE 

the  Junta  called  on  the  American  Consul-General  and  presented  an 
address,  thanking  him  for  sending  Aguinaldo  to  the  Philippines,  con 
gratulating  Admiral  Dewey,  expressing  a  desire  for  the  establishment 
of  a  native  government  in  the  Philippines  under  American  protec 
tion,  deprecating  the  restoration  of  the  islands  to  Spain  or  their 
transference  to  any  other  power,  and  declaring  that  the  natives  were 
able  to  govern  themselves. 

Meanwhile,  Augusti  had  forwarded  dispatches  to  Madrid,  declaring 
that  defense  was  almost  hopeless  in  the  absence  of  supplies  and 
munitions.  He  asked  for  plenary  powers  in  dealing  with  the  situa 
tion.  These  were  granted  to  him.  The  authority  meant  that  he  was 
free  to  negotiate  with  the  insurgents  with  boundless  promises  of 
autonomy  and  liberty.  Shortly  afterwards  Augusti  reported  that  his 
native  troops  were  deserting  and  even  his  Spaniards  were  disheart 
ened  and  were  surrendering  themselves  under  promises  made  of  the 
security  of  their  lives  and  safety. 

General  Prima  de  Rivera,  formerly  Governor-General  of  the  Philip 
pines,  made  a  fierce  speech  in  the  Cortes,  in  which  he  exposed  the 
fact  that  the  Spanish  Government  had  dealt  foully  with  the  colonial 
government.  He  declared  that  when  he  took  charge  there  was  a  sur 
plus  of  $5,000,000  in  the  treasury.  He  reported  it  and  asked  permis 
sion  to  fortify  and  strengthen  his  defenses,  because  the  Americans 
were  preparing  at  Hong  Kong.  The  government  replied  to  him  that 
there  was  no  prospect  of  war  with  the  United  States  and  the  surplus 
was  dissipated  in  Spain.  He  charged  the  government  with  abandon 
ing  Augusti. 

At  this  time  the  plenary  powers  held  by  Augusti  began  to  affect 
the  situation  at  Manila  seriously. 


AUGUSTI 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  337 


III. 

ADMIRAL  DEWEY  found  himself  in  a  network  of  Spanish  guile,  na 
tive  craft,  and  foreign  hostility.  German,  French,  and  Russian  vessels 
were  to  be  distrusted.  British  and  Japanese  sympathy 

OK Ar I x     IW- 

existed,  but  could  not  be  displayed.     The  backbone  of  TRIGUES  BY 

•        ii  ii  •    i  t   nr        -i  AOUINALDO 

resistance  in  the  city  was  in  the  Archbishop  of  Manila. 

It  was   known   that   on  May  1,  after  Montejo's  fleet  was  destroyed, 

Augusti   had   hoisted   the  white   flag  of    surrender  in   Manila.       His 

soldiers  were  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to  march  out  and  lay  down 

their  arms.     If  the  white  flag  was  observed  by  Dewey,  he  did  not  dare 

accept  the  surrender    under   the    circumstances.      His   force  was  too 

small. 

When  the  Archbishop  learned  that  the  white  flag  was  raised,  he 
held  a  council  with  the  Vice-Governor,  Senor  Don  Ferruni  Jaudenes, 
and  deposed  Augusti.  The  yellow  flag  of  Spain  was  unfurled  again, 
and  the  Archbishop  issued  his  pastoral  appeal  against  the  accursed 
and  savage  Americans.  But  Augusti  was  restored — though  by  what 
process  was  not  understood. 

With  plenary  power  bestowed  upon  him,  negotiations  now  began 
between  Spaniards  and  insurgents.  Advised  by  the  Germans,  it  was 
said,  encouraged  by  government  promises  of  assistance  from  Cer- 
vera's  fleet,  from  Camara's  fleet,  from  troops,  Augusti  sought  to  win 
Aguinaldo  over  by  warning  him  that  the  Americans  were  only  using 
him  to  hold  the  Spaniards  in  check  until  their  troops  could  arrive, 
when  he  would  be  wdrse  off  than  under  Spanish  autonomy.  Or,  that, 
if  the  Spanish  reenforcements  arrived  first,  the  Americans  would  be 
destroyed  and  the  insurgents  abandoned. 

Aguinaldo  replied  that  he  had  guarantees  from  the  Americans. 
The  Archbishop  urged  him  to  test  the  guarantees  and  see  if  he  were 
not  being  deceived.  The  Americans  were  conscienceless  mercena 
ries,  whose  hand  would  be  more  remorseless  than  that  of  Spain. 

Augusti  warned  him  that  the  foreign  war  ships  would  not  permit  the 
22 


338  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Americans  to  land  their  forces,  that  Europe  had  determined  not  to 
permit  the  United  States  to  gain  a  colony  in  the  East. 

Aguinaldo's  personal  secretary,  Legardo,  was  busily  employed  in 
these  negotiations,  as  the  go-between.  Atachio,  the  lieutenant  of 
Aguinaldo,  who  was  to  share  the  former  bribe,  and  had  charged  that  it 
had  not  been  employed  for  revolutionary  purposes,  but  that  Aguinaldo 
had  misused  it  for  personal  purposes,  was  now  on  the  island.  He  was 
not  a  pleasant  person  to  have  about  if  Aguinaldo  should  conclude  to 
make  terms  with  Spain.  Atachio  was  arrested,  charged  with  a  trea 
sonable  act,  and  imprisoned.  Sandigo,  another  insurgent  leader,  con 
ceded  by  general  consent  to  be  actuated  by  disinterested  patriotism 
alone,  who  possessed  fine  executive  ability  and  true  political  foresight, 
was  in  Atachio's  confidence,  and  distrusted  Aguinaldo.  He  did  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  the  leader  was  only  looking  out  for  personal 
wealth,  power,  and  honors.  Sandigo,  also,  was  arrested  upon  a  pre 
tense,  and  sent  to  prison. 

Atachio  "  disappeared."  It  was  said  that  he  had  been  shot  for  treason; 
that  he  had  escaped  and  deserted  to  the  enemy;  that  he  had  been 
deported  because  of  his  jealousies,  and  as  a  benevolent  act  of  his  old 
comrade  who  did  not  wish  to  take  his  life. 

The  news  came  to  the  Americans.  They  could  not  ascertain  what 
had  become  of  Atachio  or  of  his  brother,  his  cousin  and  two  nephews. 
They  discovered  Sandigo,  imprisoned  in  a  house,  awaiting  death.  They 
talked  with  him  and  visited  him  daily.  Aguinaldo  could  not  risk 
executing  his  vengeance  under  the  circumstances.  With  the  hard, 
impassive,  unscrupulous  craft  of  his  race,  he  had  removed  all  the 
enemies  possible  on  the  first  days  of  his  occupation.  Twenty-three 
priests  in  a  monastery  at  Cavite  fell  into  his  hands  the  first  day  he 
took  possession.  They,  too,  ''disappeared." 

But  Aguinaldo  had  ostentatiously  practiced  magnanimity  to  some 
foes.  Their  lives  were  spared,  and  he  had  4,000  or  more  Spanish 
and  native  volunteer  prisoners  at  Cavite.  His  army  was  large  and 
could  be  greatly  augmented.  He  was  credited  with  having  100,000 
guns  and  some  field  pieces  captured  from  the  Spanish. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  389 

He  was  rendered  uneasy  by  the  warnings  of  future  hostility  on  the 
part  of  Americans,  and  he  concluded  to  test  the  good  faith  of  Dewey. 
He  declared  publicly  the  independence  of  the  Philippine  Islands, 
announced  the  intention  to  organize  a  republic,  and  organized  a  Pro 
visional  Government,  of  which  he  was  President.  He  was  to  be  dis 
tinguished  by  the  privilege  of  wearing  a  collar  of  braided  gold,  as 
the  Spanish  governors  were.  His  proclamation  was  issued  in  these 
words :  — 

DON  EMILIO  AGUINALDO  Y  FAUKY, 

President  of  the  Revolutionary  Government  of  the  Philippines  and   General-in-Chief  of 

Its  Army:  — 

In  conformity  with  the  precepts  in  the  decree  of  this  government,  dated  June 
23  ult.,  and  the  instructions  which  accompanied  it,  I  proclaim  as  follows:  — 

ARTICLE  1.  Sefior  Don  Balclomero  Aguinaldo  is  appointed  Secretary  of  War 
and  Public  Works;  Senor  Don  Leandro  Ibarra,  Secretary  of  the  Interior  and  branches 
comprehended  therein;  Senor  Don  Mariani  Trias,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  the 
annexed  branches. 

The  conduct  of  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  Relations,  Marine  and  Commerce,  will  be 
in  charge  provisionally,  for  the  present,  of  the  Presidency,  until  there  is  appointed  a 
Secretary  who  is  considered  more  apt. 

ART.  2.  The  gentlemen  named  will  assume  charge  of  their  respective  offices,  pre 
viously  having  solemnly  taken,  on  the  day  designated  for  that  purpose  by  the  Pres 
ident,  the  following  oath:  "I  swear  by  God  and  my  honor  to  carry  out  the  laws 
and  decisions  and  to  fulfill  faithfully  the  duty  I  voluntarily  accept,  under  the  penal 
ties  established  for  the  same.  So  may  it  be." 

This  oath  will  be  taken  before  the  President  and  the  dignitaries  who  are  invited 
for  this  solemn  act,  the  interested  person  placing  his  right  hand  on  the  New  Testa 
ment. 

ART.  3.  The  directors  and  chiefs  of  provinces  and  villages  on  receiving  their 
respective  titles  will  take  a  similar  oath  before  the  President  and  the  Secretaries  of 
the  government. 

The  prominent  counselors,  as  well  as  the  delegates  and  sub-chiefs,  will  take  the 
oath  before  the  chief  of  the  province  and  the  chiefs  of  the  villages  previously  in 
vited  to  the  solemn  act. 

ART.  4.  In  the  reports  and  similar  documents  presented  to  the  authorities  and 
in  official  correspondence,  there  will  be  employed  before  the  name  of  the  official  the 
title  "Sefior"  or  "  Maguifior"  (Tagalo),  according  to  the  character  and  importance  of 
the  same.  When  the  official  is  not  so  addressed  the  personal  title  "Usted"  will  be 
used  when  directed  to  an  inferior  or  to  an  equal,  but  when  addressed  to  a  superior 
the  title  "  Xorot  ros  "  will  be  employed. 


340  HISTORY   OF   THE 

ART.  5.  The  Secretaries  are  empowered  to  sign  "  by  order  of  the  President "  such 
resolutions  or  decisions  as  are  of  small  importance  and  those  which  expediency  re 
quires  should  be  put  into  effect;  but  final  decrees  and  resolutions  will  be  confirmed 
by  the  President  and  the  Secretary. 

ART.  6.  The  chiefs  of  provinces  are  permitted  to  use  as  distinctive  of  their  office 
a  cane  with  gold  head  and  silver  tassels.  On  the  upper  part  of  the  cane  there  will 
be  engraved  a  sun  and  three  stars. 

The  chiefs  of  villages  may  carry  a  similar  cane,  but  with  black  tassels.  The 
sub-chiefs,  also,  may  carry  a  cane  with  silver  head  and  red  tassels. 

The  provincial  counselors  are  authorized  to  wear  a  triangular  badge  of  gold, 
pendent  from  a  collar  and  a  chain  of  the  same  metal;  on  the  badge  there  shall  ap 
pear  an  engraved  sun  and  three  stars.  The  delegates  will  wear  a  similar  badge,  but 
of  silver;  also  the  chain. 

ART.  7.  The  President  will  wear  as  a  distinctive  mark  a  collar  of  gold  from 
which  depends  a  badge  similar  to  those  heretofore  described,  and  also  a  whistle  of 
gold.  The  Secretaries  will  wear  a  similar  collar  with  the  badge,  and  the  directors, 
also,  but  of  silver. 

The   President  will  carry,  also,  a  cane  with  head  and  tassels  of  gold. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  REVOLUTIONARY  GOVERNMENT, 

EMILIO   AGUINALDO. 

Dated  at  BAKOOR,  July  5,  1898. 

Aguinaldo  had  been  told  that  the  first  American  reenforcements 
would  arrive  not  later  than  June  15.  They  did  not  reach  Cavite 
until  June  30,  and  there  was  but  one  brigade  of  troops  under  Gen 
eral  Anderson.  Aguinaldo  was  suspicious  of  the  strength  of  the 
Americans,  and  was  not  unwilling  to  set  himself  up  between  the 
United  States,  Spain,  and  Europe  as  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with. 

He  respected  Admiral  Dewey,  who  had  not  been  open  to  negotia 
tion  or  discussion  and  who  had  made  no  sign.  He  had  seen  what 
Dewey's  squadron  could  do  on  the  water;  and  when  the  Admiral 
had  warned  him  that  if  his  troops  undertook  to  enter  Manila  they 
would  be  decimated  by  the  guns  of  the  war  ships,  he  had  acknowl 
edged  the  force  of  the  argument.  But  now  that  American  soldiers 
were  encamped  between  his  lines  and  the  ships  he  felt  easier. 

He  was  invited  to  attend  the  Fourth  of  July  celebration  by  the 
troops,  but  replied  that  he  was  "  indisposed."  He  sent  his  military 
band. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  341 

The  ''indisposition"  was,  perhaps,  the  preoccupation  of  preparing 
the  announcement  dated  July  5,  of  the  provisional  republic  of  the 
Philippines. 

The  Americans  were  still  reticent.  He  was  puzzled  by  such  unrespon- 
siveness  to  his  clearly  expressed  intention  to  forestall  their  purposes. 

But  Aguinaldo  exhibited  no  lack  of  confidence,  if  he  felt  any.  He 
became  haughty,  reserved,  cautious,  as  becoming  his  high  office.  When 
the  American  commissaries  and  quartermasters  asked  the  natives  for 
supplies,  they  answered  that  they  could  not  comply  with  the  request 
without  permission  from  "the  President-General."  It  was  difficult  to 
secure  horses,  bullock-carts,  and  wagons,  for  transporting  supplies. 
Aguinaldo  did  not  inconvenience  himself  to  obtain  them. 

The  patience  of  Chief-Quartermaster  Jones  was  exhausted.  He 
must  prepare  quarters  for  an  army  division,  soon  to  arrive,  and  delay 
was  perilous.  He  visited  Aguinaldo's  headquarters  at  Bakoor,  whither 
they  had  been  removed.  The  orderly  announced  that  the  General  was 
"indisposed."  Major  Jones  waited  two  hours  and  called  again.  The 
orderly  politely  said  the  General  was  asleep  and  nobody  dared  awaken 
him  when  he  was  asleep. 

Major  Jones  left  abruptly  and  wrote  a  terse  and  very  plain  letter 
which  he  sent  to  Aguinaldo  by  an  orderly  who  was  instructed  to  see 
that  it  reached  the  young  Dictator.  It  notified  him  that  if  all  the 
transportation  and  assistance  needed  was  not  promptly  furnished  by 
the  natives,  the  American  soldiers  would  at  once  seize  everything 
needed  without  permission.  "  We  should  regret  very  much,"  the  let 
ter  concluded,  "to  do  this,  as  we  are  here  to  befriend  the  Filipinos. 
Our  nation  has  spent  millions  of  money  to  send  forces  here  to  expel 
the  Spaniards  and  to  give  a  good  government  to  the  whole  people, 
and  the  return  we  are  asking  is  comparatively  slight.  General  Ander 
son  wishes  you  to  inform  your  people  that  we  are  here  for  their 
good,  and  that  they  must  supply  us  with  labor  and  material  at  the 
current  market  prices.  We  are  prepared  to  purchase  five  hundred 
horses  at  a  fair  price,  but  cannot  undertake  to  bargain  for  horses 
with  each  individual  owner. 


342  HISTORY   OF   THE 

"I  will  await  your  reply." 

The  convenience  of  the  American  army  was  not  as  important  to 
"the  President-General"  as  was  the  ultimate  American  purpose.  He 
sent  an  aide  at  once  to  General  Anderson  to  inquire  if  the  letter  of 
Major  Jones  was  authorized. 

General  Anderson  replied  that  it  was  authorized,  and,  in  fact, 
ordered.  He  added  the  remark  that  when  an  American  commander 
was  indisposed  or  asleep  it  was  the  rule  to  have  some  one  in  authority 
ready  to  transact  matters  of  importance. 

Then  the  craft  of  Aguinaldo  was  exercised.  He  formally  replied  to 
the  letter  next  day.  He  expressed  surprise  that  there  should  have 
been  any  suggestion  of  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  the  Filipinos  to 
aid  the  Americans,  for  the  Filipinos  knew  that  the  Americans  "  did 
not  desire  a  colony,"  and  were  there  only  to  drive  out  the  Spaniards 
and  turn  the  islands  over  to  the  Filipinos  for  government.  The 
Filipinos  would  be  only  too  glad  to  help  the  Americans,  but  they  could 
not  furnish  so  much  transportation,  because  they  did  not  have  it.  In 
conclusion,  he  asked  for  a  definite  statement  of  the  American  inten 
tions. 

The  receipt  of  his  letter  was  acknowledged,  with  the  statement  that 
it  would  be  referred  to  General  Merritt  upon  his  arrival. 

Then  transportation  was  furnished,  but  in  many  crafty  ways  Agui 
naldo  sought  to  get  a  definite  expression  of  purpose,  and  to  obtain 
letters  addressed  to  him  as  "President."  General  Anderson  informed 
him  that  the  Americans  could  give  no  recognition  to  his  government 
or  his  office  without  authority  from  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

During  these  proceedings  the  insurgents  were  continually  assault 
ing  the  fortifications  around  Manila,  and  the  Spanish  garrison  was 
worn  out  with  sleepless  guard,  poor  food,  and  exposure  to  the  drench 
ing  rains.  Persons  coming  out  of  the  city  reported  famine  as  fast 
approaching.  Horses  were  being  butchered  for  food,  and  the  distress 
was  great.  There  were  dissensions  in  the  army  over  the  question  of 
surrendering.  The  Captain-General,  Augusti,  was  determined  to  sur 
render  as  soon  as  the  Americans  advanced.  Some  of  the  subordinate 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  343 

officers  who  wanted  to  fight  to  the  last,  were  reported  as  having  secretly 
drawn  lots  to  determine  which  should  kill  Augusti  if  he  surrendered, 
and  the  plan  for  his  assassination  was  reported  complete.  The  vol 
unteers  had  refused  to  leave  the  walls  of  the  city,  and  nearly  all  the 
regulars  had  been  sent  into  the  trenches  and  outworks. 


IV. 

ON   JULY   23,  Major-General    Merritt,   Military-Governor  and  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  United  States  army  for  the  Philippines,  arrived 
with  4,000  troops.     Informing  himself  at  once  of  the    FINAL  INVEST 
military  and  political  conditions   existing,  he  decided       MENT  OF  THE 

.        ,.  ...  ,  ,  ,   .  CITY  COMPLETED 

to  have  no  communication  with  Aguinaldo  or  his 
provisional  government,  but  to  deal  with  the  Spanish  holders  of  the 
island  and  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  capture  of  Manila.  He 
made  an  inspection  of  the  camps  and  of  the  prisons  at  Cavite,  where 
some  of  Aguinaldo's  prisoners  were  confined.  They  were  emaciated, 
wan,  and  starving.  They  had  sold  every  button,  medal,  ornament, 
and  nearly  all  their  clothing,  to  purchase  food.  They  were  served 
with  rations  from  the  United  States  commissariat  and  cared  for. 

The  brigades  were  moved  up  nearer  to  Manila,  and  the  heavy  bat 
tery,  which  had  been  presented  to  the  United  States  by  Mr.  John 
Jacob  Astor,  of  New  York,  was  placed  in  effective  position.  The 
road  from  Bakoor  to  Manila  was  occupied  up  to  the  village  of  Malate 
on  the  river  of  the  same  name  where  the  Spaniards  had  thrown  up 
intrenchments. 

This  movement  thrust  Aguinaldo's  troops  aside.  They  had  been 
occupying  the  position  and  carrying  on  an  intermittent  artillery  and 
rifle  duel  with  the  Spaniards  within  the  walls.  The  poor  marksman 
ship  of  the  Spaniards  sent  their  shells  and  bullets  over  the  insur 
gents  and  into  the  American  ranks.  General  Merritt  sent  instructions 
to  Aguinaldo  to  remove  his  men,  or  to  make  them  cease  the  exchange 
of  tiring,  because  it  accomplished  no  object  and  endangered  our 


344  HISTORY   OF   THE 

troops.  The  insurgents  were  ordered  away  and  the  Astor  battery  was 
placed  within  a  thousand  yards  of  the  walls  of  Manila. 

The  country  all  around  Manila  was  reconnoitered  and  mapped  for 
use  in  the  event  of  assault.  Preparations  advanced  rapidly,  and  with 
the  precision  of  well-ordered  purpose.  Aguinaldo  grew  uneasy.  If 
Manila  passed  under  American  control  there  would  be  no  foothold  for 
an  insurgent  army.  What  was  to  become  of  Aguinaldo's  troops  and 
their  arms?  He  relaxed  his  pride  and  practiced  the  cunning  of  hu 
mility.  He  wrote  to  General  Merritt  and  begged  the  privilege,  as  a 
reward  for  his  troops,  that  on  the  day  of  capture  or  surrender,  they  be 
permitted  to  march  through  Manila.  The  triumph  of  passing  through 
the  streets  they  had  assisted  in  conquering,  would  repay  them  for  the 
sacrifices  they  had  made  to  assist  the  Americans  against  the  power 
of  Spain. 

General  Merritt  meditated  over  the  political  effect  of  this  request, 
the  prestige  and  glory  it  would  confer  upon  Aguinaldo,  and  the  pos 
sibilities  it  offered  for  future  troubles,  and  took  it  under  advisement 
only. 

Aguinaldo  was  averse  to  having  his  men  disarmed  after  Manila 
should  be  taken.  He  made  the  suggestion  that  there  might  be  formed 
several  regiments  of  Filipinos,  officered  by  Americans,  and  kept  as  part 
of  the  regular  force  of  Americans  as  long  as  the  United  States  main 
tained  a  military  force  in  the  islands.  The  suggestion  brought  up 
vividly  the  action  of  the  Filipinos  in  going  over  by  whole  regiments 
to  the  Spaniards  in  rebellions.  It  would  be  difficult  to  find  American 
officers  who  would  voluntarily  take  such  a  command.  They  remem 
bered  the  great  Indian  Mutiny,  and  discouraged  a  repetition  of  the 
betrayals  and  massacres  that  were  practiced  by  native  regiments 
against  their  British  officers  around  Calcutta. 

In  the  city  Governor  Augusti  was  disheartened.  He  was  constantly 
urging  his  government  to  authorize  him  to  capitulate.  The  govern 
ment  refused,  and  replied  that  Camara's  fleet  was  on  its  way  with  suc 
cor.  But  Augusti  was  a  Spaniard,  and  did  not  believe  the  government. 
He  persisted  in  his  demands,  and  expressed  the  fear  that  if  he  did  not 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  345 

capitulate  to  the  Americans  the  insurgents  would  storm  the  city  and 
loot  it  with  awful  massacre. 

Spain  cared  little  for  such  an  argument.  She  was  hoping  by  some 
trick  to  save  the  Philippines  in  the  negotiations  for  peace,  then  plainly 
within  political  view. 

Augusti  resigned;  or  was  deposed — which?  Jaudenes  was  appointed 
Governor,  with  the  implacable  Archbishop  at  his  back  to  lend  him 
advice  and  strength. 

At  this  time  great  events  were  occurring  on  the  other  side  of  the 
world. 


CHAPTER  THE   TWENTY-FIFTH. 

THE  INVASION  OF  PORTO  Rico. 

YELLOW  AND  MALARIAL  FEVERS  INVADE  THE  CAMPS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  NEAR  SANTIAGO 
—  A  "  ROUND  ROBIN"    AND   THE  PROTEST   THAT  CAUSED   THE  FIGHTERS  TO  BE  BROUGHT 
HOME  —  GENERAL  MILES,  WITH  THE  FIFTH  ARMY  CORPS,  INVADES  PORTO  Rico,  LAND 
ING   AT    GUANICA — YAUCO    AND  PONCE  WELCOME   OUR    SOLDIERS   AND    ARE  GLAD 

TO  BE  IN  THE  UNITED   STATES  —  THE  Two  MOVEMENTS  THAT  WERE  TO 

UNITE  AND  CAPTURE  SAN   JUAN,  THE  CAPITAL  —  INTERRUPTED  BY 

THE  PEACE  PROTOCOL,  BUT  VERY  SUCCESSFULLY  UNDER  WAY 

—  GENERAL  MILES  REGARDS  THE  PEOPLE  FAVORABLY  — 

SIGNIFICANCE  OF  PORTO  Rico's  READY  SURRENDER. 


THE   fall  of  Santiago  was  to  be  followed  by  the   fall  of  Spain. 
Dewey's  victory  at  Manila  had   opened   vast   possibilities   of 
internationalism  to  the  United  States  and   set  in   motion  all 
the  political  influences  of  the  world.      The  victory  of  Samp 
son    and    Shafter    at    Santiago    had    confirmed    the    permanence    of 
American  power  and  put  an  end  to  all  possible  machinations  by  con- 
tinental  ^ur°Pe-     Just   as   it  had   unnerved  Augusti  at 
THE  Manila,   it    had    unnerved    Captain-General    Macias    of 

Porto  Rico,  and  filled  Spain  with  mortal  despair. 
The  surrender  of  Santiago  was  obtained  none  too  soon.  It  was  a 
piece  of  good  fortune.  Immediately  after  the  Spaniards  turned  over 
their  arms,  the  American  troops  were  sent  into  camp  on  the  hilltops 
north  of  the  city  where  the  cool  atmosphere,  it  was  hoped,  would  enable 
them  to  recuperate  and  resist  disease.  It  was  too  late.  Three  weeks 
of  fighting  and  constant  exposure  in  trenches,  without  tentage  and  on 
short  rations,  followed  by  the  sudden  relaxation  of  nervous  tension  in 
inaction,  rendered  them  particularly  susceptible  to  the  diseases  pecul 
iar  to  the  country  and  the  season.  Yellow  fever,  malarial  fever,  and 
other  camp  maladies  began  to  appear.  Nearly  75  per  cent,  of  the  army 
was  soon  unfit  for  duty.  August  1,  nineteen  days  after  the  surrender, 

(346) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAI!  ;J47 

(Jeneral   Shafter  reported   4,239  cases  of  sickness  and   fifteen   deaths, 
while  many  others  of  his  men  were  weak  and  ready  to  succumb. 

A  conference  was  held  by  the  officers  at  Santiago  which  resulted 
in  the  preparation  of  a  petition  or  protest  called  a  "Round  Robin/' 
addressed  to  General  Shafter,  which  was  as  follows:  — 

We,  the  undersigned  officers  commanding  the  various  brigades,  divisions,  etc.,  of 
the  army  of  occupation  in  Cuba,  are  of  the  unanimous  opinion  that  this  army  should 
be  at  once  taken  out  of  the  island  of  Cuba  and  sent  to  some  point  on  the  northern 
seacoast  of  the  United  States;  that  it  can  be  done  without  danger  to  the  people  of 
the  United  States;  that  yellow  fever  in  the  army  at  present  is  not  epidemic;  that 
there  are  a  few  sporadic  cases;  but  that  the  army  is  disabled  by  malarial  fever  to 
the  extent  that  its  efficiency  is  destroyed,  and  that  it  is  in  a  condition  to  be  prac 
tically  destroyed  by  an  epidemic  of  yellow  fever,  which  is  sure  to  come  in  the  near 
future. 

We  know  from  the  reports  of  competent  officers  and  from  personal  observations 
that  the  army  is  unable  to  move  into  the  interior  and  that  there  are  not  facilities 
for  such  a  move,  if  attempted,  and  that  it  could  not  be  attempted  until  too  late. 
Moreover,  the  best  medical  authorities  of  the  island  say  that  with  our  present  equip 
ment  we  could  not  live  in  the  interior  during  the  rainy  season  without  losses  from 
malarial  fever,  which  is  almost  as  deadly  as  yellow  fever. 

This  army  must  be  moved  at  once  or  perish.  As  the  army  can  be  safely  moved 
now,  the  persons  responsible  for  preventing  such  a  move  will  be  responsible  for  the 
unnecessary  loss  of  many  thousands  of  lives.  Our  opinions  are  the  result  of  careful 
personal  observation,  and  they  are  also  based  on  the  unanimous  opinion  of  our 
medical  officers  with  the  army,  who  understand  the  situation  absolutely. 

J.  FORD  KENT, 
Major-General,  volunteers,  commanding  First  Division,  Fifth  Corps. 

J.  C.   BATES, 
Major-General,  volunteers,  commanding  Provisional  Division. 

ADXA  R.  CHAFFEE, 
Major-General,  commanding  Third  Brigade,  Second  Division. 

SAMUEL  S.  SUMMER, 
Brigadier-General,  volunteers,  commanding  First  Brigade,  cavalry. 

WILLIAM  LUDLOW, 
Brigadier-General,  volunteers,  commanding  First  Brigade,  Second  Division. 

ADELBEKT  AMES, 
Brigadier-General,  volunteers,  commanding  Third  Brigade,  First  Division. 

LEONARD  WOOD. 
Brigadier-General,  volunteers,  commanding  the  city  of  Santiago. 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT, 
Colonel,  commanding  Second  Cavalry  Brigade. 


348  HISTORY   OF   THE 

General  Shafter  had  called  the  conference,  and  the  "Round  Robin" 
was  transmitted  to  him  by  Colonel  Roosevelt,  with  the  following  letter 
of  explanation:  — 

In  a  meeting  of  the  general  and  medical  officers,  called  by  you  at  the  palace 
this  morning,  we  were  all,  as  you  know,  unanimous  in  view  of  what  should  be  done 
with  the  army.  To  keep  us  here,  in  the  opinion  of  every  officer  commanding  a 
division  or  a  brigade,  will  simply  involve  the  destruction  of  thousands.  There  is 
no  possible  reason  for  not  shipping  practically  the  entire  command  north  at  once. 
Yellow  fever  cases  are  very  few  in  the  cavalry  division,  where  I  command  one  of 
the  two  brigades,  and  not  one  true  case  of  yellow  fever  has  occurred  in  this 
division,  except  among  the  men  sent  to  the  hospital  at  Siboney,  where  they  have,  I 
believe,  contracted  it.  But  in  this  division  there  have  been  1,500  cases  of  malarial 
fever.  Not  a  man  has  died  from  it,  but  the  whole  command  is  so  weakened  and 
so  shattered  as  to  be  ripe  for  dying  like  sheep  when  a  real  yellow  fever  epidemic, 
instead  of  a  fake  epidemic  like  the  present,  strikes  us,  as  it  is  bound  to  if  we  stay 
here  at  the  height  of  the  sickness  season,  August  and  the  beginning  of  September. 

Quarantine  against  malarial  fever  is  much  like  quarantining  against  the  toothache. 
All  of  us  are  certain,  as  soon  as  the  authorities  at  Washington  fully  appreciate  the 
conditions  of  the  army,  to  be  sent  home.  If  we  are  kept  here  it  will  in  all  human 
probability  mean  an  appalling  disaster,  for  the  surgeons  here  estimate  that  over  half 
the  army,  if  kept  here  during  the  sickly  season,  will  die. 

This  is  not  only  the  trouble  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual  lives  lost,  but 
it  means  ruin  from  the  standpoint  of  the  military  efficiency  of  the  flower  of  the 
American  army,  for  the  great  bulk  of  the  regulars  are  here  with  you.  The  sick 
list,  large  though  it  is,  exceeding  4,000,  affords  but  a  faint  index  of  the  debilita 
tion  of  the  army.  Not  ten  per  cent,  are  fit  for  active  work.  Six  weeks  on  the 
north  Maine  coast,  for  instance,  or  elsewhere,  where  the  yellow  fever  germ  cannot 
possibly  propagate,  would  make  us  all  as  fit  as  fighting  cocks,  able  as  we  are  and 
eager  to  take  a  leading  part  in  the  great  campaign  against  Havana  in  the  Fall, 
even  if  we  are  not  allowed  to  try  Porto  Rico. 

We  can  be  moved  north,  if  moved  at  once,  with  absolute  safety  to  the  country, 
although,  of  course,  it  would  have  been  infinitely  better  if  we  had  been  moved 
north  or  to  Porto  Rico  two  weeks  ago.  If  there  were  any  object  in  keeping  us 
here,  we  would  face  yellow  fever  with  as  much  indifference  as  we  face  bullets. 
But  there  is  no  object  in  it.  The  four  immune  regiments  ordered  here  are  suffi 
cient  to  garrison  the  city  and  surrounding  towns,  and  there  is  absolutely  nothing 
for  us  to  do  here,  and  there  has  not  been  since  the  city  surrendered.  It  is  impos 
sible  to  move  into  the  interior.  Every  shifting  of  camp  doubles  the  sick  rate  in 
our  present  weakened  condition  ;  and,  anyhow,  the  interior  is  rather  worse  than  the 
coast,  as  I  have  found  by  actual  reconnoissance.  Our  present  camps  are  as  health 
ful  as  any  camps  at  this  end  of  the  island  can  be. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    \VAH  34<J 

I  write  only  because  I  cannot  see  our  men,  who  have  fought  so  bravely,  and 
who  have  endured  extreme  hardship  and  danger  so  uncomplainingly,  go  to  destruc 
tion  without  striving,  so  far  as  lies  in  me,  to  avert  a  doom  as  fearful  as  it  is  un 
necessary  and  undeserved. 

The  "Round  Robin"  caused  a  great  deal  of  excited  comment  in 
the  United  States,  owing  to  the  fact  that  such  proceedings  are  rare 
in  armies,  and  to  the  additional  fact  that  the  public  had  not  sus 
pected  the  existence  of  the  conditions  exposed.  The  government  gave 
orders  that  the  official  letters  must  not  be  permitted  to  pass  outside  the 
United  States  by  cable  or  telegraph,  lest  the  information  give  encour 
agement  to  Spain. 

The  cavalry  of  Wheeler's  division  at  Santiago  was  immediately 
ordered  to  Montauk  Point,  Long  Island,  U.  S.  A.,  and  preparations  were 
at  once  made  to  bring  the  infantry  home.  Five  regiments  of  uim- 
munes,"  Southern  soldiers  that  had  once  suffered  from  yellow  fever, 
and  were  considered  safe  from  a  second  infection,  were  ordered  to 
Santiago  for  garrison  duty,  under  command  of  Brigadier-General  Hood, 
son  of  the  famous  Confederate  Commander. 

The  return  of  the  troops  from  Cuba  was  attended  by  many  diffi 
culties,  and  involved  much  suffering  to  the  sick  and  wounded. 


n. 

SWIFTLY   following  up  the   Spanish   collapse  at  Santiago,  General 
Nelson  A.  Miles,  General-in-Chief  of  the  army,  sailed  with  part  of  the 
Fifth  Army  Corps  from  Santiago  to   Porto  Rico   nine    INVAgION  OF  THE 
days   after   the   surrender.     He  was  accompanied    by       ISLAND  OF 
Major-General  James  H.  Wilson,  of  volunteers,  and  was 
reenforced  later  with  fresh  troops  from  Newport  News  under  Major- 
General  John  R.  Brooke,  U.  S.  A.     No  opportunity  was  to  be  permitted 
for  Spain  to  recover  the  shock  of  her  losses. 

The  squadron  under  Commodore  Watson,  intended  to  pursue  Ca- 
mara's  ships,  was  now  enlarged  to  a  fleet,  which  Admiral  Sampson 


350  HISTORY    OF    THE 

was  to  command,  with  orders  to  prepare  for  immediate  attack  upon 
the  Canary  Islands  and  a  descent  upon  the  Spanish  fortified  seaports 
to  find  Camara's  hiding  ships  and-  destroy  them.  The  announcement 
caused  great  fear  throughout  Spain,  and  once  again  her  cabinet  sought 
to  arouse  Europe  to  combine  against  the  entrance  by  American  ships 
upon  European  waters  for  war  purposes — urging  the  step  as  a  retalia 
tory  act  against  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  But  the  European  Powers  did 
not  display  any  intention  to  act  after  an  exchange  of  notes.  The 
appearance  of  a  British  squadron  at  Gibraltar  was  considered  ominous 
to  the  proposed  interference. 

The  island  of  Porto  Rico,  which  was  discovered  in  1493,  and  has  ever 
since  been  under  Spanish  rule,  is  one  hundred  and  eight  miles  in  length 
and  about  forty  miles  wide.  It  is  a  most  healthful  and  delightful  coun 
try,  with  mountain  ranges  and  many  streams.  Forty  of  these  are  navi 
gable  for  a  short  distance  from  the  coast.  The  climate  in  the  interior 
is  particularly  mild  and  salubrious.  It  contains  an  area  of  about  3,600 
square  miles  and  800,000  inhabitants.  It  is  fourth  in  rank,  according 
to  size,  of  the  Greater  Antilles  group,  but  in  prosperity  and  density 
of  population  it  is  first.  It  is  one  of  the  few  tropical  islands  and 
countries  where  the  white  population  outnumbers  the  black.  The 
commercial  capital  and  largest  city  is  Ponce,  situated  three  miles 
inland  from  the  port  of  the  same  name  on  the  southern  coast.  The 
city  rests  on  a  rich  plain,  surrounded  by  gardens  and  plantations. 
There  are  hot  springs  in  the  vicinity,  which  are  much  frequented  by 
invalids.  Along  the  beach  in  front  of  the  port  are  extensive  depots, 
in  which  the  products  of  the  interior,  forwarded  through  Ponce,  are 
stored  for  shipment.  The  last  enumeration  gave  to  Ponce  a  popula 
tion  of  37,545,  while  San  Juan,  the  capital  on  the  north  coast,  had 
only  23,414  inhabitants.  Ponce  has  a  number  of  fine  buildings,  among 
which  are  the  town  hall,  the  theatre,  two  churches,  the  Charity  and 
the  Women's  asylums,  the  barracks,  the  Cuban  House,  and  the  market. 
The  road  between  the  city  and  the  seaside  is  a  beautiful  prom 
enade.  Cuba  is  thirteen  times  larger  than  Porto  Rico,  but  its  popula 
tion  was  not  more  than  double  the  latter  before  Weyler  exterminated 


SPANISH  AMKUirAN    WAR  351 

a  third  of  the  native  Cubans.  Besides  Ponce  and  San  Juan,  the  largest 
towns  on  the  island,  are  Arecibo  (30,000  inhabitants),  Utuado  (31,000), 
Mayaguez  (28,000),  San  German  (20,000),  Yauco  (25,000),  Juana  Diaz 
(21,000),  and  there  are  some  ten  other  towns  with  a  population  of 
15,000  or  over.  In  the  past  fifty  years  about  half  the  population  has 
gravitated  into  and  about  the  towns,  particularly  those  of  the  seaboard. 
The  inhabitants  live  in  comfortable  houses,  and  many  have  sufficient 
means  to  purchase  all  the  comforts  of  the  world. 

Porto  Rico  has  always  been  lightly  touched  by  the  blighting  hand 
of  Spain.  It  has  been  regarded  as  a  part  of  Spain,  rather  than  a 
colony,  and  for  the  past  twenty  years  it  has  been  politically  a  prov 
ince  of  the  Spanish  Kingdom.  The  Spanish  Government  has  had  little 
to  do  directly  with  internal  improvements  in  the  island,  and  kept  her 
heavy  hand  off  the  people,  so  that  there  was  opportunity  for  the  spirit 
of  enterprise  to  develop.  As  a  consequence  Porto  Rico  has  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  of  railroad,  and  as  much  more  under  con 
struction;  and  a  system  of  wagon  roads  leading  to  all  the  important 
trading  centers  that  surpasses  anything  of  the  sort  seen  in  most  parts 
of  Spain  itself.  The  portions  of  railroad  parallel  to  the  coasts  are 
long  sections  of  a  line  that  will  ultimately  make  the  entire  circuit  of 
the  island,  with  short  branches  to  all  the  seaports  and  the  inland 
market  towns. 

This  beautiful  island  abounds  in  sugar,  coffee,  tobacco,  honey,  and 
wax,  which  have  enriched  the  people.  A  very  large  part  of  the 
trade  has  been  with  the  United  States,  whose  corn,  flour,  salt  meat, 
fish,  and  lumber  were  imported  in  return  for  sugar,  molasses,  and 
coffee.  The  natives  have  little  taste  for  the  sea  and  most  of  the 
foreign  trade  has  been  carried  in  foreign  bottoms.  Porto  Rico  is 
rich  in  natural  blessings,  and,  for  a  tropical  region,  very  healthful. 

The  capital,  San  Juan,  was  the  best  fortified  city  of  Porto  Rico, 
occupying  there  the  relative  position  that  Havana  occupied  in  Cuba. 
When  General  Miles  started  his  expedition  the  expectation  was  that 
it  would  effect  a  landing  at  Fajardo,  on  the  northeastern  coast. 
After  this  ostensible  purpose  had  been  well  published,  his  convoys 


352  HISTORY   OF   THE 

and  transports  suddenly  arrived  off  the  harbor  of  Guanica  on  the 
southwestern  coast  at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  July  25. 

The  small  Spanish  garrison  in  a  blockhouse  on  the  beach  was 
utterly  surprised  when  Commander  Wainwright  of  the  Gloucester  ran 
into  the  harbor  and  with  his  small  guns  opened  fire.  The  Spaniards 
attempted  to  reply  but  were  soon  driven  off  and  a  party  of  marines 
landed  and  hoisted  the  American  flag  over  the  blockhouse.  None  of 
the  Americans  was  injured,  but  the  Spanish  lost  several  killed  and 
wounded. 

The  troops  of  the  expedition,  numbering  some  3,500,  were  disem 
barked  in  the  afternoon  without  difficulty  or  opposition.  The  harbor 
is  the  best  in  the  island,  although  the  country  about  is  low  and  swampy. 
Guanica  is  the  port  outlet  for  several  towns  near  the  coast.  That  part 
of  Porto  Eico  has  never  been  entirely  loyal  to  Spain,  perhaps  because 
it  was  in  sympathy  with  the  eastern  province  of  Cuba.  East  of  Guanica 
are  the  towns  of  Yauco  and  Ponce,  the  former  not  more  than  five 
miles  distant,  and  thence  a  railroad  leads  to  Ponce. 

Marching  towards  Yauco  on  the  26th  there  was  a  skirmish  with 
the  enemy,  in  which  the  Americans  had  four  men  wounded,  and  the 
Spaniards  lost  sixteen  killed  and  wounded.  When  our  troops  entered 
Yauco  they  were  received  with  enthusiasm  and  joy,  not  wholly  un 
mixed,  however,  with  some  anxiety.  Francisco  Megia,  alcalde,  or 
mayor,  of  the  town,  had  issued  in  advance  a  proclamation  to  the 
public,  to  prepare  the  population  for  the  crisis.  It  was  in  these  terms, 
which  accepted  annexation  as  an  accomplished  fact:  — 

CITIZENS  :  —  To-day  the  citizens  of  Porto  Rico  assist  in  one  of  her  most  beauti 
ful  festivals.  The  sun  of  America  shines  upon  our  mountains  and  valleys  this  day 
of  July,  1898.  It  is  a  day  of  glorious  remembrance  for  each  son  of  this  beloved 
isle,  because  for  the  first  time  there  waves  over  it  the  flag  of  the  Stars,  planted  in 
the  name  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  of  America  by  the  Major-Gen 
eral  of  the  American  army,  General  Miles. 

Porto  Ricans,  we  are,  by  the  miraculous  intervention  of  the  God  of  the  just, 
given  back  to  the  bosom  of  our  mother  America,  in  whose  waters  nature  placed  us 
as  people  of  America.  To  her  we  are  given  back,  in  the  name  of  her  government, 
by  General  Miles,  and  we  must  send  her  our  most  expressive  salutation  of  generous 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  ;>;,:; 

affection  through  our  conduct  toward  the  valiant  troops  represented  by  distinguished 
officers  and  commanded  by  the  illustrious  General  Miles. 

Citizens:  Long  live  the  government  of  the  United  States  of  America!  Hail  to 
their  valiant  troops!  Hail  Porto  Rico,  always  American! 

YAUCO,  Porto  Rico,  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 

On  the  same  day  the  Massachusetts,  Dixie,  Annapolis,  Wasp,  and 
Gloucester  had  appeared  before  Ponce  to  blockade  the  port  and  prepare 
to  bombard  it  when  the  troops  arrived  from  Guanica,  ten  miles  west. 
Instead  of  meeting  with  resistance,  the  city  authorities  sent  a  delega 
tion  to  call  on  Commander  Higginson  of  the  Massachusetts,  and  welcome 
the  American  forces  to  peaceful  occupation.  The  population  was  en 
thusiastic  over  the  Americans,  and  when  General  Miles  and  his  soldiers 
arrived  by  rail  from  Guanica,  he  entered  an  American  city  from  which 
the  Spanish  garrison  had  fled  without  stopping  to  look  back.  In  the 
streets  the  whole  population  had  assembled  as  for  a  patriotic  cele 
bration.  The  buildings  were  decorated  with  the  flags  of  all  nations 
except  Spain.  The  ceremony  of  welcoming  the  conquerors  was  in 
teresting  and  unusual. 

General  Miles,  who  had  come  with  the  army  from  Guanica,  and 
General  Wilson,  who  had  come  on  the  war  ships,  were  met  at  Ponce 
port  by  arrangement,  and  a  delegated  escort  drove  them  in  carriages 
into  the  city  proper,  to  the  Casa  del  Rey,  where  the  civil  governor, 
Toro,  and  the  mayor,  Ulpiano  Colon,  awaited  them.  A  guard  in  front 
of  the  building  forced  a  way  for  the  American  Generals,  and  through 
the  cheering  crowd  they  walked  into  the  building,  where  they  were 
presented  to  the  local  officials. 

Governor  Toro  said  the  citizens  of  Ponce  were  anxious  to  know 
if  the  municipal  officers  and  system  that  had  been  in  vogue  would 
be  continued  temporarily.  He  was  assured  that  municipal  affairs 
would  not  be  disturbed  for  the  time  being,  and  that  the  same  local 
officers  would  serve.  But  it  was  explained  that  the  local  authori 
ties  would  be  responsible  to  General  Wilson  as  Military  Governor, 
who  would  keep  the  city  under  a  form  of  martial  law  oppressive  to 
none. 

23 


354  HISTORY    OF    THE 

After  the  conference  Mayor  Colon  said  he  was  glad  the  Americans 
had  come,  because  the  island  would  now  enjoy  prosperity  and  peace, 
and  the  best  citizens  wanted  the  Americans  to  take  possession. 

The  political  prisoners  were  released  at  once.  Redolf  Figeroa  was 
saved  in  the  nick  of  time  from  being  shot  by  the  Spaniards.  He 
was  charged  with  having  cut  the  telegraph  wire  between  Ponce  and  San 
Juan  the  previous  night.  His  purpose  was  to  prevent  the  authorities 
in  Ponce  from  sending  to  San  Juan  for  reinforcements.  He  had  been 
led  from  his  cell  to  be  executed,  but  when  our  ships  entered  the  harbor, 
the  Spaniards,  in  their  excitement,  let  him  go,  and  Figeroa  escaped. 
Some  men  who  had  been  political  prisoners  for  years  were  released. 

The  popular  demonstrations  continued  all  day.  The  natives  were 
all  in  gala  dress,  and  "open  house"  was  kept  for  all  Americans.  Kind 
ness  and  hospitality  were  unbounded.  This  outburst  was  not  entirely 
the  artifice  of  fear. 

Three  days  before,  Captain-General  Macias,  the  Spanish  Commander- 
in-Chief,  had  cabled  to  the  Madrid  cabinet  that  Porto  Rico  could  not 
be  defended.  He  said  the  populace  was  inclined  to  the  Americans 
and  could  not  be  depended  upon,  and  that  his  handful  of  12,000  or 
15.000  troops  could  not  make  an  effective  resistance. 

This  information  caused  the  Sagasta  government's  pretenses  of  war 
to  collapse.  Its  most  favored  possession,  Porto  Rico,  favorable  to  the 
•enemy,  Cuba  inevitably  lost,  its  fleet  destroyed,  its  treasury  bankrupt, 
and  its  expected  friends  in  Europe  unable  to  take  a  step,  there  was 
but  one  thing  to  do,  if  the  Philippines  were  to  be  saved  by  hook  or 
crook.  That  one  thing  necessary  was  to  sue  for  peace. 

On  the  26th  of  July,  therefore,  the  Spanish  Government  made  over 
tures  for  peace.  While  General  Miles  was  waiting  in  Ponce  peace 
negotiations  were  pending,  but  there  was  to  be  no  halt  in  the  prose 
cution  of  his  campaign. 

The  great  central  trans-Porto  Rico  highway  runs  from  Ponce  north 
easterly  to  San  Juan,  through  the  towns  of  Juan  Diaz.  Coamo,  andAybo- 
nito,  where  it  goes  almost  eastward  to  Cayey,  there  to  take  a  winding 
course  to  the  north  as  far  as  Caguas,  where  it  turns  west  to  Aguas 


I 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  ;;;,;, 

Buenas,  and  then  goes  decidedly  north  to  San  Juan  through  Guayanabo 
and  Rio  Piedras,  making  in  all  a  distance  of  about  eighty-five  miles. 
The  distance  from  Ponce  to  San  Juan  in  a  straight  line  is  only  forty- 
five  miles.  The  highway  is  a  fine  military  road.  Major-General  Wil 
son  was  appointed  Governor  of  Ponce,  and  the  troops  started  next 
day  for  Juana  Diaz.  In  two  days,  under  American  tariffs,  the  custom 
house  at  Ponce  yielded  a  revenue  of  $14,000.  The  natives  were  asking 
for  American  flags  to  hoist  over  the  large  buildings,  a  clear  indica 
tion  of  the  state  of  settled  feeling  about  the  new  relations. 

The  campaign  in  Cuba  lasted  nineteen  days,  and  wras  conducted 
upon  military  lines  which  were  impossible  at  Santiago.  When  the 
Spaniards  withdrew  along  the  line  of  the  great  military  road  between 
Ponce  and  San  Juan  they  destroyed  the  bridges,  obstructed  the  roads, 
and  fortified  strong  positions  in  the  mountain  passage,  and  then  were 
surprised  to  find  that  one  column  of  our  army  was  sweeping  around 
the  west  end  of  the  island,  capturing  the  principalities  and  towns, 
while  another  had  passed  over  the  mountains  by  a  trail  which  the 
Spaniards  had  supposed  impassable,  and,  therefore,  had  not  fortified 
or  guarded.  The  first  the  Spanish  knew  of  the  march  of  the  Ameri 
can  army  was  the  appearance  of  a  strong  brigade  within  twenty  miles 
of  the  northern  coast,  at  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  connecting  San 
Juan  with  Arecibo.  The  actual  objective  of  both  movements  was  to 
capture  San  Juan,  where  the  greatest  force  of  the  enemy  gathered 
by  retreat.  There*  were  not  more  than  half  a  dozen  encounters  with 
the  enemy,  all  mere  skirmishes.  The  troops  on  the  west  coast,  under 
General  Brooke,  were  all  regulars,  while  the  main  column  that  moved 
along  the  military  road  was  composed  of  volunteers.  These  acted  with 
courage  and  spirit  throughout  the  whole  march,  and  displayed  the 
temper  that  would  quickly  convert  them  into  veteran  soldiers. 

The  campaign  was  ended  without  either  movement  being  com 
pleted.  But  both  were  well  in  hand,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  they 
would  have  been  thoroughly  carried  out  to  success.  A  few  days  more 
and  General  Schwan  and  General  Henry,  with  their  divisions,  would 
have  effected  junction  at  Arecibo.  ready  for  a  flank  movement  on  the 


356  HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

capital  in  rear  of  the  Spanish  forces  operating  around  Aybonito. 
These  would  have  been  driven  from  the  latter  position  by  General 
Wilson;  and  while  there  might  have  been  found  many  points  for  a 
stand  by  the  enemy,  the  only  possible  outcome  would  have  been  pre 
cipitate  retreat  by  the  Spanish  to  San  Juan,  or  their  capture. 

"  The  island  of  Porto  Rico,"  said  General  Miles,  on  his  return, 
"was  fairly  won  by  the  right  of  conquest,  and  became  a  part  of  the 
United  States.  The  sentiment  of  the  people  was  in  no  sense  outraged 
by  the  invaders,  but,  on  the  contrary,  was  successfully  propitiated.  A 
people  who  have  endured  the  severity  of  Spanish  rule  for  four  centuries 
hail  with  joy  the  protection  of  the  Great  Republic.  One  of  the  rich 
est  sections  of  country  over  which  our  flag  now  floats  has  been  added 
and  will  be  of  lasting  value  to  our  nation,  politically,  commercially,  and 
from  a  military  or  strategic  point  of  view.  The  possession  of  that 
island  also  rendered  any  further  resistance  of  the  Spanish  forces  in 
Cuba  hopeless." 

General  Miles  remained  in  Porto  Rico  as  long  as  he  deemed  his 
presence  necessary  for  carrying  out  his  instructions,  and  returned  bring 
ing  with  him  nearly  5,000  troops  no  longer  required.  There  were 
about  12,000  troops  left  on  the  island  for  garrison  purpose,  a  number 
considered  ample  for  the  duty. 

The  remarkable  welcome  given  to  Americans  in  this  island  might 
well  be  considered  the  deathblow  to  Spanish  colonial  rule.  The  least 
harassed  of  all  Spain's  possessions,  the  people  were  glad  to  escape 
her  clutches.  It  was  not  surprising  that  Spanish  soldiers  in  Cuba  were 
eager  to  surrender  and  autonomist  officials  in  some  towns  begged  to 
have  their  municipalities  included  in  Toral's  surrender.  At  Manila 
it  was  not  so  much  surrender  to  Americans  that  was  dreaded,  as  the 
expectation  of  terrible  retaliations  from  the  insurgent  natives  who  had 
been  so  cruelly  oppressed.  There  had  been  no  Porto  Rican  revolutions 
in  recent  times.  But  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  had  written  their 
histories  in  their  own  blood. 


CHAPTER  THE   TWENTY-SIXTH. 
PEACE. 

SPAIN  AT  LAST  BEGS  FOR  TERMS  UPON  WHICH  PEACE  MAY   BE   REACHED  — THE  UNITED  STATES 

DEMANDS  THE  FREEDOM  OK  CUBA,  CESSION  OK  PORTO  Rico  AND  ALL  SPANISH  ISLANDS 

IN  THE  WESTERN   HEMISPHERE,  ONE   OK  THE  LADRONES,  AND   RESERVES   THE 

RIGHT  TO  DECIDE  WHAT  SHALL  BE  DONE  WITH  THE  PHILIPPINES  — 

SPAIN   REQUIRES   DELAY,    OK    COURSE,    BUT    ACCEPTS  THE 

TERMS  — PEACE  PROTOCOL  SIGNED  AUGUST  12  — 

MANZANILLO,    CUBA,    BOMBARDED    THE 

SAME  DAY  AND  A  SKIRMISH 

IN     PORTO     Rico. 


F 


I. 

OR  several  weeks  Spain  had  been  seeking  peace  by  every  means 
but   the   proper   one.      She   had    appealed    to    Europe    for    a 
mediator,  but  the  continental  countries  had  no 
stomach  for  the  business  and  coldly  advised  her         FOR  PEACE, 

AT   LAST 

to  turn  to  the  United  States.  The  American  Ambassa 
dors  at  Paris  and  London  were  unofficially  sounded,  and  they  re 
turned  the  answer  that  the  President  would  not  permit  any  inter 
vention  or  mediation  for  peace  through  any  third  nation,  and  that 
the  only  channel  of  communication  was  between  Madrid  and  Wash 
ington.  Spain's  guile  was  exhausted.  The  United  States  had  kept 
to  a  straight  line  of  conduct  that  permitted  no  complication. 

When  war  opened  Spain  requested  the  French  Ambassador  and  the 
Austrian  Minister  to  take  charge  of  the  interests  of  Spanish  subjects 
resident  in  the  United  States.  When  these  diplomats  reported  the 
arrangement  for  approval,  the  President  replied  that  it  would  give  him 
great  pleasure  to  receive  either  of  those  gentlemen,  but  he  could  not 
consent  that  both  might  act.  It  was  an  opening  wedge  through  which 
misunderstanding  might  arise  and  thus  permit  protest  and  appeal. 
He  begged  them  to  arrange  for  a  single  representative.  It  was  finally 
arranged  that  M.  Jules  Cambon.  the  French  Ambassador,  should  act 

(357) 


358  HISTORY    OF    THE 

and  that  Austrian  consuls  should  represent  the  interests  of  Spanish 
subjects  at  points  only  where  no  French  consuls  were  stationed,  but 
that  their  representations  should  come  through  the  hands  of  the 
French  Ambassador. 

The  American  Ambassador  at  London,  Colonel  John  Hay,  was  in 
structed  to  inform  the  Spanish  authorities  that  it  was  the  intention 
of  this  government  not  to  recognize  in  any  manner  the  right  of 
Europe  to  mediate  or  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  the  only  proposal  for  peace  which  could  be  received  must 
come  from  Spain  direct  through  any  agent  the  Spanish  Government 
wrould  designate  and  furnish  with  the  necessary  authority. 

The  "honor  of  Spain"  could  find  no  means  of  escape  from  the 
path  of  honesty.  Porto  Rico  was  slipping  away;  a  great  fleet  of  battle 
ships,  cruisers,  torpedo  destroyers,  scouts,  and  a  dynamite  engine  was 
ready  to  set  sail  under  Sampson,  to  invade  her  home  ports.  The  game 
was  up. 

On  July  26  the  French  Ambassador  called  on  the  Secretary  of  State 
at  Washington  and  presented  a  note  from  the  Spanish  Foreign  Minister 
embodying  overtures  for  peace.  He  was  conducted  to  the  Executive 
Office  and  had  a  conference  with  the  President.  The  proposition  was  a 
surprise,  not  because  it  was  unexpected,  but  because  it  came  so  soon. 
Spanish  dilatoriness  is  so  well  known  that  speedy  action  in  this  instance 
was  an  indication  of  acute  distress. 

The  overture  did  not  embrace  any  distinct  proposition  but  asked 
the  United  States  for  a  statement  of  the  terms  upon  which  it  would 
be  willing  to  cease  hostilities.  Instead  of  suggesting  terms  the  Span 
iard  was  attempting  to  place  the  United  States  in  the  embarrassing 
position  of  taking  the  first  steps  to  obtain  peace.  Moreover,  it  would 
force  our  government  to  show  its  purpose  concerning  the  territory 
already  conquered  or  under  process  of  seizure,  and  permit  Europe  to 
ponder  the  terms  and  estimate  the  consequences  upon  its  various 
interests.  Under  the  circumstances  the  President  informed  M.  Cam- 
bon  that  he  would  not  reply  to  the  note  until  he  could  consult  with 
his  cabinet. 


M.  JULES   CAMBON 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  :;;,«) 

Only  the  day  before  our  troops  had  landed  in  Porto  Rico,  and  the  de 
lay  would  not  affect  United  States  action.  The  Spanish  note  said  the 
first  thing  hoped  for  was  a  cessation  of  hostilities.  But  the  army  opera 
tions  and  naval  preparations  went  on  vigorously. 

The  cabinet  conferred  upon  the  terms  to  be  offered.  There  was 
no  variance  of  opinion  upon  demanding  the  evacuation  of  Cuba,  the 
cession  to  the  United  States  of  the  island  of  Porto  Rico  and  all  other 
Spanish  islands  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  and  the  holding  of  one  of 
the  Ladrone  Islands.  It  was  quickly  determined  to  ask  no  indemnity  in 
money  for  the  cost  of  war,  since  it  was  obvious  that  Spain  could  not 
pay,  and  it  was  useless  to  waste  time  over  an  empty  clause. 

The  whole  interest  centered  upon  what  disposition  was  to  be  made 
of  the  Philippines.  The  sentiment  of  the  United  States  was  not  defi 
nitely  known,  and  the  President  frankly  announced  that  he  was  desirous 
of  having  popular  opinion.  He  was  determined  to  reserve  a  coaling 
station,  at  least,  and  perhaps  the  bay  and  city  of  Manila  and  its  prov 
ince.  His  purpose  was  to  make  a  statement  of  demands  to  Spain  that 
would  be  unequivocal  and  which  would  not  be  modified.  The  cab 
inet,  it  was  understood,  was  divided  upon  the  desirability  of  holding 
all  the  Philippines. 

The  answer  to  Spain's  inquiry  was  handed  to  the  French  Ambas 
sador  on  Saturday,  July  30.  Its  terms  were  not  made  known  in  form 
to  the  public,  but  were  fairly  outlined.  The  most  important  feature 
in  the  communication  was  the  demand  that  Spain  must  signify  ac 
ceptance  or  rejection  of  the  terms  offered  without  delay.  It  was  the 
firm  determination  of  our  government  that  the  propositions  should 
not  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  inciting  European  suggestion  or  inter 
national  political  activity.  It  was  intimated  that  failure  to  answer 
affirmatively  within  a  reasonable  length  of  time,  or  an  attempt  to 
temporize  in  the  hope  of  securing  a  modification  of  the  demands, 
would  be  accepted  by  the  government  as  sufficient  cause  for  declining 
to  continue  the  negotiations. 

The  demands  were  substantially  as  follows:  The  withdrawal  of  all 
Spanish  military  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba,  and  the  relinquishment 


360  HISTORY   OF   THE 

of  Spanish  sovereignty  in  that  island;  similar  action  with  regard  to 
Porto  Rico,  with  the  additional  provision  that  Spain  should  cede  that 
island  to  the  United  States;  no  responsibility  to  be  imposed  on  the 
United  States  for  financial  obligations  contracted  by  Spain  on  behalf 
of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  which  are  to  be  held  to  include  all  outlying 
possessions  of  Spain  in  the  Western  Hemisphere;  the  United  States 
to  maintain  control  over  all  other  territory  where  the  American  flag 
has  been  raised;  the  city  and  harbor  of  Manila  to  be  occupied  by  the 
United  States  until  a  peace  commission  should  decide  upon  the  future 
control,  disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philippines.  The  imme 
diate  acceptance  of  these  terms  would  be  construed  by  the  United 
States  as  sufficient  guarantee  of  Spain's  good  faith  in  proposing  an 
arrangement  of  peace  terms,  and  would  authorize  the  President  to 
appoint  commissioners  to  treat  with  commissioners  designated  by 
Spain  to  consider  and  arrange  a  treaty  of  peace,  reserving  all  rights 
to  make  demands  of  any  character.  In  substance  the  United  States 
demanded  that  before  any  terms  of  peace  should  be  considered,  Spanish 
authority  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  should  be  relinquished,  leaving 
Cuba  in  the  hands  of  this  government  as  a  trustee,  and  absolutely 
ceding  Porto  Rico,  Manila,  and  one  of  the  Ladrone  Islands.  The 
United  States  did  not  agree  to  let  Spain  have  any  part  of  the  Philip 
pines,  nor  make  any  promises  whatsoever. 

These  demands  were  received  by  the  Sagasta  government  with 
expressions  of  disappointment.  They  claimed  that  too  much  was  de 
manded,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  everything  had  been  lost.  They 
wanted  the  Cuban  and  Porto  Rican  bonds  saddled  upon  the  islands, 
or,  at  least,  a  part  of  them.  Spain  had  also  guaranteed  $40,000,000  of 
Philippine  bonds  in  1897.  There  were  more  than  $500,000,000  of  secu 
rities  guaranteed  by  Spain  involved  in  the  alienation  of  her  colonies 
under  the  terms.  Still,  as  these  bonds  had  been  issued  for  the  benefit 
of  Spain  and  not  for  the  advantage  of  the  colonies,  it  was  but  the 
return  of  her  own  selfishness  to  punish  her. 

The  Sagasta  cabinet  had,  also,  to  take  notice  of  Spanish  opinion 
of  the  demands.  Spain  was  lifeless,  and  the  public  was  apparently 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  361 

prepared  to  have  peace  accepted  at  any  price.  But  the  political  leaders 
must  be  appeased  and  committed,  since  Spain  was  in  throes  that 
might  provoke  a  revolution  of  terrible  proportions.  All  the  leaders, 
except  General  Weyler,  conferred  with  Sefior  Sagasta.  Weyler  wrote 
a  curt  note  in  reply  to  the  invitation,  saying  he  was  surprised  that 
Seiior  Sagasta  desired  to  consult  with  him  concerning  peace  when  he 
had  not  been  consulted  regarding  war.  He  added  that  the  nation 
had  been  disappointed  in  what  it  was  entitled  to  expect  in  its  leaders, 
namely,  success  in  war. 

There  was  some  reason  to  believe  that  the  American  demands 
were  communicated  to  the  Pope  as  the  basis  for  requesting  his  offices 
and  power  in  restraining  the  Spanish  clergy  from  assisting  Don  Carlos, 
if  the  pretender  should  attempt  to  lead  a  revolution  upon  the  pre 
tence  that  the  Alfonsine  dynasty  would  dishonor  Spain  by  the  con 
cessions. 

After  much  delay  and  distress  the  Spanish  cabinet  agreed  on  Au 
gust  7,  to  accept  the  demands  of  the  United  States,  the  agreement 
containing  an  expression  of  protest  against  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico,  as 
being  largely  in  excess  in  value  of  any  money  indemnity  that  could 
be  reasonably  expected,  and  against  any  final  demand  that  Spain  must 
yield  the  Philippines.  These  two  colonies  now  suddenly  appeared  to  be 
of  vast  importance.*  The  expression  was  not,  however,  contentious 
in  tone. 


*If  the  French  people  are  gratified  at  the  arrangement  they  are  helping  to  promote, 
by  which  the  United  States  will  secure  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines,  the  nation 
is  very  easy  to  please.  Cuba  might  have  belonged  to  France.  It  did  not  become  an  ac 
complished  fact  mainly  owing  to  the  greed  and  the  irresistible  desire  on  all  occasions  of 
Louis  Philippe  to  drive  a  hard  bargain.  The  proceedings  were  throughout  kept  a  secret. 
The  affair  happened  as  long  as  sixty-one  years  ago;  in  January,  1837.  At  the  beginning  of 
that  month,  Aguado,  the  well-known  Spanisli  banker,  requested  a  strictly  private  and 
absolutely  secret  interview  of  Talleyrand,  which  was  granted.  Aguado,  it  turned  out,  pro 
posed  to  introduce  a  secret  envoy  from  Queen  Cristina,  the  great-grandmother  of  the  present 
King,  Alfonso  XIII.  Cristina  was  in  greater  money  difficulties  than  usual,  and  offered  to 
sign  away  Cuba  for  the  sum  of  thirty  millions  of  reals  [About  $3,000,000,  a  sum  that  seems 
absurd. — AUTHOR.],  with  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippine  Islands  thrown  in  for  another  ten 
millions.  After  comparatively  short  negotiations,  the  King,  Talleyrand,  and  Sefior  Camp- 
uzano,  Cristina's  unwilling  envoy,  it  should  be  said,  met  in  private  conference  in  a  small 
apartment  at  the  Tuileries.  Only  Talleyrand's  secretary  and  Aguado  were  admitted  to 


362  HISTORY   OF   THE 

On  the  9th  of  August,  the  Spanish  Government  had  cabled  its  ac 
ceptance  of  the  terms  to  the  French  Ambassador  at  Washington,  but 
the  text  of  the  document  was  not  given  to  the  public.  M.  Cambon 
presented  it  to  the  President,  who  ordered  the  preparation  of  a  peace 
protocol  to  be  signed  by  both  governments.  When  this  was  drawn 
up,  the  French  Ambassador  transmitted  it  to  Madrid,  where  it  was 
accepted  as  satisfactory. 

It  was  twenty-three  minutes  past  four  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of 
Friday,  August  12,  1898,  one  hundred  and  twelve  days  since  the  first 
act  of  war,  on  April  21,  when  the  Honorable  William  R.  Day,  Secre 
tary  of  State,  and  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador,  author 
ized  by  his  own  government  to  act  for  the  government  of  Spain  upon 
official  request,  signed  the  protocol,  under  which  hostilities  were  to 
cease,  pending  the  final  results  of  peace  negotiations. 


witness  the  signing  of  the  deeds,  for  it  had  already  come  to  that,  in  the  hurry  imposed 
by  the  dread  of  the  whole  affair  leaking  out  and  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  Lord  Pal- 
merston,  at  that  time  the  only  European  statesman  of  whom  both  Talleyrand  and  his 
royal  master  stood  in  awe. 

The  provisions  of  the  contract  were  read  over  by  Senor  Campuzano,  who  looked  abso 
lutely  grief-stricken,  and  at  the  end  of  each  article  or  clause  there  was  a  short  interval, 
during  which  the  club-footed  diplomatist  and  the  citizen-king  conferred  in  whispers.  The 
cession  of  Cuba  led,  however,  to  few  observations;  it  was  practically  smooth  sailing;  the 
price  had  been  debated  and  settled  beforehand ;  and,  finally,  the  signatures  were  all  duly 
appended.  Not  so  smooth  was  the  discussion  of  the  articles  relating  to  the  cession  of 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines.  Louis  Philippe,  on  the  pretext  that  the  transfer  of  the 
latter  islands  would  be  so  obnoxious  to  England  as  possibly  to  lead  to  a  war,  demanded 
a  reduction  of  three  millions  of  reals  on  the  purchase  money.  "  Seven  millions  of  reals  is 
my  final  offer;  if  it  be  not  accepted  the  contract  had  better  be  flung  into  the  fire,"  he 
said  somewhat  peremptorily,  pushing  the  document  across  the  table. 

Talleyrand  was  about  to  interfere,  for  he  liked  neither  haste  nor  violence,  but,  before 
he  could  open  his  lips,  the  Spanish  envoy  sprang  to  his  feet  so  suddenly  as  to  overturn 
the  chair  on  which  he  was  seated,  which  rolled  across  the  floor.  Oblivious  or  indiffer 
ent  at  that  moment  to  the  presence  of  majesty,  he  leant  forward,  seized  both  the  doc 
uments,  twisted  them  together,  and,  looking  Louis  Philippe  straight  in  the  face,  said 
deliberately:  "Your  Majesty  is  right,  the  contract  is  of  no  use;  it  is  only  fit  to  be  thrown 
into  the  fire."  And,  suiting  the  action  to  the  words,  he  strode  across  the  apartment, 
kicked  the  burning  logs  on  the  hearth  with  his  boot,  forced  the  papers  between  the  incan 
descent  embers,  and  stood  stock-still  until  the  charred  wisps  told  him  that  all  the  docu 
mentary  evidence  of  the  proposed  nefarious  transaction  had  forever  vanished. —  Mr.  A.  D. 
VANDAM  (author  of  "An  Englishman  in  Paris"),  in  Illustrated  London  News,  September  10, 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  863 

The  text  of  the  agreement,  for  diplomatic  reasons,  was  reserved. 
The  substance  made  public  by  the  State  Department,  was  as  follows : 

SUBSTANCE  OF  THE  PROTOCOL. 

Article  1.  That  Spain  will  relinquish  all  claim  of  sov 
ereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba. 

Article  2.  That  Porto  Rico,  and  other  Spanish  Mauds 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  an  island  in  the  Ladrones,  to 
be  selected  by  the  United  States,  shall  be  ceded  to  the 
latter. 

Article  3.  That  the  United  States  will  occupy  and  hold 
the  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila,  pending  the  con 
clusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  ichich  shall  determine  the 
control,  disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philippines. 

Article  4.  That  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  other  Spanish 
islands  in  the  West  Indies  shall  be  immediately  evacu 
ated,  and  that  commissioners,  to  be  appointed  icithin 
ten  days,  shall,  within  thirty  days  from  the  signing  of 
the  protocol,  meet  at  Havana  and  San  Juan,  respect 
ively,  to  arrange  and  execute  the  details  of  the  evacu 
ation. 

Article  5.  That  the  United  States  and  Spain  will  each 
appoint  not  more  than  Jive  commissioners  to  negotiate 
and  conclude  a  treaty  of  peace.  The  commissioners 
are  to  meet  at  Paris  not  later  than  October  1. 

Article  6.  On  the  signing  of  the  protocol,  hostilities  will 
be  suspended  and  notice  to  that  effect  will  be  given  as 
soon  as  possible  by  each  government  to  the  command 
ers  of  its  military  and  naval  forces. 

There  was  ready,  awaiting  the  President's  signature,  a  proclamation 
directing  immediate  cessation  of  hostilities  by  the  army  and  navy 
of  the  United  States  against  Spain.  Cable  messages  were  at  once 
dispatched  to  every  commanding  officer  of  the  army  and  navy,  in  the 
field  and  on  the  sea,  conveying  the  necessary  orders,  with  instructions, 
also,  to  make  it  known  to  Spanish  forces  not  in  position  to  learn  the 
fact  otherwise. 


364  HISTORY   OF   THE 


II. 

PEACE  was  proclaimed,  but  the  war  was  not  over.     While  the  sig 
natures  were  attaching  to  the  protocol,  Captain  Gt>odrich  of  the  United 
States  cruiser  Newark,  supported  by  the  Suwanee,  Osceola, 

LAST   NAVAL 

ACTION  Hist,  and  the  converted  Spanish  gunboat  Alvarado,  was 

opening  a  bombardment  of  Manzanillo,which  Commander 
Todd  of  the  Wilmington  had  attacked  a  short  time  before.  He  had 
demanded  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  town,  which  was  re 
fused. 

At  3:45  P.  M.  the  bombardment  began  and  was  maintained  for  half 
an  hour,  when  the  Americans  saw  a  white  flag  on  a  Spanish  gunboat 
lying  at  the  wharf.  The  Suwanee  was  sent  in  under  a  truce  flag  and 
firing  ceased.  The  Suwanee  grounded  on  her  way  into  the  harbor, 
when  within  five  hundred  yards  of  shore.  Suddenly  the  whole  water 
front  was  ablaze  with  the  fire  from  the  Spaniards,  and  a  number  of 
shots  were  fired  from  the  blockhouses.  The  Americans  answered 
fiercely,  and  after  about  fifteen  minutes  slowly  drew  off.  The  Span 
ish  fire  then  slackened,  but  followed  the  gunboats  out.  No  one  was 
hurt  on  our  gunboats,  but  much  indignation  was  expressed  because 
of  the  firing  upon  a  truce  flag.  One  shot  went  through  the  Suwaneefs 
flag. 

Meantime,  the  Cubans  in  the  rear  of  the  town  began  to  fire  on  the 
Spaniards  from  the  north.  They  had  no  artillery,  but  their  rifle  fire 
finally  grew  so  annoying  to  the  enemy  that  they  answered  it  with 
field  pieces,  which  soon  caused  the  Cubans  to  cease  firing.  At  six 
o'clock  the  American  war  ships  anchored  for  the  night,  but  the  Newark 
continued  to  harass  the  Spaniards  through  the  darkness.  It  was  the 
intention  to  renew  the  bombardment  the  next  morning;  but  before 
the  firing  was  begun  the  Spaniards  sent  off  two  officers  in  a  small  boat, 
under  a  flag  of  truce,  to  announce  to  Captain  Goodrich  that  the  peace 
protocol  had  been  signed.  They  bore  a  dispatch  for  Captain  Goodrich 
from  General  Greely,  Chief  of  the  Signal  Service.  The  Spaniards  made 
an  effort  to  send  it  off  to  the  Newark  during  the  previous  night,  using  a 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  365 

white  light  instead  of  a  white  flag  in  the  darkness.  Not  understanding 
the  meaning  of  the  light,  the  boat  was  fired  upon  and  returned  to  the 
shore  as  quickly  as  possible.  As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  in  the 
morning  to  see  the  flag  of  truce,  the  message  was  again  sent  off. 

An  artillery  engagement  occurred  on  the  same  day  at  Aybonito, 
Porto  Rico,  in  which  one  American  officer  was  killed  and  four  privates 
were  wounded. 


CHAPTER  THE   TWENTY- SEVENTH. 

ASSAULT  AND  CAPTURE  OF  MANILA. 

ELECTRICITY    NOT   QUICK   ENOUGH   TO   STOP   ADMIRAL   DEWEY    FROM   TAKING  MANILA  —  MILI 
TARY    ADVANCES   UPON  THE   CITY  WALLS  —  THREE   NIGHTS'    BATTLE  BEFORE  MALATE,  IN 
WHICH   SPANIARDS    ARE  REPULSED   WITH   HEAVY    LOSSES    BY   OUR  VOLUNTEERS  — 
DEWEY    AND   MERRITT  DEMAND    ITS   SURRENDER  AND   MAKE  A   THEATRICAL 
ASSAULT  ON  AUGUST  13,  IN  ORDER  TO  APPEASE  THE  "  HONOR  OF  SPAIN" 
—  THE  AUTHORITIES  ANXIOUS  TO  SURRENDER  —  ESCAPE  OF  GEN 
ERAL  AUGUSTI    ON    A   GERMAN    SHIP  —  AMERICANS   OCCUPY 
THE     CITY  —  THE     ARTICLES     OF     CAPITULATION  — 
THE  GLORIOUS  RECORD  OF  ADMIRAL    DEWEY 
REVIEWED  —  DEATH       OF      CAPTAIN 
GRIDLEY    OF   THE    "  OLYMPIA." 

I. 

WHEN    the    peace    protocol    was    signed    at    Washington    on 
Friday,   August    12,   at    4:23    o'clock,  p.    M.,   the   time  at 
Manila  was  a  few  minutes  past  midnight  Friday  morning. 
The  cable  messages  instantly  hurried  to  Admiral  Dewey 
and  Major-General  Merritt  might  reach  Hong  Kong  cable  office  within 
a  few  hours,  before  noon,  Friday,  at  Hong   Kong.      But   Manila  was 
more   than    700  miles  distant,   three  days,  by  steamer. 

I  HK-tilj   NKjrHTS 

OF  FIGHTING       The  Spanish  Government  had  arranged  for  a  fast  steamer 

AT  MALATE  .         .  ...  T^  „          ,.  . 

to  be  in  waiting  at  Hong  Kong,  for  the  purpose  of  re 
ceiving  the  proclamation  of  peace  and  hurrying  with  it  to  Manila  at 
utmost  speed.  If  this  programme  was  perfectly  executed,  the  Spanish 
steamer  might  reach  Manila  about  noon  on  Monday,  August  15.  But 
even  in  that  event  it  would  discover  that  Manila  had  surrendered 
unconditionally  to  the  American  army  and  navy  on  the  previous  Satur 
day,  at  half-past  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  electric  telegraph, 
united  with  Spanish  steam  power,  was  not  equal  to  the  task  of  fore 
stalling  Dewey. 

The  arrival  of  General  Merritt,  the  increasing  uncertainty  of  Agui- 
naldo's  final  purpose,  the  good  condition  of  our  troops,  and  the  desire 

(366) 


HISTORY    OF   THE   SPANISH -AMERICAN    WAR 


367 


to  conquer  the  city  as  soon  as  good  order  could  be  preserved  and 
the  growing  distresses  of  non-combatants  alleviated,  had  resulted  in 
moving  our  soldiers  nearer  to  the  city.  They  had  .intrenched  themselves 
along  the  beach  on  the  highway  from  Bakoor  to  Manila.  There  was 
an  old  Capuchin  chapel  in  the  center  of  the  line,  situated  upon  a  knoll. 
Two  field  guns  were  planted  on  each  side  of  the  chapel.  Our  soldiers 
were  only  seven  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  Spanish  trenches. 


Malate  is  three  miles  south  of  Manila.  The  dotted  line  shows  the  outer  investment 
of  the  city  by  the  insurgents.  The  black  line  from  Malate  to  Manila  is  the  highroad 
to  the  city,  along  which  our  line  was  extending  when  attacked. 

At  ten  o'clock  in  the  night  of  July  31,  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
Spanish  line  opened  upon  the  Americans,  who  were  taken  by  sur 
prise,  since  the  enemy  had  not  actively  resisted  any  of  our  operations 
theretofore. 

Our  trenches  were  occupied  that  night  by  the  Tenth  Pennsylvania 
Volunteers  and  Utah  Artillery  Company  Volunteers.  The  Spanish 
firing  was  surprisingly  accurate,  and  a  hail  of  bullets  fell  among  the 
Americans.  Our  pickets  on  the  right  were  driven  in  and  reported 


368  HISTORY    OF   THE 

that  the  enemy  was  advancing  to  flank  us  along  the  road,  at  which 
point  the  trenches  ended.  There  were  trees,  bushes,  and  high  grass 
about  the  right  extreme  of  the  line,  however.  The  Spaniards  ad 
vanced  down  the  road  swiftly,  pouring  in  a  continuous  fire,  and 
finally  getting  in  position  to  flank  and  enfilade  the  American  line. 
The  Pennsylvanians,  as  all  volunteers  are  prone  to  do  before  the 
baptism  of  experience,  had  gone  into  trench  duty  with  light  ammu 
nition.  Their  cartridge  belts  were  emptying  rapidly,  and  a  courier 
was  hurried  to  General  Greene  asking  for  reinforcements  and  ammu 
nition. 

The  Utah  battery  was  at  work  with  veteran  coolness  and  precision. 
The  Pennsylvania  reserves  were  ordered  up  and  went  to  the  right  of 
the  line  to  repel  the  attack.  They  had  to  cross  an  open  field,  swept 
by  Spanish  fire.  It  was  the  only  way  of  going  to  the  objective  point, 
and  the  brave  volunteers  crossed  the  death  trap  with  unflinching 
courage. 

At  this  time,  also,  two  platoons  of  Battery  K,  Third  Artillery,  regu 
lars,  under  Lieutenant  Krayenbuhl  and  Lieutenant  Kessler,  all  acting 
as  infantry,  came  up  to  the  rescue.  The  Pennsylvanians,  with  ammu 
nition  almost  exhausted,  were  firing  at  will,  irregularly.  Lieutenant 
Krayenbuhl  drew  his  revolver  and  gave  warning  that  he  would  kill 
the  first  man  who  fired  without  orders. 

That  was  the  stern  action  needed  to  steady  the  volunteers.  The 
regulars  began  their  volley  firing  with  perfect  discipline,  and  the 
Pennsylvanians  quieted  into  steady  fighting. 

Reinforcements  came  rushing  up.  Battery  H,  of  the  Third  Regu 
lars  came  flying  up  to  the  trenches  along  the  road  which  the  Spanish 
occupied.  The  Americans  ran  in  double  column  and  sprang  into  the 
trenches. 

Private  Mcllrath  of  Battery  H,  hoping  to  encourage  steadiness 
among  the  volunteers,  leaped  on  the  parapet  of  sand  bags  and  walked 
up  and  down,  encouraging  them.  He  was  shot  in  the  head,  fatally. 
Captain  Hobbs  took  his  place,  and  the  Americans  were  soon  steadied 
down  to  deliberate,  hard  fighting. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  3()9 

The  Spanish  guns  at  Malate  were  doing  much  damage,  and  in  the 
confusion  of  the  night  it  was  thought  at  headquarters,  in  the  rear, 
that  our  advance  would  be  driven  in.  General  Greene  sent  two 
battalions  of  the  First  California  Volunteers  to  the  front  at  double- 
quick.  As  they  had  not  before  been  to  the  new  trenches,  they  dropped 
into  the  old  Spanish  trench  and  began  to  pour  volleys  into  our  own 
troops  ahead.  There  was  no  casualty,  but  a  great  disaster  was  barely 
averted. 

As  soon  as  the  mistake  was  discovered,  the  Californians  dashed 
ahead  into  the  fight  with  all  the  more  purpose  to  drive  back  the  real 
enemy.  Private  J.  F.  Finly,  of  Company  C,  of  the  Californians,  espe 
cially  distinguished  himself.  He  took  eight  cart  loads  of  ammunition 
through  a  terrific  fire  in  the  open  fields  to  the  Pennsylvanians. 
One  native  driver  was  shot  in  the  leg,  and  a  pony  was  killed.  The 
cart  tops  were  riddled.  When  the  pony  was  killed,  Finly  pulled  the 
cart  himself  and  delivered  the  ammunition.  As  he  returned  across 
the  field,  he  found  two  wounded  men  and  took  them  in  the  cart  to 
the  hospital.  Then  he  returned  to  the  front  with  ten  carts  for  the 
wounded. 

The  Spaniards  were  beaten  back  to  Malate  with  considerable  loss. 
The  Americans  lost  about  eighteen  killed  and  forty-five  wounded. 

Fighting  was  resumed  the  -next  night  and  the  third,  but  the 
Americans  were  now  prepared  and  reserved  their  fire.  Several  were 
lost  in  the  second  and  third  skirmishes.  A  correspondent  of  the 
London  Times,  who  was  present  in  these  engagements,  cabled  to  his 
paper:  "I  was  impressed  by  the  nonchalant  demeanor  of  the  Ameri 
cans  on  the  fighting  lines.  They  were  like  high-spirited  youths  pic 
nicking,  while  groups  were  lying  on  the  second  line  playing  cards. 
Had  the  Spaniards,  who  were  unaccountably  non-aggressive  during 
the  American  landing  and  advance,  dropped  shrapnel  from  the  Ma 
late  fort  they  would  have  wrought  terrible  havoc,  one  house,  forming 
a  conspicuous  mark,  being  within  easy  gun  range." 

The  insurgents  were  now  forced  inland  on  the  right  of  the  Ameri 
can  lines.  They  opened  fire  on  the  Spaniards,  and  the  latter  replied 

24 


370  HISTORY   OF   THE 

briskly.  Aguinaldo's  men  caused  the  Americans  considerable  trouble. 
Information  was  received  that  a  party  of  California  volunteers  en 
gaged  in  felling  timber  had  been  arrested  by  insurgents.  Under 
General  Greene's  instructions  Colonel  Smith  ordered  out  an  armed 
detachment,  which  released  the  prisoners  and  brought  the  offending 
insurgents  to  Camp  Dewey.  General  Greene  sent  a  message  to 
Aguinaldo  saying  that  if  the  Americans  were  further  molested  he 
would  disarm  all  the  Filipinos. 

There  was  some  belief  that  in  the  night  firing  the  insurgents  had 
turned  their  weapons  against  our  troops,  but  the  fact  was  not  estab 
lished. 

On  July  31  five  transports  arrived  with  more  troops  from  San 
Francisco,  and  on  August  4  the  monitor  Monterey  arrived  in  the  bay 
as  a  benediction  to  the  American  war  ships. 


n. 

THERE  were  now  troops  sufficient,  together  with  the  guns  of  our 

fleet  and  the  marines,  to  justify  Admiral  Dewey  and  General  Merritt 

in  preparing  to  attack  Manila  itself.    A  week  after  the 

MERRITT  n^w  troops  had  disembarked,  Dewey  and  Merritt  united 


in  a  demand  upon  the  authorities  to  surrender.     Gen- 

MANILA 

eral  Augusti,  singularly  enough,  answered  the  demand, 
and  declined.  It  was  on  that  day,  according  to  Spanish  authorities, 
he  was  deposed  or  had  resigned. 

Manila  was  invested  in  the  rear  by  insurgents,  south  by  United 
States  troops  and  heavy  field  guns,  and  the  fleet  formed  in  the  harbor. 
Although  the  Spanish  authorities  asked  and  expected  the  Americans 
to  protect  them  from  the  insurgent  rabble,  the  "honor  of  Spain" 
demanded  a  sacrifice  of  lives.  Destitution  and  distress  prevailed,  and 
resistance  was  hopeless;  but  the  "honor  of  Spain"  must  again  be 
sealed  in  blood.  The  American  troops  were  scarcely  in  condition  to 
attack,  and  not  much  resistance  was  looked  for.  Neither  Dewey  nor 
Merritt  expected  the  Spanish  to  fight.  Their  information  was  to 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  371 

the  effect  that  there  was  a  division  in  Manila,  one  faction  ready  to 
surrender,  the  other  in  favor  of  holding  out.  The  American  com 
manders  believed  that  a  perfunctory  resistance  only  would  be  made, 
but  both  wrere  prepared  to  make  a  strong  assault,  if  necessary.  The 
ultimatum  expired  at  noon  on  Tuesday,  August  9. 

Monday  afternoon  the  Spanish  requested,  through  the  Belgian 
consul,  another  day  to  remove  the  non-combatants  and  the  sick  and 
wounded.  This  was  granted.  The  Belgian  consul  had  been  active  in 
endeavoring  to  effect  an  arrangement  between  the  Americans  and 
Spanish,  to  prevent  further  fighting  and  bloodshed.  As  soon  as  he 
delivered  the  ultimatum  he  removed  his  family  to  a  supply  ship,  and 
remained  on  board  with  them.  He  reported  on  Tuesday  afternoon 
that  the  Spaniards  were  determined  to  make,  at  least,  a  show  of 
resistance.  Accordingly,  the  fleet  prepared  to  begin  a  bombardment 
at  noon  on  Wednesday. 

Tuesday  morning  the  war  ships  of  the  neutral  countries  began  to 
take  positions  to  observe  the  assault.  The  arrangement  exhibited  the 
national  sympathies  clearly.  Four  British  ships,  then  on  the  station, 
the  Immortal  iff',  flagship,  Iphigenia,  Linnet,  and  Hicift,  and  the  Japanese 
cruiser  Nanhra,  came  across  the  bay  and  anchored  beside  the  American 
ships.  The  German  cruisers,  Irene  and  Corntoran,  went  to  Mariveles 
with  the  ships  on  board  which  the  foreign  residents  had  taken  refuge. 
The  other  German  war  ships,  the  flagship  Kaiser,  the  Kaiser  in  Augusta, 
and  the  Prim  With  el  HI,  with  the  French  flagship  Bayard  and  cruiser  Pas 
cal,  moved  a  little  north  of  their  former  positions  and  anchored  together. 
These  manoeuvres  caused  general  comment  throughout  the  fleets. 

Our  ships  were  stripped  and  cleared  for  action  on  Tuesday  after 
noon  and  Wednesday  morning,  and  the  crews  were  called  to  general 
quarters.*  Suddenly  the  Admiral  signaled  "Action  postponed." 


*  And  then  occurred  a  wonderful  sight,  which  the  world  had  not  seen  and  may  not  see 
again.  The  smaller  British  vessels  steamed  uway,  but  the  big,  white  Immortalitf,  said  to 
be  the  largest  armored  cruiser  in  the  world,  headed  down  the  bay  and  came  within  two  or 
three  blocks  of  the  flagship,  the  Olympia,  and  stopped.  Then  her  flag  was  dipped  and  from 
her  deck,  loud  and  clear,  her  band  played  "The  Star  Spangled  Banner."  —  Letter  from 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Charles  L.  Jewett,  Judge  Advocate  General. 


372  HISTORY   OF   THE 

It  was  explained  that  General  Merritt  had  declared  the  army  not 
ready,  for  lack  of  preparation.  This  was  mere  pretense,  however. 
M.  Andre,  the  Belgian  consul,  anxious  to  prevent  useless  loss  of  life,  had 
been  permitted  to  negotiate  with  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  succeeded 
in  arranging  a  plan  under  which  the  resistance  would  be  so  slight 
that  hard  fighting  would  be  unnecessary. 

Flag- Lieutenant  Brumby  carried  an  order  to  the  Concord  and  Pe 
trel,  lying  before  the  Pasig  batteries,  that  they  were  not  to  fire  unless 
attacked.  The  Spanish  wished  to  have  a  theatrical  exhibition,  sur 
render  to  the  Americans,  and  be  saved  from  the  insurgents.  Dewey 
and  Merritt  were  not  averse  to  saving  life,  and,  it  was  ordered  that 
no  damage  should  be  done  to  the  city,  but  that  the  shots  should  be 
confined  to  outer  military  positions  alone. 

Such  was  the  position  on  Saturday  morning,  August  13.  The  day 
was  hazy  and  misty,  with  frequent  downpours  of  squally  rain. 

At  9:30  the  American  ships,  with  battle  flags  flying,  received  the 
signal  for  attack  from  the  Olympia,  from  which  two  puffs  of  smoke  shot 
out,  sending  two  shells  at  Malate.  They  fell  short  on  the  beach.  These 
were  followed  by  two  great  roars  from  the  Monterey,  and  cheers  sprang 
up  from  all  the  ships.  All  the  ships  then  joined  in  and  all  the  shots 
were  directed  against  Malate,  and  all  fell  short.  There  were  no  signs  of 
surrender.  The  "honor  of  Spain"  was  not  to  be  appeased  with  smoke. 
Yet  no  Spanish  guns  made  reply. 

The  Monterey,  a  mere  plank  on  the  water,  with  no  freeboard, 
steamed  in  under  the  very  guns  of  the  shore  batteries,  tempting  a 
shot,  but  none  came.  Bain  was  falling  so  mistily  as  to  cloud  the  bay. 

The  ships  now  tried  for  the  Malate  fort  in  good  faith,  and  the  clouds 
of  dust  and  dirt  that  arose  were  proof  that  our  gunners  were  as  skillful 
as  ever.  Then  they  ceased  for  awhile,  but  the  Spanish  flags  still 
flew  over  the  city,  especially  from  the  lofty  spire  of  the  Archbishop's 
cathedral. 

In  the  meantime,  the  American  army  on  shore  advanced  two  bri 
gades  against  the  Malate  fort.  It  was  captured  with  the  loss  of  eleven 
Americans  killed  and  thirty-nine  wounded.  Capturing  the  fort,  they 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  373 

drove  the  Spaniards  back  along  the  beach  into  the  city,  and  finally . 
occupied  the  deserted  places  of  the  enemy  on  the  Lunetta  parade. 

At  about  11  o'clock  the  Olympia  signaled  "cease  firing,"  and  then 
set  the  international  signal  for  the  enemy  demanding  surrender.  The 
Spaniards  made  no  reply  from  Manila,  and  Admiral  Dewey  grew  sus 
picious  of  Spanish  treachery.  He  signaled  his  ships  to  "close  in,"  and 
there  was  prospect  of  serious  work  ahead.  M.  Andre,  the  Belgian 
consul,  had  been  trusted  by  both  sides,  and  his  communications  had 
all  been  verbal.  The  question  arose  whether  there  was  misunderstand 
ing  or  Spanish  treachery.  M.  Andre"  was  called  on  board  the  Olympia, 
and  declared  that  there  might  be  misunderstanding,  but  he  did  not 
believe  there  was  treachery. 

Again  the  signal  was  made,  "  Do  you  surrender  ?  "  but  no  reply  came. 
Then  a  launch,  bearing  a  flag  of  truce  and  the  Belgian  flag,  went  toward 
Manila  with  M.  Andre",  Lieutenant  Brumby,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Whittier  on  board  to  consult  the  Spanish  authorities.  They  were 
gone  a  long  time,  during  which  the  Admiral  signaled  the  fleet  to  eat 
dinner.  As  he  had  breakfasted  in  Cavite*  he  was  now  dining  at  Manila. 

The  launch  returned  from  the  city  at  2  o'clock,  and  half  an  hour 
later  the  Olympia  signaled,  "  The  enemy  surrenders."  The  harbor  was 
filled  with  the  cheers  of  the  sailors. 

Two  battalions  of  the  Second  Oregon  Regiment,  who  were  on  a 
steamer,  now  started  ashore.  The  steamer  went  in  beside  the  break 
water,  on  which  the  troops  landed,  and  marched  on  land.  General 
Merritt  had  already  gone  on  shore  in  a  small  boat.  Flag-Lieutenant 
Brumby,  with  a  great  flag,  went  in  a  small  boat  to  haul  down  the 
Spanish  colors.  He  took  with  him  two  apprentice  boys. 

When  they  reached  the  staff  in  front  of  the  cathedral,  a  great 
crowd  of  Spaniards  gathered  around  them.  As  the  Spanish  flag  came 
down,  many  men  and  women  in  the  great  crowd  assembled  shed 
tears.  Just  as  the  Stars  and  Stripes  were  hoisted  in  place  of  the  red 
and  yellow  flag  of  Spain,  a  regimental  band  at  the  head  of  our  troops, 
marching  from  Camp  Dewey,  started  "The  Star  Spangled  Banner." 
It  was  a  coincidence,  for  the  band  was  around  a  corner  and  could  not 


374  HISTORY   OF   THE 

see  the  flag-raising.  There  was  tremendous  cheering  by  the  Ameri 
cans  when  the  flag  rose  over  the  building,  and  a  burst  of  delight  could 
be  heard  aboard  the  ships  in  the  bay  from  which  they  were  echoed. 
Then  the  guns  on  the  Olympia  boomed  out  a  national  salute  to  the  new 
sovereignty  in  the  Philippines.  The  Charleston  followed,  and  then  all 
the  American  fleet  followed  in  order,  even  the  Callao,  that  three  months 
before  boasted  allegiance  to  the  flag  now  replaced  by  a  better.  The 
clouds  cleared  away,  and  the  sun  set  in  a  burst  of  brilliant  beauty. 

Major-General  Merritt  had  landed  with  an  Oregon  company  for 
escort  They  saluted  the  flag  when  it  was  hoisted,  and  the  Oregon 
volunteers  guarded  the  streets  all  night  and  received  the  surrender 
of  the  Spanish  arms.  The  enemy  was  permitted  to  surrender  with 
the  honors  of  war,  the  officers  retaining  their  side  arms.  When  the 
Oregon  troops  reached  the  Captain-General's  palace,  where  General 
Merritt  made  his  headquarters,  they  found  the  plaza  filled  with  Span 
iards.  Between  6,000  and  7,000  soldiers  gave  up  their  arms,  which 
consisted  mostly  of  Mauser  rifles.  Twelve  thousand  stands  of  arms 
were  taken  and  millions  of  rounds  of  ammunition.  Enough  new 
Mauser  rifles  were  captured  to  arm  nearly  all  the  American  regi 
ments.  Three  magazines  were  found  stored  with  powder. 

Despite  the  promises  made,  Spanish  treachery  could  not  entirely 
renounce  its  opportunity.  After  retreating  from  their  lines  they  made 
a  cowardly  guerilla  fight,  hiding  in  the  brush  and  in  gardens,  and 
shot  at  Americans  as  they  advanced.  The  two  American  brigades 
advanced  together,  General  Greene's  moving  along  the  beach  and 
main  road  against  Malate,  while  General  Me  Arthur  advanced  along 
the  Cingalon  road  from  Pasai.  General  McArthur  had  a  hot  fight  at 
Cingalon.  The  Astor  battery  distinguished  itself  by  its  bravery.  It 
lost  two  men  killed  and  several  wounded.  The  batteries  shelled  the 
Spanish  out  of  a  blockhouse  on  the  outer  line.  The  Spaniards  then 
retreated  to  Cingalon,  where  they  hid  in  houses  and  behind  a  barri 
cade,  making  a  stubborn  resistance.  The  Astor  battery  advanced 
two  guns,  to  within  seventy-five  yards  of  the  barricade,  and  then 
charged  the  Spaniards  with  pistols. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 


III. 

THAT  night  Manila  was  under  martial  law.  The  California  Red 
Cross  Society  was  permitted  to  care  for  the  sick  and  wounded  of  both 
sides.  The  troops  marched  in  with  perfect  order  in  TH£  OCCUPATION 
the  afternoon,  and  guards  were  placed  before  the  house  OF  MANILA  BY 

.      ,         .  .  ,          ,.  OUR  FORCES 

of  every  foreign  resident  to  prevent  looting  by  disor 
derly  mobs.    General  Merritt  had  refused  to  permit  Aguinaldo's  army 
to  take  part  in  the  assault,  in  order  that  no  lives  might  be  sacrificed 
to  rage.     No  insurgent   was   permitted   to  enter  after  the  surrender, 
without  first  delivering  up  all  his  weapons. 

These  were  the  acts  of  protection  accorded  by  Americans,  whom 
the  Archbishop  had  described  as  heartless,  immoral,  cruel,  and  treach 
erous  people. 

General  Merritt  issued  next  day  a  proclamation,  announcing  the 
establishment  of  a  military  government  in  Manila.  It  was  printed 
in  Spanish  and  English.  After  setting  forth  the  progress  of  the  war, 
it  announced  that  the  United  States  Government  had  directed  him,  as 
Governor,  to  declare  that  Americans  had  not  come  to  wage  war  on 
the  people,  but  to  protect  all  in  their  personal  and  religious  rights. 
There  would  be  a  military  occupation  of  the  island  of  Luzon,  but, 
until  further  notice,  all  laws  would  continue  in  effect,  as  relating  to 
personal  rights,  local  societies,  and  crime,  unless  they  conflicted  with 
the  necessary  military  laws  as  might  be  determined  by  the  General 
commanding. 

The  laws  would  be  administered  by  the  ordinary  tribunals  and 
officers  who  would  accept  the  authority  of  the  United  States.  Churches 
and  places  of  religious  worship  would  be  protected,  and  all  public  prop 
erties,  works  of  art,  and  libraries.  The  people  would  not  be  inter 
fered  with  as  long  as  they  preserved  the  peace.  All  ports  would  be 
held  by  the  land  or  naval  forces  until  the  United  States  declared  them 
open  for  the  trade  of  neutral  nations  on  payment  of  the  prescribed 
rates  of  duty. 


376  HISTORY   OF   THE 

The  same  day  the  commissioners  selected  to  draw  up  the  articles 
of  capitulation  met.  They  were,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
Brigadier-General  F.  V.  Greene,  Captain  B.  L.  Lamberton,  U.  S.  N., 
Lieutenant-Colonels  Charles  A.  Wbittier  and  V.  E.  H.  Crowden.  For 
Spain,  Nicolas  de  la  Pena,  Auditor-General,  Colonel  Carlos  Reyes,  and 
Major  Jose  Maria  Olaguen.  The  articles  follow:  — 

1.  The  Spanish  troops,  European    and    native,  capitulate,  with  the    city  and   de 
fenses,  with  all  honors  of  war,  depositing    their    arms'  in    the    places   designated    by 
the  authorities  of  the  United  States  and  remaining  in  the    quarters   designated    and 
under  the  orders  of    their    officers    and    subject    to   control   of    the    aforesaid    United 
States    authorities  until  the    conclusion    of    a    treaty  of    peace  between  the   two    bel 
ligerent    nations.       All    persons    included    in    the    capitulation    remain  at  liberty,  the 
officers    remaining    in    their    respective   homes,    which    shall    be    respected  as  long  as 
they  observe  the  regulations  prescribed  for  their  government  and  the  laws  in  force. 

2.  Officers    shall    retain    their  side  arms,  horses,  and  private   property.     All  pub 
lic  horses  and  public    property  of    all    kinds   shall    be    turned    over    to    staff    officers 
designated    by   the    United    States. 

3.  Complete    returns    in    duplicate  of  men  by  organization,  and  full  lists  of  pub 
lic  property  and  stores,  shall  be  rendered  to  the  United  States  within  ten  days  from 
this  date. 

4.  All  questions    relating    to  the  repatriation  of    officers  and  men  of  the  Spanish 
forces,  and  of  their  families,  and  of  the  expenses  which  said  repatriation  may   occa 
sion,  shall   be   referred    to    the    government    of    the    United    States    at    Washington. 
Spanish  families  may  leave   Manila  at  any  time  convenient  to  them.     The  return   of 
the  arms  surrendered  by  the  Spanish  forces  shall  take  place  when  they  evacuate  the 
city,  or  when  the  American  army  evacuates. 

5.  Officers   and    men    included     in    the    capitulation    shall    be    supplied    by   the 
•United   States,  according  to  their  rank,  with    rations    and    necessary  aid,    as    though 
they  were  prisoners  of  war,  until  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain.     All  the  funds  of  the  Spanish  treasury  and  all  other  pub 
lic  funds  shall  be  turned  over  to  the  authorities  of  the  United  States. 

6.  This    city,  its    inhabitants,  its    churches  and  religious  worship,  its    educational 
establishments,  and    its    private  property  of    all    descriptions,   are    placed    under    the 
special  safeguard  of  the  faith  and  honor  of  the  American  army. 

The  articles  were  authorized  on  behalf  of  Spain  by  General  Jau- 
denes,  "acting  General-in-Chief  of  the  Spanish  army  in  the  Philippines." 
Augusti  had  disappeared.  He  had  been  reported  as  deposed  and  as 
having  resigned.  The  Spanish  Government  declared  that  he  had  been 


SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR  377 

removed  on  August  8,  for  being  averse  to  holding  out  until  the  protocol 
was  signed.  The  government  had  made  desperate  efforts  to  prevent 
American  possession,  its  dispatches  reaching  Augusti  through  German 
channels,  it  was  said.  Augusti  did  not  know  the  protocol  had  been 
signed  when  the  city  surrendered,  and,  perhaps,  not  daring  to  assume 
the  authority  of  the  capitulation,  he  fled. 

Then  Spain  claimed  that  Augusti  had  sent  in  his  resignation,  but 
denied  that  it  had  been  accepted;  Jaudenes,  therefore,  had  no  right  to 
surrender  any  territory  except  that  of  Manila,  of  which,  alone,  he 
was  Military  Governor. 

The  "honor  of  Spain"  was  displaying  itself  brilliantly  in  the  final 
episode  of  war. 

The  United  States  did  not  contend  that  the  surrender  included  more 
than  the  city  and  its  suburbs.  The  whole  Philippines  question  was 
open.  Besides,  the  capture  had  been  accomplished  after  the  signing 
of  the  peace  agreement,  which  ceded  the  occupation  and  holding  of 
Manila  and  the  harbor  until  otherwise  determined  upon. 

The  American  losses  in  the  fighting  amounted  to  about  forty  killed 
and  one  hundred  and  h'fty  wounded,  the  wounds  being  slight.  The 
Spanish  losses  were  very  heavy,  and  the  prisoners  were  found  to  be 
emaciated  with  hunger  and  worn  out  with  sleepless  nights  in  the 
trenches  deluged  with  rain. 


IV. 

IT  WAS  one  hundred  and  five  days  after  Admiral  Dewey  destroyed 
the  fleet  off  Cavite  that  Flag-Lieutenant  Brumby  broke  out  the  Stars 
and  Stripes  over  Manila.  Although  the  capture  of  WHAT  DEWEY  HAD 
Manila  was  merely  an  exhibition,  Dewey 's  ships  had  spent  DONE  THAT 

...         _,  MADE  HIS  GLORY 

only  twelve  hours  in  conquering  the  key  of  the  East. 
It  was  a  record  of  glory  and  of  duty  well  done,  besides  an  exhibition 
of  pluck,  sound  capacity,  and  judgment,  that  no  naval  officer  has  ever 
surpassed.     He  had  fought  the  Germans  and  the  insurgents  with  firm 


378  HISTORY   OF   THE 

diplomacy  and  courage,  and  the  Spaniards  with  metal.  He  had  defeated 
all  of  them  equally. 

There  was  one  incident,  however,  which  could  not  be  foreseen. 
Before  the  white  flag  of  surrender  was  hoisted,  General  Augusti  went 
to  a  launch  of  the  German  war  ship  Kaiserin  Augusta  and  was  taken 
aboard,  the  vessel  sailing  for  Hong  Kong  before  the  bombardment  con 
cluded.  Augusti  escaped  under  cover  of  the  mist.  The  United  States 
paid  no  attention  to  him  nor  to  the  Germans.  One  Spaniard  more 
or  less  was  not  significant,  and  one  incivility  more  or  less  from  the  Ger 
man  fleet  was  not  a  matter  for  surprise  or  comment.* 

Our  fleet  had  not  lost  a  man  killed  during  the  whole  period  of 
blockade  and  battle. 

But  there  was  one  deeply  regretted  loss.  Captain  Charles  Vernon 
Gridley,  of  the  Olympia,  who  fought  his  ship  so  splendidly  at  Cavite, 
did  his  duty  at  the  cost  of  his  life.  He  was  dangerously  ill  at  the 
time,  but  determined  to  take  his  part  against  the  advice  of  his 
physician.  He  went  through  the  long  preliminary  voyage  to  Manila 
and  fought  the  good  fight,  when  he  ought  to  have  been  in  bed. 


*  During  the  blockade,  the  American  ships  were  furnished  with  fresh  meat  from  a 
refrigerating  steamer  chartered  by  the  government  in  Australia.  The  American  sailors, 
therefore,  fared  much  better  than  their  brothers  of  the  foreign  fleets  lying  off  Manila. 
These  had  to  get  their  supplies  from  the  city,  and  as  provisions  were  rather  low  toward 
the  end  of  the  blockade,  they  did  not  fare  very  well,  having  to  live  on  buffalo  meat,  at  a 
dollar  a  pound.  As  soon  as  our  flag  was  raised,  the  English  gave  it  a  national  salute, 
while  the  Germans,  French,  and  Russians  have  not  yet  done  so,  as  they  are  waiting  for 
instructions  from  their  governments.  Immediately  after  the  English  fired  the  salute,  our 
Admiral  hoisted  an  international  signal  with  an  English  flag,  meaning,  "  Send  for  fresh 
meat."  The  signal  was  immediately  answered  by  the  foreign  fleets,  and  it  was  some  mo 
ments  before  the  Germans,  French,  and  Russians  found  that  the  signal  was  to  the  English 
only.  They  were  very  angry  when  they  found  their  mistake,  and  are  sorry  they  did  not 
salute  the  flag,  as  they  are  still  living  on  buffalo  meat,  while  the  English  are  enjoying 
mutton  and  fresh  beef. —  Letter  from  an  officer  at  Manila. 

The  Germans  have  never  given  the  ordinary  courtesies  of  salutation,  while  the  English 
recognize  Manila  Bay  as  an  American  port,  and  put  up  the  Stars  and  Stripes  on  the  fore 
mast  as  they  come  in.  One  of  the  latest  incidents  that  struck  me  at  Manila  was  the  salute 
fired  by  Admiral  Dewey  in  acknowledgment  of  the  courtesy  of  an  Englishman  just  coming 
in.  The  flagship  then  was  the  Baltimore,  and  she  raised  a  great  white  thunder  cloud, 
through  which  the  red  flashes  of  the  guns  played  like  the  lightning. —  Remark  credited  to 
Mr.  Murat  Halstead,  in  an  interview. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  379 

After  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  he  collapsed  and  was 
invalided  home,  by  way  of  Hong  Kong.  He  died  at  sea,  returning  to 
San  Francisco,  less  than  a  week  after  he  had  started.  Captain  G ridley 
was  buried  at  Erie,  Pennsylvania,  his  home,  on  July  13,  with  the 
honors  of  war.  He  was  a  native  of  Indiana  and  had  been  thirty- 
eight  years  in  the  navy  at  the  time  of  his  death.  He  had  nearly 
reached  the  rank  of  Commodore.  He  was  the  first  and  only  naval 
officer  of  high  rank  whose  death  was  the  actual  result  of  war.  He 
was  fifty-three  years  old,  and  a  very  handsome,  agreeable,  and  cour 
ageous  officer. 

To  a  friend  in  Hong  Kong  he  said,  u  I  think  I  am  in  for  it ;  but  I 
could  not  leave  my  ship  on  the  eve  of  battle,  after  waiting  all  these 
years  to  serve  my  country  as  well  as  it  deserved.  And,  knowing 
what  will  soon  happen,  I  would  do  it  again  to-morrow  without  hesi 
tation."  These  are  heroic  words.  It  was  the  presence  of  such  men 
in  his  fleet  that  made  Admiral  Dewey,  in  his  report,  speak  so  highly 
of  the  patriotism  and  courage  of  his  officers  and  crew. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  George  Dewey  came  out  of  the  war  the  pop 
ular  hero  of  the  United  States,  his  name  lustrous  with  glory;  that  glory 
fixed  by  his  modesty  and  quiet  reserve.  No  naval  officer  has  ever 
written  his  name  higher  on  the  roll  of  honor  in  the  history  of  any 
country  or  impressed  himself  so  deeply  in  the  hearts  and  upon  the 
memories  of  his  own  people. 


CHAPTER  THE   TWENTY-EIGHTH. 
FIGHTING  LEADERS  OF  THE  NAVY. 

ANECDOTES  OF   DEWEY   FROM   BOYHOOD  T&   IMMORTALITY   AT  MANILA  —  THE  SCHOOL-TEACHER 
WHO    RAWHIDED    HIM    INTO    GOOD    BEHAVIOR  —  WHAT    THE    SAILORS    THOUGHT    OF 
HIM    ON   ALL   OCCASIONS  — SAMPSON,   THE  MOST   UNASSUMING    OFFICER    IN 
THE  SERVICE  — SCHLEY  AND  His  FIGHTING  RECORD  — THE  MEET 
ING  HE  HAD  WITH  A  GERMAN  AT  VALPARAISO  —  A  STORY 

OF  "FIGHTING  BOB"  EVANS AMERICAN  GUN- 

NERS  AND  SAILORS  —  TARGET  PRACTICE 
MAKES    THEM    PERFECT. 

I. 

OUR    fighting   leaders  in  the  Spanish- American  War  were  past 
the  prime  of  middle  age.      Fighting  Generals   and   fighting 
Admirals  have  usually  been  young  men  in  all  the  wars  of 
history  —  Alexander   and   Caesar;   Napoleon,   triumphant   at 
twenty-five,  established  at  thirty-one,  and  master  of  Europe  at  thirty- 
seven;  Washington,   commanding   the  American   armies   at  forty-four; 
A  KOLL  CALL  OF     Wellington  defeating  Napoleon  when  both  were  forty- 
SEASONED  VET-    four;  Nelson  winning  Trafalgar  and  death  at  forty-seven; 
Grant  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Federal  millions  at 
forty-one.    Opposite  the  list  is  the  single  name,  in  modern  times,  of 
von  Moltke,  who  was  seventy  when  he  led  the  German  hosts  against 
France,  yet  who  was  considered  too  old  for  the  task  which  he  so  splen 
didly  accomplished.    Of  the  leaders  of  the  Spanish-American  War  not  one 
was  under  fifty-eight,  and  none  more  than  sixty-three.     At  the  latter 
age  those  in  the  regular  service  are  usually  retired  as  "superannuated." 
Among  the  seven  in  active  command  of  fighting  forces  the're  was  little 
of  the  spirit  of  superannuation,  but  more  the  dash  and  intrepidity  of 
vigorous  youth.    Dewey,  Sampson,  and  Schley;  Miles,  Shafter,  Wheeler, 
and  Merritt;  these  were  seasoned  veterans  of  a  previous  war  who  proved 
to  be  young  enough  to   carry  a  world-covering  war  impetuously  to  a 

(380) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  ;;sl 

triumphant  close  in  a  little  more  than  a  hundred  days.  There  were 
young  heroes,  but  they  were  not  commanders.  There  were  Hobson  and 
Blue  and  Gridley,  and  in  the  ranks  hundreds  of  young  men  of  the 
stuff  of  which  great  leaders  are  made. 


ii. 

ADMIRAL  GEORGE  DEWEY'S  conduct  in  battle  and  blockade,  his  un 
flinching  courage  and  coolness  amidst  the  encompassing  perils  of  diplo 
matic  treachery  and  the  ceaseless  provocations  of  the    ADMIRAL 
German  fleet  at  Manila,  made  him  the  undisputed  hero       GEORGE  DEWEY 
of  the  war,  and  will  give  him  brilliant  and  lasting  fame 
in  history.     As  has  been  recorded  elsewhere,  he  is  of  good   Puritan 
stock,  of  the  strong  and  persistent  old  Dewey  family  of  Vermont,  the 
members  of  which   have  been  successful   in   professions,   scholarship, 
business,  and   finance,   for  generations.     The   Admiral's   brothers  are 
excellent  representatives  of  the  family  traits,  as  were  their  father  and 
their  grandfather.     It  is  a  typical  American  family  of  moderate  com 
petence,  plain  habits,  and  strong  nature.     It  is  a  stock  worthy  to  have 
produced  Admiral  Dewey. 

Nobody  has  ever  written  better  history  than  Plutarch  and  Herod 
otus,  and  they  wrote  theirs  in  anecdote.  The  earliest  anecdote  we 
have  of  Admiral  Dewey  is  related  by  Major  Pangborn,  for  many  years 
a  well-known  journalist  in  New  Jersey,  but  who  was  in  early  life  a 
school-teacher.  Upon  graduating  from  college  he  undertook  the  man 
agement  of  a  district  school,  at  Montpelier,  that  had  been  in  rebel 
lion  against  all  teachers  for  some  time.  Young  Dewey  was  the  ring 
leader  of  the  "irreconcilables."  At  the  head  of  his  boyish  insurgents 
he  had  driven  away  several  teachers,  and  had  stood  one  on  his  head 
in  a  snowbank.  The  school  seemed  unmanageable. 

When  Major  Pangborn  appeared  on  the  first  day  of  the  new  session, 
the  first  scene  that  met  his  eyes  was  young  Dewey,  perched  up  in  a 
tree,  throwing  stones  at  small  boys.  The  teacher  ordered  him  to  come 
down.  Dewey's  reply  was  that  the  teacher  could  himself  go  down 


382  HISTORY   OF    THE 

to  a  certain  tropical  climate  unmentionable,  and  he  remained  in  the 
tree.  School  went  on  smoothly  that  day,  but  there  were  indications 
that  trouble  was  coming.  The  teacher  provided  himself  with  a  nice 
rawhide  whip,  which  he  tucked  away  over  the  door,  and  then  placed 
several  sticks  of  good  hickory  on  the  top  of  the  pile  in  the  old  wood- 
box. 

Next  day  another  boy  who  was  disorderly  was  told  to  take  his 
seat.  He  did  so,  and  seven  of  the  big  boys  joined  him  on  his  bench. 
Then  Dewey  stepped  up  and  coolly  informed  the  teacher  that  they 
were  "going  to  give  him  the  best  licking  he  ever  had." 

"  Go  to  your  seat ! "  commanded  the  teacher,  who  was  not  so  big 
physically  as  either  of  the  two  boys  mentioned. 

Dewey  struck  out,  and  the  next  instant  the  rawhide  was  playing 
catch-and-go  all  over  him.  The  other  "  biggest  boy  "  entered  the  fight, 
and  was  promptly  laid  low  by  a  blow  from  one  of  the  hickories. 

Dewey  by  this  time  was  lying  on  the  floor,  howling  with  pain,  but 
sensibly  ready  to  make  peace.  The  other  boy  was  unconscious.  Major 
Pangborn  had  quelled  the  mutiny  and  conquered  the  school.  He 
took  Dewey  home  to  his  father,  and  reported  that  he  had  brought 
him  his  son,  "somewhat  the  worse  for  wear,  but  ready  for  school 
work." 

"  Thank  you,"  replied  Dr.  Dewey  ;  "  I  think  George  will  not  give 
you  any  more  trouble.  He  will  be  at  school  to-morrow." 

The  father  of  the  other  boy  tried  to  get  a  warrant  for  the  arrest 
of  the  schoolmaster,  but  there  was  not  a  magistrate  in  the  county 
who  would  issue  one.  They  agreed  that  if  anybody  had  been  found 
who  could  govern  that  school,  he  was  the  man  for  the  place. 

Young  Dewey  remained  at  school.  He  soon  became  a  good  scholar, 
and,  under  his  friend's  tuition,  fitted  for  the  Annapolis  Academy. 
Years  after  these  events  he  often  visited  Major  Pangborn  at  his  home 
in  Boston.  On  one  of  these  visits,  Dewey,  then  a  naval  lieutenant, 
said  to  him:  "I  shall  never  cease  to  be  grateful  to  you.  You  made 
a  man  of  me.  But  for  that  thrashing  you  gave  me  I  should  proba 
bly  now  be  of  very  little  account."  The  swiftness  and  irresistible 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  383 

force  of  Major  Pangborn's  attack  may  have  had  its  influence  upon 
the  famous  pupil  at  Manila. 

Dewey  was  a  Lieutenant  in  the  Federal  navy  during  the  Civil  War, 
and  during  that  period  received  the  actual  training  for  hostile  opera 
tions  that  he  could  not  exhibit  until  thirty-three  years  later,  lie  was 
on  the  Mississippi  when  New  Orleans  was  captured.  The  vessel  sank 
the  Confederate  ram  Manassas,  and  met  the  same  fate  shortly  after. 
In  attempting  to  run  past  the  batteries  at  Port  Hudson,  March  15, 
1863,  she  was  thrown  aground  by  an  accident  to  the  leading  ship. 
The  batteries  had  her  under  direct  range  and  riddled  her  with  shot. 
Seeing  that  the  ship  could  not  be  saved,  her  commander  ordered  the 
crew  to  abandon  her.  Captain  Smith  and  his  chief  subordinate,  Lieu 
tenant  Dewey,  displayed  true  courage  throughout,  and  were  the  last 
to  leave  the  ship.  "It  is  in  such  trying  moments,"  said  Admiral 
Porter,  in  his  official  report,  "that  men  show  of  what  mettle  they  are 
made,  and  in  this  instance  the  mettle  was  of  the  best."  But  there 
was  more  than  "mettle"  in  Dewey.  One  of  the  crew  of  the  Missis 
sippi  called  attention  to  one  incident  that  he  believed  was  an  inno 
vation  iii  fighting  a  man-of-war  at  night.  "Dewey  gave  orders,"  he 
said,  "before  we  went  into  action,  that  the  decks  of  the  Mississipjti 
should  be  whitewashed  (see  the  smartness) ;  that  gave  the  guns'  crews 
a  chance  to  see  the  running  gear  of  the  guns  —  8-inch.  It  was  all 
lights  out  that  night." 

He  was  with  Farragut  at  Mobile,  and  bore  himself  always  with  per 
fect  courage  and  quiet  modesty. 

After  the  war,  there  came  thirty-three  years  of  humdrum  duty, 
which  tires  the  temper  and  nature  of  men  more  than  dangerous  action. 
In  the  navy  he  was  greatly  admired  by  his  men;  and  his  common 
sense,  natural  sense  of  justice  and  fairness  "between  man  and  man," 
won  their  affection.  He  was  always  kindly  to  the  sailors  "  forward," 
and  it  was  said  of  him  that  he  could  get  along  with  any  man  except 
a  liar.  He  could  see  or  hear  what  he  thought  he  ought  to  see 
and  hear,  but  was  generally  unobservant  of  petty,  natural  irregulari 
ties. 


384  HISTORY   OF   THE 

Here  are  some  newspaper  anecdotes  of  him  taken  from  the  gos 
sip  that  followed  his  victory  at  Manila,  which  convey  a  sense  of 
personal  portraiture  of  a  man  such  as  Dewey  of  Manila  might 
naturally  be :  — 

"Dewey  is  a  man  with  big,  piercing  eyes,"  said  a  messenger  in  the 
Navy  Department,  at  Washington,  who  made  a  cruise  with  him.  "He's 
what  I'd  call  a  little  fellow  as  to  height,  but  he  surely  looked  bigger'n  a 
Dutch  frigate  when  he  stood  on  his  side  of  the  mast  and  you  were  up  in 
front  of  him.  But  he  was  a  tender-hearted  man  on  the  cruise  when  he 
and  I  were  shipmates.  He'd  try  not  to  see  or  hear  things  that  he  didn't 
want  to  see  or  hear.  None  of  us  knew  him,  '  up  forward,'  I  mean  as  a 
commander.  Some  of  us  had  been  shipmates  with  him  when  he  was  a 
deck  officer,  and  had  never  got  the  worst  of  it  at  his  hands.  But  we 
weren't  sure  how  he'd  stack  up  as  a  skipper.  We  weren't  long  in 
finding  out.  We  had  to  sailorize  all  right,  but  there  wasn't  much 
brigging  with  Dewey.  He  didn't  like  to  see  a  man  in  double  irons 
on  his  tours  of  inspection.  We  hadn't  been  to  sea  with  him  very  long 
before  we  got  next  to  how  he  despised  a  liar.  One  of  the  petty  officers 
went  ashore  at  Gibraltar,  got  mixed  up  with  the  soldiers  in  the  canteens 
up  on  the  hill  and  came  off  to  the  ship  paralyzed  with  drink.  He  went 
before  Dewey  at  the  mast  next  morning,  and  gave  him  the  '  two-beers- 
and-sunstruck '  yarn. 

'"You're  lying,  my  man,'  said  Dewey.  'You  were  very  drunk.  I, 
myself,  heard  you  aft  in  my  cabin.  I  will  not  have  my  men  lie  to  me. 
I  don't  expect  to  find  total  abstinence  in  a  man-of-war  crew.  But  I  do 
expect  them  to  tell  me  the  truth,  and  I  am  going  to  have  them  tell 
me  the  truth.  Had  you  told  me  candidly  that  you  took  the  drop  too 
much  on  your  liberty,  you'd  have  been  forward  by  this  time,  for  you 
at  least  returned  to  the  ship.  For  lying,  you  get  ten  days  in  irons. 
Let  me  have  the  truth  hereafter.  I  am  told  you  are  a  good  seaman. 
A  good  seaman  has  no  business  lying.' 

"After  that  there  were  few  men  aboard  who  didn't  throw  them 
selves  on  the  mercy  of  the  court,  and  none  of  us  ever  lost  anything 
by  it.  He'd  have  to  punish  us  in  accordance  with  regulations,  but  he 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  ;;s;, 

had  a  great  way  of  ordering  the  release  of  men  he  had  to  sentence 
before  their  sentences  were  half  worked  out. 

"Dewey  was  the  best  liberty-granting  skipper  I  was  ever  ship 
mates  with.  He  hated  to  keep  quarantined  men  aboard  when  the 
good-conduct  men  were  flocking  off  to  the  beach.  One  fine  Christmas 
day  in  Genoa  harbor  all  the  men  entitled  to  shore  liberty  lined  up  at  ten 
o'clock  in  the  morning  to  answer  muster  before  taking  the  running 
boats  for  the  shore.  There  were  about  forty  of  us,  myself  among  the 
number,  who  were  quarantined  aboard  for  having  raised  Cain  ashore, 


How  DEWEY  WON  AT  MANILA. —  A  veracious  newspaper  of  Ross  County,  Ohio,  published 
an  explanation  of  the  battle  of  Manila  that  may  prove  of  interest  to  those  who  are  not 
experts  in  naval  tactics  and  construction.  "  On  Saturday  night."  said  this  veracious  his 
torian,  "John  Bridges's  store  was  crowded  with  men  who  wanted  to  hear  a  description  of 
the  battle,  by  Daniel  Doble,  and  an  explanation  of  some  things  that  were  not  under 
stood. 

"  Whut  I  can't  git  through  my  noodle,"  said  Pontius  Anderson,  "  is  how  none  o'  th' 
Spanish  cannon  balls  didn't  go  right  through  our  boats  jest  th'  same  as  our  balls  went 
through  theirn. 

"Simple  enough,"  said  Daniel  Doble,  "'cause  our  boats  is  made  o'  soft  metal  an' 
theirn's  made  o'  brittle.  Ev'ry  time  old  Dewey  hit  a  Spanish  boat  her  sides  cracked  jest 
like  they  wuz  glass,  but  when  a  ball  hit  Dewey's  it  was  diffrunt.  Th'  metal  bein'  soft, 
it  closed  over  th'  balls  when  they  struck,  not  leavin'  a  hole,  jest  th'  same  uz  ef  you  threw 
a  marble  int'  a  pan  o'  dough. 

"  Them  Spaniards  is  sharp,  though,  an'  they  ketched  ont'  th'  thing,  an'  ef  they'd 
ketched  on  sooner  mebby  Dewey'd  had  a  hard  time.  They  seen  th't  soft  metal  was  th' 
best,  so  they  het  up  their  boat,  th'  last  one  they  had.  Th'  hotter  it  got  th'  better  it  wuz, 
an'  they  het  'er  way  up.  Old  Dewey  seen  th'  balls  frum  his  boats  wuzn't  doin'  no  hurt, 
an'  he  seen  th'  trick,  so  he  yelled  out  t'his  Captains,  "  Don't  shoot  nothin'  but  heavy  balls ! " 
They  kept  pepperin'  away  with  big  balls  till  th'  Spanish  boat  wuz  so  full  o'  lead  she  sunk 
uv'er  own  weight. 

"  Them  Vermont  fellers  is  great  fer  tricks,  I  tell  you.  Dewey's  sailors  waded  t'  shore 
an'  got  in  single  rank,  Indian  file.  Th'  Spanish  Gen'ral  seen  whut  Dewey  wuz  doin'  an' 
he  sez  :  '  Whut's  good  fer  Yanks  is  good  fer  Spanish,'  an'  he  drawed  his  men  up  in  In 
dian  file  th'  same  way.  Thet  was  jest  whut  old  Dewey  was  waitin'  fer;  there  was  twixt 
twelve  an'  fifteen  thousan'  Spaniards,  an'  they  made  a  line  more'n  six  miles  long.  '  Fire!' 
sez  Dewey,  when  he  seen  'em,  an'  bang  went  'is  gun,  th'  biggest  one  he  had  with  Mm,  one 
th't  carried  twelve  miles.  Thet  ball  went  chasin'  down  the  line,  knockin'  them  Spaniards 
over  like  they  was  tenpins.  Th'  first  three  seconds  a  mile  o'  Spaniards  fell.  Th'  heads 
was  knocked  clean  off' n  ev'ry  one  o'  them.  Course  th'  ball  was  gittin'  weaker  ev'ry  min 
ute,  an'  when  it  struck  th'  second  mile  it  had  drapped  till  it  ketched  'em  in  necks.  Th'  third 
mile  o'  Spaniards  got  hit  in  th'  breast,  an'  th'  fourth  mile  right  in  th'  stummicks.  Then 
th'  Spanish  seen  whut  was  goin'  on,  an'  they  begun  t'  drap  t'  th'  ground,  but  it  didn't  do 
no  good,  fer  th'  ball  wuz  gittin'  spent  an'  drapped  too.  It  mowed  down  close  an*  killed 
ev'ry  Spaniard  leader'n  a  last  year's  bird's  nest,  whereas,  ef  they  hadn't  drapped  they'd 
only  lost  their  legs  an'  feet." 
25 


386  HISTORY   OF   THE 

in  Nice,  a  few  weeks  before.  Our  quarantine  was  for  three  months, 
and  it  wasn't  half  run  out  on  this  Christmas  day.  Dewey  stood  at  the 
break  of  the  poop,  with  his  hands  on  his  hips,  watching  the  liberty  party 
line  up.  We  fellows  that  couldn't  go  were  standing  around  the  gang 
way,  smoking  our  pipes,  and  looking  pretty  down  in  the  mouth,  I  guess. 
The  big  liberty  party — there  were  a  couple  of  hundred  men  in  the 
batch — finally  got  away,  and  the  ship  was  practically  deserted,  except 
for  us  quarantined  fellows.  Dewey  watched  us  for  a  while  out  of  the 
tail  of  his  eye.  We  were  leaning  over  the  side,  watching  the  receding 
running  boats  with  the  big  liberty  party.  Dewey  went  up  on  the  poop 
and  walked  up  and  down,  chewing  his  mustache,  and  every  once  in  a 
while  shooting  a  look  at  us  men  up  forward.  Finally,  he  walked  down 
the  poop  ladder  and  straight  forward  to  where  we  were  grouped. 

" '  You,  boys,  hop  into  your  mustering  clothes  and  go  on  off  to  the 
beach.  I'll  let  you  have  a  couple  of  the  running  boats  when  they 
return.  Come  back  with  the  other  men  when  you  get  ready.  Don't 
raise  any  more  trouble  ashore  than  you  can  help.' 

"There  wasn't  a  man  in  the  gang  of  us  that  didn't  want  to  hug 
little  Dewey  for  that,  and  you  can  gamble  that  we  gave  him  a  '  cheer 
ship '  that  rang  around  the  harbor  of  Genoa.  We  all  got  marked  in  the 
log  as  'clean  and  sober,'  too,  when  we  got  back  to  the  ship,  for  we 
weren't  going  to  do  any  cutting  up  on  Dewey  after  the  way  he'd 
treated  us." 

From  a  bandmaster  on  board  the  Pensacola,  in  1887,  when  she  was 
lying  at  Manila,  with  Dewey  in  command,  comes  another  anecdote 
illustrating  the  same  quiet  trait  of  kindliness  for  his  men  and  the 
dauntless  patriotic  courage  displayed  in  his  attitude  toward  Prince 
Henry  of  Prussia,  for  discourtesy  to  the  United  States.  While  the 
Pensacola  gunboat  was  at  Manila,  a  number  of  sailors  went  on  shore 
and  engaged  in  a  street  brawl.  An  alarm  was  turned  in,  but  *  the 
sailors  succeeded  in  escaping  to  their  ships.  The  next  morning  the 
Spanish  Captain  of  the  port  came  out  to  the  Pensacola  to  complain  to 
Captain  Dewey  of  the  action  of  his  sailors. 

"What  can  I  do?"  asked  Dewey. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  :;s; 

"Why,  your  men  raised  a  riot  on  shore,  and  you  can  assist  me  in 
arresting  and  punishing  them,"  was  the  reply. 

The  American  Captain  was  very  courteous  in  the  expression  of 
regret  that  sailors  of  the  Pensacola  should  be  lawless  while  on  shore 
leave,  but  could  see  no  way  in  which  he  might  assist  his  visitor  in 
searching  out  the  guilty  ones. 

The  reply  of  Dewey  angered  the  port  Captain,  who  said,  somewhat 
peremptorily:  "You  certainly  can  parade  your  crew  before  me,  in  order 
that  the  rioters  may  be  identified." 

Looking  aloft,  and  pointing  to  the  Stars  and  Stripes  waving  at 
the  masthead,  Dewey  made  reply:  "The  deck  of  this  vessel  is  United 
States  territory,  and  I'll  parade  my  men  for  no  foreigner  that  ever 
drew  breath." 

The  man  described  in  these  anecdotes,  from  boyhood  to  maturity, 
can  be  easily  understood  in  the  incident  attending  the  fate  of  Cap 
tain  C.  V.  Gridley  of  the  Olywpia,  who  went  into  action  at  Manila  a 
sick  man,  and  died  a  month  later.  Before  the  squadron  sailed,  every 
officer  and  man  was  examined  as  usual  for  his  physical  fitness.  The 
surgeons  "condemned"  Captain  Gridley,  who  was  in  very  poor  health. 
Commander  Lamberton  was  assigned  to  his  place,  but  Captain  Grid- 
ley  pleaded  with  Dewey  against  being  relieved  on  the  eve  of  battle. 
He  succeeded,  and  Lamberton  was  made  Chief-of-Staff  to  the  Admiral. 
When  the  battle  opened  Captain  Gridley  wanted  to  stay  on  the  bridge 
with  Dewey,  but  the  Admiral  ordered  him  to  the  safer  position  in  the 
conning  tower,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  inexcusable  if  both 
commanders  of  the  ship  should  be  killed.  And  Dewey  remained  on 
the  bridge,  while,  from  the  conning  towrer,  Gridley  fought  ship  for  the 
last  time,  and  came  home  a  corpse,  but  leaving  a  splendid  memory 
to  his  family  and  his  country. 

The  part  that  good  fortune  plays  in  the  lives  of  the  best  of  men 
is  well  illustrated  in  Admiral  Dewey's  service  record.  When  the  irrec 
oncilable  differences  with  Spain  were  growing  rapidly,  the  command 
of  the  Asiatic  squadron  lay  between  Commodore  Howell  and  (then) 
Commodore  Dewey.  Both  made  efforts  to  avoid  selection  for  the  good 


388  HISTORY   OF   THE 

professional  reason  that  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  Cuban  waters  seemed 
to  offer  the  best  opportunities  for  service  in  war.  Commodore  How- 
ell,  by  seniority,  received  the  command  of  the  European  station,  and 
Dewey  went  unwillingly  to  Hong  Kong.  It  was  difficult  to  secure  a 
staff  to  accompany  him,  not  because  officers  were  not  glad  to  serve 
under  him,  but  because  the  service  was  believed  to  be  out  of  the 
way  of  glory.  But,  once  there,  Dewey  saw  the  importance  of  seizing 
and  holding  Manila,  and,  with  one  blow  won  immortality,  and  with  a 
second  closed  the  war  so  gloriously  begun. 

It  is  also  interesting  to  know  that  a  man  of  such  kindly,  firm,  and 
sensible  character,  who  endears  himself  to  rough  sailors  and  the  great 
world  alike,  does  not  look  the  portrait  drawn.  Never  did  so  daunt 
less  a  fighter  look  less  one;  never  did  such  a  sailor's  "shipmate" 
look  so  unlike  one.  Naval  officers,  spending  much  time  abroad,  where 
the  details  of  uniform  dress,  of  scrupulous  observance  of  etiquette, 
and  niceties  of  manner  and  address  are  official  formulas,  have  been 
looked  upon  as  smartly-dressed  idlers,  mainly  of  that  much-abused 
yet  harmless  type  of  man  described  as  a  "dude."  But  Dewey,  in  re 
spect  to  his  apparel,  his  precise  manners  and  scrupulous  perfection 
of  address  and  ';  good  form,"  was  the  dude  of  dudes.  One  who  writes 
of  him  as  from  personal  knowledge,*  says :  "  In  person  Dewey  is  not 
the  naval  hero  of  popular  imagination.  He  is  slight,  of  medium 
height,  with  finely  chiseled  face,  and  hair  sprinkled  with  gray,  while 
his  firmly  set  lips  and  clear  eye  would  mark  him  as  a  gentleman  and 
a  man  of  the  world.  While  in  service  at  Washington  he  was  a  club 
man  and  fond  of  society,  one  of  those  who  rarely  appeared  after  din 
ner  except  in  evening  dress;  just  the  kind  of  a  fellow,  in  short,  that 
the  agitator  has  in  mind  when  he  inveighs  against  the  'dudes'  of 
the  navy  who  are  pensioned  on  the  government  and  haunt  the  draw 
ing-rooms  of  the  capital.  He  is  quiet  in  manner,  sparing  and  incisive 
in  speech,  courteous  in  bearing,  and  decisive  in  action.  In  all  these 
qualities  he  does  not  differ  greatly  from  other  naval  officers  who  have 


L.  A.  Coolidge,  McClure's  Magazine,  June,  1898. 


REAR-ADMIRAL  W.  T.  SAMPSON,  U.  S.  N. 


SPANISH    AMKRICAN     NVAH  ;;s<) 

been  trained  in  the  same  school."     It  is  said  of  him  that  in  the  Civil 
War  he  always  went  into  action  in  full  dress,  wearing  kid  gloves. 

Finally,  it  must  be  said,  that  he  was  sixty-one  when  he  became  so 
famous ;  that  he  deserved  his  fame  by  his  work ;  that  he  bore  it  with 
modesty ;  and  to  such  men  Americans  yield  unstinted  honor  and 
admiration. 

in. 

REAR-ADMIRAL  WILLIAM  T.  SAMPSON,  who  stepped  from  a  Captaincy 
to  his  Rear-Admiralship  at  Santiago,  is  the  son  of  a  small  farmer 
of  New  York,  and  was  entered  at  Annapolis  Academy 
and  maintained  by  the  sacrifices  of  his  father — sacri-  SON  OF  SANTI- 
tices  most  nobly  justified  and  rewarded  in  the  character 
and  achievements  of  the  son.  He  was  graduated  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Civil  War,  and  was  a  Lieutenant  when  the  war  ended.  He  was 
second  officer  on  the  monitor  Patapsco,  when  that  vessel  was  blown  up 
by  a  torpedo  in  January,  1865,  in  Charleston  harbor.  He  was  com 
mended  by  his  superior  officer  as  deserving  "  highest  praise "  for  his 
''  cool  intrepidity."  He  has  been  known  in  the  navy  as  a  thorough 
master  of  ordnance,  possessing  the  highest  executive  capacity,  great 
courage,  and  patience.  He  is  described  as  being  a  serious  and  stern 
man,  lacking  in  suavity  and  therefore  in  popularity;  but,  as  all  naval 
officers  usually  are,  a  gentleman,  unassuming,  and  possessing  sagacity 
and  excellent  judgment.  He  was  always  scrupulous  to  avoid  mere 
courtesy  honors,  and  while  a  bureau  chief  in  the  Navy  Department 
(in  the  temporary  occupancy  of  which  every  officer  is  usually  ad 
dressed  as  "  Commodore " )  he  was  careful  to  remind  callers  that  he 
was  a  captain  only  and  preferred  to  be  so  addressed.  It  was  such 
accurate  distinction  between  fact  and  figment  that  gave  to 'his  insist 
ence  that  it  was  the  fleet  under  his  command  which  won  the  battle 
off  Santiago  the  immediate  support  of  all  high  authorities.  His  lack 
of  popularity  was  apparent  in  the  lack  of  responsive  applause,  but 
that  it  was  Sampson's  victory  will  be  the  undoubted  verdict  of  his 
tory. 


390  HISTORY   OF   THE 

IV. 

COMMODORE  (now  Rear- Admiral)  WINFIELD  SCOTT  SCHLEY,  command 
ing  the  Flying  Squadron,  whose  admirable  gallantry  in  the  battle  off 
ADMIRAL  SCHLEY      Santiago  was  conspicuous,  was  born  in  Maryland,  and 
OF  THE  FLYING      graduated  from  Annapolis   about  the  same  time  that 

SQUADRON  ,.,  .        ..         _..     „ 

Dewey  and  Sampson  did,  and  saw  service  in  the  Civil 
War.  His  intrepidity  and  dash  were  tested  in  many  engagements  and 
skirmishes,  and  he  became  known  as  an  officer  who  loved  fighting.  He 
is  one  of  the  few  who  have  seen  actual  service  between  1865  and  1895. 
He  was  Lieutenant-Commander  of  the  United  States  ship  Benicia  when, 
in  1871,  she  attacked  a  fort  on  Salee  River  in  Korea,  for  the  purpose 
of  chastising  the  Koreans  for  the  mistreatment  of  Americans.  In  1884 
he  was  commander  of  the  expedition  sent  to  the  Arctic  regions  to 
attempt  a  rescue  of  the  Greely  exploring  party.  The  selection  was 
determined  by  his  fearlessness  and  resourcefulness.  He  set  out  on 
one  day's  notice,  and  arrived  at  Sabine  Point  in  time  to  rescue  the 
seven  survivors,  who  would  have  been  dead  twenty-four  hours  later. 
He  was  also  in  Valparaiso  harbor,  Chili,  in  1891,  when  some  of  his 
sailors  ashore  were  set  upon  by  a  mob,  and  one  was  killed  and  five 
injured.  The  American  bluejackets  were  arrested,  and  Schley  de 
manded  their  release.  Upon  this  being  refused,  he  sent  word  to  the 
authorities  that  if  the  men  were  not  released  at  the  dock  within  a 
specified  time,  he  would  open  fire  on  the  city.  He  immediately  cleared 
decks  for  action,  and  notified  the  foreign  ships  of  his  purpose,  and 
requested  their  withdrawal  out  of  range.  It  is  a  coincidence  that  all 
but  the  Captain  of  a  German  war  vessel  promptly  complied.  The  Ger 
man  sent  the  surly  reply  that  he  would  not  move.  Schley  instantly 
returned  the  warning  that  if  his  demand  on  the  Valparaiso  authori 
ties  was  not  complied  with,  he  intended  to  bombard ;  that  there  re 
mained  less  than  an  hour  of  time,  and  if  the  German  chose  to  maintain 
his  position  he  was  at  liberty  to  do  so,  but  if  he  chanced  to  find  him 
self  between  the  American  and  the  shore  batteries  during  hostilities, 
he  must  be  prepared  to  accept  all  the  shots  that  the  position  might 


REAR-ADMIRAL  W.  S.  SCHLEY,  U.  S.  N. 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  :;<.)] 

render  it  necessary  to  stop.*  Then  the  German  moved  out;  and 
Schley's  bluejackets  were  returned  to  him  in  safety.  It  was  a  year 
later  that  some  Chilian  revolutionists  sought  refuge  on  the  Baltimore, 
Captain  Robley  D.  Evans's  ship,  at  Valparaiso.  There  were  three  Chil 
ian  men-of-war  in  the  harbor.  The  Admiral  came  on  board  the  Balti 
more,  and  notified  Captain  Evans  that  if  the  refugees  were  not  sur 
rendered,  his  three  ships  would  follow  the  Baltimore  out  of  the  harbor 
and  sink  her.  Captain  Evans  conveyed  the  warning  to  his  guests, 
and  told  them  to  decide  for  themselves — he  was  ready  to  protect  them 
at  all  hazards.  They  concluded  to  remain  with  him,  and  Captain 
Evans  so  informed  the  Chilian  Admiral,  adding  that  as  long  as  they 
chose  to  stay  he  would  protect  them. 

"Very  well,"  replied  the  Admiral ;  "your  ship  will  be  sunk  half  an 
hour  after  you  leave  the  harbor." 

"That  may  be  true,"  Captain  Evans  is  reported  to  have  calmly 
answered,  "  but  the  Baltimore  will  make  you  a  h-11  of  a  lot  of  trouble 
for  half  an  hour." 

And  he,  too,  had  his  way,  and  kept  his  refugees. 


v. 

To  MEASURE  out  the  merit  of  individuals  in  the  war  is  an  im 
possible  task,  but  among  the  men  who  went  in  unknown  to  the  public 
and  came  out  resplendent  in  heroism  for  duty  well  done,  OFFICERS  MEN 
Captain  Clark  of  the  Oregon  stands  boldly  out.  She  AND  GUNNERS 

,   .  .     .  .,  OF  THE  NAVY 

was  the  greatest  ship  of  the  seas,  the  best  sailer,  the 

hardest  fighter.     And  Captain  Clark  was  worthy  to  command  the  great 


*Dewey  sent  a  similar  message  to  Von  Diederichs  at  Manila,  requesting  the  Germans 
to  arrange  their  anchorage  in  such  manner  that  they  would  not  interfere  with  firing,  if 
necessary.  He  received  a  similarly  surly  answer,  to  which  Dewey  made  reply  that  it  was 
of  little  consequence  to  himself  if  the  Germans  got  in  the  way,  but  if  they  persisted  they 
must  expect  to  receive  all  shots,  accidental  or  otherwise,  that  the  Americans  might  find 
necessary  to  direct  assault,  if  one  were  made.  The  Germans  moved  away.  The  German 
people  are  most  courteous  and  kindly,  but  the  autocracy  created  by  militarism  has  made 
German  army  and  naval  officers  the  most  insolent  in  the  world.  They  usually  yield  to 
force  and  determination,  however. 


392  HISTORY   OF   THE 

vessel  whose  journey  of  15,000  miles  to  enter  battle  startled  the  world. 
Captain  Gridley  of  the  Olympia  is  another,  Captain  Evans  of  the  Iowa, 
Commodore  Phillip  of  the  Texas,  Lieutenant  Wainwright  of  the  Glouces 
ter,  Commander  Todd  of  the  Wilmington,  and  Lieutenant  Gleaves  of  the 
Gushing,  proved  to  be  men  of  independent  resources  and  undoubted 
bravery.  The  American  naval  officer  in  the  war  proved  to  be  a  man 
of  uniform  high  ability.  Not  one  turned  back  from  his  duty  or  evaded 
any  post  of  danger.  The  personnel  of  our  navy  is  to-day  not  surpassed 
in  any  navy  of  the  world.  And  the  men  behind  the  guns  were  the  best 
yet  shown  in  modern  naval  warfare. 

A  month  after  Manila  the  world  was  amused  by  an  article  in  an 
English  review,  from  the  pen  of  a  member  of  Parliament  more  cele 
brated  for  sensational  eccentricities  of  opinion  than  for  good  sense, 
in  which  the  assertion  was  made  that  Dewey's  ships  were  manned  with 
English  gunners  who  were  promised  five  hundred  dollars  per  month 
each  to  enlist,  because  American  gunners  were  notoriously  incompe 
tent.  The  Navy  Department  gave  out  an  analysis  of  the  muster  rolls 
showing  that  there  were  but  eight  English-born  men  on  Dewey's  ships, 
and  not  one  a  gunner.  Further,  that  the  muster  roll  of  the  sailors  of 
the  American  navy  proved  that  ninety-five  per  cent.  wrere  native-born 
Americans.  The'  writer  of  the  article  seemed  to  be  entirely  ignorant 
of  the  fact  that  in  every  sea  fight  between  America  and  England,  the 
Yankee  had  proved  to  be  superior  to  his  British  cousin  in  marksman 
ship. 

Writers  on  the  subject  attribute  our  superiority  to  target  practice, 
of  which  the  American  gunner  gets  more  than  in  any  other  navy.  Two 
kinds  of  target  practice  are  required,  sea  practice  and  record  practice. 
Sea  practice  is  carried  on  six  times  each  year  and  record  practice  once. 
Every  vessel  is  required  to  carry  out  these  instructions.  This  refers  to 
normal  times,  for  in  the  past  year  there  has  been  three  times  the 
amount  of  target  practice  called  for.  This  was  because  the  government 
anticipated  trouble  with  Spain.  For  purposes  of  sea  practice  a  regu 
lation  target,  anchored  or  not,  or  any  suitable  mark  not  smaller  than 
a  regulation  target,  may  be  used.  Target  practice  may  range  between 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAll  J^J 

eight  hundred  yards  and  three  thousand  yards  or  even  higher,  but  is 
seldom  beyond  three  thousand  yards,  and  it  is  required  that  the  speed  of 
the  ship  shall  not  be  less  than  eight  knots  when  her  batteries  are  open 
ing  fire.  Sea  practice  is  intended  to  simulate  as  nearly  as  practicable 
the  conditions  of  actual  battle,  and  the  work  of  observing  the  fall  of 
shots  is  not  allowed  to  interfere  unduly  with  a  spirited  and  continuous 
fire.  The  ships  are  stripped,  battle  hatches  are  down,  and  sometimes 
forced  draught  is  put  on  in  order  to  simulate  a  chase,  during  which 
the  batteries  of  some  vessel  are  opened  at  the  little  target.  At  night 
there  is  frequently  target  practice  with  the  aid  of  searchlights,  but  this 
is  required  only  once  a  year. 

At  two  sea  practices  annually  the  ship  is  cleared  for  action,  and 
the  men  stationed  as  in  actual  battle,  wTith  necessary  officers,  aids,  and 
quartermasters  in  conning  tower,  and  all  other  officers  at  their  stations. 
Ammunition  is  supplied  in  the  manner  that  would  actually  be  necessary 
in  battle,  and,  except  in  case  of  emergency,  orders  are  given  by  the 
means  that  would  be  employed  in  battle.  Inducements,  in  the  shape 
of  prizes,  are  offered  by  the  department  to  enlisted  men  to  become 
expert  gunners.  In  proportion  to  the  extent  of  the  navy  the  United 
States  spends  more  money  annually  on  target  practice  than  any  other 
service.  Great  Britain  devotes  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  it,  but 
France  and  Germany  give  comparatively  little.  The  Spanish  have 
never  spent  much  time  at  target  practice  because,  their  officers  said, 
"  it  was  simply  throwing  money  in  the  sea."  But  their  real  shooting 
threw  a  great  deal  more  "into  the  sea." 


CHAPTER  THE   TWENTY-NINTH. 
FIGHTING  LEADERS  OF  THE  ARMY. 

THE  ALMOST   ROMANTIC  CAREER  OK   GENERAL   NELSON  A.   MILES,    COMMANDING  THE  ARMY- 

FROM    A    LIEUTENANT   AT    TWENTY-TWO    TO  A   MAJOR-GENERAL    AT    TWENTY-FIVE  — 

GENERAL  MERRITT'S  RAPID  RISE  IN  THE  CAVALRY  ARM  AT  THE  SAME  TIME  — 

'  THE    SOLDIERS    OF    THE   ARMY    AS    DESCRIBED    BY    FOREIGNERS  —  A 

VIVID  DESCRIPTION    OF  THE  CHARGE  AT  SAN  JUAN  —  THE 

LONDON  "TiMEs's"  DESCRIPTION    OF   OUR    MEN. 


THE  biography  of  Major-General   Nelson  A.  Miles,  commanding 
the  army  of  the  United  States,  when  it  shall  be  written,  will 
be  one  as  striking  as  a  page  of  romance.     Especially  so  will 
it  be  to  Americans,  who  honor  their  free  institutions,  because 
they  provide  no  royal  road  to  success,  but  maintain  a  free  highway 
along  which   natural  capacity  may  find   its  way  to  all  the   honor  it 
can  achieve.    General  Miles's  life  is  the  romance  of  free 
MILES,  COM-        democracy.    When  the  Civil  War  began  Nelson  A.  Miles 


was  a  clerk   in   a   Boston   business   house,  and  twenty- 


MANDING 

r 

two  years  old.  At  his  own  expense  he  recruited  a  com 
pany  of  volunteers,  and  offered  their  services  to  the  government. 
The  offer  was  accepted,  but  he  was  thought  too  young  to  be  com 
missioned  as  their  Captain,  and  was,  instead,  appointed  a  Lieutenant. 
Without  protest  he  went  to  the  front  in  that  capacity.  In  three 
months  the  Lieutenant  of  twenty-two  was  Colonel  of  a  regiment,  a 
post  he  had  won  by  gallantry  and  capacity ;  in  three  years  the  young 
man,  then  twenty-five,  was  Major-General,  commanding  a  corps  of 
25,000  men,  forming  part  of  the  line  besieging  Richmond,  and  it  was 
to  him  that  General  Lee  communicated  his  purpose  to  arrange  for  a 
surrender  of  the  Confederate  forces. 

(394) 


MAJOR-GENERAL    NELSON   A.  MILES 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH  AMERICAN     WAR  ;](J5 

General  Miles  was  not  a  West  Point  graduate,  but  he  was  a  graduate 
of  the  university  of  experience — studied  in  the  tents  and  trenches  and 
demonstrated  his  problems  on  the  h'eld  of  battle.  In  the  Civil  War 
he  was  three  times  wounded,  four  times  brevetted  for  personal  bravery 
in  action.  He  had  fought  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  Jackson,  and  was  in 
every  battle  fought  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  one,  and  a  wound 
restrained  him  on  that  occasion.  In  every  action  he  distinguished 
himself  as  a  commander.  There  are  few  careers  more  suggestive  of 
the  glamour  of  romance  than  that  of  this  young  man  who  between  his 
twenty-second  and  twenty-fifth  year  was  rejected  as  a  Captain  because 
of  his  youth,  and  became  a  Major-General  of  the  largest  and  most  active 
army  corps  in  the  Richmond  campaign,  and  to  whom  the  fortune  of 
war  brought  the  offer  of  surrender  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Confederate  armies. 

After  the  war  was  over  General  Miles  was  transferred  to  the  regular 
army,  and  was  sent  to  what  was  then  the  Far  West,  to  subdue  the 
hostile  Indians.  There  he  earned  great  renown  as  "the  Indian  Fighter" 
against  the  Comanches,  Sioux,  Nez  Perces,  Apaches,  and  other  tribes, 
led  by  such  Chiefs  as  Sitting  Bull,  Crazy  Horse,  Spotted  Tail,  Chief 
Joseph,  and  Geronimo,  all  daring  fighters  and  skillful  in  tactics. 

No  man  in  the  army  of  the  United  States  has  won  and  deserved 
more  commissions  than  General  Miles.  They  represent  every  grade 
from  Lieutenant  of  Volunteers  to  Major-General  in  the  regular  estab 
lishment  commanding  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  He  has 
received  votes  of  thanks  of  four  legislatures,  State  and  Territorial. 
In  addition  to  a  congressional  medal  of  honor,  the  people  of  Arizona 
gave  him  a  jeweled  sword;  for  General  Miles  finally  subdued  the  Indian 
tribes  and  retired  them  to  their  reservations,  where  they  now  live  in 
peace  and  quiet,  whereas  they  had  been  a  continual  menace  to  our 
frontier  ever  since  the  settlement  of  the  West  began. 

General  Miles  has  been  called  "The  Winner  of  Bloodless  Victories." 
It  is  used  to  his  honor  by  those  who  know  him,  and  his  record  of 
preserving  the  life  and  health  of  his  troops,  and  in  derision  by  his 
enemies.  In  the  Cuban  invasion,  as  one  of  the  war  board,  he  insisted 


396  HISTORY    OF   THE 

upon  disregarding  the  mere  theatrical  idea  of  assaulting  Havana,  where 
great  loss  of  life  must  inevitably  follow,  and  proposed  the  Santiago 
campaign;  that  is,  he  suggested  the  southern  coast  as  the  most  healthful 
point  for  the  first  foothold  and  to  let  Havana  wait  for  a  cooler  and  more 
propitious  season.  These  tactics  he  pursued  in  Porto  Rico,  and  his 
orders  have  always  been  to  preserve  the  health  of  troops,  and  to  make 
war  by  the  tactics  that  will  result  in  least  sacrifice  of  life. 

He  is  a  member  of  the  International  Peace  Society  and,  like  all  good 
soldiers,  regards  war  as  the  last  resort  when  nothing  can  be  used  but 
force.  He  is  about  sixty  years  old,  a  gentleman  in  education,  manner, 
taste,  and  habit,  as  well  as  by  birth.  He  represented  the  United  States 
army  at  the  Jubilee  of  Victoria,  and  in  the  Greco-Turkish  War. 

Personally,  General  Miles  is  a  very  agreeable  and  unassuming  gen 
tleman;  as  an  officer  of  the  army  he  is  celebrated  for  his  careful  observ 
ance  of  appearances,  and  in  all  aspects  of  his  official  position  he  looks 
as  he  is  the  General  commanding  the  American  army. 


n. 

A  GRADUATE  of  West  Point  Military  Academy,  Major-General  Wesley 

Merritt  was  distinguished  during   the  Civil  War  as  a  most  successful 

MAJOR  GENERAL       Ga.vsi\rj    leader.     He,    like    General    Miles,   became    a 

MERRITT,  MILI-      corps-commander  before  he  was  twenty-seven.    He  was 

TARY-GOVERNOR  .      ,„,         _ 

graduated  a  year  later  than  General  Joseph  Wheeler, 
and  the  two  men  were  on  opposing  sides  and  of  opposing  tempera 
ments.  General  Wheeler,  ardent,  fiery,  yet  tenacious,  quick  to  pursue 
advantage  or  to  retreat  from  error;  General  Merritt  cool,  contem 
plative,  and  working  out  the  problem  carefully  before  achieving  his 
task.  General  Merritt  served  with  Generals  Sheridan  and  Custer.  He 
has  won  all  his  honors  by  courage  and  ability,  and  possesses  the  tem 
perament  that  inspires  confidence  in  his  troops. 

It  was  the  possession  of  the  faculties  of  order,  fine  regulation, 
and  coolness  that  singled  him  out  to  command  the  Philippines'  army 
of  invasion,  and  to  be  Military  Governor  of  the  conquered  territory. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  WESLEY  MERRITT 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  H97 

For  the  same  reason  he  hud  hardly  secured  a  foothold  before  he  was 
instructed  to  proceed  to  Paris  to  advise  the  United  States  peace  com 
missioners  respecting  the  Filipinos  and  the  problems  of  government 
affecting  the  Philippine  Islands.  General  Merritt  was  about  sixty 
years  old  when  he  was  sent  on  these  important  missions. 


in 

AMONG  the  leaders  who  were  expected  to  fight  in  Cuba,  none  was 
more  conspicuous  than  Major-General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  of  Virginia,  who 
was  commissioned  to  command  the  seventh  army  corps 

OTHER    LEADERS 

at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  General  Lee  had  attracted  AND  THE  MEN 
national  attention  to  himself  by  the  courageous  manner 
in  which  he  bore  himself  toward  Captain-General  Weyler  and  after 
wards  toward  Captain-General  Blanco,  while  serving  as  Consul  General 
of  the  United  States  at  Havana.  A  graduate  of  West  Point  Academy, 
a  cavalry  leader  of  distinction  in  the  Confederate  army  during  the 
Civil  War,  a  member  of  Congress,  Governor  of  Virginia, —  he  had  borne 
distinguished  honors  with  credit  to  himself  and  his  State.  He  was 
appointed  Consul  General  by  President  Cleveland  and  had  so  empha 
sized  the  quality  of  his  ability  that  he  was  continued  at  the  post  by 
President  McKinley.  It  may  be  said,  in  fact,  that  General  Lee's  posi 
tion  at  Havana  transcended  in  importance  that  of  a  minister,  and  it 
was  his  open,  brave  and  determined  stand  that  put  an  end  to  the  op 
pression  laid  upon  American  citizens  in  Cuba.  It  was  intended  that 
General  Lee  should  lead  the  assault  against  the  city  of  Havana  in 
the  autumn ;  but  the  sudden  collapse  of  the  war,  following  upon  the 
splendid  actions  of  the  navy,  rendered  assault  upon  Havana  unneces 
sary.  There  could  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  if  opportunity  had  come 
to  him,  General  Lee  would  have  distinguished  himself  as  he  had  in  all 
other  positions  of  responsibility. 

Accounts  of  General  Shafter  and  General  Wheeler  have  been  given 
in  a  previous  chapter  on  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  as  well  as  of  other 


398  HISTORY    OF    THE 

brave  and  courageous  leaders,  such  as  Kent,  Hawkins,  Lawton,  Chaffee, 
Wood,  and  Roosevelt.  The  men  they  led  were  worthy  of  the  leaders. 
Descriptions  of  them  by  English  correspondents  will  be  interesting. 

A  correspondent  of  the  London  Daily  Mail,  who  witnessed  the 
charge  at  El  Caney,  thus  described  it:  "When  the  afternoon  came, —  I 
lost  exact  count  of  time, —  there  was  still  a  jumble  of  volleying  over 
by  Caney.  But  in  front  our  men  were  away  out  of  sight  behind  a 
ridge  far  ahead.  Beyond  there  arose  a  long,  steepish  ascent,  crowned 
by  the  blockhouse  upon  which  the  artillery  had  opened  fire  in  the 
morning. 

"Suddenly,  as  we  looked  through  our  glasses,  we  saw  a  little  black 
ant  go  scrambling  quickly  up  this  hill,  and  an  inch  or  two  behind 
him  a  ragged  line  of  other  little  ants,  and  then  another  line  of  ants 
at  another  part  of  the  hill,  and  then  another,  until  it  seemed  as  if 
somebody  had  dug  a  stick  into  a  great  ants'  nest  down  in  the  valley, 
and  all  the  ants  were  scrambling  away  up  hill.  Then  the  volley 
firing  began  ten  times  more  furiously  than  before ;  from  the  right 
beyond  the  top  of  the  ridge  burst  upon  the  ants  a  terrific  fire  of 
shells ;  from  the  blockhouse  in  front  of  them  machine  guns  sounded 
their  continuous  rattle.  But  the  ants  swept  up  the  hill.  They  seemed 
to  us  to  thin  out  as  they  went  forward  ;  but  they  still  went  forward. 
It  was  incredible,  but  it  was  grand.  The  boys  were  storming  the 
hill.  The  military  authorities  were  most  surprised.  They  were  not 
surprised  at  these  splendid  athletic  daredevils  of  ours  doing  it.  But 
that  a  military  commander  should  have  allowed  a  fortified  and  in 
trenched  position  to  be  assailed  by  an  infantry  charge  up  the  side  of 
a  long  exposed  hill,  swept  by  a  terrible  artillery  fire,  frightened  them, 
not  so  much  by  its  audacity  as  by  its  terrible  cost  in  human  life. 

"As  they  neared  the  top  the  different  lines  came  nearer  together. 
One  moment  they  went  a  little  more  slowly ;  then  they  nearly  stopped ; 
then  they  went  on  again  faster  than  ever,  and  then  all  of  us  sitting 
there  on  the  top  of  the  battery  cried  with  excitement.  For  the  ants 
were  scrambling  all  round  the  blockhouse  on  the  ridge,  and  in  a 
moment  or  two  we  saw  them  inside  it.  But  then  our  hearts  swelled 


• 


MAJOR-GENERAL  FITZHUGH    LEE 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  399 

up  into  our  throats,  for  a  fearful  fire  came  from  somewhere  beyond 
the  blockhouse  and  from  somewhere  to  the  right  of  it  and  somewhere 
to  the  left  of  it.  Then  we  saw  the  ants  come  scrambling  down  the 
hill  again.  They  had  taken  a  position  which  they  had  not  the  force 
to  hold.  But  a  moment  or  two  and  up  they  scrambled  again,  more  of 
them,  and  more  quickly  than  before,  and  up  the  other  face  of  the 
hill  to  the  left  went  other  lines,  and  the  ridge  was  taken,  and  the 
blockhouse  was  ours,  and  the  trenches  were  full  of  dead  Spaniards. 

"It  was  a  grand  achievement  —  for  the  soldiers  who  shared  it — 
this  storming  of  the  hill  leading  up  from  St.  Juan  River  to  the  ridge 
before  the  main  fort.  We  could  tell  so  much  at  2,560  yards.  But  we 
also  knew  that  it  had  cost  them  dearly." 

A  correspondent  of  the  London  Times  thus  described  the  American 
soldier's  outfit  as  compared  with  others:  — 

''In  the  way  of  clothing  the  American  private  carries  a  complete 
change  of  underdrawers,  undershirts,  socks,  laced  boots,  and  uniform 
trousers.  My  particular  private  was  carrying  a  double  allowance 
of  socks,  handkerchiefs,  and  underwear.  He  had  a  toothbrush  and 
comb.  That  is  the  heavy  marching  order  knapsack.  For  light 
marching,  which  is  the  usual  manner,  the  man  begins  by  spreading 
on  the  ground  his  half  tent,  which  is  about  half  the  size  of  a  travel 
ing  rug.  On  this  he  spreads  his  blanket,  rolls  it  up  tightly  into  a 
long,  narrow  sausage,  having  first  distributed  along  its  length  a  pair 
of  socks,  a  change  of  underwear,  and  the  two  sticks  of  his  one  tent 
pole.  Then  he  brings  the  ends  of  this  canvas  roll  together,  not 
closely,  as  in  the  German  army,  but  more  like  the  ends  of  a  horse 
shoe  held  by  a  rope,  which  at  the  same  time  stops  the  ends  of  the 
roll  tightly.  When  this  horseshoe  is  slung  over  the  man's  shoulder 
it  does  not  press  uncomfortably  upon  his  chest.  The  total  weight  is 
distributed  in  the  most  convenient  manner  for  marching. 

"The  packing  of  the  man's  things  is  strictly  according  to  regula 
tion,  excepting  only  the  single  pocket  in  his  knapsack,  where  he 
may  carry  what  he  chooses,  as  he  chooses.  His  light  canvas  haver 
sack  is  much  like  the  English  one,  and  his  round,  rather  flat  water 


400  HISTORY   OF   THE 

flask  is  covered  with  canvas.  It  is  made  of  tin.  and  the  one  I  in 
spected  was  rusty  inside.  It  would  be  better  if  of  aluminum.  In  the 
haversack  is  a  pannikin  with  a  hinged  handle  that  may  be  used  as  a 
saucepan.  Over  this  fits  a  tin  plate,  and  when  the  two  are  covering 
each  other  the  handle  of  the  pannikin  fits  over  both  by  way  of 
handle.  It  is  an  excellent  arrangement,  bat  should  be  of  aluminum 
instead  of  a  metal  liable  to  rust.  The  most  valuable  part  of  this 
haversack  is  a  big  tin  cup  that  can  be  used  for  a  great  variety  of 
purposes,  including  cooking  coffee.  It  is  hung  loose  at  the  strap  of 
the  haversack.  Of  course,  each  man  has  knife,  fork,  and  spoon,  each 
in  a  leather  case. 

"The  cartridge  belt  contains  one  hundred  rounds,  which  are  dis 
tributed  all  the  way  around  the  waist,  there  being  a  double  row  of 
them.  The  belt  is  remarkably  light,  being  woven  all  in  one  opera 
tion.  It  is  of  cotton  and  another  material,  which  prevents  shrinking 
or  loosening.  The  belts  have  stood  admirably  the  test  put  upon 
them  for  the  last  six  days,  when  it  has  rained  every  day,  on  top  of 
the  ordinary  heavy  moisture  usual  at  sea  in  the  tropics.  The  test  is 
the  more  interesting  from  their  having  been  previously  in  a  very 
dry  country.  Officers  and  men  alike  unite  in  praise  of  this  cartridge 
belt.  The  particular  private  whom  I  was  inspecting  said  he  now  car 
ried  one  hundred  as  easily  as  he  formerly  carried  fifty.  This  belt 
rests  loosely  on  the  hips,  without  any  straps  over  the  shoulders.  It 
is  eminently  business-like  in  appearance.  The  hat  is  the  gray  felt  of 
South  Africa,  Australia,  and  every  other  part  of  the  world  where 
comfort  and  cost  are  consulted.  No  boots  are  blacked  on  expedi 
tions  of  this  kind.  The  men  who  form  in  line  for  guard  duty  have 
their  tunics  well  brushed,  but  that  may  be  due  to  extraneous  assist 
ance. 

"For  fighting  purposes,  then,  the  United  States  private  has  noth 
ing  to  keep  clean  excepting  his  rifle  and  bayonet.  He  carries  no 
contrivances  for  polishing  buttons,  boots,  or  the  dozens  of  bits  of 
accoutrement  deemed  essential  to  a  good  soldier  in  Europe.  In 
Spain,  for  instance,  the  private,  though  he  may  have  nothing  in  his 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  401 

haversack,  will,  nevertheless,  carry  a  clumsy  outfit  of  tools  for  mak 
ing  his  uniform  look  imposing. 

"Now,  as  to  discipline  in  the  American  army,  I  cannot  speak  at 
present,  for  the  war  is  yet  too  young.  It  may,  however,  be  worth 
noting  that  in  this  particular  regiment,  while  most  complete  liberty 
was  allowed  the  men  all  the  twelve  days  of  the  rail  journey  from 
San  Francisco  to  Tampa,  not  a  single  case  of  drunkenness  or  any 
other  breach  of  discipline  was  reported.  Among  the  one  hundred 
and  five  men  on  this  boat  there  has  not  in  the  past  seven  days  been 
a  single  case  of  sickness  of  any  kind,  or  any  occasion  for  punish 
ing.  The  firing  discipline  during  the  three  times  we  have  been 
under  fire  has  been  excellent,  the  obedience  of  soldiers  to  their  of 
ficers  has  been  as  prompt  and  intelligent  as  anything  I  have  seen  in 
Europe;  and  as  to  coolness  under  fire  and  accuracy  of  aim,  what  I 
have  seen  is  most  satisfactory.  The  men  evidently  regard  their  offi 
cers  as  soldiers  of  equal  courage  and  superior  technical  knowledge. 
To  the  Yankee  private  'West  Pointer'  means  what  to  the  soldier 
of  Prussia  is  conveyed  by  noble  rank.  Tn  my  intimate  intercourse 
with  officers  and  men  aboard  this  ship  I  cannot  recall  an  instance 
of  an  officer  addressing  a  private  otherwise  than  is  usual  when  a 
gentleman  issues  an  order.  I  have  never  heard  an  officer  or  non 
commissioned  officer  curse  a  man.  During  the  engagement  of  Cabanas 
the  orders  were  issued  as  quietly  as  at  any  other  time,  and  the  men 
went  about  their  work  as  steadily  as  bluejackets  on  a  man-of-war." 


CHAPTER   THE    THIRTIETH. 
INTERESTING  FACTS  ABOUT  WAR. 

THE  NAVAL  LESSONS  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN.  AS  SUMMED  UP  BY  A  NAVAL  EXPERT — VALUE 
OF  ARMOR  AND  GUNS,  AND  THE  DANGER  OF  WOOD  —  TORPEDO  BOATS  PROVED  TO  BE  OF 
MUCH  LESS  EFFICIENCY  THAN  EXPECTED  —  ABOVE  ALL,  ONLY  THE  BEST  OF  MEN 
MUST  FORM  FIGHTING  CREWS  —  COST  OF  MANY  MODERN  WARS  IN  TREAS 
URE  AND  BLOOD  —  INDEMNITIES  PAID  BY  THE  CONQUERED  NATION. 

I.* 

THIS  battle  [of  Santiago]  will  be  accepted  by  some  naval  experts 
as  the  only  modern  one  that  can  be  counted  on  for  theoretical 
conclusions   of   value   to   the   builders   of  war  ships.      In  the 
Yalu  River  the  inequality  of  the  two  sides  in  character  caused 
students  to  hesitate  about  drawing  many  inferences  from   it.    It  is 
true  we  have  only  emphasized  the  Yalu  lessons  in  many  respects,  but 
I  think  we  can  go  ahead    with  the  two  together,  one 

NAVAL    LESSONS 

OF  THE  WAR       checking   the    other,  to   say   positively   that   we    have 

WITH   SPAIN  .  ... 

learned  something. 

To  go  back  a  bit,  the  ineffectiveness  of  a  fleet  against  land  batter 
ies  is  demonstrated,  I  think,  by  our  bombardment  of  San  Juan  and 
Santiago.  We  failed  to  reduce  their  works.  We  silenced  them  all 
right  enough.  As  we  gained  in  skill  we  were  able  to  drive  the  gun 
ners  away  very  quickly.  But  their  silence  was  only  temporary,  even 
when  the  batteries  were  weak  and  the  conditions  all  favorable  to  our 
ships ;  when  our  guns  numbered  twenty  to  one. 

Everybody  knows  by  this  time  that  the  batteries  guarding  Santi 
ago  harbor  are  on  the  bluffs,  some  of  them  two  hundred  feet  above 
the  water  line.  This  unquestionably  makes  them  harder  to  hit,  but 
it  likewise  increases  the  difficulty  of  their  aim.  We  found  out  the 


*The  entire  article  from  the  New  York  Commercial  Advertiser,  July  16,  1898,  by  an  officer 
of  the  battleship  Iowa. 
(402) 


HISTORY   OF   THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  4()3 

difference  in  the  latter  respect  when  the  same  gunners  (probably) 
came  out  in  the  ships.  The  first  broadside  from  Cervera's  squadron 
was  much  more  effective  than  the  fire  of  the  shore  batteries,  and  this, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  range  during  the  bombardment  was  often 
less  than  at  the  opening  of  the  sea  fight,  when  the  Spaniards  tired 
so  well. 

The  ability  of  a  watchful  and  efficient  fleet  to  ward  off  hostile 
torpedo  boats  has  been  fully  brought  out.  Here  we  have  remained 
for  months  blockading  a  port  in  which  there  were  always  two  tor 
pedo  boats.  Our  ships  lay  sometimes  as  close  in  as  a  mile  off  the 
entrance.  And  several  attempts  were  made  by  the  destroyers  to  attack 
us.  None  of  them  got  out  without  being  seen,  and  always  they  were 
driven  back.  Our  readiness  was  the  thing.  In  South  American  wars 
torpedo  attacks  have  been  successful  several  times,  and  the  torpedo 
boats  were  nowhere  near  as  swift  and  powerful  as  the  Spanish  de 
stroyers  Furor  and  Pint  on.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  we  have  shown  that 
if  a  man-of-war  is  ready  at  all  times  to  open  up  instantly  an  efficient 
rapid  fire,  that  ship  has  little  or  nothing  to  fear  from  torpedo  boats. 

With  the  rapid-fire  guns  a  modern  vessel  can  throw  a  storm  of 
shell  into  an  enemy.  A  torpedo  boat  with  her  "paper"  sides  might 
as  well  sink  herself  before  starting,  so  certain  is  she  of  destruction. 
There  must  be  swarms  of  these  boats  to  have  any  prospect  of  suc 
cess  against  a  modern  ship  of  any  size,  even  when  the  circumstances 
are  most  favorable  for  the  attack.  Searchlight  tactics  and  the  great 
service  that  they  can  do  were  well  brought  out  off  the  blockade. 
Without  the  searchlights  our  fleet  could  not  have  kept  the  Spaniards 
penned  up.  Illuminating  as  we  did,  night  after  night,  the  entrance  of 
the  harbor,  by  swinging  the  lights  slowly  from  side  to  side  over  all  the 
water,  nothing  could  have  escaped  unseen  by  the  picket  boats.  Then, 
too,  the  light  was  of  great  service  in  indicating  to  the  crews  manning 
the  guns  just  where  to  direct  the  fire.  Since  it  was  an  invariable 
rule  never  to  throw  the  beam  of  a  searchlight  on  one  of  our  own 
vessels,  there  could  be  no  doubt  left  in  the  mind  of  the  gun  pointer 
as  to  the  hostile  character  of  the  approaching  vessel.  It  eliminated 


404  HISTORY   OF    THE 

all  the  delay  and  liability  of  error  to  which  any  verbal  orders  are  so 
liable. 

The  necessity  of  a  secondary  fleet,  as  it  might  be  called,  was  also 
shown.  The  number  of  important  and  hazardous  missions  was  so 
great  for  these  smaller  vessels  that  they  were  more  constantly  on  the 
go  than  the  proverbial  fashion  butterfly  in  the  height  of  the  season. 
The  work  of  these  dispatch  boats  was  most  exhausting,  and  care  should 
be  taken  that  they  be  given  great  credit  for  their  efficient  and  valu 
able  services.  Indeed,  these  smaller  craft  are  noted  for  the  lack  of 
space  aboard  for  '"idlers." 

It  is  obvious,  of  course,  that  a  large  supply  fleet  is  indispensable. 
A  ship  cannot  run  without  fuel,  and  in  war  times  the  boilers  seem 
to  eat  up  coal.  Nor  can  a  crew,  no  matter  how  brave,  fight  as  well 
hungry  as  they  can  on  a  full  stomach.  "It  is  hard  work  fighting  on 
cracker  hash,"  so  let  there  be  plenty  of  supply  ships.  Our  repair  ship 
Vulcan  was  an  indispensable  adjunct,  and  so,  of  course,  was  the  ammu 
nition  supply  ship.  After  each  engagement  every  ship  brought  her 
ammunition  supply  up  to  the  limit,  no  matter  how  little  she  had  used. 
The  hospital  ship  possesses  to  a  fleet  not  only  the  obvious  use  that 
makes  it  a  necessity ;  it  gets  out  of  sight  the  wounded  men,  and  it 
is  a  comforting  thing  to  know  it  is  near  at  hand. 

Perhaps  one  of  the  most  important  lessons  is  the  advantage  of 
smokeless  powder.  With  the  incessant  firing  of  our  ships  there  was 
always  smoke  hanging  round  some  part  of  the  ship's  batteries,  though 
we  had  a  gentle  breeze,  and  the  enemy  was  to  windward  of  us.  Fire 
from  the  guns  had  to  be  slackened  again  and  again,  and  I  doubt  if 
the  Colon  could  have  escaped  with  so  little  punishment  if  the  smoke 
from  the  few  minutes  of  firing  at  the  leading  ships  had  not  left  a 
cloud  which,  combined  with  the  firing  of  the  smaller  quick-fire  guns, 
prevented  the  pointing  of  the  heavier  guns.  Of  course,  with  a  quick- 
fire  gun,  any  temporary  lifting  of  the  smoke  will  give  plenty  of  time 
to  deliver  a  fire,  but  with  the  slower  firing  turret  guns  the  view  must 
be  unimpeded  for  some  time.  The  smoke  from  our  guns  did  the 
enemy  no  harm  either,  as  some  part  of  the  ship  was  almost  bound 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  4()5 

to  protrude,  and  with  this  assistance  his  guns  could  be  laid.  Hoth 
sides  were  even  in  this,  however,  since,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Colon,  none  of  the  Spanish  ships  had  smokeless  powder.  The  Colon 
did  not  have  any  heavy  guns  in  her  turrets,  as  they  had  not  been 
completed.  Wash  deck  gear,  it  is  said,  filled  up  their  turrets,  but  the 
turrets  could  not  have  been  so  small  as  that  would  imply. 

The  teachings  of  Mahan  about  men  were  fully  borne  out.  The  great 
lesson  of  the  war  is  the  importance  of  the  personnel.  Poor  men  make 
poor  ships.  No  matter  how  brave  and  efficient  the  officers  may  be, 
they  cannot  fight  well  with  a  poor  crew.  Thirty  men,  however  alive, 
cannot  infuse  their  knowledge  and  enthusiasm  into  five  hundred  others. 
The  officers  may  make  the  men  stand  up  at  the  guns  and  prevent  them 
from  jumping  overboard,  by  closing  the  half-ports,  and  by  other  means, 
but  they  cannot  cause  other  than  real  men-of-war's  men  to  put  up  a 
good  fight.  No  wonder  that  the  crews  of  some  of  the  Spanish  ships 
wanted  to  jump  overboard  on  coming  out  of  the  harbor.  All  the  men 
were  conscripts,  and  six  hundred  had  been  impressed  just  before  the 
departure  of  the  fleet  from  the  Canaries.  It  is  said  that  all  the  jails 
there  were  opened  and  the  male  factors  taken  aboard  the  Spanish 
ships.  You  can  force  a  man  aboard  a  ship,  but  you  can't  force  him 
to  fight. 

Our  men  had  another  advantage.  They  had  had  gun  practice.  Most 
of  the  gunners  were  on  personally  affectionate  terms  with  their  guns, 
had  made  bull's-eyes  with  them,  and  not  only  ached  to  train  them  on  the 
enemy,  but  had  such  confidence  in  their  marksmanship  that  fear  was 
out  of  the  question.  The  crews  simply  knew  they  could  lick  the  other 
fellows,  and  their  whole  interest  wras  in  their  own  ships,  not  in  those 
of  the  enemy.  The  Spaniards  are  not  cowards,  yet  their  impulse  from 
the  first  was  to  dive  out  of  their  ships.  They  felt  sure  of  defeat. 

I  value,  too,  the  moral  effect  on  the  men  of  large  ships.  That 
also  gives  confidence.  The  resistance  of  thick  armor  was  illustrated 
in  some  instances.  Battle  is  a  better  test  than  the  conditions  of  the 
proving  ground.  On  the  Colon's  6-inch  armor  the  nose  of  quite  a 
good-sized  projectile  was  found  sticking,  and  a  large  12-inch  common 


406  HISTORY   OF   THE 

shell  had  exploded  on  it  without  doing  any  damage.  However,  on 
the  Vizcaya  a  large  shell  had  entered  well  aft  in  the  cabin  and  had 
passed  right  through,  tearing  off  a  plate  on  the  other  side;  she  was 
not  armored.  On  the  Iowa  two  large  shells  struck  well  forward  at 
the  water  line,  but  on  the  unarmored  part  of  the  ship.  The  first,  a 
6-inch,  did  not  even  perforate  the  cofferdam,  but,  though  it  pulverized 
the  cellulose,  it  is  still  in  the  cofferdam,  the  inner  side  of  which  it  did 
not  penetrate.  Moreover,  as  it  did  not  explode,  the  rotating  band 
being  recovered  entire,  though  separated  from  the  shell,  it  presumably 
was  an  armor-piercing  shell.  Surely  it  must  have  had  little  velocity. 
This  is  the  more  surprising,  as  the  Spanish  ships  all  had  the  long, 
high-power  English  guns.  Still  the  blow  probably  was  an  oblique 
one.  The  other  big  shell  also  struck  the  water  line,  just  a  few  feet 
aft  of  the  first  one,  and  made  a  clean  hole  in  the  cofferdam.  Strik 
ing  a  hatch  well  amidships,  it  exploded,  but  the  pieces  seem  to  have 
been  carried  along,  most  of  them  going  through  the  chain  locker, 
which  is  right  abreast  the  hatch.  There  are  seven  good-sized  holes 
through  it,  besides  any  number  of  dents.  The  chain  locker  happened 
to  be  empty,  so  the  pieces  passed  through  into  the  midship  chain 
locker,  where  they  were  caught  by  the  chain.  One  of  them  passed 
through  the  after  side  of  the  chain  locker  and  struck  the  base  of  the 
turret.  Most  of  the  pieces  were  picked  up  around  the  deck  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  and  in  the  chain  locker,  showing  that  the  force 
of  the  bursting  charge  must  have  been  slight.  One  of  the  pieces  gave 
the  arc  of  the  base  of  the  shell,  which  proved  to  be  a  12-inch.  The 
ship  was  struck  by  a  number  of  other  smaller  shells,  once  on  a  stan 
chion  aft,  probably  any  number  of  times  on  the  armor,  and  scars  made 
by  two  small-arm  bullets  were  discovered  on  the  muzzle  face  of  one  of 
the  after  12-inch  guns.  Everything  would  tend  to  emphasize  the  supe 
riority  of  armored  ships  over  unarmored  ones.  Such  a  riddling  as  some 
of  the  Spanish  ships  received  could  not  have  been  inflicted  on  any  of 
our  ships  that  were  engaged. 

Everything  goes  to  prove  the  value  of  the  battleship.    The  power 
it   has   to    keep   off   torpedo    boats   and   rapid-fire    fusilade,   and   the 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  407 

confidence  a  battleship  inspires  in  the  crew,  all  go  to  show  the  value 
of  the  type. 

The  importance  of  having  no  woodwork  aboard,  and  making  the 
most  perfect  provisions  against  tire,  cannot  be  overestimated.  Fire  was 
what  destroyed  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  not  only  the  tire  from  our  ships 
but  that  aboard  their  own.  Now,  they  had  little  wood  aboard  any  of 
the  vessels,  yet  no  one  of  them  was  under  tire  more  than  a  few  minutes 
(about  fifteen)  before  smoke  could  be  seen  rising  from  the  decks.  It 
seems  even  the  cork  paint  burned.  One  fire  on  the  Vizcaya  was  ex 
tinguished,  but  others  started  quickly,  both  forward  and  aft.  The 
water  mains  were  shot  away,  and  the  fight  had  to  be  given  up.  Some 
thing  must  be  done  to  protect  these  mains  hereafter  in  every  fight 
ing  ship.  Fire  and  smoke  always  have  the  worst  possible  effect  on 
the  crew,  and,  owing  to  the  great  number  of  hatches  and  compartments 
on  the  ship,  flames  are  the  harder  to  discover  and  fight.  It  was  found 
simply  impossible  to  keep  fighting  both  the  fire  and  the  ship,  the  gun 
fire  slackening  up  immediately  the  alarm  was  given.  So  clear  did  this 
become  that  whenever  the  flame  and  smoke  could  be  seen  from  our 
fleet  it  was  felt  that  all  was  up  with  that  ship,  and  the  tendency  was 
to  direct  our  gun  fire  on  some  other  ship.  Without  an  exception  every 
ship  that  was  on  fire  was  soon  headed  in  for  the  beach.  It  is  a 
fallacy  to  think  that  fire  drill  is  all  a  matter  of  form  on  a  steel  ship. 
So  quickly  and  rapidly  does  the  fire  spread  that  it  seems  that  even 
the  steel  itself  must  be  burning.  The  importance,  also,  of  keeping 
watch  in  every  compartment  for  fire  was  shown. 

There  was  the  greatest  difficulty  during  all  the  action  in  getting 
messages  to  and  from  the  different  parts  of  the  ship.  The  noise  and 
concussions  were  too  great  to  allow  of  the  use  of  any  kind  of  voice 
tubes,  and  messengers  are  slow  and  unreliable,  and  in  danger  of  being 
killed.  A  serious  error  was  made  by  the  messengers  on  one  ship.  An 
order  which  was  intended  for  the  secondary  battery  only  was  taken 
to  the  turret.  The  messenger  told  the  officer  in  one  of  the  12-inch 
turrets  to  point  on  the  torpedo  boats,  and  a  chance  at  the  Colon 
was  missed.  Unless  some  better  means  of  communication  is  invented, 


408  HISTORY   OF   THE 

officers  shut  off  as  they  are  from  any  direct  orders  must  be  left  to 
act  largely  at  their  own  discretion.  This,  at  times,  would  be  most  un 
fortunate,  as  in  the  sighting  hoods  of  the  turrets,  especially,  the  view 
is  so  limited  that  it  is  often  difficult  to  keep  even  the  target  in  sight, 
much  less  to  have  the  complete  range  over  the  horizon  that  is  so 
necessary  for  proper  gun  control.  Then,  too,  in  case  of  accident,  some 
method  of  reporting  promptly  to  the  Captain  is  needed. 

This  fight  probably  gave  a  severe  blow  to  the  use  of  conning  tow 
ers.  So  far,  I  can  learn  of  no  case  where  they  were  used  during  the 
engagement,  the  Captain  preferring  not  to  cramp  himself  and  be  con 
fined  in  such  narrow  quarters,  where  he  could  see  so  little  of  what  is 
occurring.  Every  one  has  to  rely  chiefly  on  his  eyes  for  a  knowledge 
of  how  the  fight  is  going,  and  in  the  conning  tower  the  range  of  view 
is  about  as  limited  as  in  the  sighting  hood. 

It  was  also  shown  that  a  practical  battle  range  finder  has  yet  to 
be  introduced.  Those  in  use  are  so  delicate  that  they  cannot  with 
stand  the  discharge  of  the  guns.  They  get  out  of  order  in  action,  so 
that  the  old  method  of  angling  on  the  masthead  height  of  the  enemy 
has  to  be  relied  on.  Even  the  range  indicators,  simple  as  they  seem 
to  be,  were  completely  thrown  out  by  the  gun  blasts,  and  every  one, 
to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  had  to  use  his  own  judgment  in  giving 
the  range,  and  without  smokeless  powder  the  opportunities  for  a 
prompt  correction  of  range  were  rare.  I  do  not  think  the  old  fork 
system  of  establishing  the  range  has  gone  out  for  good. 

A  full  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  blasts  from  the  different 
guns  is  valuable  to  the  crew,  and  to  the  designers  of  the  ships  it  will 
be  all-important.  Some  of  the  rapid-fire  guns  suffered  so  from  the 
blasts  of  the  turret  guns  that  the  gun  crews  were  actually  blown 
away  from  their  stations.  In  other  cases  the  smoke  of  the  firing  was 
so  great  that  the  gun  pointers  were  blinded  by  it.  The  taste  and 
the  smell  of  the  gunpowder  was  so  objectionable  that  many  of  the 
gun  crews  found  it  necessary  to  wrap  towels  about  their  mouths. 
If  this  is  the  case  with  ordinary  old  brown  cocoa  powder,  it  must  be 
much  worse  with  the  smokeless.  Indeed,  it  would  be  a  necessity  to 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  409 

have  the  fumes  from  the  smokeless  powder  made  harmless  in  some 
way,  otherwise  it  will  be  impossible  to  keep  any  of  the  guns  manned 
during  a  rapid  h're.  This  suggests  the  use  in  the  shells  of  some  ex 
plosive  giving  forth  poisonous  fumes. 

Another  interesting  thing  brought  out  by  the  action  was  the  ex 
tremely  short  time  the  Spanish  ships  were  under  our  fire  before  some 
thing  happened  that  demoralized  the  crews.  It  would  show  that  every 
man  on  the  ship  must  be  so  trained  in  his  duties  that  he  knows  ex 
actly  what  to  do  in  case  of  accident,  for  there  will  be  no  time  to  wait 
and  summon  assistance. 

The  value  of  cofferdams  was  conclusively  shown  by  the  swelling 
up  of  the  cellulose  so  that  it  closed  the  6-inch  hole.  To  be  sure  the 
hole  was  only  occasionally  submerged,  and  the  cofferdam  itself  was 
not  penetrated. 

One  of  the  great  dangers  to  be  avoided  was  shown  to  be  splinters. 
A  great  number  of  the  wounded  was  laid  out  by  splinters  rather 
than  by  the  fragments  of  shot  or  shell.  Steel  splinters  are  very  bad. 
If  one  could  get  a  ship  that  was  absolutely  splinter-proof  and  fire 
proof,  it  would  be  a  long  stride  in  the  direction  of  the  ideal  —  some 
thing  "unsinkable  and  unlickable." 


IN  THE  earlier  wars  of  the  century  some  notable  precedents  have 
been  made  from  which  an  idea  may  be  formed  of  the  size  of  the  bill 
shortly  to  be  made  out   by   the  United  States  against     CQST  QF  wARg 
Spain.     The  principle  followed  has  been  that,  both  in        AND  INDEMNI- 
territory  and  in  cash,  the  defeated  nation  is  liable  to  pay 
for  its  experience.     A  far-off  but  famous  illustration  of  this  principle 
is  found  in  the  terms  of  peace  dictated  by  the  allied  powers  of  Europe 
to  France,  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon  at  Waterloo.     Not  only  were 


•Entire  article  from  the  New  York  Sun,  July  24, 


410  HISTORY   OF   THE 

various  pieces  of  French  territory  appropriated,  but  her  important 
frontier  fortresses  were  held  for  five  years  by  an  "army  of  occupa 
tion,"  which  the  French  treasury  was  made  to  pay  and  support. 

As  a  result  of  the  three  wars  between  Great  Britain  and  China, 
(1840,  1857,  and  1860),  the  Chinese  government,  besides  ceding  Hong 
Kong  to  the  victorious  British,  and  opening  several  of  her  ports  to 
trade,  was  made  to  pay  an  indemnity  amounting  in  all  to  about  $35,- 
000,000.  In  the  case  of  the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mex 
ico,  when  the  terms  of  peace  were  dictated  by  our  government,  com 
pensation  was  taken  wholly  in  territory.  Mexico  was  too  poor  at  that 
time  to  have  paid  a  cash  indemnity  equivalent  to  the  cost  of  the 
war,  which  was  about  $100,000,000.  So  we  took  California  and  New 
Mexico  instead  of  money,  and  considered  the  bargain  so  good  that 
we  paid  $15,000,000  to  the  Mexican  Government,  as  an  additional 
consideration  for  the  transfer. 

Although  not  strictly  a  war  indemnity,  that  paid  by  Great  Britain 
on  account  of  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama  during  our  Civil  War, 
is  of  timely  interest  as  exemplifying  the  extent  to  which  claims  for 
compensation  may  be  built  up  and  cut  down.  As  originally  put  for 
ward,  the  American  claims  practically  comprised  every  item  in  the 
expense  of  the  war  from  the  day  on  which  the  Alabama  put  to  sea. 
The  prolongation  of  the  war  was  attributed  entirely  to  her,  and  she 
was,  therefore,  made  responsible  for  this,  as  well  as  for  the  loss  suffered 
by  American  commerce  through  its  transference  to  foreign  vessels 
and  the  increased  rates  of  maritime  insurance.  The  Geneva  tribunal, 
however,  decided  that  such  indirect  results  of  the  Alabama's  depre 
dations  could  not  be  included  in  the  bill,  and  awarded  an  indemnity 
of  $15,875,000  as  an  equivalent  for  the  injury  actually  done  to  the 
United  States  through  the  fault  or  negligence  of  England. 

The  recent  war  between  China  and  Japan  was  terminated  by  the 
peace  of  Shimonoseki  three  years  ago.  By  the  treaty  China  agreed 
to  pay  Japan  a  sum  equivalent  to  $175,000,000.  In  addition,  she 
ceded  the  island  of  Formosa  to  her  conquerors,  recognized  the  inde 
pendence  of  Korea,  and  consented  to  open  four  new  treaty  ports. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  411 

The  war  between  Prussia  and  Austria,  in  1866,  was  rounded  off  by 
the  payment  of  a  notable  indemnity  by  the  vanquished  Austrians. 
In  addition  to  the  territorial  aggrandizement  of  Prussia  and  the  ex 
clusion  of  Austria  from  the  German  Bund,  the  treaty  of  Prague,  which 
terminated  the  war,  provided  for  the  payment  by  Austria  of  an  in 
demnity  of  40,000.000  Prussian  thalers,  or  about  $30,000.000.  From 
this  amount,  however,  deduction  was  made  of  15,000,000  thalers,  rep 
resenting  Austrian  claims  on  Schleswig-Holstein,  and  5,000,000  thalers 
as  an  equivalent  for  the  free  maintenance  of  the  Prussian  army  in 
Austria,  pending  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

The  heaviest  war  indemnity  of  modern  times  was,  of  course,  that 
paid  by  France  at  the  close  of  the  war  with  Germany.  The  hostili 
ties  lasted  over  eight  months,  and  the  total  cost  of  the  war  was 
estimated  at  $1,580.000,000.  Besides  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lor 
raine,  France  had  to  pay  Germany  five  milliards  of  francs  ($1,000,- 
000,000),  in  installments,  which  were  allowed  to  extend  over  three 
years.  The  original  demand  of  Germany  was  six  milliards,  or  $200.- 
000,000  more.  M.  Thiers  strove  in  vain  to  save  Metz,  but  it  was 
to  his  exertions  that  the  reduction  in  the  amount  of  the  indemnity 
was  due. 

The  cost  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war  of  1877  has  been  estimated  at 
$945,000,000.  Between  the  declaration  of  war  by  Russia  and  the  treaty 
of  San  Stefano  nearly  eleven  months  elapsed.  By  this  treaty  the 
Porte  admitted  itself  indebted  to  Russia  in  the  sum  of  1,410,000,000 
rubles  (about  $725.000,000)  as  indemnity  for  the  losses  and  expenses 
of  the  war.  The  items  in  the  account  were  as  follows:  — 

Four  hundred  and  sixty  million  dollars  for  war  expenses;  $205,- 
000,000  for  damage  done  to  the  south  coast  of  Russia,  her  export 
commerce,  industries,  and  railways  ;  $55.000,000  for  injuries  caused  by 
the  invasion  of  the  Caucasus,  and  $5,000,000  for  injuries  suffered  by 
Russian  subjects  and  establishments  in  Turkey.  In  consideration  of 
the  financial  embarrassments  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  Czar  con 
sented  to  accept  in  substitution  for  about  three-fifths  of  the  total 
sum  the  various  territorial  cessions  sanctioned  by  the  treaty  of 


412  HISTORY    OF    THE 

Berlin.  This  left  a  balance  of  $225,000,000  due  to  Russia  by  Turkey, 
and  a  part  of  it  is  still  unpaid. 

The  latest  and  most  lenient  war  indemnity  was  that  levied  by  vic 
torious  Turkey  on  Greece  last  year.  The  Sultan  was  obliged  by  the 
Great  Powers  of  Europe  to  cut  it  down  to  $20,000,000,  which  was  not 
a  fourth  part  of  what  it  actually  cost  him. 

A  few  comparative  figures,  taken  from  official  records,  will  serve 
to  put  the  great  increase  in  the  cost  of  war  as  now  conducted,  with 
all  the  modern  improvements,  in  a  clear  light.  Our  war  for  independ 
ence  lasted  eight  years,  and  its  cost  is  officially  recorded  as  $135,000,- 
000,  using  round  figures.  There  were  about  310.000  troops  engaged  in 
that  war — one-third  more  than  have  been  called  out  in  the  present 
conflict  with  Spain.  It  follows  that,  accepting  Mr.  Dingley's  estimate 
of  $500,000,000  a  year  as  the  cost  of  the  present  war,  it  is  going  to  cost 
three  times  as  much  to  fight  Spain  for  one  year  in  1898  as  it  cost  to 
fight  Great  Britain  for  the  eight  years  from  1775  to  1783.  The  War 
of  1812,  which  lasted  two  years  and  eight  months,  cost  the  United 
States  a  little  over  $107,000,000,  and  to  carry  it  on  we  put  in  the  field 
576,000  troops,  nearly  three  times  as  many  as  we  have  now  under 
arms. 

The  Mexican  War,  which  lasted  two  years  and  three  months,  cost 
the  American  people  $100,000,000,  and  112,000  troops  were  engaged  in  it. 
If  the  number  of  the  troops  who  carried  our  flag  victoriously  to  the 
capital  of  Mexico  had  been  doubled  they  would  have  about  equaled 
the  number  of  the  army  now  in  the  field  against  Spain,  and  the  cost 
of  their  two  years  and  three  months  of  operations  would  have  been 
about  $200,000,000.  From  this  it  is  a  plain  deduction  that,  with  the 
same  number  of  men  under  arms,  a  year  of  war  in  1898  is  about  five 
times  as  expensive  as  was  a  year  of  war  in  1846. 

The  cost  of  our  great  civil  conflict  has  been  put  down  at  $6,189,- 
929,909,  but  that  estimate  includes  all  expenses  growing  out  of  the 
war,  as  well  as  the  actual  cost  of  the  military  and  naval  operations. 
The  direct  outlay  of  the  United  States  Government  in  carrying  on  the 
war  for  four  years  was  $3,400,000,000,  and  in  the  course  of  the  struggle 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  413 

2,859,13*2  Union  troops  were  engaged.  It  is  estimated  that  the  num 
ber  of  troops  actually  engaged  on  the  Union  side  averaged  2,326,168 
for  three  years.  Hence,  it  appears  that  the  direct  cost  of  the  war, 
counting  it  on  this  three  years'  basis,  was  about  $1, 466,000,000  a  year. 
But  Mr.  Dingley  has  told  us  that  it  will  cost  $500,000,000  to  keep 
200,000  men  fighting  Spain  for  one  year,  which  is  more  than  one-third 
as  much  as  it  cost  the  government  to  keep  2,326,000  men  fighting 
the  Confederate  States  for  the  same  length  of  time. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  why  modern  warfare  is  so  much  more 
costly  than  the  old-fashioned  kind,  if  we  turn  to  a  few  of  the  lead 
ing  items  in  the  military  and  naval  expenditure  of  our  time.  The 
average  cost  of  a  first-class  battleship  is  $3,000,000.  The  cost  of 
the  Maine,  which  was  a  battleship  of  the  second  class,  was  $2,500,000. 
An  armored  cruiser  of  the  Brooklyn  type  costs  $3,000,000.  An  armored 
ram  like  the  Katahdin  costs  $1,000,000.  A  double-turreted  monitor 
costs  about  $1,500,000.  A  single-turreted  monitor  costs  about  $500,000. 
A  protected  cruiser  costs  all  the  way  from  $1,000.000  to  $2,700,000; 
the  Charleston  cost  the  former,  and  the  Columbia  the  latter  sum.  An 
unprotected  cruiser  of  the  Detroit  type  costs  $600,000.  An  unarmored 
gunboat  like  the  Concord  is  worth  $500,000.  A  composite  gunboat  of 
the  Newport  class  costs  $230.000.  A  dynamite  gunboat  like  the  famous 
Vesuvius  is  worth  $350,000.  A  torpedo  boat  of  the  Farraaut  pattern 
costs  $225,000. 

We  have  not  lost  any  of  our  vessels  in  the  war  with  Spain.  The 
Maine,  destroyed  in  Havana  harbor  before  the  war  began,  is  the  only 
item  of  this  kind  that  wrill  figure  in  the  coming  bill  of  costs.  The 
Maine  cost  about  $2,500,000  to  build.  A  more  serious  item  will  be 
compensation  for  the  lives  of  the  two  hundred  and  sixty-six  American 
sailors  that  were  destroyed  with  her.  This  may  well  justify  a  claim 
of  $5,000,000  more,  to  be  distributed  among  the  surviving  families  of 
the  men  who  were  thus  treacherously  killed.  Other  items  in  the  bill 
will  cover  our  general  war  expenses  of  all  kinds;  for  coal  used  at  sea, 
for  transportation  of  our  soldiers  by  land  and  by  sea,  for  war  supplies 
of  all  kinds,  for  the  pay  of  our  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  for  the  losses 


414  HISTORY   OF   THE 

sustained  by  the  interruption  and  disturbance  of  our  trade  and  com 
merce,  not  only  with  Cuba,  but  with  other  parts  of  the  world. 

The  Quartermaster's  department  has  estimated  that  $44,000,000 
will  be  needed  to  pay  the  transportation  charges  alone  of  our  armies 
now  engaged  in  fighting  Spain  for  six  months.  The  Navy  Depart 
ment's  latest  estimate  of  the  cost  of  furnishing  our  fleets  in  time  of 
peace  with  all  their  necessary  equipment — of  which  coal  is  the  lead 
ing  article  —  was  nearly  $1,500,000  a  year.  The  exigencies  of  war 
have  certainly  doubled  it.  This  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  cost  of 
guns  or  the  ammunition  or  the  torpedoes.  It  covers  only  such  things 
as  coal,  hemp,  wire,  anchors,  cables,  chains,  nautical  instruments, 
lamps,  bunting,  and  other  things  that  come  strictly  under  the  head 
of  "ships'  equipments." 

The  high  cost  of  modern  ordnance  and  ammunition  will  also  help 
swell  Spain's  indemnity  bill.  A  complete  supply  of  ammunition  to 
fill  once  all  the  vessels  sent  to  sea  against  Spain  costs  about  $4,750,- 
000.  One  battleship's  full  supply  of  shot  and  shell  costs  about  $400,000. 
Every  time  one  of  our  monster  13-inch  guns  is  fired  the  charge 
costs  $1,500;  a  great  many  of  these  charges  are  already  included  in 
our  little  account  against  Spain.  The  smaller  guns  are  fired  at  a 
cost  running  all  the  way  from  $200  up  to  $1.000  for  each  charge.  The 
guns  themselves  are  costly,  too.  The  bill  for  one  hundred  high-power 
steel  guns  for  seacoast  defenses,  built  at  Bethlehem,  Pennsylvania,  is 
$3,500,000— averaging  $35,000  apiece. 

Mr.  Dingley's  estimate  of  $500,000,000  as  the  cost  of  our  war  oper 
ations  against  Spain  for  a  year  covers  all  these  things,  and  is  prob 
ably  a  calculation  well  within  the  actual  expenditure.  Even  though 
Spain  sues  for  peace  quickly,  it  is  not  possible  for  our  government 
to  avoid  a  large  portion  of  this  estimated  outlay,  as  the  troops  have 
been  called  out  and  contracts  of  all  kinds  have  been  made  for  months 
ahead. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  415 


in. 

THE  cost  to  the  United  States  of  the  war  with  Spain  cannot  yet 
be  known.     The  actual  expenditures  during  hostilities  and  the  expen 
ditures  in  prospect  may  be  estimated  with  something 
like  accuracy.     But  there   always   follows  a  train   of       SPANISH- 

,.,  .       ,     .  AMERICAN   WAR 

consequential  expenditures  for  the  payment  of  claims, 
pensions,  etc.,  which  cannot  be  foreseen.  The  first  money  appropri 
ated  for  the  war  was  the  $50,000,000  put  into  the  hands  of  the  Presi 
dent  for  national  defense,  without  debate  or  a  single  opposing  vote, 
on  March  I).  Of  this  the  President  gave  to  the  navy  nearly  $30,000,- 
000,  to  the  War  Department  nearly  $20,000,000.  Small  sums  went  to 
the  Treasury  and  State  Departments.  New  vessels  were  purchased  for 
the  navy,  at  a  total  cost  of  $17,750,000,  before  war  began.  The  auxil 
iary  cruisers  Harvard  and  Yale  were  chartered  at  a  rental  of  $2,000 
per  day,  the  St.  Louis  and  St.  Paul  at  $2,500  per  day.  To  fire  one 
13-inch  armor-piercing  shell  costs  $560;  to  fire  an  8-inch  shell  costs 
$134.  Many  thousands  of  the  latter  and  hundreds  of  the  former  were 
discharged  during  the  war.  Secretary  Long  estimated  that  the  cost  of 
supplying  the  vessels  of  our  navy  with  complete  ammunition,  sufficient 
for  one  prolonged  battle,  would  be  $6,521,985.  All  might  be  fired  in 
one  day.  Admiral  Dewey  carried  one  million  dollars'  worth  of  ammu 
nition  to  Manila  when  he  passed  Corregidor  Island.  Every  time  his 
fleet  passed  before  Montejo's  squadron,  delivering  broadsides,  it  cost 
the  government  at  least  $100.000.  In  three  hours  he  burned  up 
$500,000  of  ammunition,  and  sunk  $10,000,000  of  Spanish  property. 
The  same  amount  was  expended  by  Sampson's  fleet  in  sinking  Cer- 
vera's  ships,  valued  at  $16,500,000. 

Assistant   Secretary  of  War  Vanderlip,  in  an   article  in  McClure's 
Magazine,*  from  which  these  facts  are  taken,  says:  — 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  only  $98,000,000  was  paid  out  by  the  Treasury  Department, 
on  account  of  the  army  and   navy,  during  the  actual   continuance   of  the  war,  from 


•October.  1898. 


WAR. 

NAVY. 

TOTAL. 

$      600,000 

$  2,400,000 

$  3,000,000 

1,200,000 

9,800,000 

11,000,000 

12,000,000 

7,000,000 

19,000,000 

16,500,000 

6,500,000 

23,000,000 

29,500,000 

5,500,000 

35,000,000 

5,500,000 

1,500,000 

7,000,000 

416  HISTORY   OF   THE 

March  until  August  12,  when  the  Protocol  was  signed.  The  following  statement 
will  show  these  expenditures  in  detail,  and  will  give  a  graphic  idea  of  the  im 
mensely  greater  expenditure  for  the  army  than  for  the  navy,  although  in  the  pres 
ent  war  the  navy  accomplished  the  greater  results  :  — 

1898. 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August  12.  .. 

$65,300,000        $32,700,000        $98,000,000 

The  actual  Treasury  outlay  for  the  war  he  estimates  at  about 
$361,000,000.  "The  government,"  he  adds,  "actually  paid  out  an  aver 
age  of  $860,000  for  each  day  of  the  Spanish-American  War.  To  this 
must  be  added,  however,  an  estimate  of  fifty  per  cent,  of  accounts 
not  yet  presented  for  settlement,  which  will  bring  the  total  up  to 
approximately  a  million  and  a  quarter  a  day.  And  this  maximum  of 
expense  continued  for  several  weeks  after  the  close  of  the  war,  the 
subsistence  of  troops  and  their  transportation  remaining  very  much 
the  same  as  if  an  actual  state  of  hostility  still  existed.  .  .  .  Ac 
cepting  the  statistics  of  Mulhall  as  to  the  National  Treasury  cost  of 
our  own  Civil  War,  each  day  of  that  war  cost  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  an  average  of  $2,476,760.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that,  unless 
when  all  accounts  are  rendered  a  much  different  result  from  that 
anticipated  appears,  the  daily  cost  of  the  Spanish-American  War  was 
only  about  fifty  per  cent,  of  that  of  the  Civil  War.  It  must  be  remem 
bered,  however,  that  there  were  millions  of  men  in  the  field  during 
the  latter  struggle,  where  only  a  quarter  of  a  million  were  engaged 
in  the  Spanish- American  War,  and  if  actual  figures  could  be  given  of 
the  cost  of  the  late  war  based  upon  the  number  of  men  engaged,  it 
would  probably  be  found  that  the  cost  of  fighting  has  not  been  re 
duced  with  the  introduction  of  improved  arms  and  ships." 

Mr.  Charles  A.  Conant*  gives  the  following  interesting  table  of 
appropriations  on  the  war  account,  voted  by  Congress:  — 


'Article  in  the  American  Revieiv  of  Reviews,  September,  1898. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR 


417 


APPROPRIATIONS  MADE  DURING  THK  SECOND  SESSION  OK  THE  FIFTY-FIFTH  CON 
GRESS  TO  MEET  EXPENSES  INCIDENT  TO  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

For  the  national  defense,  act  March  9,  1898 $50,117,000.00 

Army  and  navy  deficiencies,  act  May  4,  1898  .                           .  34,625,725.71 
Naval  appropriation  act,  May  4,  1898  —  amount  of  increase  over 

preceding  naval  appropriation  act  .  28,006,649.49 
Fortification  appropriation  act,  May  7,  1898  — amount  of   in 
crease  over  act  as  passed  by  House 5,232,582.00 

Naval  auxiliary  act,  May  26,  1898  3,000,000.00 
Additional  clerical  force,  War  Department,  auditors'  offices, 

etc.,  act  May  31,  1898 227,976.45 

Life-saving  Service  act,  June  7,  1898. . .  70,000.00 

Army  and  navy  deficiencies  act,  June  8,  1898 18,015,000.00 

Appropriations  in  act  to  provide  ways  and  means  to  meet  war 

expenditures,  June  13,  1898..  .                  (500,000.00 

Army,  navy,  and  other  war  expenses  for  six  months,  beginning 

July  1,  1898,  in  general  deficiency  act  .                             226,604,261.46 

Expenses  of  bringing  home  remains  of  soldiers 200,000.00 

Total $361,788,095.1 1 

He  also  prepared  a  very  interesting  table  showing  the  difference 
between  army  and  navy  warrants  drawn  during  corresponding  months 
of  peace  and  war,  in  1897  and  1898:  — 


FOR    THK    ARMY.* 


MONTH. 

WARRANTS 
DRAWN  IN  1S98. 

"WARRANTS 
DRAWN  IN  1897. 

EXCESS  IN 
1808. 

March  
April  
May 
June  
July  .. 
August  1-18  

$5,159,571 
6,223,814 
17,093,595 
19,723,804 
34,774,153 
14,315,000 

$3,046,103 
4,287,020 
4,214,955 
2,886,016 
10,736,758 
2,782,000 

$2,113,468 
1,936,794 
12,878,640 
16,837,788 
24,037,395 
11.633.000 

Totals  

$97,289,937 

$27,952,852 

$69,337,085 

FOR   THE   NAVY. 


Marcli 
April  
May  
June  .  . 
July 
August  1-18    .  . 

$5,241,443 
12,556,932 
9,093,577 
9,506,021 
8,514,279 
4,490,000 

$2,694,835 
2,744,079 
2,537,576 
3.563,922 
2,998,809 
1,738,000 

$2,546,608 
9,812,853 
6,656,001 
5,942,099 
5,515,470 
2,752,000 

Totals  .  . 

$49,402,252 

$16.277,221 

$33,125,031 

Aggregates 

$146,692.189 

$44,230.073 

$102,462,116 

27 


418  HISTORY   OF  .THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

Mr.  Conant  estimates  the  actual  cost  of  the  war  at  between  $250,- 
000,000  and  $281,000,000  over  and  above  the  peace  footing. 

The  United  States  demanded  no  money  indemnity  from  Spain. 
It  will  receive  Porto  Rico  instead  —  without  counting  the  Philippines 
possibility  or  the  eventual  contingency  of  the  annexation  of  Cuba. 
These  would  prove  sources  of  large  revenue,  but  would,  for  a  long  time, 
necessitate  heavy  garrison  expenditures. 

So,  that,  counting  not  lives,  nor  pensions,  or  anything  future,  the 
cost  of  our  war  with  Spain  will  prove  to  be  about  $300,000,000. 


*  The  warrants  drawn  for  the  War  Department  in  July,  1897,  were  abnormally 
large  because  the  sum  of  $6,047,320  was  drawn  for  river  and  harbor  improvements.  The 
amount  thus  drawn  in  July,  1898,  was  less  than  $2,000,000,  so  that  the  real  excess  of  expendi 
tures  on  account  of  the  military  service  is  $4,000,000  greater  than  appears  in  the  table.  The 
drafts  for  river  and  harbor  improvements  are  always  large  in  July,  because  disbursing  officers 
then  inaugurate  their  accounts  for  the  new  fiscal  year  with  ample  balances. 


CHAPTER   THE  THIRTY- FIRST. 
ASPECTS  AND  INCIDENTS. 

THE  WORK   OF  WAR  CORRESPONDENTS   AND  REPORTERS  —  ENORMOUS  COST   OK  THE  SERVICE- 
NO  WAR  IN  HISTORY  EVER  So  PROMPTLY  AND  FULLY  DESCRIBED  —  MATKRIAL  FOR  HIS 
TORIANS —  INCIDENTS  AND  ANECDOTES  OF  SOLDIERS  IN   THE  CAMP,  IN   BATTLE, 
AND  IN  HOSPITALS  — How  SOME  HEROES  DIED  AND  OTHERS  SUFFERED  — 
NAVAL  ANECDOTES  — ACTS  OF  GREAT  BRAVERY— BOWERY  Music 
AT  GUAM— AGUINALDO'S  FINE  BAND  — SPANISH  AND 
AMERICAN    SAILORS    CONTRASTED. 


I. 


T 


wo  or  three  days  after  Sampson's  fleet  had  moved  out  of  Key 
West  to  blockade  Havana,  the  cable  brought  from  Berlin  a  re 
port  that  the  German  Emperor  was  "greatly 
amused  at  the  idea  of  a  fleet  of  war  ships 


going  to  battle  accompanied  by  a  fleet  of  newspaper       REPORTS 

OF  THE  WAR 

dispatch  boats."  It  is  fortunate  that  amusement,  like 
happiness,  is  purely  a  relative  joy.  The  German  Emperor  was  to 
see  the  fleet  of  dispatch  boats  forward  reports  of  the  progress  of  the 
war  (subsequently  confirmed  by  acknowledgments  of  his  own  military 
and  naval  observers),  that  proved  beyond  doubt  the  superiority,  in 
mettle  and  capacity,  of  men  reared  under  the  influence  of  a  free 
press,  over  those  stunted  by  the  existence  of  a  truckling  press,  held 
in  terror  by  fear  of  prosecutions  for  free  speech.  He  was  to  read  in 
the  leading  papers  of  his  own  empire  —  edited  by  men  who  were  not 
afraid  to  speak  the  truth,  that  his  own  fine  standing  armies,  formed 
by  conscription  and  under  compulsion,  were  not  better  than  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  formed  by  volunteer  enlistments,  making 
up  in  quick  intelligence  and  initiative  what  his  own  soldiers  learned 
through  despotic  drill,  and  long  service  rendered  with  indifference. 
Also,  that  his  reserves  were  not  better  than  our  volunteers. 

The  "  fleet  of  dispatch  boats,"  which  so  amused  the  Emperor,  was 
the  navy  of  modern  journalism,  not  less  wonderful  in  its  perform- 

(419) 


420  HISTORY   OF    THE 

ances  than  the  fighting  navy.  Its  land  forces,  the  war  correspond 
ents  with  the  army,  composed  a  worthy  arm  of  the  great  establishment 
of  trained  journalism. 

It  remained  for  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States  to  demon 
strate  to  international  journalism,  through  their  employes,  the  same 
superior  vigor,  courage,  endurance,  and  success  in  the  labors  on  sea 
and  land  that  our  army  and  navy  demonstrated  against  the  anti 
quated  arid  incompetent  mechanisms  and  ideas  of  war  put  forth  by 
a  country  restrained  of  free  speech  and  manacled  with  ignorance. 

Never  before  in  the  world's  history  was  the  progress  of  a  great 
war  so  completely  and  so  promptly  described.  It  seemed  as  if  Amer 
ican  journalism,  responding  to  the  desire  of  the  enormous  clientage 
it  had  established,  mobilized  its  forces  concurrently  with  army  and 
navy  to  make  war  on  all  the  precedents  of  journalistic  achievement. 
On  land  and  sea  the  American  newspaper  reporter  was  everywhere. 
He  was  an  army  in  himself.  He  stood  on  the  bridge  of  the  Olympia 
at  Manila  with  Dewey,  and  was  complimented  for  his  accuracy  of 
statement  and  his  courage ;  he  stood  by  Schley  on  the  Brooklyn,  raced 
with  Sampson  on  the  Neiv  York,  and  watched  the  battle  on  the  Oregon, 
He  went  into  the  fight  at  Las  Guasimas  with  the  cavalry  heroes,  and 
stormed  El  Caney  with  Lawton,  being,  in  fact,  the  first  man  in  the  fort. 

Who  can  doubt  the  heroism  of  Hobson  ?  But  was  it  more,  in 
truth — apart  from  its  setting  —  than  that  of  Marshall,  the  correspond 
ent,  who,  shot  through  the  spine  at  Las  Guasimas,  dictated  his  report 
of  the  battle  to  a  colleague,  while  death  seemed  to  wait  on  his  sen 
tences?  Was  it  more  than  that  of  Creelman.  who  forced  the  fort  at 
El  Caney  and  met  a  bullet  for  his  pains,  and  who,  suffering  agonies 
of  pain,  asked  to  be  kept  conscious  until  he  could  dictate  his 
notes  to  his  employer?  These  actions  have  been  equaled  by  jour 
nalists  everywhere,  but  they  have  never  been  surpassed. 

More  than  these  incidents,  which  illustrate  the  courage,  audacity, 
and  determination  of  the  reporter,  was  the  extraordinary  spectacle  of 
an  unfettered  press  giving  news,  opinions,  and  speculations  from  the 
front  as  openly  as  if  it  were  discussing  local  news  at  home.  Except 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  421 

for  a  short  time,  and  with  respect  to  specific  information,  there  was 
no  censorship.  It  was  the  test  of  a  free  press.  Plans  of  battle,  faults 
of  execution,  complaints  of  every  sort  were  made  public.  If  there 
remain  any  secrete  of  the  campaign  in  Cuba  it  must  be  because  no 
experienced  correspondent  or  raw  novice  thought  the  affair  worth  the 
telling. 

Perhaps  there  was  much  inaccuracy  of  detail,  errors  of  judgment 
in  trusting  rumor  as  facts,  some  mistaken  "enterprise,"  if  not,  indeed, 
actual  dishonesty  in  the  haste  and  difficulty  of  the  news  service. 
Even  the  press  harbors  its  due  proportion  of  incompetents  and  rascals 
whose  faults  intrude  everywhere;  but  the  substantial  foundations  of 
accurate  reports  of  battles,  marches,  truces,  and  casualties,  occurring 
from  day  to  day,  were  confirmed  to  the  shame  of  fraud.  But  were  there 
not  also  similar  errors  in  official  military  and  naval  reporting — more 
than  are  known,  perhaps,  mercifully  covered  up  in  the  archives  at 
Washington.  Generals  and  Admirals  are  not  more  infallible  thcvn 
reporters.  But  the  reporter's  mistake  is  open  to  the  whole  world  to 
be  tested  and  revised.  His  accuracy  is  measured  against  all  the  infor 
mation  the  world  may  possess.  Are  not  General  Wheeler  and  General 
Kent  brave,  efficient,  and  honest  leaders?  But  if  the  world  depended 
upon  their  reports  of  San  Juan  for  knowledge  of  the  battle,  the  result 
would  be  a  blank.  Five  hundred  separate  persons,  perhaps,  have 
described  the  battles  of  San  Juan  and  El  Caney.  There  are  five  hundred 
very  different  descriptions  in  details,  but  in  the  essentials  the  story  is 
the  same  in  all.  No  American  naval  officer  off  Santiago  knew  in  what 
order  the  Spanish  ships  came  out  of  the  harbor  until  five  days  after 
the  battle,  when  the  Spanish  survivors  cleared  up  the  confusion.  Yet  the 
morning  after  the  great  fight  the  American  papers  contained  all 
the  material  facts  correctly,  the  errors  being  those  of  mere  detail. 
Nine  hours  before  the  President  received  Admiral  Sampson's  official 
dispatch,  announcing  the  victory,  the  news  of  the  fight  was  in  the 
hands  of  every  daily  newspaper  in  America. 

No  war  ever  left  such  a  wonderful  mass  of  material  for  historians. 
It  is  not  only  the  great  newspapers  and  the  news-gathering  associations 


422  HISTORY   OF    THE 

that  are  to  be  considered.  These  sent  experienced  correspondents  and 
observers  capable  of  describing  and  understanding  great  events,  but 
there  was  also  a  real  "army"  of  correspondents  of  the  "home  papers." 
Every  regiment  and  company  had  its  enlisted  reporter  or  correspond 
ent,  whose  letters  to  the  town  or  village  paper  will  lend  a  new  inter 
est  to  the  history  of  war.  And  all  these  reported  the  opinion  of  the 
general  movement  or  the  great  events.  Then,  all  the  newspapers 
were  deluged  with  private  letters  from  soldiers  to  their  families  at 
home.  The  intelligence  of  the  United  States  was  writing  the  history 
of  the  war  which  it  was  prosecuting.  Only  the  archives  of  the  Navy, 
War,  and  State  Departments  are  to  be  opened  to  complete  the  ma 
terial. 

Mr.  Ray  Stannard  Baker,  himself  a  correspondent  at  the  front,  in 
an  article  describing  how  war  news  was  reported,*  gives  these  inter 
esting  ideas  of  the  difficulty  and  cost:  "When  actual  war  [with  Spain] 
was  approaching,"  he  writes,  "a  more  extended  service  became  nec 
essary,  and  each  of  several  newspapers  acquired  a  veritable  fleet  of 
vessels,  three,  or  four,  or  five,  to  patrol  the  waters  of  the  West 
Indies.  These  newspaper  dispatch  boats  were  swift-going  steamers, 
capable  of  making  from  twelve  to  fourteen  knots  an  hour,  and  carry 
ing  crews  of  a  dozen  men  or  more,  with  several  correspondents  on 
each.  Two  dispatch  boats,  representing  New  York  newspapers,  were 
private  yachts,  fitted  with  dynamos,  powerful  searchlights,  and  a  hun 
dred  and  one  other  conveniences.  Until  war  had  been  declared  the 
whole  cargo  of  these  vessels  in  their  trips  between  Havana  and  Key 
West,  was  a  little  package  of  copy  that  a  man  might  carry  in  his 
vest  pocket,  and  yet  they  were  exceedingly  expensive,  as  shipowners 
exacted  from  $5,000  to  $9,000  a  month  for  the  use  of  each  boat,  and 
the  newspapers  were  required  to  bea,r  the  additional  expense  of  fire, 
marine,  accident,  and  war  insurance,  which  the  alarmed  underwriters 
of  New  York  had  fixed  at  the  enormous  rate  of  eight  per  cent,  a 
month.  One  New  York  newspaper  paid  $2,200  a  month  insurance  on 


*McClure's  Magazine,  September,  1898. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  !_>:; 

a  single  vessel,  and  it  had  five  boats  in  service.  But  besides  these 
expenses  the  newspapers  had  to  buy  their  own  coal  and  supplies  at 
war-time  prices,  and  pay  the  salaries  of  the  correspondents  who  di 
rected  the  boats.  One  managing  editor  showed  a  salary  list  for  a  single 
week,  including  only  war  correspondents.  It  amounted  to  $1,403.51, 
and  the  best-paid  correspondent  hailing  from  New  York  is  said  to  have 
received  $10,000  a  year. 

"Every  time  a  dispatch  boat  made  port  in  Havana  harbor  a  rapa 
cious  Spanish  officer  swooped  down  upon  it  and  collected  all  manner 
of  fees — health-office  fees,  customhouse  fees,  and  fees  for  clear  water 
to  use  in  the  boilers,  to  say  nothing  of  pilotage  charges — a  total  of 
from  $70  to  $125  a  day  for  this  purpose  alone.  At  the  Key  West  end 
of  the  voyage  there  were  still  further  charges,  rendered  necessary  by 
the  inevitable  medical  certificate  and  the  pilot  hire.  Expenses  were 
paid  in  cash,  and  the  correspondents  found  it  necessary  to  go  loaded 
down  with  all  they  could  carry." 

Sometimes  a  single  paper  received  5,000  words  a  day  by  cable 
from  Key  West,  and  as  the  rate  from  Key  West  to  New  York  is  five 
cents  a  word,  this  made  an  additional  expense  of  $250  a  day  for  this 
single  item.  This  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  after  a  dispatch  was 
received  it  was  often  crowded  out  by  more  important  news.  Every 
message  received  by  cable  from  Hong  Kong  cost  $1.60  per  word. 

The  result  of  all  this  vast  expenditure,  of  the  labors  of  reporters, 
whose  perils,  exposures,  hardships,  and  endurance  were  not  less  than 
those  of  the  fighting  forces,  was  that  the  American  people  knew  the 
progress  of  the  war  by  the  hour.  The  newspapers  kept  the  govern 
ment  itself  informed  far  in  advance  of  its  own  sources  of  informa 
tion,  in  many  instances. 

The  newspaper  press  came  out  of  the  war  not  less  broadened  than 
the  nation  itself. 


424  HISTORY   OF   THE 


II. 

THE  newspapers  were  filled  with  anecdotes  and  personal  incidents, 

pathetic   and  humorous,  both  of  the   army   and   navy.     They   impart 

the  true  color  of  life  to  the  game   of  war  and  illus- 

ANECDOTES  AND  ,11  •  ?    ,1  i  n  £    ,1        i 

INTERESTING       trate  the  heroism  ot  the  obscure  as  well  as  of  the  lead- 
STORIES  erg       ^   j^e(j   Qross  nurse   in   the   hospital   at   Siboney 

OF  THE  ARMY 

during  the  battle  of  Santiago,  wrote :  "  A  striking  fea 
ture  of  the  first  day's  engagement  was  the  number  of  men  wounded 
in  the  head,  arms,  and  upper  part  of  the  body  —  the  unerring  aim  of 
Spanish  sharpshooters  concealed  in  trees.  Some  of  these  cases— the 
most  severely  wounded — were  taken  into  the  Red  Cross  hospital,  where 
they  would  receive  the  most  skillful  and  gentle  nursing.  Two  days 
of  steady  strain  began  to  show  on  the  Sisters.  But  nobody  thought 
of  meals ;  the  one  thing  was  to  feed  and  nurse  the  four  hundred  and 
seventy-five  wounded  and  sick  men.  Human  endurance,  however,  had 
its  limit,  and  unless  the  Sisters  could  get  a  little  rest  they  would  give 
out.  I  went  on  duty  for  twenty-four  hours,  and  at  night,  with  the 
assistance  of  one  man,  taking  care  of  twenty-three  patients  —  fever, 
measles,  and  dysentery  cases,  and  three  badly  wounded  men. 

"Among  the  latter  were  Captain  Mills,  of  the  First  Cavalry,  and 
William  Clark,  a  private  in  the  Twenty-fifth  Infantry  regulars.  They 
were  brought  over  from  the  hospital  tents  and  placed  on  cots  on  the 
little  porch,  where  there  was  just  space  enough  to  pass  between  the 
cots.  Their  wounds  were  very  similar,  in  the  head,  and  of  such  a 
character  as  to  require  cool  applications  to  the  eyes  constantly.  Ice 
was  worth  its  weight  in  gold,  for  the  lives  of  these  men,  as  well  as 
of  others,  depended  chiefly  on  cool  applications  to  the  eyes,  with  as 
uniform  temperature  as  possible.  We  had  one  small  piece  of  ice, 
carefully  wrapped  in  a  blanket.  There  never  was  a  small  piece  of 
ice  that  'went  so  far.'  If  I  wTere  to  tell  the  truth  about  it  nobody 
would  believe  it.  Never  in  my  life,  I  think,  have  I  wished  for  any 
thing  so  much  as  I  wished  for  ice  that  night.  It  was  applied  by  chip 
ping  it  in  small  pieces,  or  bits,  put  in  thin  dry  cotton  cloth,  folded  over 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  425 

in  just  the  right  size,  and  Hat,  to  place  across  the  eyes  and  forehead 
—  enough  of  it  to  be  cold  but  not  heavy  on  the  wounds.  The  ears 
of  the  sick  are  strangely  acute.  Whenever  the  sick  men  heard  the 
sound  of  chipping  ice  they  begged  for  ice  water — even  the  smallest 
bit  of  ice  in  a  cup  of  water  was  begged  for  with  an  eagerness  that 
was  pitiful.  I  felt  conscience-smitten.  But  it  was  a  question  of  saving 
the  eyes  of  the  wounded  men,  and  there  was  no  other  way.  To 
make  the  ice  last  till  morning.  1  stealthily  chipped  it  off  so  the  sick 
men  would  not  hear  the  sound. 

"At  midnight  a  surgeon  came  over  from  his  tent  ward  with  a 
little  piece  of  ice,  not  larger  than  his  hand.  I  do  not  know  his  name, 
but  it  does  not  matter — it  was  inscribed  above.  'This  is  all  we  can 
spare,'  he  said.  'Take  it.  You  must  keep  these  wounds  cool,  at  all 
hazards.  I  have  another  case,  very  like  these,  wounded  in  the  head. 
I  want  to  bring  him  over  here,  where  he  will  be  sure  of  exactly  the 
same  nursing.  His  life  depends  on  the  care  he  will  get  in  the  next 
twenty-four  hours.  Have  you  a  vacant  cot?' 

"  There  was  not  a  vacant  cot,  though  we  could  make  room  for  one 
on  the  porch  if  he  could  find  the  cot.  He  thought  he  could,  and 
went  back,  taking  the  precious  bit  of  ice  that  he  really  needed  more 
than  wre  did.  In  the  course  of  half  an  hour  the  surgeon  returned 
to  say  it  was  impossible  to  get  a  cot  anywhere,  and  the  wounded 
man  must  be  left  where  he  was  in  the  tent  —  at  least  until  morning. 

"And  so  it  went  on  through  the  long  night— the  patient  suffering 
of  the  sick  men,  the  heroism  of  the  wounded  — all  fearing  to  give  any 
trouble,  desiring  not  to  do  so,  and  grateful  for  the  smallest  attention. 
The  courage  that  faces  death  on  the  battlefield  or  calmly  waits  for 
it  in  the  hospital  is  not  a  courage  of  race  or  color.  Two  of  the  bravest 
men  I  ever  saw  were  here,  almost  side  by  side,  on  the  little  porch, 
Captain  Mills  and  Private  Clark,  one  white,  the  other  black.  They  were 
wounded  almost  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  way.  The  patient 
suffering  and  heroism  of  the  black  soldier  was  fully  equal  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon.  It  was  quite  the  same — the  gentleness  and  appreciation.  They 
were  a  study  —  these  men,  so  widely  apart  in  life,  but  here  so  strangely 


426  HISTORY   OF    THE 

close  and  alike,  on  the  common  ground  of  duty  and  sacrifice.  They 
received  precisely  the  same  care.  Each  was  fed  like  a  child,  for  with 
their  bandaged  eyes  they  were  as  helpless  as  blind  men.  When  the 
ice  pads  were  renewed  on  Captain  Mills's  eyes  the  same  change  was 
made  on  Private  Clark's  eyes.  There  was  no  difference  in  their  food 
or  beds.  Neither  ever  uttered  a  word  of  complaint.  The  nearest 
to  a  regret  expressed  by  Captain  Mills  was  a  heavy  sigh,  followed  by 
the  words:  — 

"'Oh,  we  were  not  ready — our  army  was  not  prepared.' 

"Of  himself  he  talked  cheerfully  —  strong  and  hopeful.  'I  think 
I  shall  get  back  with  the  sight  of  one  eye,'  he  said.  That  was  all. 
In  the  early  part  of  the  night  he  was  restless  —  his  brain  was  active 
—  strong  and  brave  as  he  was.  The  moonlight  wras  very  bright  —  a 
flood  of  silver  light,  seen  only  in  the  tropics.  Hoping  to  divert  him* 
I  said:  'The  moonlight  is  too  bright,  Captain.  I  will  try  to  put  up 
a  little  screen,  so  you  can  get  to  sleep.'  He  realized  at  once  the 
absurdity  and  the  ludicrous  side,  and  with  an  amused  smile  replied: 
'But  you  know — I  can't  see  the  moon.' 

"  I  said  it  was  time  to  get  more  ice  for  his  head,  and  half  stumbled 
across  the  porch,  blinded  by  tears.  When  told  who  his  nearest  neighbor 
was,  Captain  Mills  expressed  great  sympathy  for  Private  Clark  and  paid 
a  high  tribute  to  the  bravery  of  the  colored  troops  and  their  faithful 
performance  of  duty.  Private  Clark  talked  but  little.  He  would  lie, 
apparently  asleep,  until  the  pain  in  his  head  became  unbearable,  then 
he  would  try  to  sit  up,  always  careful  to  keep  the  ice  pad  on  his  eyes 
over  the  bandage.  'What  can  I  do  for  you,  Clark?'  I  would  ask. 
'Nothing,  thank  you,'  he  would  answer,  'it's  very  nice  and  com 
fortable  here.  But  it's  only  the  misery  in  my  head  —  the  misery  is 
awful.' " 

Sergeant  Mclnerney  of  Company  E,  Ninth  Infantry,  is  credited  with 
having  fired  the  shot  that  disabled  the  Spanish  General  Linares.  The 
Sergeant  was  peeping  over  the  edge  of  the  trench  Saturday  morning, 
the  second  day  before  Santiago;  near  him  stood  his  Lieutenant.  The 
Ninth  had  received  orders  from  its  Colonel  not  to  fire  unless  so  ordered. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  427 

"  Lieutenant,"  said  the  Sergeant,  "  there's  a  Spaniard  on  a  white 
horse  with  staff  officers  around  him.  I  think  he's  a  general  officer. 
The  distance  is  1,000  yards.  Can  I  pick  him  off?"  The  word  was 
passed  along,  and  permission  came  back.  Mclnerney  rolled  his  car 
tridge  over  his  tongue  (a  soldier's  superstition),  and  loaded  his  rifle. 
Then,  resting  his  rifle  on  the  edge  of  the  pit,  he  aimed  and  tired. 

"I  undershot  just  100  yards,"  said  he,  drawing  another  cartridge 
from  his  mouth,  "  but  it  didn't  scare  him." 

When  Mclnerney's  rifle  cracked  again  he  cried,  "  I  got  him,"  and 
the  officer  on  the  white  horse  fell  over  with  a  shot  in  his  shoulder. 
It  was  General  Linares,  the  Spanish  commandant. 

Before  Mclnerney  could  get  under  cover  a  Mauser  clipped  the  dirt 
tin  inch  from  his  ear.  ''A  little  too  far  to  the  right,"  he  cried, 
waving  his  right  arm  as  though  he  were  a  target  marker  on  a  rifle 
range. 

One  of  the  volunteers  before  Santiago  had  an  excessive  fondness 
for  liquor,  that  at  times  rendered  him  unmanageable.  One  day  while 
in  camp  in  Florida  the  Colonel  of  his  regiment  called  him  into  his 
tent  for  the  purpose  of  talking  to  him  like  a  father,  as  he  had  known 
him  for  years. 

'•  Now,  look  here,  John,"  said  the  Colonel  kindly,  "  what  do  you 
mean  by  this  sort  of  thing?" 

"  I  mean  to  quit,  Colonel,"  he  responded. 

"  You've  said  that  a  million  times.  You  ought  to  be  ashamed  of 
yourself.  You  are  a  man  of  more  than  ordinary  intelligence,  you 
have  nice  people  at  home,  you  are  of  a  good  family,  you  are  quick  to 
learn  the  duties  of  a  soldier,  you  are  clean,  you  look  well,  you  keep 
your  accoutrements  in  fine  condition,  you  are  obedient,  you  are  always 
willing  to  take  your  share  of  the  hardships,  you  never  complain,  and, 
in  fact,  you  are  a  model  soldier  with  one  exception." 

"What's  that,  Colonel?"  asked  John,  just  a  shade  leerily,  it  must 
be  confessed. 

"You  will  get  drunk." 

"Is  that  all,  Colonel?" 


428  HISTORY    OF    THE 

" That's  enough,  isn't  it?" 

John  steadied  himself  by  the  Colonel's  table. 

"  Now,  Colonel,"  he  said  —  all  volunteers  have  a  way  of  talking  to 
their  superiors — "if  I'm  all  these  good  things  that  you  say  I  am,  why 
not  let  the  drinking  go  with  the  balance?  You  don't  expect  to  get 
all  the  cardinal  virtues  for  $13  a  month,  do  you?" 

It  was  in  the  canteen  at  Camp  Wikoff  that  a  reporter  heard  this 
anecdote  from  a  regular. 

"  Talk  about  your  Generals,  Chaffee's  the  old  boy  for  my  money. 
I  found  out  what  he  was  at  El  Caney.  My  company  was  at  work 
digging  trenches  and  while  we  were  finishing  up  one  the  Spaniards 
began  to  fire  and  the  bullets  sang  their  little  tunes  pretty  nigh  to 
our  heads.  Well,  there  was  a  kid  in  the  company  that  couldn't  have 
been  over  eighteen.  Never  ought  to  have  let  him  enlist  at  all.  He 
was  always  complaining  and  kicking,  and  at  the  first  fire  down  he 
went  flat  on  his  face  and  lay  there.  One  of  the  men  kicked  him, 
but  he  didn't  stir.  Then  along  came  Chaffee,  cool  and  easy,  and 
sees  the  kid. 

"'Hello,  there!'  says  Chaffee.  'What's  the  matter,  you  fellow  down 
there?  Get  up  and  fight  with  your  company.' 

" '  No,  I  can't,'  whines  the  kid. 

"'Can't?'  says  Chaffee,  jumping  down  into  the  trench  and  hauling 
the  boy  up.  '  What's  the  matter  with  you  that  you  can't?  Are  you 
hurt?' 

" 'No,  sir,' says  he.     'I'm  scairt.     I'm  afraid  of  getting  hit.' 

"  '  Well,  you're  a  fine  soldier,'  says  the  General.  Then  he  looked 
at  the  boyish  face  of  the  kid  and  his  face  kind  of  softened.  '  I  sup 
pose  you  can't  help  it,'  he  said.  '  It  ain't  so  much  your  fault.  I'd 
like  to  get  hold  of  the  fellow  that  took  you  into  the  army.' 

"  I  suppose  any  other  General  would  have  sent  the  kid  to  the  rear 
in  disgrace  and  that  would  have  been  the  end  of  it;  but  Chaffee  stood 
there  with  the  bullets  ki-yiying  around  him  beside  the  boy,  who  had 
crouched  down  again,  and  thought,  with  his  chin  in  his  hand.  By 
and  by  he  put  his  hand  on  the  boy's  shoulder. 


SPANISH  AMERICAN    WAR  439 

"'There  isn't  as  much  danger  as  you  think  for,'  he  said.  'Now, 
you  get  up  and  take  your  gun  and  tight  and  I'll  stand  here  by 
you.' 

"The  boy  got  up  shaking  like  a  leaf,  and  fired  his  first  shot  pretty 
near  straight  in  the  air. 

'"That's  pretty  high,'  says  the  General.     ' Keep  cool  and  try  again.' 

"Well,  sir,  in  three  minutes  that  'scairt'  kid  was  fighting  like  a 
veteran  and  cool  as  a  cucumber,  and  when  he  saw  it  the  General 
started  on. 

'"You're  all  right  now,  my  boy,'  he  said.  'You'll  make  a  good 
soldier.' 

"'God  bless  you,  sir,'  said  the  youngster.  'You  saved  me  from 
worse  than  death,'  and  he  was  pretty  close  to  crying  when  he  said  it. 

"After  a  while  the  order  came  to  retire  from  the  trench,  and  we 
just  had  to  collar  that  kid  and  haul  him  away  by  the  neck  to  get 
him  to  retreat  with  his  company.  And,  at  that,  he'd  got  a  bullet 
through  the  fleshy  part  of  his  shoulder  an  hour  before.  In  the  rest 
of  the  fights  there  wasn't  a  better  soldier  in  the  company,  and  not 
only  that,  but  we  never  heard  a  grumble  or  a  kick  from  him  from 
that  day." 

Here  is  the  story  of  "Old  Hoss"  at  Camp  Wikoff:  In  the  middle 
of  the  main  roadway  from  the  railroad  station  across  the  point  is 
a  little  grassy  rise  where  the  wagon  trails  divide  to  reunite  a  few 
rods  further  on.  A  rough  wooden  cross  stands  upright  there.  It 
marks  the  last  resting  place  of  a  veteran  of  the  Sixth  Cavalry,  who 
fell  there  and  was  buried  where  he  fell.  On  the  cross  is  the  inscrip 
tion  :  — 

"RATTLESNAKE  BILL, 
A  HORSE." 

The  Sixth  are  mourning  Rattlesnake  Bill  almost  as  they  would  a 
man  of  the  regiment,  for  he  was  a  part  of  it  before  half  of  them  en 
listed.  Years  of  service  had  weakened  his  frame,  but  not  his  spirit, 
and  as  one  of  the  equine  veterans  he  was  treated  with  special  con 
sideration.  Yesterday  a  trooper  rode  him  down  to  the  station,  where  he 


430  HISTORY    OF   THE 

found  a  message  requiring  his  immediate  return.  He  urged  the  old 
horse  to  extra  speed  with  voice  and  rein, —  spurs  never  were  needed 
for  Rattlesnake  Bill, —  and  the  animal  answered  with  the  best  there 
was  in  him.  But  Montauk  roadways  turn  and  twist  over  a  hundred 
little  rises  and  descents,  that  break  the  wind  and  torture  the  spirits. 
The  sandy  dust  was  fetlock  deep.  Clouds  of  it  blew  into  the  strain 
ing  nostrils  of  the  horse,  and  his  breath  came  harder  and  harder. 
Once  or  twice  he  looked  around  appealingly,  but  this  was  a  case  of 
haste,  and  his  disciplined  spirit  set  the  wearied  muscles  firmly  to  the 
task  at  the  word  of  command.  On  a  roadway  where  nearly  half  the 
cavalry  horses  go  at  a  gallop  not  an  animal  passed  him,  until  he 
reached  the  hill  where  the  roadway  curves  just  before  it  splits  at  the 
grassy  mound.  Then  three  colored  cavalrymen  went  tearing  by. 

"Get  on,  Bill,"  urged  his  rider.  "What's  got  you,  lettin'  a  lot  of 
skates  like  that  go  by  you?" 

Up  went  the  old  horse's  ears,  and  with  a  short  whinny  he  leaped 
forward,  stumbled,  staggered,  plunged  blindly  up  the  little  slope  and 
fell.  In  an  instant  the  trooper  was  at  his  head. 

"What's  the  matter,  Bill,  old  boy?     Come,  boy,  get  up." 
Bill  lay  with  half-closed  eyes,  panting.     A  little  group  of  infantry 
men  came   up,  and  looked  on  while  the   trooper  patted   the  animal's 
neck  and  talked  to  him. 

"Come  up  now,  boy!"  cried  the  rider.  "Come  on,  Bill!" 
For  the  last  time  the  brave  old  horse  answered  the  word  of  com 
mand,  got  his  forelegs  under  him,  struggled  half  way  up,  then,  with 
a  moan  like  that  of  a  suffering  human  being,  fell  back.  The  trooper 
sat  down  and  took  the  great  head  on  his  knees.  Bill  whinnied  brok 
enly,  nestled  his  soft  nose  into  his  master's  hand,  stretched  out,  and 
was  dead.  The  man's  head  drooped  over,  and  the  face  was  buried  in 
the  heavy  mane.  The  infantrymen  silently  turned  and  walked  away, 
the  owner  of  the  flask  forgetting,  or  not  caring  to  reclaim  it.  Pres 
ently  there  came  along  a  detachment  of  Sixth  Cavalrymen.  They 
dismounted  and  joined  their  grief-stricken  comrade.  All  their  efforts 
could  bring  no  sign  of  life  from  the  horse. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  431 

They  left  a  guard  of  honor  beside  the  body  of  Rattlesnake  Bill 
\u\ti\  sunset.  That  night  ten  men  of  the  Sixth  ran  the  guard,  and 
with  pick  and  spades,  which  they  had  borrowed  from  the  engineers, 
dug  the  veteran's  grave  and  buried  the  horse.  His  rider  set  tirmly 
in  the  ground  the  wooden  cross  with  its  penciled  inscription,  the 
men,  uncovering,  and  walking  away  in  silence. 

Sergeant  Ousler  of  the  regulars  told  some  stories  of  the  action  at 
Las  Guasimas.  "That  story  about  Assistant  JSurgeon  Church,  the  young 
Washington  medico  of  the  Rough  Riders,  who  dressed  a  fallen  man's 
wound  away  out  ahead  of  the  line,  amid  a  hail  of  Mauser  bullets,  has 
been  published,"  said  he, "  but  the  coolness  of  that  young  fellow  wasn't 
even  half  described.  While  he  was  making  an  examination  of  his 
wounded  comrade,  paying  no  attention  to  the  whistle  of  the  bullets, 
a  young  private  of  the  Rough  Riders,  who  had  been  a  college  mate 
of  Church  at  Princeton,  yelled  over  to  him  from  a  distance  of  about 
twenty  feet  —  he  was  in  with  a  half  a  dozen  fellows  doing  sharp 
shooter's  work  from  behind  a  cluster  of  bushes  —  to  ask  how  badly 
the  patient  was  hurt.  The  young  surgeon  looked  over  his  shoulder 
in  the  direction  whence  the  private's  voice  proceeded,  and  he  saw 
his  former  chum  grinning  in  the  bushes. 

"'Why,  you  whelp!'  said  Church,  with  a  comical  grin  on  his  face, 
'how  dare  you  be  around  here  and  not  be  killed!' 

"  Then  he  went  on  fixing  the  wounded  man,  and  he  remained  right 
there  with  him  until  the  arrival  of  the  litter,  that  he  had  sent  to 
the  rear  for. 

"In  my  cavalry  outfit  there  was  a  fellow  with  whom  I  soldiered 
out  West  four  or  five  years  ago.  He  was  a  crack  baseball  pitcher, 
and  he  would  rather  play  ball  than  eat,  any  time.  He  got  a  Mauser 
ball  plumb  through  the  biceps  of  his  right  arm  early  in  the  engage 
ment.  I  never  saw  a  man  so  darned  mad  over  a  thing  in  my  life. 
The  wound  pained  him  a  good  deal,  but  it  wasn't  the  pain  that  hurt 
him  so  much.  I  met  him  at  the  rear  after  the  scrap  was  over.  He 
had  tried  to  go  on  shooting  with  his  carbine,  but  he  couldn't  make 
rt  go  with  his  left  hand  and  arm  alone,  and  so  he  had  to  drop  back. 


432  HISTORY   OF   THE 

He  was  alternately  rubbing  his  arm  and  scratching  his  head  when  I 
came  across  him. 

"'Hurt  much?'  I  asked  him. 

"  '  Hurt,  nothing! '  said  he,  scowling  like  a  savage;  '  but  did  you  ever 
hear  of  such  luck  as  this,  to  get  plugged  right  in  my  pitching  arm? 
Why  the  devil  didn't  they  get  me  in  the  neck,  or  somewhere  else, 
anyhow?  I'll  never  be  able  to  pitch  another  game,  I'll  bet  $2,  for 
these  muscles  are  going  to  contract  when  the  hole  heals  up,'  and 
he  went  on  swearing  '  to  beat  the  band '  because  the  Spaniards  hadn't 
let  him  have  it  '  in  the  neck,  or  somewhere  else.' 

"One  of  the  fellows  in  the  Rough  Riders,  an  Oklahoma  boy,  got 
a  ball  clean  through  his  campaign  hat,  which  was  whirled  off  his 
head,  and  fell  about  five  feet  away  from  him.  He  picked  up  the 
hat,  examined  it  carefully,  and  said:  — 

" '  I'll  have  to  patch  that  up  with  sticking  plaster,  or  I'll  get  my 
hair  sunburnt.'  The  fun  of  it  was  that  his  hair  was  about  the  reddest 
I  ever  saw." 

Another  regular  of  the  First  Cavalry  related  an  incident  of  the 
advance  on  San  Juan.  "  There  was  a  young  fellow  near  me,"  he 
said,  "behind  a  tree  trunk,  one  of  those  stunted  little  trees.  It  was 
big  enough  to  cover  his  body,  because  he  was  about  as  thick  as  a 
lath.  His  name  was  Charlie  Jacob,  and  his  father  was  United  States 
Minister  to  Colombia  at  one  time,  and  is  now  a  rich  and  prominent 
man  at  Louisville,  in  Kentucky.*  Young  Jacob  was  just  a  boy  in 
heart,  though  he  was  twenty-one.  When  the  war  came  he  enlisted 
among  the  very  first  in  the  old  First  Cavalry.  His  hands  were  made 
for  kid  gloves,  and  his  feet  for  patent  leathers,  and  he  was  as  tall 
and  thin  as  they  can  make  'em  without  breaking.  Well,  we  tried 
putting  work  onto  him,  but  he  seemed  to  like  it,  and  was  so  full  of 
singing,  joking,  and  skylarking  that  it  was'nt  three  weeks  before  we  all 
got  to  taking  work  off  him.  He  never  bragged,  and  he  never  kicked ; 
soldier- work  was  fun  for  him.  When  he  was  standing  behind  the 


*The   Honorable   Charles  D.  Jacob,  a  distinguished   citizen  of  Kentucky. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  1:;:| 

tree  there,  his  Sergeant  started  on  a  rush  ahead  for  a  clump  of  brush 
in  sight.  He  had'nt  got  twenty  feet  past  young  Jacob's  tree  when 
a  bullet  or  two  socked  him  in  the  legs  and  he  fell.  Shrapnel  and  Mau 
sers  were  coming  hot  when  young  Jacob  put  down  his  gun,  and  made 
about  two  jumps  to  the  Sergeant,  and  stooped  over  to  lift  him  up  and 
bring  him  back  to  cover.  He  was  asking  where  the  Sergeant  was 
hit  and  gathering  him  up,  when  two  bullets  struck  him,  one  in  the 
head.  He  did'nt  live  but  a  few  hours. 

"The  Sergeant  said,  'you  ought'nt  to  have  done  it,  Charlie.' 

"'I  could'nt  help  it,'  said  Charlie. 

"  His  hands  were  soft,  but  he  had  a  strong  heart  in  him,  and  went 
into  fighting  like  he  went  into  playing.  When  we  buried  him  next 
day  we  laid  a  brave  soldier  away,  and  thought  of  his  happy  disposi 
tion  that  had  cheered  us  so  much.  There  was  some  crying,  I  tell 
you.  used  as  we  were  to  such  things." 

Edward  Marshall,  the  correspondent,  badly  shot  at  Las  Guasimas, 
describes  the  Mauser  bullet  and  its  effect.*  He  could  not  find  a  bet 
ter  way  to  describe  the  sound  of  the  Mauser  bullets  that  were  singing 
around  the  Rough  Riders  in  that  fight  than  by  the  letters  "Z-Z-Z-Z-Z-CH," 
adding  that  the  cracks  of  the  rifles  sounded  for  all  the  world  like  the 
explosion  of  a  lamp  in  a  drawing-room.  "  The  noise  of  the  Mauser 
bullet  traveling  through  the  air  is  not  impressive  enough  to  be 
really  terrifying  until  you  have  seen  what  it  does  when  it  strikes. 
It  is  a  nasty,  malicious  little  noise,  like  the  soul  of  a  very  petty  and 
mean  person  turned  into  sound.  Its  beginning  and  its  ending  are 
pitched  a  little  lower  than  its  middle.  Its  beginning  is  gradual,  but 
its  ending  is  instantaneous.  I  saw  many  men  shot.  Every  one  went 
down  in  a  lump  without  cries,  without  jumping  up  in  the  air,  with 
out  throwing  up  hands.  They  just  went  down  like  clods  in  the  grass. 
It  seemed  to  me  that  the  terrible  thud  with  which  they  struck  the 
earth  was  more  penetrating  than  the  sound  of  guns.  Some  were  only 
wounded;  some  were  dead. 


*  Scribner's  Magazine,  September,  1898. 


4JJ4  HISTORY  OF   THE 

"  Once  I  thought  I  had  found  a  coward.  A  man  was  running 
wildly  toward  the  rear.  L  stopped  him  and  asked  him  what  he  was 
running  away  from.  He  restrained  himself  with  diiiic.nlty  from  brain 
ing  me  with  his  carbine.  lie  had  torn  off  the  sole  of  one  shoe,  and 
the  accident  hampered  his  movements.  He  was  running  wildly  about 
in  a  temperature  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  three  degrees,  searching 
for  a  dead  man  to  take  a  shoe  from.  He  was  running  so  that  he  could 
get  quickly  back  to  where  the  firing  was.  I  showed  him  the  dead 
man  and  helped  him  to  take  the  shoe  off.  He  was  very  grateful, 
and  after  he  had  once  more  gained  protection  for  his  foot  he  started 
on  the  double-quick  for  the  firing  line." 


in. 

IN  AN  account  of  the  sea  fight  at  Santiago  by  George  E.  Graham, 

a  press  correspondent  on  board  the  Brooklyn,*  he  describes  some  acts 

ANECDOTES  AND       °^  SrG&^  courage  and  how  they  were  performed.     "  Up 

INCIDENTS  FROM    forward   on   the   gun   decks,"   he   writes,   "was  a  six- 

THE   NAVAL  LOG  ,      .         ,,   .  „  .  ,  ,  .  ,        , 

pounder  that  in  this  close  forty-minutes  action  had 
been  doing  valiant  work.  As  they  were  putting  in  a  cartridge  the 
shell  loosened  from  the  casing  and  became  wedged.  This  was  on  the 
side  near  the  enemy,  but  there  was  not  a  moment's  hesitation.  Out 
on  the  gun's  mu//Je  crawled  Corporal  Robert  Gray,  of  the  Marine 
Corps,  a  rammer  in  his  hand  ready  to  drive  the  shell  out.  The  gun 
was  hot,  and  he  could  not  retain  his  hold;  so  he  dropped  down  to 
the  sea  ladder.  Over  his  head  was  the  frightful  blast  and  draft  of 
the  big  gun,  while  around  him  pattered  the  shot  of  the  enemy.  He 
failed  in  his  attempt,  and  gunner  Smith  then  tried  it,  but  he  too 
failed.  Tt  looked  as  though  the  gun  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  but 
Private  MacNeal,  of  the  squad,  asked  permission  to  make  an  attempt, 
and  was  allowed  to  try  it.  Clinging  to  the  hot  gun,  with  death  by 
water  assured  if  he  dropped  or  was  knocked  off  by  the  concussion, 

*In  Mc("luri''x  Mat/nzine,  September,  1898. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  485 

and  the  enemy  firing  at  him,  he  got  the  rammer  in  the  muzzle  and 
rammed  out  the  shell,  amidst  cheers  from  his  comrades.  1  watched 
these  men  closely.  None  of  them  showed  the  slightest  sign  of  heroic 
exhilaration.  it  was  evidently  to  them  a  duty  of  the  commonest 
sort.  A  few  minutes  later  a  (J-inch  projectile  smashed  into  a  com 
partment  just  below  them.  They  laughed  at  the  gunner's  aim  when 
they  found  nobody  hurt.  Five  minutes  later  I  photographed  a  man 
at  the  after  masthead  fixing  up  one  of  the  battle  flags,  the  halyards 
of  which  had  been  shot  away.  The  fire  was  deadly  about  him.  He 
would  not  give  his  name. 

Mr.  C.  S.  Clark,  in  the  United  Service  Magazine,  recounted  an  extraor 
dinary  exploit  by  an  officer  named  Gillis  on  the  torpedo  boat  Porter: 
"The  torpedo  had  been  fired  from  the  destroyer  Pluton,  and.  with  force 
almost  expended,  was  coming  slowly  but  surely  toward  the  anchored 
torpedo  boat  Porter.  Gillis  sprang  overboard,  swam  to  the  torpedo, 
turned  the  nose  away  from  the  Porter,  and  screwed  up  the  firing-pin 
tightly  so  that  it  would  not  operate.  Then,  treading  water,  he  saluted 
Lieutenant  Fremont  and  reported:  'Sir,  I  have  to  report  I  have  cap 
tured  a  torpedo/  'Bring  it  aboard,  sir.'  replied  Fremont;  and  Gillis 
actually  did  so,  swimming  with  it  to  the  ship  and  fastening  tackles 
to  it." 

From  a  very  finely  written  and  spirited  description  of  the  capture 
of  Guam  Island,  in  the  Ladrones  group,  in  the  New  York  Sun,  is  taken 
this  amusing  incident  of  the  visit  of  the  American  soldiers  and  sailors 
to  the  house  of  the  head  of  the  police  in  Agana:  "Vincente  Diaz  pro 
duced  cigarettes  and  cigars,  of  Manila  make,  and  a  bottle  of  hell-fire 
aguardiente  of  his  own  distillation.  Then  from  some  mysterious  inside 
nook  he  brought  out  a  new  and  shiny  accordion.  He  gave  it  to  a 
vacant-faced  and  bashful  young  man  and  commanded  him  to  play. 
The  Americans  joined  in  the  demand  at  once,  and  asked  for  a  dance. 
But  Diaz  replied  that  the  Chamorros  had  no  dances.  The  boy  tried 
the  accordion  a  while  and  began  to  play.  The  first  bar  made  every 
American  in  the  room  cock  his  ears  and  stare  at  his  neighbor.  No  weird, 
fantastic  music  of  any  sort  could  have  surprised  them.  They  expected 


436  HISTORY   OF   THE 

that.  They  would  have  called  it  native  and  been  well  pleased  with 
it.  But  this  was  familiar.  It  wasn't  exactly  as  they  remembered  it, 
'  but  as  the  song  grew  louder '  it  developed  unmistakably  into  the  '  New 
Bully,'  and  when  it  struck  the  chorus  the  whole  crowd  joined  with 
a  roar  in  yelling: — 

When  I  walk  that  levee  roun' 

I'm  lookin'  for  dat  bully  V  he  mus'  be  foun'. 

"The  applause  that  followed  this  performance  so  astonished  the 
young  artist  that  he  stopped  playing.  When  he  was  persuaded  to 
go  on  again  he  played  '  Ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay.'  amid  the  wildest  cheers. 
The  reception  the  Americans  gave  his  music  surprised  him  very 
much. 

There  were  loud  inquiries  as  to  where  he  learned  the  tunes,  but  this 
was  the  only  question,  almost,  that  the  Diazes  could  not  answer.  They 
'  guessed '  that  it  was  from  a  whaler,  and  probably  they  guessed  right. 
But  the  '  New  Bully '  is  not  so  very  old,  and  it  was  mighty  queer  to 
hear  it  ground  out  on  an  accordion  under  a  cocoanut-palm  thatch 
in  Guam,  when  it  was  just  the  other  day  that  May  Irwin  was  singing 
it  in  New  York." 

The  same  correspondent  gave  an  account  of  Aguinaldo's  military 
band,  at  Cavite,  which  will  surprise  those  who  know  so  little  of  the 
Far  East.  "A  wonderful  band,"  he  wrote,  "  marched  up  the  muddy 
Calle  de  San  Francisco  from  Aguinaldo's  headquarters  this  morning, 
and  for  an  hour  serenaded  General  Anderson  with  playing  that  would 
set  the  music  lovers  of  New  York  wild  with  excitement.  The  aver 
age  Filipino  does  not  present  the  appearance  of  a  musician  or  a 
music  lover.  But  for  his  bright,  intelligent  eyes  he  would  look  like  a 
stupid  Patagonian  sheep  herder.  There  are  few  musical  instruments 
in  the  native  villages.  Once  in  a  while  one  runs  across  an  old  tin- 
pan-toned  cracked  piano  horribly  out  of  tune,  and  two  or  three  places 
have  harps.  But  this  band,  composed  entirely  of  Filipinos,  is  worthy 
to  rank  with  the  bands  of  the  world.  It  was  the  famous  military  band 
of  Manila,  where  it  used  to  furnish  classic  music  on  the  Lunetta  when 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  4;J7 

the  aristocratic  Spaniards  went  out  for  their  evening  drive  or  prom 
enade.  And  occasionally,  or  oftener,  it  was  turned  out  to  play  while 
a  few  dozens  of  the  musicians'  people  were  shot  for  the  edification  of 
the  multitude,  on  the  charge  of  sympathizing  with  insurrection  or 
some  other  trumped-up  accusation. 

"In  Manila  there  were  seventy-two  members.  Sixty  of  them  man 
aged  to  get  away  with  their  instruments  and  music.  This  morning 
forty-eight  played  on  the  little  plaza  in  front  of  General  Anderson's 
headquarters.  And  such  playing !  It  was  recompense  for  every  dis 
comfort,  every  vexation,  every  disappointment,  every  hardship  of  seven 
thousand  miles  in  a  troop  ship,  the  last  five  thousand  at  half  steam 
in  a  tropic  sea.  You  shut  your  eyes  and  heard  the  orchestra  of  the 
Royal  Opera  at  Vienna,  the  great  Budapest  Band,  the  famous  military 
hand  in  Berlin,  the  Boston  Symphony  at  its  best,  Seidl's  finest  work, 
anything  in  the  world.  With  never  a  note  in  front  of  them,  they 
played  what  you  liked,  any  part  of  any  opera,  the  grandest  music 
ever  written,  or  a  simple  Strauss  waltz  or  a  folksong.  And  the  bass 
drummer  was  the  leader.  You  will  never  hear  a  bass  drum  really 
played  until  you  hear  that  Filipino  do  it.  He  makes  a  bass  drum 
talk,  sing,  cry,  shout.  It  fits  the  mood  and  movement  of  the  music. 
It  is  subordinate  or  dominant,  soft,  subdued,  or  loud  and  roaring;  it 
laughs  and  chuckles  like  a  thing  alive;  it  raves  and  protests  like  an 
angry  soldier,  and  all  in  perfect  harmony  and  sympathy  with  the  rest. 
The  ambition  of  the  average  bass  drummer  is  to  develop  the  muscles 
in  his  arms.  He  pounds  the  uncomplaining  drum  as  if  he  were 
swinging  clubs  for  exercise.  But  with  this  Filipino  it  is  a  science 
and  an  art,  and  he  is  master  of  both.  It  is  a  curiously  organ 
ized  band  —  one  bass  drum,  two  snares,  a  lyre,  five  tubas,  eleven  sax 
ophones,  big  and  little;  eleven  clarinets,  eight  cornets,  one  ballad 
horn,  and  four  altos  and  tenors.  They  played  songs  from  'Faust,' 
and  I  sat  again  in  the  Metropolitan  Opera  House  and  heard  and  saw 
the  vast  audience  get  to  its  feet  with  frantic  cheers  when  Calve  and 
the  two  de  Reszkes  finished  the  prayer  song.  They  played,  but  no 
telling  describes  what  they  played." 


438  HISTORY   OF    THE 

From  two  articles  on  the  subject*  are  extracted  some  compari 
sons  of  American  and  Spanish  seamen  on  war  vessels :  — 

"A  man-of-war  commander  in  the  American  naval  service  seldom  knows  what 
one-half  of  the  men  of  his  crew  are  capable  of  doing  until  the  man's  respective 
capabilities  are  revealed  by  incidents  that  happen  aboard  ship.  There  are  some 
curious  instances  of  how  men  forward,  down  on  the  rolls  as  '  laborers '  or  '  clerks, 
have  shown  their  hands,  and  made  decided  hits  in  emergencies.  One  night  about 
three  years  ago,  when  most  of  the  officers,  including  the  surgeon,  of  a  gunboat 
lying  in  San  Francisco  harbor  were  ashore  attending  a  social  function,  a  newly 
shipped  coal  heaver,  whose  occupation  on  the  rolls  was  that  of  a  laborer,  fell  down 
the  hatchway  ladder  from  the  main  deck  to  the  machine  shop.  There  was  no  one 
in  the  machine  shop  at  the  time.  The  coal  heaver  with  his  legs,  the  right  one 
badly  broken,  dangling  in  the  air,  walked  on  his  hands  from  the  machine  shop  up 
forward  to  the  sick  bay,  where  some  of  the  bluejackets  picked  him  up  and  deposited 
him  on  a  couch.  The  coal  heaver  told  the  men  that  his  leg  was  broken,  and  one 
of  them  rushed  to  report  the  case  to  the  officer  of  the  deck. 

"  The  officer  of  the  deck  sent  for  the  apothecary.  The  apothecary  told  the  officer 
of  the  deck  that  he  didn't  have  the  skill  to  set  broken  legs.  A  big,  indolent 
marine,  a  recruit,  whose  only  capability  thus  far  had  seemed  to  consist  in  the  getting 
on  the  outside  of  three  very  heavy  'squares'  a  day,  heard  the  excitement  from  his 
hammock  where  he  was  dozing.  The  big  marine  tumbled  out  of  his  hammock,  went 
to  the  sick  bay,  and  set  the  coal  heaver's  broken  leg  in  a  style  that  aroused  the 
admiration  of  the  surgeon  when  he  returned  to  the  ship  after  midnight.  All  hands 
wondered  how  the  coal  heaver  had  managed  to  walk  on  his  hands  from  the  machine 
shop  forward  to  the  sick  bay,  until  he  admitted  that  he  had  been  a  professional 
acrobat  ashore,  and  that  he  had  shipped  in  the  navy  because  the  circus  with  which 
he  last  traveled  had  gone  to  pieces  in  San  Francisco,  leaving  him  stranded  in  the 
hardest  town  in  which  to  go  broke  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  big,  indolent 
marine,  who  set  the  coal  heaver's  broken  leg,  had  to  admit  to  the  surgeon  that  he 
had  been  graduated  in  surgery  years  before,  and  had  done  his  tour  in  several 
famous  English  hospitals  before  he  drifted  into  sea-soldiering. 

'"How  did  you  happen  to  enter  the  marine  corps?'  inquired  the  surgeon. 

" '  Rum,'  laconically  replied  the  marine. 

"  One  afternoon,  down  in  Honolulu  harbor,  Admiral  Beardslee,  in  command  of  the 
Pacific  squadron  from  the  flagship  Philadelphia,  was  in  a  quandary  because  of  the 
unexpected  arrival  a  day  ahead  of  time  of  the  Australian  steamer  that  was  to  carry 
the  fleet's  mail  to  San  Francisco.  The  Admiral  had  a  voluminous  report  to  make 
on  the  situation  in  Honolulu  —  this  was  during  the  last  Hawaiian  revolution  —  and 
he  had  only  three  hours  in  which  to  draw  up  the  report,  for  the  Australian  steamer 


*From  the  New  York  Sun,  May  22,  and  June  5. 


SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR  439 

could  uot,  of  course,  wait.  The  Admiral  came  out  of  his  cabin  and  told  the  officer 
of  the  deck  at  the  gangway  to  send  ashore  with  all  haste  for  somebody  who  could 
take  rapid  dictation  on  a  typewriting  machine.  A  young  landsman,  who  had  been 
a  good  deal  of  a  inuff  at  '  sailorizing,'  overheard  the  Admiral  giving  this  order,  and 
he  walked  up  to  Beardslee,  knuckled  his  forehead  in  the  usual  manner,  and  volun 
teered  to  do  the  work.  The  Admiral  looked  at  the  landsman  without  much  confi 
dence  in  his  gaze. 

"'What  kind  of  a  typewriter  do  you  handle?'  he  asked  the  recruit. 

"'Any  kind,1  was  the  reply. 

"The  Admiral  took  the  landsman  recruit  aft  and  began  to  dictate  trial  stuff  to 
the  bluejacket.  The  bluejacket  rattled  the  copy  off  in  a  style  that  opened  the 
Admiral's  eyes.  Beardslee  dictated  his  report  to  the  lightning  swift  bluejacket 
typewriter,  the  words  hardly  falling  from  his  lips  before  the  landsman  had  them 
down  pat.  The  Admiral  took  the  pages  one  by  one.  There  wasn't  a  mistake  in 
spelling,  punctuation,  or  paragraphing.  The  copy  was  absolutely  clean,  although  the 
Admiral  had  dictated  at  the  rate  of  ninety  words  a  minute.  The  Australian  steamer 
carried  Beardslee's  report,  and  the  landsman  was  immediately  rated  Admiral's  yeo 
man,  or  private  secretary.  A  yeoman  is  a  sixty-dollar-a-month  chief  petty  officer. 
The  bluejacket  had  been  a  court  stenographer  in  New  York. 

"A  bluejacket  who  put  in  a  three-year's  enlistment  as  a  deck  hand  took  his  dis 
charge  from  the  navy  a  couple  of  years  ago  while  his  ship  was  at  Yokohama,  Japan, 
and  got  a  job  as  a  shipping  clerk.  A  few  weeks  after  he  went  to  work  ashore 
one  of  his  shipmates  was  arrested  and  locked  up,  charged  with  stabbing  a  jinriksha 
Jap.  The  sailor  was  tried  before  the  Consular  Court,  but  before  his  trial  came  off 
his  ship  left  Yokohama  for  China.  The  ex-bluejacket  conducted  his  shipmate's  de 
fense  before  the  Consular  Court,  and  he  conducted  it  so  ably  and  with  such  a  fine 
knowledge  of  law  that  his  man-of-war's  man  client  was  acquitted.  The  ex-bluejacket 
lawyer  had  been  in  his  day  the  junior  partner  in  a  well-known  firm  in  St.  Louis. 
Kum,  injudiciously  mixed  with  politics  and  cards,  had  got  him  over  the  side  of  a 
man-of-war  with  a  hammock  and  ditty  bag,  but  he  went  in  as  a  'laborer.' 

"  When  the  officers  of  one  of  our  cruisers  on  the  Mediterranean  station  were  giv- 
ino-  a  dance  aboard  one  night  about  a  year  ago,  the  ship's  dynamo  broke  down  and 
all  the  lights  on  the  ship  went  out  at  once.  The  swell  congregation  of  American 
tourists  and  foreigners  was  in  the  midst  of  a  waltz  on  the  main  deck  at  the  moment 
of  the  extinguishment  of  the  lights,  and  the  women  fell  into  a  panic.  The  officer  of 
the  deck  galloped  to  the  dynamo  room,  where  he  found  the  chief  gunner's  mate,  who 
used  to  be  the  chief  electrician  aboard  our  war  ships,  in  despair.  The  dynamo  was 
in  such  a  condition  that  its  custodian,  whose  course  in  electricity  had  been  of  a  hur 
ried  and  superficial  sort,  reported  that  it  would  require  a  week  anyhow  to  patch  it 
up.  The  machinists  were  called  forward,  but  machinists  are  not  supposed  to  have 
much  knowledge  of  electrical  apparatus,  unless  they  have  been  specialists  ashore 
with  that  kind  of  gear.  They  shook  their  heads. 


440  HISTORY   OF   THE 

"Then  a  bluejacket,  who  had  shipped  aboard  in  New  York  City  a  few  months 
before,  when  the  cruiser  started  on  her  Mediterranean  trip,  turned  up  in  the  dynamo 
room.  He  sized  up  the  dynamo  with  the  eye  of  a  man  who  knew  dynamos  down  to 
the  ground;  and  while  the  officers  and  chief  gunner's  mate  and  machinists  stood  by 
watching  him  wonderingly,  he  made  a  few  little  adjustments  with  a  wrench,  and  the 
dynamo  started  to  whir,  the  ship  immediately  becoming  a  blaze  of  light  again. 
The  landsman  was  down  on  the  rolls  as  a  laborer.  But  he  had  put  in  an  appren 
ticeship  of  seven  years  at  Mr.  Edison's  electrical  works,  and  he  is  about  the  most 
valuable  electrician  —  a  chief  petty  officer  —  in  the  navy  to-day.  He  is  serving  with 
one  of  the  fleets  in  Cuban  waters." 

The  contrary  of  these  pictures  of  skill  and  intelligence  is  presented 
by  the  Spanish  sailors:  — 

"  Naval  officers  of  the  United  States  service,  in  common  with  officers  of  the 
British  navy,  have  often  marveled  over  the  lack  of  expertness  exhibited  by  Spanish 
officers  in  handling  modern  ships,  but  they  have  always  dwelt  particularly  upon 
the  apparent  stupidity  of  the  Spanish  man-of-war's  men  forward.  There  is  nothing 
ashore  or  afloat  to  equal  the  stolidity,  indifference,  slouchiness,  and  general  incapacity 
of  the  Spanish  bluejacket.  Nor  is  the  wonder  great  that  the  Spanish  bluejacket  is 
so  poor  a  seaman,  so  inferior  a  gunner,  so  sluggish  a  performer  of  the  thousand  and 
one  chores  aboard  ship  of  which  a  good  man-of-war's  man  has  the  knack.  Four- 
fifths  of  the  Spanish  bluejackets  are  men  who  had  never  been  at  sea  before  being 
impressed  into  the  naval  service.  Impressed  is  the  word,  for  the  difficulty  the 
Spanish  navy  has  experienced  during  the  past  decade  or  two  in  getting  enough 
men  to  man  the  ships  is  well  known  to  those  who  make  a  study  of  naval  matters. 
'  Impressed '  is  almost  too  well-sounding  a  phrase  with  which  to  express  the  fashion 
the  Spanish  naval  recruiters  have  of  getting  bluejackets.  The  term  should  rather 
be  'shanghaied.'  The  Spanish  law  forbids  the  conscription  of  naval  recruits  in  time 
of  peace.  But  if  you  ask  any  Spanish  man-of-war's  man  how  he  happened  to  take 
on  in  an  outfit  wherein  he  received  so  little  consideration,  the  reply  is  apt  to  be: 
'  I  was  drunk.'  It  is  asserted  that  a  majority  of  the  Spanish  sailors  are  men  from 
inland  Spain.  The  Spanish  merchant  sailors,  the  men  living  in  Spanish  ports,  who 
are  of  age  for  service  aboard  war  ships,  know  too  well  the  cruelties  and  hardships 
inflicted  upon  men  forward  in  their  country's  naval  service  to  put  themselves  in  the 
way  of  being  trapped  into  it. 

"  Spanish  sailors  forward  are  ill-treated  habitually  bv  their  officers.  This  is  not 
a  prejudiced  or  an  exaggerated  statement.  It  is  literally  true.  The  officers  of  the 
Spanish  navy  are,  for  the  most  part,  younger  sons  of  good  families,  who  have  gained 
their  billets  not  by  ability  or  through  competition,  but  through  the  intercession  of 
their  people  at  the  court.  The  incapacity  of  many  of  them  is  laughable  ;  their 
cruelty  is  notorious.  From  the  very  day  that  a  Spaniard  is  enlisted  in  the  ship's 


SPANISH- AMERICAN    WAR  441 

company  of  one  of  his  country's  war  vessels, —  enlisted  voluntarily  or  involuntarily, — 
he  is  made  to  feel  that  he  is  no  better  than  a  beast.  For  the  slightest  infraction 
of  regulations  he  is  punished  in  a  fashion  that  makes  bluejackets  in  navies  like  our 
own  or  that  of  Great  Britain  flush  with  anger.  The  central  and  consuming  idea  of 
the  Spanish  naval  officer  is  that  all  hands  forward  are  his  servants.  There  is  abso 
lutely  nothing  of  this  in  the  American  navy.  Once  in  a  while  when  an  American 
ship  is  at  sea  for  a  considerable  period  in  tropical  waters,  and  all  hands,  fore  and 
aft,  are  wearing  white  uniforms,  an  officer  will  pay  a  mess  attendant  for  scrubbing 
one  of  his  uniforms  and  hanging  it  out  on  the  scrub-and-wash  line.  The  officer 
who  requests  a  man  to  do  anything  like  this  stands  by  to  have  the  man  refuse.  It 
is  the  man's  privilege  to  refuse  outright  to  peform  such  a  task  for  money  or  other 
wise,  but  if  he  accepts  the  job  he  is  well  paid  for  it.  In  the  Spanish  navy  every 
man  forward,  from  the  chief  petty  officer  down  to  the  unrated  landsman,  stands  by 
for  a  trick  as  valets  for  all  the  officers  aft.  They  are  not  asked  to  wash  the  officers' 
linen;  they  are  not  requested  to  blacken  the  officers' shoes  or  pipeclay  their  belts  — 
they  are  commanded  to  do  these  things,  and  tasks  more  menial,  more  repugnant  to 
men  of  self-respect ;  and  the  slightest  indication  of  hesitancy  on  the  part  of  a  blue 
jacket  is  visited  by  heavy  punishment.  When  a  Spanish  officer  'gets  it  in'  for  a 
chief  petty  officer  for  any  real  or  fancied  cause,  he  does  not  immediately  undertake 
to  secure  the  petty  officer's  disrating.  Instead,  he  begins  systematically  to  humili 
ate  him.  He  calls  him  vile  names  in  the  hearing  of  the  unrated  bluejackets,  and 
not  infrequently  kicks  him.  He  calls  him  aft  —  especially  when  the  petty  officer 
is  showing  a  party  of  women  visitors  about  the  ship  —  and  orders  him  to  blacken 
his  shoes,  right  in  sight  of  all  hands  and  all  the  visitors  on  the  main  deck. 

"  The  stanchion  punishment  is  employed  for  the  most  trivial  offenses  in  the 
Spanish  navy.  The  bluejacket  who  breaks  his  liberty  by  a  few  hours  knows  that 
he  is  in  for  the  stanchion  lash  when  he  returns  aboard.  The  Spanish  sailors  who 
deserted  their  ships  by  the  score  in  New  York  at  the  time  of  the  centenary  cele 
bration  in  1889,  were  most  of  them  liberty  breakers  who,  after  having  got  a  whiff 
of  freedom,  could  not  muster  up  the  nerve  to  return  to  their  ships  to  get  the  stanchion 
lash.  The  man  who  is  twenty  minutes  late  in  returning  from  his  leave  of  absence 
from  a  Spanish  man-of-war  gets  as  many  cat-o'-nine-tail  blows  on  his  bare  back,  while 
his  wrists  are  securely  lashed  to  a  stanchion,  as  the  officer  of  the  deck  cares  to  have 
inflicted  upon  him.  It  all  depends  upon  the  state  of  the  liver  of  the  officer  of  the 
deck.  ...  To  reduce  the  matter  to  its  smallest  term,  a  Spanish  man-of-war  is 
simply  a  floating  hell  for  the  bluejackets,  and  the  idea  of  the  officers  of  the  Span 
ish  navy  expecting  men  to  put  up  a  good  fight  for  any  sort  of  cause,  after  having 
had  a  taste  of  the  kind  of  treatment  they  get  aboard  ship,  is  a  matter  a  bit  beyond 
the  comprehension  of  the  American  mind." 

These  descriptions  account  for  the  difference  between  the  *'  men 
behind  the  gnns." 


CONCLUSION. 
MEMBERS  OF  THE  PEACE  COMMISSION. 

UNDER  the  terms  of  the  peace  protocol,  the  President  and  the 
Spanish  ministry  each  selected  five  members  to  meet  in  Paris  on 
October  1,  1898,  to  negotiate  final  terms  of  peace  between  the  two 
countries.  The  members  of  the  commission  were  as  follows:  — 

FOB  THE  UNITED  STATES.  FOR  THE  KINGDOM  OF  SPAIN. 

THE  HON.  WILLIAM  R.  DAY,  SENOR  MONTERO  Rios, 

Ex-Secretary  of  State,  of  Ohio.  President  of  the  Senate. 

THE  HON.  WILLIAM  E.  FRYE,  SENOR  ABARZUZA, 

U.  S.  Senator  from  Maine. 

THE  HON.  GEORGE  K.  DAVIS,  SENOR  GUANICA, 

U.  S.  Senator  from  Minnesota.  GENERAL    CERERO, 

THE  HON.  WHITELAW  REID,  «ESOR  VIITARRTITIA 

Of  New  York.  fOR     V  ILLARRUTIA. 

THE  HON.  GEORGE  GRAY, 

U.  S.  Senator  from  Maryland. 

The  commissioners  began  their  sessions  in  Paris,  October  1,  under 
the  friendly  and  hospitable  auspices  of  the  French  Government. 

Commissioners  for  the  evacuation  of  Cuba  by  Spanish  officials 
were  appointed  as  follows:  — 

BY  THE  UNITED  STATES.  BY  SPAIN. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JAMES  F.  WADE,  GENERAL  GONZALES  PARRADO, 

ADMIRAL  WM.  T.  SAMPSON,  CAPTAIN  PASTOR  LANDERA, 

MAJOR-GENERAL  MATTHEW  C.  BUTLER.  THE  MARQUIS  OF  MONTORO. 

The  corresponding  commissioners  for  the  island  of  Porto  Rico, 
were  the  following:  — 

FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES.  FOR  SPAIN. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  R.  BROOKE,  ADMIRAL  VALLARINO, 

ADMIRAL  WINFIELD  S.  Sen  LEY,  GENERAL  ORTEGA, 

BRIG. -GENERAL  WILLIAM  W.  GORDON.  SEJJOR  SANCHEZ  DELAGUILA. 

These  met  during  the  latter  part  of  the  month  of  September,  and 
all  the  commissions  were  in  negotiation  at  the  time  this  narrative  of 
the  war  closed. 

(442) 


APPENDIX 

OF   INTERESTING   DOCUMENTS 


(443) 


APPENDIX. 


REPORTS   OF  THE   NAVAL  COMMANDERS   ON   SANTIAGO. 


ADMIRAL   SAMPSON'S    REPORT   TO   THE   SECRETARY  OF  THE   NAVY. 

UNITED  STATES  FLAGSHIP  "NEW  YORK," 
FIRST  RATE,  OFF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA, 
July  15,  1898. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  upon  the  battle  with  and 
the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  commanded  by  Admiral  Cervera,  off  San 
tiago  de  Cuba,  on  Sunday,  July  3,  1898:  — 

Second — The  enemy's  vessels  came  out  of  the  harbor  between  9:35  and  10  A.  M., 
the  head  of  the  column  appearing  around  Cay  Smith  at  9:31,  and  emerging  from 
the  channel  five  or  six  minutes  later. 

Third — The  positions  of  the  vessels  of  my  command  off  Santiago  at  that  moment 
were  as  follows  :  The  flagship  New  York  was  four  miles  east  of  her  blockading 
station,  and  about  seven  miles  from  the  harbor  entrance.  She  had  started  for 
Siboney,  where  I  intended  to  land,  accompanied  by  several  of  my  staff,  and  go  to 
the  front  to  consult  with  General  Shafter.  A  discussion  of  the  situation  and  a  more 
definite  understanding  between  us  of  the  operations  proposed  had  been  rendered 
necessary  by  the  unexpectedly  strong  resistance  of  the  Spanish  garrison  of  Santiago. 
I  had  sent  my  Chief-of-Staff  on  shore  the  day  before  to  arrange  an  interview  with 
General  Shafter,  who  had  been  suffering  from  heat  prostration.  I  made  arrange 
ments  to  go  to  his  headquarters,  and  my  flagship  was  in  the  position  mentioned 
above  when  the  Spanish  squadron  appeared  in  the  channel.  The  remaining  vessels 
were  in  or  near  their  usual  blockading  positions,  distributed  in  a  semicircle  about 
the  harbor  entrance,  counting  from  the  eastward  to  the  westward  in  the  following 
order :  — 

The  Indiana  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  shore;  the  Oregon,  the  New  York's 
place;  between  these  two  the  Iowa,  Texas,  and  Brooklyn,  the  latter  two  miles 
from  the  shore,  west  of  Santiago.  The  distance  of  the  vessels  from  the  harbor  en 
trance  was  from  two  and  one-half  to  four  miles — the  latter  being  the  limit  of  day 
blockading  distance.  The  length  of  the  arc  formed  by  the  ships  was  about  eight 
miles.  The  3fas#achit$etts  had  left  at  4  A.  M.  for  Guantanamo  for  coal.  Her  station 
was  between  the  Iowa  and  Texas.  The  auxiliaries,  Gloucester  and  Vixen,  lay  close 
to  the  land  and  nearer  the  harbor  entrance  than  the  large  vessels,  the  Gloucester  to 

(445) 


446  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

the  eastward,  and  the  Vixen  to  the  westward.  The  torpedo  boat  Ericsson  was  in 
company  with  the  flagship,  and  remained  with  her  during  the  chase  until  ordered 
to  discontinue,  when  she  rendered  very  efficient  service  in  rescuing  prisoners  from 
the  burning  Vizcaya.  I  inclose  a  diagram,  showing  approximately  the  positions  of 
the  vessels  as  described  above. 

Fourth — The  Spanish  vessels  came  rapidly  out  of  the  harbor  at  a  speed  esti 
mated  at  from  eight  to  ten  knots,  and  in  the  following  order:  Infanta  Maria 
Teresa  (flagship),  Vizcaya,  Cristobal  Colon,  and  the  Almirante  Oquendo.  The  dis 
tance  between  these  ships  was  about  eight  hundred  yards,  which  means  that  from 
the  time  the  first  one  became  visible  in  the  upper  reach  of  the  channel  until  the 
last  one  was  out  of  the  harbor,  an  interval  of  only  about  twelve  minutes  elapsed. 
Following  the  Oquendo  at  a  distance  of  about  1,200  yards,  came  the  torpedo-boat 
destroyer,  Pluton,  and  after  her  the  Furor.  The  armored  cruisers,  as  rapidlv  as 
they  could  bring  their  guns  to  bear,  opened  a  vigorous  fire  upon  the  blockading 
vessels,  and  emerged  from  the  channel  shrouded  in  the  smoke  from  their  guns. 

Fifth  —  The  men  of  our  ships  in  front  of  the  port  were  at  Sunday  "quarters  for 
inspection."  The  signal  was  made  simultaneously  from  several  vessels,  "  Enemy's 
ships  escaping";  and  general  quarters  was  sounded.  The  men  cheered  as  they 
sprang  to  their  guns,  and  fire  was  opened  probably  within  eight  minutes  by  the 
vessels  whose  guns  commanded  the  entrance.  The  New  York  turned  about  and 
steamed  for  the  escaping  fleet,  flying  the  signal,  "  close  in  toward  harbor  entrance 
and  attack  vessels,"  and  gradually  increasing  speed,  until  toward  the  end  of  the 
chase  she  was  making  sixteen  and  one-half  knots  and  was  rapidly  closing  on  the 
Cristobal  Colon.  She  was  not  at  any  time  within  the  range  of  the  heavy  Spanish 
ships,  and  her  only  part  in  the  firing  was  to  receive  the  undivided  fire  from  the 
forts  in  passing  the  harbor  entrance,  and  to  fire  a  few  shots  at  one  of  the  destroyers, 
thought  at  the  moment  to  be  attempting  to  escape  from  the  Gloucester. 

Sixth  —  The  Spanish  vessels  upon  clearing  the  harbor  turned  to  the  westward  in 
column,  increasing  their  speed  to  the  full  power  of  their  engines.  The  heavy  block 
ading  vessels,  which  had  closed  in  toward  the  Morro  at  the  instant  of  the  enemy's 
appearance,  and  at  their  best  speed  delivered  a  rapid  fire,  well  sustained  and  de 
structive,  speedily  overwhelmed  and  silenced  the  Spanish  fire.  The  initial  speed  of 
the  Spaniards  carried  them  rapidly  past  the  blockading  vessels,  and  the  battle 
developed  into  a  chase  in  which  the  Brooklyn  and  Texas  had,  at  the  start,  the  ad 
vantage  of  position.  The  Brooklyn  maintained  this  lead.  The  Oregon,  steaming 
with  amazing  speed  from  the  commencement  of  the  action,  took  first  place.  The 
Iowa  and  the  Indiana  having  done  good  work  and  not  having  the  speed  of  the 
other  ships,  were  directed  by  me,  in  succession,  at  about  the  time  the  Vizcaya  was 
beached,  to  drop  out  of  the  chase  and  resume  blockading  stations.  These  vessels 
rescued  many  prisoners.  The  Vixen,  finding  that  the  rush  of  the  Spanish  ships  would 
put  her  between  two  fires,  ran  outside  of  our  own  column,  and  remained  there  dur 
ing  the  battle  and  chase. 


ADMIRAL  SAMPSON'S   KEPOKT  447 

Seventh  —  The  skillful  handling  and  gallant  fighting  of  the  Gloucester  excited  the 
admiration  of  every  one  who  witnessed  it,  and  merits  the  commendation  of  the  Navy 
Department.  She  is  a  fast  and  entirely  unprotected  auxiliary  vessel  —  the  yacht  Cor- 
mtir  —  and  has  a  good  battery  of  light  rapid-fire  guns.  She  was  lying  two  miles 
from  the  harbor  entrance,  to  the  southward  and  eastward,  and  immediately  steamed 
in,  opening  fire  upon  the  large  ships.  Anticipating  the  appearance  of  the  Pluton 
and  Furor,  the  Gloucester  was  slowed,  gaining  more  rapidly  a  high  pressure  of 
steam,  and  when  the  destroyers  came  out  she  steamed  for  them  at  full  speed  and 
was  able  to  close  to  short  range,  where  her  fire  was  accurate,  deadly,  and  of  great 
volume.  During  this  fight  the  Gloucester  was  under  the  fire  of  the  Socapa  battery. 
Within  twenty  minutes  from  the  time  they  emerged  from  Santiago  harbor,  the 
careers  of  the  Furor  and  the  Pluton  were  ended  and  two-thirds  of  their  people 
killed.  The  Furor  was  beached  and  sunk  in  the  surf ;  the  Pluton  sank  in  deep 
water  a  few  minutes  later.  The  destroyers  probably  suffered  much  injury  from  the 
fire  of  the  secondary  batteries  of  the  battleships  Iowa,  Indiana,  and  the  Texas,  yet  I 
think  a  very  considerable  factor  in  their  speedy  destruction  was  the  fire,  at  close  range, 
of  the  Gloucester's  battery.  After  rescuing  the  survivors  of  the  destroyers,  the  Glouces 
ter  did  excellent  service  in  landing  and  securing  the  crew  of  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa. 

Eighth  —  The  method  of  escape  attempted  by  the  Spaniards  —  all  steering  in  the 
same  direction  and  in  formation  —  removed  all  tactical  doubts  or  difficulties,  and  made 
plain  the  duty  of  every  United  States  vessel  to  close  in,  immediately  engage  and 
pursue.  This  was  promptly  and  effectively  done.  As  already  stated,  the  first  rush 
of  the  Spanish  squadron  carried  it  past  a  number  of  the  blockading  ships,  which 
could  not  immediately  work  up  to  their  best  speed;  but  they  suffered  heavily  in 
passing,  and  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  and  the  Oquendo  were  probably  set  on  fire 
by  shells  fired  during  the  first  fifteen  minutes  of  the  engagement ;  it  was  afterward 
learned  that  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa's  fire  main  had  been  cut  by  one  of  our  first 
shots,  and  that  she  was  unable  to  extinguish  fire.  With  large  volumes  of  smoke 
rising  from  their  lower  decks  aft,  these  vessels  gave  up  both  fight  and  flight  and 
ran  in  on  the  beach  —  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  at  about  10:15,  at  Nima,  six  and 
one-half  miles  from  Santiago  harbor  entrance,  and  the  Almirante  Oquendo  at  about 
10:30  A.  M.,  at  Juan  Gonzales,  seven  miles  from  the  port. 

Ninth — The  Vizcaya  was  still  under  the  fire  of  the  leading  vessels;  the  Cristobal 
Colon  had  drawn  ahead,  leading  the  chase,  and  soon  passed  beyond  the  range  of 
the  guns  of  the  leading  American  ships.  The  Vizcaya  was  soon  set  on  fire  and  at 
11:15  she  turned  in  shore  and  was  beached  at  Aserraderos,  fifteen  miles  from  San 
tiago,  burning  fiercely,  and  with  her  reserves  of  ammunition  on  deck  already 
beginning  to  explode.  When  about  ten  miles  west  of  Santiago  the  Indiana  had 
been  signaled  to  go  back  to  the  harbor  entrance,  and  at  Aserraderos  the  Iowa  was 
signaled  to  "  resume  blockading  station."  The  Toica,  assisted  by  the  Ericsson  and 
the  Hist,  took  off  the  crew  of  the  Vizcaya,  while  the  Harvard  and  the  Gloucester 
rescued  those  of  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  and  the  Almirante  Oquendo. 


448  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING   DOCUMENTS 

This  rescue  of  prisoners,  including  the  wounded  from  the  burning1  Spanish 
vessels,  was  the  occasion  of  some  of  the  most  daring  and  gallant  conduct  of  the 
day.  The  ships  were  burning  fore  and  aft,  their  guns  and  reserve  ammunition  were 
exploding,  and  it  was  not  known  at  what  moment  the  fire  would  reach  the  main 
magazines.  In  addition  to  this,  a  heavy  surf  was  running  just  inside  of  the 
Spanish  ships.  But  no  risk  deterred  our  officers  and  men  until  their  work  of 
humanity  was  complete. 

Tenth  —  There  remained  now  of  the  Spanish  ships  only  the  Cristobal  Colon  — 
but  she  was  their  best  and  fastest  vessel.  Forced  by  the  situation  to  hug  the 
Cuban  coast,  her  only  chance  of  escape  was  by  superior  and  sustained  speed. 
When  the  Vizcaya  went  ashore,  the  Colon  was  about  six  miles  ahead  of  the 
Brooklyn  and  the  Oregon,  but  her  spurt  was  finished,  and  the  American  ships  were 
now  gaining  upon  her.  Behind  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Oregon  came  the  Texas. 
Vixen,  and  New  York.  It  was  evident  from  the  bridge  of  the  Neiv  York  that 
all  the  American  ships  were  gradually  overhauling  the  chase,  and  that  she  had  no 
chance  of  escape.  At  12:50  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Oregon  opened  fire  and  got  her 
range — the  Oregon's  heavy  shell  striking  beyond  her  —  and  at  1:20  she  gave  up 
without  firing  another  shot,  hauled  down  her  colors,  and  ran  ashore  at  Rio  Tarquino, 
forty-eight  miles  from  Santiago.  Captain  Cook,  of  the  Brooklyn,  went  on  board  to 
receive  the  surrender.  While  his  boat  was  alongside  I  came  up  on  the  New  York, 
received  his  report,  and  placed  the  Oregon  in  charge  of  the  wreck  to  save  her,  if 
possible;  and  directed  the  prisoners  to  be  transferred  to  the  Resolute,  which  had 
followed  the  chase.  Commodore  Schley,  whose  Chief-of-Staff  had  gone  on  board 
to  receive  the  surrender,  had  directed  that  all  their  personal  effects  should  be 
retained  by  the  officers.  This  order  I  did  not  modify.  The  Cristobal  Colon  was 
not  injured  by  our  firing  and  probably  is  not  much  injured  by  beaching,  though 
she  ran  ashore  at  high  speed.  The  beach  was  so  steep  that  she  came  off  by  the 
working  of  the  sea.  But  her  sea  valves  were  opened  and  broken,  treacherously,  I 
am  sure,  after  her  surrender,  and,  despite  all  efforts,  she  sank.  When  it  became 
evident  that  she  could  not  be  kept  afloat,  she  was  pushed  by  the  New  York 
bodily  up  on  the  beach  —  the  New  York's  stem  being  placed  against  her  for  that 
purpose — the  ship  being  handled  by  Captain  Chadwick  with  admirable  judgment 
—  and  sank  in  shoal  water,  and  may  be  saved.  Had  this  not  been  done  she  would 
have  gone  down  in  deep  water  and  would  have  been,  to  a  certainty,  a  total  loss. 

Eleventh  —  I  regard  this  complete  and  important  victory  over  the  Spanish 
forces  as  the  successful  finish  of  several  weeks  of  arduous  and  close  blockade,  so 
stringent  and  effective  during  the  night  that  the  enemy  was  deterred  from  making 
the  attempt  to  escape  at  night,  and  deliberately  elected  to  make  the  attempt  in 
daylight.  That  this  was  the  case  I  was  informed  by  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Cristobal  Colon. 

Twelfth — It  seems  proper  to  briefly  describe  here  the  manner  in  which  this 
was  accomplished.  The  harbor  of  Santiago  is  naturally  easy  to  blockade  —  there 


ADMIRAL   SAMPSON'S    HEPOKT  H'j 

being  but  one  entrance,  and  that  a  narrow  one,  and  the  deep  water  extending 
close  up  to  the  shore  line  presenting  no  difficulties  of  navigation  outside  of  the  en 
trance.  At  the  time  of  mv  arrival  before  the  port,  June  1,  the  moon  was  at  its 
full,  and  there  was  sufficient  light  during  the  night  to  enable  any  movement  out 
side  of  the  entrance  to  be  detected;  but  with  the  waning  of  the  moon  and  the 
coming  of  dark  nights,  there  was  opportunity  for  the  enemy  to  escape,  or  for  his 
torpedo  boats  to  make  an  attack  upon  the  blockading  vessels.  It  was  ascertained, 
with  fair  conclusiveness,  that  the  Merrimac,  so  gallantly  taken  into  the  channel 
on  June  3,  did  not  obstruct  it.  I  therefore  maintained  the  blockade  as  follows:  To 
the  battleships  was  assigned  the  duty,  in  turn,  of  lighting  the  channel.  Moving 
up  to  the  port  at  a  distance  of  from  one  to  two  miles  from  the  Morro  —  dependent 
upon  the  condition  of  the  atmosphere,  —  they  threw  a  searchlight  beam  directly  up  the 
channel  and  held  it  steadily  there.  This  lightened  up  the  entire  breadth  of  the 
channel,  for  half  a  mile  inside  of  the  entrance,  so  brilliantly  that  the  movement  of 
small  boats  could  be  detected.  Why  the  batteries  never  opened  fire  upon  the 
searchlight  ship  was  always  a  matter  of  surprise  to  me,  but  they  never  did.  Sta 
tioned  close  to  the  entrance  of  the  port  were  three  picket  launches,  and,  at  a  little 
distance  further  out,  three  small  picket  vessels, — usually  converted  yachts, --and, 
when  they  were  available,  one  or  two  of  our  torpedo  boats  With  this  arrangement 
there  was.  at  least,  a  certainty  that  nothing  could  get  out  of  the  harbor  undetected. 
After  the  arrival  of  the  army,  when  the  situation  forced  upon  the  Spanish  Admiral 
a  decision,  our  vigilance  increased.  The  night  blockading  distance  was  reduced  to 
two  miles  for  all  vessels,  and  a  battleship  was  placed  alongside  the  searchlight  ship 
with  her  broadside  trained  upon  the  channel  in  readiness  to  fire  the  instant  a  Span 
ish  ship  should  appear.  The  commanding  officers  merit  the  greatest  praise  for  the 
perfect  manner  in  which  they  entered  into  this  plan  and  put  it  into  execution.  The 
Massachusetts^  which,  according  to  routine,  was  sent  that  morning  to  coal  at  Guan- 
tanamo,  like  the  others,  had  spent  weary  nights  upon  this  work,  and  deserved  a 
better  fate  than  to  be  absent  that  morning.  I  inclose,  for  the  information  of  the  de 
partment,  copies  of  orders  and  memorandums  issued  from  time  to  time,  relating  to 
the  manner  of  maintaining  the  blockade. 

Thirteenth  -When  all  the  work  was  done  so  well,  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate 
in  praise.  The  object  of  the  blockade  of  Cervera's  squadron  was  fully  accomplished. 
and  each  individual  bore  well  his  part  in  it  —  the  Commodore  in  command  on  the 
second  division,  the  captains  of  ships,  their  officers  and  men.  The  fire  of  the  battle 
ships  was  powerful  and  destructive,  and  the  resistance  of  the  Spanish  squadron  was, 
in  great  part,  broken  almost  before  they  had  got  beyond  the  range  of  their  own 
forts.  The  fine  speed  of  the  Oregon  enabled  her  to  take  a  front  position  in  the 
chase,  and  the  Criittobal  Colon  did  not  give  up  until  the  Oregon  had  thrown 
a  13-inch  shell  beyond  her.  This  performance  adds  to  the  already  brilliant  record 
of  this  fine  battleship,  and  speaks  highly  of  the  skill  and  care  with  which  her  ad 
mirable  efficiency  has  been  maintained  during  a  service  unprecedented  in  the  history 
29 


450  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

of  vessels  of  her  class.  The  Brooklyn's  westerly  blockading  position  gave  her  an 
advantage  in  the  chase,  which  she  maintained  to  the  end,  and  she  employed  her 
fine  battery  with  telling  effect.  The  Texas  and  the  New  York  were  gaining  on 
the  chase  during  the  last  hour,  and,  had  any  accident  befallen  the  Brooklyn  or  the 
Oregon,  would  have  speedily  overhauled  the  Cristobal  Colon.  From  the  moment 
the  Spanish  vessel  exhausted  her  first  burst  of  speed,  the  result  was  never  in  doubt. 
She  fell,  in  fact,  far  below  what  might  reasonably  have  been  expected  of  her.  Care 
ful  measurements  of  time  and  distance  give  her  an  average  speed  —  from  the  time 
she  cleared  the  harbor  mouth  until  the  time  she  was  run  on  shore  at  Rio  Tarquino  — 
of  13.7  knots.  Neither  the  New  York  nor  the  Brooklyn  stopped  to  couple  up  their 
forward  engines,  but  ran  out  the  chase  with  one  pair,  getting  steam,  of  course,  as 
rapidly  as  possible  on  all  boilers.  To  stop  to  couple  up  the  forward  engines  would 
have  meant  a  delay  of  fifteen  minutes  —  or  four  miles  in  the  chase. 

Fourteenth  —  Several  of  the  ships  were  struck,  the  Brooklyn  more  often  than 
the  others,  but  very  slight  material  injury  was  done,  the  greatest  being  aboard  the 
Iowa.  Our  loss  was  one  man  killed  and  one  wounded,  both  on  the  Brooklyn.  It 
is  difficult  to  explain  this  immunity  from  loss  of  life  or  injury  to  ships  in  a  combat 
with  modern  vessels  of  the  best  type,  but  Spanish  gunnery  is  poor,  at  the  best,  and 
the  superior  weight  and  accuracy  of  our  fire  speedily  drove  the  men  from  their 
guns  and  silenced  their  fire.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  statements  of  prisoners  and 
by  observation.  The  Spanish  vessels,  as  they  dashed  out  of  the  harbor,  were  covered 
with  the  smoke  from  their  own  guns,  but  this  speedily  diminished  in  volume  and  soon 
almost  disappeared.  The  fire  from  the  rapid-fire  batteries  of  the  battleships  appears 
to  have  been  remarkably  destructive.  An  examination  of  the  stranded  vessels  shows 
that  the  Almlrante  Oquendo,  especially,  had  suffered  terribly  from  this  fire.  Her 
sides  are  everywhere  pierced,  and  her  decks  were  strewn  with  the  charred  remains 
of  those  who  had  fallen. 

Fifteenth — The  reports  of  Commodore  W.  S.  Schley  and  of  the  commanding 
officers  are  inclosed. 

/Sixteenth  —  A  board  appointed  by  me  several  days  ago  has  made  a  critical  ex 
amination  of  the  stranded  vessels,  both  with  a  view  of  reporting  upon  the  result  of 
our  fire  and  the  military  features  involved,  and  of  reporting  upon  the  chance  of 
saving  any  of  them  and  of  wrecking  the  remainder.  The  report  of  the  board  will 
be  speedily  forwarded.  Very  respectfully, 

W.  T.  SAMPSON, 

Rear-Admiral  United  States  Navy,  Comma nder-in-Chief   United  States  Naval  Force, 
North  Atlantic  Station. 

To  THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY,  NAVY  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


COMMODORE  SCHLKY'S  REPORT  451 


COMMODORE  SCHLEY'S  REPORT. 

NORTH  ATLANTIC  FLEKT,  SECOND  SQUADRON,      ) 

UNITED  STATES  FLAGSHIP  u  BROOKLYN, "  > 

GUANTANAMO  BAY,  CUBA,  July  <>,  1898.          \ 

SIR:  First  —  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  that  part  of  the 
squadron  under  your  command  which  came  under  my  observation  during  the  engage- 
ment  with  the  Spanish  fleet  on  July  3,  1898:  — 

Second — At  9:35  A.  M.  Admiral  Cervera,  with  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Viz- 
cm/a,  Oquendo,  Cristobal  Colon,  and  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  came  out  of  the 
harbor  at  Santiago  de  Cuba  in  column,  at  distance,  and  attempted  to  escape  to  the 
westward.  Signal  was  made  from  the  loira  that  the  enemy  was  coming  out,  but 
his  movement  had  been  discovered  from  this  ship  at  the  same  moment.  This  vessel 
was  the  farthest  west,  except  the  Vixen,  in  the  blockading  line;  signal  was  made 
to  the  western  division  as  prescribed  in  your  general  orders,  and  there  was  imme 
diate  and  rapid  movement  inward  by  your  squadron,  and  a  general  engagement  at 
ranges  beginning  at  1,100  yards  and  varying  to  3,000  until  the  Vizcayti  was  de 
stroyed,  about  10:50  A.  M.  The  concentration  of  the  fire  of  the  squadron  upon  the 
ships  coming  out  was  most  furious  and  terrific,  and  great  damage  was  done  them. 

Third  —  About  twenty  or  twenty-five  minutes  after  the  engagement  began,  two 
vessels,  thought  to  be  the  Teresa  and  Oquendo,  and  since  verified  as  such,  took  fire 
from  the  effective  shell  fire  of  the  squadron,  and  were  forced  to  run  on  the  beach 
some  six  or  seven  miles  west  of  the  harbor  entrance,  where  they  burned  and  blew 
up  later.  The  torpedo-boat  destroyers  were  destroyed  early  in  the  action,  but  the 
smoke  was  so  dense  in  their  direction  that  1  cannot  say  to  which  vessel  or  vessels 
the  credit  belongs.  This,  doubtless,  was  better  seen  from  your  flagship. 

Fourth — The  Vizcaya  and  Colon,  perceiving  the  disaster  to  their  consorts,  con 
tinued  at  full  speed  to  the  westward  to  escape,  and  were  followed  and  engaged  in 
a  running  fight  with  the  Brooklyn,  Texas,  Iowa,  and  Oregon,  until  10:50,  when 
the  Vizcaya  took  fire  from  our  shells.  She  put  her  helm  to  port,  and,  with  a 
heavy  list  to  port,  stood  in  shore  and  ran  aground  at  Asseraderos,  about  twenty- 
one  miles  west  of  Santiago,  on  fire,  fore  and  aft,  where  she  blew  up  during  the 
light.  Observing  that  she  had  struck  colors,  and  that  several  vessels  were  nearing 
her  to  capture  and  save  her  crew,  signal  was  made  to  cease  firing.  The  Oregon 
having  proved  vastly  faster  than  the  other  battleships,  she  and  the  Brooklyn,  to 
gether  with  the  Texas  and  another  vessel  which  proved  to  be  your  flagship,  con 
tinued  westward  in  pursuit  of  the  Colon,  which  had  run  close  in  shore,  evidently 
seeking  some  good  spot  to  beach  if  she  should  fail  to  elude  her  pursuers. 

Fifth — This  pursuit  continued  with  increasing  speed  in  the  Brooklyn,  Oregon, 
and  other  ships,  and  soon  the  Brooklyn  and  Oregon  were  within  long  range  of  the 
Colon,  when  the  Oregon  opened  fire  with  her  13-inch  guns,  landing  a  shell  close 


452  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

to  the  Colon.  A  moment  afterward  the  Brooklyn  opened  fire  with  her  8-inch  guns, 
landing  a  shell  just  ahead  of  her.  Several  other  shells  were  fired  at  the  Colon,  now 
in  range  of  the  Brooklyn's  and  Oregon's  guns.  Her  commander,  seeing  all  chances 
of  escape  cut  off  and  destruction  awaiting  his  ship,  fired  a  lee  gun,  and  struck  her  flag 
at  1:15  P.  M.,  running  ashore  at  a  point  some  fifty  miles  west  of  Santiago  harbor. 
Your  flagship  was  coming  up  rapidly  at  the  time,  as  was  also  the  Texas  and  Vixen. 
A  little  later,  after  your  arrival,  the  Cristobal  Colon,  which  had  struck  to  the 
Brooklyn  and  the  Oregon,  was  turned  over  to  you  as  one  of  the  trophies  of  this 
great  victory  of  the  squadron  under  your  command. 

Sixth  —  During  my  official  visit  a  little  later,  Commander  Eaton,  of  the  Resolute 
appeared,  and  reported  to  you  the  presence  of  a  Spanish  battleship  near  Al tares. 
Your  orders  to  me  were  to  take  the  Oregon  and  go  eastward  to  meet  her,  and  this 
was  done  by  the  Brooklyn,  with  the  result  that  the  vessel  reported  as  an  enemy  was 
discovered  to  be  the  Austrian  cruiser  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  seeking  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. 

Seventh — I  would  mention  for  your  consideration  that  the  Brooklyn  occupied 
the  most  westward  blockading  position  with  the  Vixen,  and,  being  directly  in  the 
route  taken  by  the  Spanish  squadron,  was  exposed  for  some  minutes,  possibly  ten, 
to  the  gun  fire  of  three  of  the  Spanish  ships  and  the  west  battery  at  a  range  of  fifteen 
hundred  yards  from  the  ships  and  about  three  thousand  yards  from  the  batteries, 
but  the  vessels  of  the  entire  squadron,  closing  in  rapidly,  soon  diverted  this  fire 
and  did  magnificent  work  at  close  range.  I  have  never  before  witnessed  such  deadly 
and  fatally  accurate  shooting  as  was  done  by  the  ships  of  your  command  as  they 
closed  in  on  the  Spanish  squadron,  and  I  deem  it  a  high  privilege  to  commend  to 
you  for  such  action  as  you  may  deem  proper  the  gallantry  and  dashing  courage, 
the  prompt  decision  and  the  skillful  handling  of  their  respective  vessels,  of  Captain 
Phillip,  Captain  Evans,  Captain  Clark,  and  especially  of  my  Chief-of-Staff,  Captain 
Cook,  who  was  directly  under  my  personal  observation,  and  whose  coolness,  prompt 
ness,  and  courage  were  of  the  highest  order.  The  dense  smoke  of  the  combat  shut 
out  from  my  view  the  Indiana  and  the  Gloucester,  but,  as  these  vessels  were  closer 
to  your  flagship,  no  doubt  their  part  in  the  conflict  was  under  your  immediate  obser 
vation. 

Eighth  —  Lieutenant  Sharp,  commanding  the  Vixen,  acted  with  conspicuous  cour 
age;  although  unable  to  engage  the  heavier  ships  of  the  enemy  with  his  light  guns, 
nevertheless  he  was  close  into  the  battle  line  under  heavy  fire,  and  many  of  the  enemy's 
shots  passed  beyond  his  vessel. 

Ninth  —  I  beg  to  invite  special  attention  to  the  conduct  of  my  Flag-Lieutenant 
James  H.  Sears,  and  Ensign  Edward  McCauley,  Jr.,  aide,  who  were  constantly  at 
my  side  during  the  engagement,  and  who  exposed  themselves  fearlessly  in  discharg 
ing  their  duties;  and  also  to  the  splendid  behavior  of  my  secretary,  Lieutenant  B. 
W.  Wells,  Jr.,  who  commanded  and  directed  the  fighting  of  the  fourth  division  with 
splendid  effect. 


COMMODORE    SCHLEY'S    REPORT  .\:t:} 

Tenth  —  I  would  commend  the  highly  meritorious  conduct  and  courage  in  the  en 
gagement  of  Lieutenant-Commander  N.  E.  Mason,  the  executive  officer,  whose  presence 
everywhere  over  the  ship  during  its  continuance  did  much  to  secure  the  good  result 
of  this  ship's  part  in  the  victory. 

Eleventh  —  The  navigator,  Lieutenant  A.  C.  Hodgson,  and  the  division  officers, 
Lieutenant  T.  D.  Griffin,  Lieutenant  W.  R.  Rush,  Lieutenant  Edward  Simpson,  Lieu 
tenant  J.  G.  Doyle,  Ensign  Charles  Webster,  and  the  junior  divisional  officers  were 
most  steady  and  conspicuous  in  every  detail  of  duty,  contributing  to  the  accurate 
firing  of  this  ship  in  her  part  of  the  great  victory  of  your  forces. 

Twelfth — The  officers  of  the  medical,  pay,  and  engineer  and  marine  corps  re 
sponded  to  every  demand  of  the  occasion  and  were  fearless  in  exposing  themselves. 
The  warrant  officers,  boatswain  William  L.  Hill,  carpenter  G.  H.  Warford,  and  gun 
ner  F.  T.  Applegate  were  everywhere  exposed  in  watching  for  damage,  reports  of 
which  were  promptly  conveyed  to  me. 

Thirteenth  —  I  have  never  in  my  life  served  with  a  braver,  better,  or  worthier 
crew  than  that  of  the  Brooklyn.  During  the  combat  lasting  from  9:35  until  1:15 
i>.  M.,  much  of  the  time  under  fire,  they  never  flagged  for  a  moment,  and  were  ap 
parently  undisturbed  by  the  storm  of  projectiles  passing  ahead,  astern,  and  over  the 
ship. 

Fourteenth  —  The  result  of  the  engagement  was  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
squadron  and  the  capture  of  the  Admiral  and  some  thirteen  to  fifteen  hundred 
prisoners  with  the  loss  of  several  hundred  killed,  estimated  by  Admiral  Cervera  at 
600  men. 

Fifteenth  —  The  casualties  on  board  this  ship  were:  G.  H.  Ellis,  chief  yeoman, 
killed  ;  J.  Burns,  fireman,  first  class,  severely  wounded.  The  marks  and  scars  show 
that  the  ship  was  struck  about  twenty-five  times,  and  she  bears  in  all  forty-one  scars 
as  the  result  of  her  participation  in  the  great  victory  of  your  force  on  July  3,  1898. 
The  speed-cone  halliards  were  shot  away  and  nearly  all  the  signal  halliard.  The 
ensign  at  the  main  was  so  shattered  that  in  hauling  it  down,  at  the  close  of  the 
action,  it  fell  to  pieces. 

Sixteenth  —  I  congratulate  you  most  sincerely  on  this  great  victory  to  the  squad 
ron  under  your  command,  and  1  am  glad  that  I  had  an  opportunity  to  contribute  in 
the  least  to  a  victory  that  seems  big  enough  for  all  of  us. 

Seventeenth  —  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  the  report  of  the  command 
ing  officer  and  a  drawing  in  profile  of  the  ship,  showing  the  location  of  hits  and 
scars ;  also  a  memorandum  of  ammunition  expended,  and  the  amount  to  fill  her 
allowance. 

Eighteenth  —  Since  reaching  this  place  and  holding  conversation  with  several  of 
the  Captains,  viz.:  Captain  Eulate,  of  the  Viscaya,  and  the  second  in  command  of 
the  Colon,  Commander  Contreras,  I  have  learned  that  the  Spanish  Admiral's  scheme 
was  to  concentrate  all  fire  for  a  while  on  the  Brooklyn,  and  the  Vitcaya  to  ram 
her.  in  hopes  that  if  they  could  destroy  her  the  chance  of  escape  would  be  increased. 


454  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING   DOCUMENTS 

as  it  was  supposed  she  was  the  swiftest  ship  of  your  squadron.  This  explains  the 
heavy  fire  mentioned  and  the  Viscayd's  action  in  the  earlier  moments  of  the  engage 
ment.  The  execution  of  this  purpose  was  promptly  defeated  by  the  fact  that  all  the 
ships  of  the  squadron  advanced  into  close  range  and  opened  an  irresistibly  furious 
and  terrific  fire  upon  the  enemy's  squadron  as  it  was  coming  out  of  the  harbor. 

Nineteenth  —  I  am  glad  to  say  that  the  injury  supposed  to  be  below  the  water 
line  was  due  to  a  water  valve  being  opened  from  some  unknown  cause  and  flooding 
the  compartment.  The  injury  to  the  belt  is  found  to  be  only  slight  and  the  leak 
small. 

Twentieth  —  I  beg  to  inclose  a  list  of  the  officers  and  crew  who  participated  in 
the  combat  of  July  3,  1898. 

Twenty-first  —  I    cannot   close   this  report   without   mentioning   in   high   terms   of 
praise   the   splendid  conduct   and   support  of  Captain    C.  E.  Clark  and  the   Oregon. 
Her  speed  was  wonderful,  and  her  accurate  fire  splendidly  destructive. 
Very  respectfully, 

W.   S.   SCHLEY, 

Commodore  United  States  Navy,  Commanding  Second  Squadron, 
North  Atlantic  Fleet. 

To  THE  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  FORCE, 
NORTH  ATLANTIC  STATION. 


CAPTAIN  CLARK'S  REPORT. 

UNITED  STATES  SHIP  "  OREGON,"  FIRST  RATE,      ) 
OFF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA,   July  4,  1898.  \ 

SIR  :  First  —  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  at  9:30  A.  M.,  yesterday,  the 
Spanish  fleet  was  discovered  standing  out  of  the  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba. 
They  turned  to  the  westward  and  opened  fire,  to  which  our  ships  replied  vigorously. 
For  a  short  time  there  was  an  almost  continuous  flight  of  projectiles  over  this  ship, 
but  when  our  line  was  fairly  engaged  and  the  Iowa  had  made  a  swift  advance  as 
if  to  ram  or  close,  the  enemy's  fire  became  defective  in  train  as  well  as  range. 
The  ship  was  only  struck  three  times,  and  at  least  two  of  them  were  but  fragments 
of  shells.  We  had  no  casualties. 

Second  —  As  soon  as  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy's  ships  were  trying  to  break 
through  and  escape  to  the  westward,  we  went  ahead  at  full  speed,  with  the  deter 
mination  of  carrying  out  to  the  utmost  your  order  :  '•  If  the  enemy  tries  to  escape 
the  ships  must  close  and  engage  as  soon  as  possible  and  endeavor  to  sink  his  ves 
sels,  or  force  them  to  run  ashore."  We  soon  passed  all  of  our  ships  except  the 
Brooklyn,  bearing  the  broad  pendant  of  Commodore  Schley.  At  first  we  only  used 
our  main  battery,  but  when  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy's  torpedo  boats  were 


CAPTAIN   CLARK'S   REPORT  455 

following  their  ships  we  used  our  rapid-fire  guns  as  well  as  the  six  upon  thorn, 
with  telling  effect.  As  we  ranged  up  near  the  stermnost  of  their  ships,  she  headed 
for  the  beach,  evidently  on  fire.  We  raked  her  as  we  passed,  pushing  on  for  the 
next  ahead,  using  our  starboard  guns  as  they  were  brought  to  bear,  and  before  we 
had  her  fairly  abeam  she,  too,  was  making  for  the  beach.  The  two  remaining  ves 
sels  were  now  some  distance  ahead,  but  our  speed  had  increased  to  sixteen  knots, 
and  our  fire,  added  to  that  of  the  Brooklyn,  soon  sent  another,  the  Vizcaya,  to 
the  shore  in  flames.  Only  the  Cristobal  Colon  was  left,  and  for  a  time  it  seemed 
as  if  she  might  escape,  but  when  we  opened  with  our  forward  turret  guns,  and 
the  Brooklyn  followed,  she  began  to  edge  in  toward  the  coast,  and  her  capture 
or  destruction  was  assured.  As  she  struck  the  beach  her  flag  came  down,  and  the 
Brooklyn  signaled,  "  Cease  firing,"  following  it  with  "  Congratulations  for  the  grand 
victory;  thanks  for  your  splendid  assistance." 

Third — The  Brooklyn  sent  a  boat  to  her,  and  when  the  Admiral  came  up  with 
the  New  York,  Texas,  and  Vixen  she  was  taken  possession  of.  A  prize  crew  was 
put  on  board  from  this  ship  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Comewell,  the  executive 
officer,  but  before  11  r.  M.  the  ship,  which  had  been  filling  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
stop  leaks,  was  abandoned,  and  just  as  the  crew  left  she  went  over  on  her  side. 

Fourth — I  cannot  speak  in  too  high  terms  of  the  bearing  and  conduct  of  all 
on  board  this  ship.  When  they  found  the  Oregon  had  pushed  to  the  front  and 
was  hurrying  to  a  succession  of  conflicts  with  the  enemy's  vessels  if  they  could  be 
overtaken  and  would  engage,  their  enthusiasm  was  intense. 

Fifth  — As  these  vessels  were  so  much  more  heavily  armored  than  the  Brooklyn, 
they  might  have  concentrated  upon  and  overpowered  her,  and,  consequently,  I  am 
persuaded  that  but  for  the  way  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Oregon  steamed  and 
steered  the  ship  and  fought  and  supplied  her  batteries,  the  Colon,  and  perhaps  the 
Vizcaya,  would  have  escaped.  Therefore,  I  feel  that  they  rendered  meritorious 
service  to  the  country,  and,  while  I  cannot  mention  the  name  of  each  officer  and 
man  individually,  I  am  going  to  append  a  list  of  the  officers  with  their  stations  that 
they  occupied,  hoping  that  they  may  be  of  service  to  them  should  the  claims  of 
others  for  advancement  above  them  ever  be  considered. 

Very  respectfully. 

C.  E.  CLARK, 
Captain  United  States  Navy,  Commanding. 


456  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 


CAPTAIN    EVANS'    REPORT. 

UNITED  STATES  SHIP  "  IOWA,"  FIRST  RATE,          ) 
OFF   SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA,  July  4,  1898.  \ 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  the  engagement  with 
Spanish  squadron  off  Santiago  cle  Cuba  on  the  3d  of  July:  — 

First — On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  while  the  crew  were  at  quarters  for  Sunday 
inspection,  the  leading  vessel  of  the  Spanish  squadron  was  sighted  at  9:31  coming 
out  of  the  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba.  Signal,  "Enemy's  ships  are  coming  out," 
was  immediately  hoisted  and  a  gun  fired  to  attract  attention.  The  call  to  general 
quarters  was  sounded  immediately,  the  battery  made  ready  for  firing,  and  the 
engines  rung  full  speed  ahead. 

Second —  The  position  of  this  vessel  at  the  time  of  sighting  the  squadron  was 
the  usual  blockading  station  off  the  entrance  of  the  harbor ;  Morro  Castle  bearing 
about  north,  and  distant  about  three  or  four  miles.  The  steam  at  this  time  in  the 
boilers  was  sufficient  for  a  speed  of  five  knots. 

Third — After  sighting  the  leading  vessel,  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Admiral 
Cervera's  flagship,  it  was  observed  that  she  was  followed  in  succession  by  the 
remaining  three  vessels  of  the  Spanish  squadron,  the  Vizcaya,  Cristobal  Colon,  and 
Almirante  Oquendo.  The  Spanish  ships  moved  at  a  speed  of  about  eight  to  ten 
knots,  which  was  steadily  increased  as  they  cleared  the  harbor  entrance  and  stood 
to  the  westward.  They  maintained  a  distance  of  about  800  yards  between  vessels. 
The  squadron  moved  with  precision,  and  stations  were  well  kept. 

Fourth  —  Immediately  upon  sighting  the  leading  vessel,  fires  were  spread  and 
the  loica  headed  toward  the  leading  Spanish  ship.  About  9:40  the  first  shot  was 
fired  from  this  ship  at  a  distance  of  about  6,000  yards. 

The  course  of  this  vessel  was  so  laid  that  the  range  speedily  diminished.  A  num 
ber  of  shots  were  fired  at  ranges  varying  between  6,000  and  4,000  yards.  The  range 
was  rapidly  reduced  to  2,500  yards,  and,  subsequently,  to  2,000  and  to  1,200  vards. 
Fifth — When  it  was  certain  that  the  Maria  Teresa  would  pass  ahead  of  us, 
the  helm  was  put  to  starboard  and  the  starboard  broadside  delivered  at  a  range  of 
2,500  yards.  The  helm  was  then  put  to  port  and  the  ship  headed  across  the  bow 
of  the  second  ship,  and  as  she  drew  ahead  the  helm  was  again  put  to  starboard  and  she 
received  in  turn  the  full  weight  of  our  starboard  broadside  at  a  range  of  about  1,800 
yards.  The  Iowa  was  again  headed  off  with  port  helm  for  the  third  ship,  and  as  she 
approached  the  helm  was  put  to  starboard  until  our  course  was  approximately  that 
of  the  Spanish  ship.  In  this  position,  at  a  range  of  1,400  yards,  the  fire  of  the  entire 
battery,  including  rapid-fire  guns,  was  poured  into  the  enemy's  ship. 

Sixth — About  10  o'clock  the  enemy's  torpedo-boat  destroyers.  Furor  and  Pluton, 
were  observed  to  have  left  the  harbor  and  to  be  following  the  Spanish  squadron. 
At  the  time  that  they  were  observed,  and,  in  fact,  most  of  the  time  that  they  were  under 


CAPTAIN    EVANS*    KEI'OUT  457 

fire,  they  were  at  a  distance  varying  from  4,500  to  4.000  yards.  As  soon  as  they 
were  discovered,  the  secondary  battery  of  the  Iowa  was  turned  uj>on  them,  while  the 
main  battery  continued  to  engage  the  Vizcaya,  Oyuemlo,  and  Maria  Teresa. 

The  fire  of  the  main  battery  of  this  ship,  when  the  range  was  below  2,«r)(X)  vards, 
was  most  effective  and  destructive,  and,  after  a  continuance  of  this  fire  for  perhaps 
twenty  minutes,  it  was  noticed  that  the  Maria  Teresa  and  Oqnemlo  were  in  flames, 
and  were  being  headed  for  the  beach.  Their  colors  were  struck  about  10:!iO.  and 
they  were  beached  about  eight  miles  west  of  Santiago. 

Seventh  —  About  the  same  time  (about  10:'JO),  the  tire  of  this  vessel,  together  with 
that  of  the  Gloucester  and  another  smaller  vessel,  proved  so  destructive  that  one  of 
the  torpedo-boat  destroyers  {Plutori)  was  sunk  and  the  Furor  was  so  much  damaged 
that  she  was  run  upon  the  rocks. 

Kiahth —  After  having  passed,  at  10:35,  the  Oquendo  and  Maria  Teresa,  on  tire 
and  ashore,  this  vessel  continued  to  chase  and  fire  upon  the  Vizcaya  until  10:30, 
when  signal  to  cease  firing  was  sounded  on  board,  it  having  been  discovered  that 
the  Vizcaya  had  struck  her  colors. 

Ninth  —  At  11:00  the  Iowa  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Vizcaya,  which  had 
been  run  ashore,  and,  as  it  was  evident  that  she  could  not  catch  the  Cristobal  Colon, 
and  that  the  Oregon,  Brooklyn,  and  New  York  would,  two  steam  cutters  and  three 
cutters  were  immediately  hoisted  out  and  sent  to  the  Vizcaya  to  rescue  her  crew. 
Our  boats  succeeded  in  bringing  off  a  large  number  of  officers  and  men  of  that  ship's 
company  and  in  placing  many  of  them  on  board  the  torpedo  boat  Krictwon  and  the 
auxiliary  dispatch  vessel  Hist, 

Tenth  —  About  11:30  the  New  York  passed  in  chase  of  the  Cristobal  ('<>/<>, t. 
which  was  endeavoring  to  escape  from  the  Oreyon,  Jtrooklyii,  and  Terax. 

Eleventh — We  received  on  board  this  vessel  from  the  Vizcaya,  Captain  Eulate. 
the  commanding  officer,  and  twenty-three  officers,  together  with  about  two  hundred 
and  forty-eight  petty  officers  and  men.  of  whom  thirty-two  were  wounded.  There  were 
also  received  on  board  five  dead  bodies,  which  were  immediately  buried  with  the  honors 
due  to  their  grade. 

Twelfth  —  The  battery  behaved   well   in   all   respects. 

The  dash  pot  of  the  forward  l!3-inch  gun,  damaged  in  the  engagement  of  the 
2cl,  had  been  replaced  the  same  day  by  one  of  the  old  dashpots,  which  gave  no 
trouble  during  this  engagement.  This  ship  was  struck  in  the  hull,  on  the  star 
board  side,  during  the  early  part  of  the  engagement,  by  two  projectiles  of  about  six- 
inch  caliber,  one  striking  the  hull  two  or  three  feet  above  the  actual  water  line 
and  almost  directly  on  the  line  of  the  berth  deck,  piercing  the  ship  between  frames 
nine  and  ten,  and  the  other  piercing  the  side  and  the  cofferdam  between  frames 
eighteen  and  nineteen. 

The  first  projectile  did  not  pass  beyond  the  inner  bulkhead  of  cofferdam  A 
41  43.  The  hole  made  by  it  was  large  and  ragged,  being  about  sixteen  inches  in 
longitudinal  direction.  It  struck  with  a  slight  inclination  aft,  and  perforated  the 


458  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING   DOCUMENTS 

cofferdam  partition,  bulkhead  A  41^43-45-47.  It  did  not  explode,  and  remained  in 
the  cofferdam. 

The  second  projectile  pierced  the  side  of  the  ship  and  the  cofferdam  A  105, 
the  upper  edge  of  the  hole  being  immediately  below  the  top  of  the  cofferdam  on 
the  berth  deck  in  compartment  A  104.  The  projectile  broke  off  the  hatch  plate 
and  coaming  of  the  water  tank  compartment,  exploded,  and  perforated  the  walls  of 
the  chain  locker.  The  explosion  created  a  small  fire,  which  was  promptly  extin 
guished.  The  hole  in  the  side,  made  by  this  projectile,  was  about  five  feet  above 
the  water  line  and  about  two  or  three  feet  above  the  berth  deck.  One  fragment  of 
this  shell  struck  a  link  of  the  sheet-chain,  wound  around  the  6-pounder  ammunition 
hoist,  cutting  the  link  in  two.  Another  perforated  the  cofferdam  on  the  port  side, 
and  slightly  dished  outside  plating. 

These  two  wounds,  fortunately,  were  not  of  serious  importance. 

Two  or  three  other  projectiles  of  small  caliber  struck  about  the  upper  bridge 
and  smoke  stacks,  inflicting  trifling  damage,  and  four  other  small  projectiles  struck 
the  hammock  nettings  and  the  side  aft. 

There  are  no  casualties  among  the  ship's  company  to  report.  No  officer  nor 
man  was  injured  during  the  engagement. 

After  having  received  on  board  the  ship's  crew  of  the  Vizcaya,  my  vessel  pro 
ceeded  to  the  eastward,  and  resumed  the  blockading  station  in  obedience  to  the 
signal  made  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  about  11:30. 

Upon  returning  upon  the  blockading  station  the  Gloucester  transferred  to  this 
vessel  Admiral  Cervera,  his  Flag-Lieutenant,  and  the  commanding  officers  of  the  tor 
pedo-boat  destroyers  Furor  and  Pluton,  and  also  one  man  of  the  Oquendo's  crew, 
rescued  by  the  Gloucester. 

Naval  Cadets  Frank  Taylor  Evans  and  John  E.  Lewis  and  five  men  belonging 
to  the  Massachusetts  were  on  board  the  Iowa  when  the  enemy's  ships  came  out. 
They  were  stationed  at  different  points  and  rendered  efficient  service. 

The  officers  and  men  of  this  ship  behaved  admirably.  No  set  of  men  could 
have  done  more  gallant  service. 

I  take  pleasure  in  stating  to  you,  sir,  that  the  coolness  and  judgment  of  the  ex 
ecutive  officer,  Lieutenant-Commander  Raymond  P.  Rodgers,  deserves  and  will,  I  hope, 
receive  a  proper  reward  at  the  hands  of  the  government.  The  test  of  the  executive 
officer's  work  is  the  conduct  of  ship  and  crew  in  battle  —  in  this  case  it  was  simply  superb. 

The  coolness  of  the  navigator,  Lieutenant  W.  H.  Schuetze,  and  of  Lieutenant 
F.  K.  Hill,  in  charge  of  the  rapid-fire  guns  on  the  upper  deck,  are  worthy  of  the 
greatest  commendation. 

Other  officers  of  the  ship  did  not  come  under  my  personal  observation,  but  the 
result  of  the  action  shows  how  well  they  did  their  duty. 

I  cannot  express  my  admiration  for  my  magnificent  crew.  So  long  as  the  enemy 
showed  his  flag  they  fought  like  American  seamen,  but  when  the  flag  came  down 
they  were  as  gentle  and  tender  as  American  women. 


CORRESPONDENCE  .j;,'.» 

In    conclusion,    sir,    allow    me    to    congratulate     von    on    the    complete    victory 
achieved  by  your  fleet.  Very  respectfully, 

R.  D.   EVANS, 

Captain  United   States  Navy,  Commanding. 

To  THE  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF   UNITED    STATES   NAVAL    FORCE, 
NORTH  ATLANTIC  STATION. 


CORRESPONDENCE    BETWEEN    ADMIRAL   SAMPSON,  CAPTAIN 
TAYLOR   AND  COMMANDER   EATON. 

ADMIRAL  SAMPSON  tiled  in  the  Navy  Department  copies  of  letters 
that  had  passed  between  himself  and  Captain  Taylor,  of  the  Indiana, 
regarding  the  part  taken  by  the  latter  in  the  action  of  July  3,  off 

Santiago. 

UNITED  STATES  SHIP  "  INDIANA,"      ) 

GUANTANAMO    BAY,  CUBA,  August    6,   1898.   \ 

ADMIRAL  :  The  report  of  Commodore  Schley  on  the  battle  of  July  3,  as  pub 
lished,  gives  credit  in  the  seventh  paragraph  to  four  ships,  and  mentions  by  name 
their  Captains,  Phillip,  Evans,  Clark,  and  Cook,  and  adds  :  "  The  dense  smoke  of  the 
combat  shut  out  from  my  view  the  Indiana  and  the  Gloucester,  but  as  these  vessels 
were  closer  to  your  flagship,  no  doubt  their  part  in  the  conflict  was  under  your  im 
mediate  observation." 

Second — In  v°ur  report,  as  published,  you  make  but  a  slight  mention  of  the 
Indiana,  stating  that  "  the  Iowa  and  Indiana,  having  done  good  work  and  not  hav 
ing  the  speed  of  the  other  ships,  were  directed  by  me,"  etc. 

Third — The  result  of  these  reports  is  that  the  Captains  of  all  the  vessels  of  the  line 
of  battle  except  the  Indiana  have  received  personal  mention  in  the  official  report 
before  the  department,  while  the  two  smaller  vessels  have  also  had  distinctive  men 
tion,  either  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  or  the  second  in  command. 

Fourth  —  If  the  official  record  should  be  referred  to  in  future,  it  will  appear 
from  its  general  tone  that  the  Indiana  was  less  deserving  than  all  of  her  consorts. 
Leaving  out  my  personal  interest  in  the  matter,  it  is  right  that  I  should  consider 
the  officers  and  crew  of  the  ship;  and  I  speak  for  them  as  well  as  for  myself  when 
I  submit  to  you.  Admiral,  that  the  above  combination  of  reports  will  place  the  ship, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  department  and  the  country,  markedly  below  all  the  other  ves 
sels  of  your  squadron.  I  respectfully  submit,  sir,  that  this  is  injustice  to  the  Indi 
ana  and  her  officers  and  crew. 

Fifth  —  I  can  say,  without  disparagement  of  any  other  vessel,  that  during  the 
first  hour  of  the  fight  the  Indiana's  gun  fire  contributed  to  the  destruction  of  the 


460  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

Oquendo  and  the  Teresa  more  than  that  of  any  single  vessel  of  our  squadron  except 
one,  and  equaled  hers.  I  do  not  know  why  the  second  in  command  failed  to  ob 
serve  the  Indiana  during  this  period  of  our  hottest  action.  I  saw  the  Brooklyn 
quite  plainly. 

Sixth  —  An  examination  of  these  reports  with  reference  to  the  Indiana  will,  1 
believe,  convince  you,  sir,  that  they  do  produce  the  effect  of  putting  the  Indiana 
below  all  the  other  vessels  of  the  squadron.  If  it  be  your  opinion,  sir,  that  this  is 
the  case,  and  that  all  the  vessels,  from  the  Brooklyn  to  the  Vixen,  rendered 
services  as  much  more  valuable  than  the  Indiana's  as  the  published  report  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  and  the  second  in  command,  taken  together,  would  indicate, 
then  I  must  accept  it  for  myself  and  the  ship.  If,  on  the  contrary,  that  be  not 
your  opinion,  I  urge  respectfully  that  such  steps  be  taken  to  remedy  this  injustice 
as  may  seem  wise  to  you.  Very  respectfully, 

*  H.  C.  TAYLOR, 

Captain  United  States  Navy.  Commanding. 

To  THE    COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  UNITED    STATES   NAVAL    FORCE,  ) 
NORTH    ATLANTIC  STATION.  \ 

ADMIRAL  SAMPSON  replied  as  follows :  — 

UNITED  STATES  SHIP  "  NEW  YORK,"      ) 
GUANTANAMO  BAY,  CUBA,  August  8,  1898.  [ 

SIR:  I  am  greatly  obliged  that  you  have  called  my  attention  to  what  appears 
to  have  been  an  injustice  to  your  ship,  and  of  course,  your  crew,  for  the  part  which  they 
took  in  the  action  of  July  3,  and,  also,  for  the  very  proper  manner  in  which  you 
have  presented  it.  I  think,  however,  that  you  will  agree  with  me  that  in  submitting 
such  a  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  where  so  many  officers  are  vitally 
interested  and  justly  proud  of  their  ships,  it  is  no  easy  task  to  do  so  without 
apparently  bestowing  praise  unjustly.  It  requires  very  careful  consideration  of  the 
report  from  every  point  of  view  to  avoid  misunderstanding. 

Second — The  position  of  the  ships  of  the  squadron  must  be  carefully  considered 
to  fully  appreciate  what  it  was  possible  for  each  vessel  to  accomplish  under  the 
circumstances  in  which  she  was  placed.  Those  that  were  to  the  westward  of  the 
escaping  enemy  were  certainly  better  placed  for  stopping  the  enemy,  and  also 
better  placed  for  delivering  their  fire,  than  the  vessels  to  the  eastward,  which  was 
the  blockading  station  of  the  Indiana. 

Third — No  distribution  of  the  fleet  could  completely  predict  and  provide 
against  every  variation  of  such  a  sortie,  nor  do  I  consider  that  any  commanding 
officer  deserved  either  credit  or  blame  because  the  ship  under  his  command  was 
faster  or  slower  than  another  ship,  or  carried  a  heavier  or  lighter  battery,  but, 
rather,  that  the  commanding  officer  was  blameworthy  when  he  failed  to  put  his  ship 


CORRESPONDENCE  461 

in  the  proper  place    for  destroying   the  enemy,  just    in  proportion  to  the  advantage 
which  he  possessed  in  speed,  battery,  or  position  over  his  neighbors. 

Fourth  —  Each  commanding  officer,  in  mv  opinion,  was  personally  responsible 
for  the  good  use  which  he  made  of  the  tools  with  which  he  had  to  work.  1  cer 
tainly  did  not  intend  to  criticize  you,  nor  to  bestow  less  praise  upon  the  Indiana 
than  was  bestowed  upon  any  other  ship  of  the  squadron. 

fifth  — The  fact  that  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Indiana  was  signaled  to 
return  to  blockade  duty  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  after  she  had  so  gallantly  con 
tributed  to  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  ships,  was  only  a  necessary  precaution 
which  the  Commander-in-Chief  felt  obliged  to  take  to  prevent  disaster  to  the  large 
number  of  transports  which  were  left  in  that  vicinity  when  the  fleet  started  in  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy.  There  were  still  some  armed  vessels  remaining  in  the  harbor 
of  Santiago  —  at  least  two,  and  we  did  not  know,  then,  how  many  more  —  which 
could  have  come  out,  in  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  and  produced  great  havoc  among  the 
troop  ships,  which  were  defenseless  in  the  absence  of  an  armed  vessel. 

Sixth  —  This  explanation,  together  with  your  letter,  will  be  sent  to  the  depart 
ment,  with  the  request  that  it  may  be  attached  to  and  form  a  part  of  the  original 
report.  Very  respectfully, 

W.  T.  SAMPSON, 

Rear  Admiral  United  States  Navy.  Conmiand»T-in-Chief  United  States  Naval  Force, 
North  Atlantic  Station. 

To  THK  COMMANDING  OFFICER  UNITED  STATES  SHIP,  "  INDIANA." 
GUANTANAMO  BAY,  CUBA. 

COMMANDER  EATON,  of  the  Resolute,  also  contributed  his  observations 
of  the  Indiana' a  part  in  the  great  battle,  in  the  following  frank  letter 
to  Admiral  Sampson : 

U.  S.  S.  "  RESOLUTE,"  NAVY  YARD.  NEW  YORK, 
September  3.  1898. 

SIR:  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  lay  before  you  the  following  report  of  the  events 
witnessed  by  myself  in  the  action  of  July  3,  1898,  off  Santiago: 

The  Resolute,  which  I  commanded,  lay  just  east  of  the  Indiana,  distant  from 
her  one  thousand  feet,  and  about  two  and  six-tenths  miles  from  the  Morro,  when 
the  Maria  Teresa  was  sighted. 

The  Indiana  had  been  near  the  Morro,  but  about  9  o'clock  circled  to  the 
eastward  with  a  port  helm,  leaving  the  Resolute  within  the  arc  of  the  circle  de 
scribed  by  the  fleet.  The  Resolute  was  then  turned  under  a  slow  bell  and  stopped 
when  the  Indiana  was  due  west  of  us,  and  just  outside  the  circle  of  fighting 
ships.  The  Gloucester  was  to  the  northward  and  eastward,  nearly  off  Aguadores. 

As  the  Maria  Terexa  appeared  the  Iowa  fired  a  6-pounder  and  hoisted  signal. 
Within  a  few  seconds  of  this  shot  (not  more  than  five  or  ten)  all  the  Spanish  bat 
teries  opened,  and  at  the  same  instant  the  port  broadside  of  the  Maria  Teresa 


462  APPENDIX   OF    INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

was  discharged.  It  seemed  to  me  then  that  all  or  nearly  all  of  these  shots  and 
shells  were  fired  at  the  Indiana,  and  as  the  Resolute  lay  directly  in  line  the 
water  around  the  Indiana  and  the  Resolute  was  alive  with  the  fall  of  projectiles. 

Before  the  Vizcaya  appeared  the  Indiana  opened  fire  with  her  heavy  guns, 
and,  with  screws  whitening  the  water  astern,  was  heading  for  the  Morro. 

As  the  Vizcaya  came  out  I  distinctly  saw  one  of  the  Indiana's  heavy  shells 
strike  her  abaft  the  funnels,  and  the  explosion  of  this  shell  was  followed  by  a 
burst  of  flame,  which  for  the  moment  obscured  the  afterpart  of  the  Vizcaya. 

The  Vizcaya  fired  her  port  battery  apparently  at  the  Indiana,  for  many  of 
the  shells  struck  about  and  beyond  the  Resolute,  which  was  then  headed  east. 

The  Cristobal  Colon,  as  soon  as  she  was  clear  off  Morro  point,  fired  her  first 
broadside  at  the  Indiana. 

The  Oquendo,  in  coming  out,  also  fired  her  first  broadside  at  the  Indiana,  and 
I  could  see  some  of  the  Indiana's  shells  strike  the  Oquendo  as  she  steamed  south. 

Following  close  astern  on  the  Colon  and  Oquendo  came  the  destroyer  Furor, 
and  I  distinctly  saw  her  struck  by  an  8-inch  or  13-inch  shell  from  the  Indiana, 
which  was  followed  by  an  explosion  and  flames  aboard  the  Furor. 

During  all  this  time  the  Indiana  had  been  steaming  ahead,  and  I  roughly  es 
timated  that  she  was  then  about  3,000  yards  from  the  Oquendo  and  the  Furor. 

The  Resolute  was  nearly  in  line  with  the  Indiana,  and  I  could  clearly  follow 
the  course  of  the  Indiana's  projectiles. 

The  other  ships  engaged,  except  the  Oregon  and  occasionally  the  Brooklyn, 
which  showed  at  times  to  the  southward,  but  were  most  of  the  time  hidden  by  other 
vessels  (the  Resolute  being  by  this  time  well  to  the  windward)  were  hidden  in 
smoke. 

From  the  position  of  the  ships  engaged  it  appeared  to  me  that  the  Indiana 
was  the  first  to  close  with  the  escaping  enemy,  and,  though  I  could  see  the  Teresa 
and  Vizcaya  sweeping  across  her  course,  it  was  apparent  that  the  Indiana's  shells 
were  the  first  to  reach  them.  This  was  due,  first,  to  the  Indiana's  proximity,  and. 
second,  to  the  fact  that  the  Indiana  had  a  fair  beam  target  on  each  ship  as  it 
came  out. 

The  Oregon  had  this  in  a  less  degree,  and  the  other  vessels  engaged  seemed 
to  have  all  fired  their  first  shells  when  the  Spanish  ships  were  four  points  on. 

In  addition  to  the  heavier  shells  noted  as  striking  the  enemy,  we  could  count 
many  lighter  projectiles  from  the  secondary  battery  exploding  on  board,  and  as  the 
Indiana's  fire  was  incessant  I  took  these  to  be  from  her  guns. 

The  Spanish  officers  who  were  prisoners  from  the  Colon  and  the  Vizcaya  have 
since  told  me  that  the  fire  from  the  Indiana  and  the  Oregon,  as  they  (the  Spaniards) 
passed  from  the  harbor,  was  deadly  in  its  clestructiveness,  and  that  although  the 
Colon  escaped  with  small  injury,  due  to  her  greater  speed,  and  being  in  a  measure 
covered  by  other  ships,  the  Vizcaya  was  hopelessly  crippled  before  she  had  gone 
a  mile  from  the  Morro. 


LETTER    FROM   CAPTAIN    A.  T.  MAHAN  4G:J 

I  have  ventured  to  address  you  this  letter,  as  1  had  exceptional  opportunities 
for  observation  during  this  part  of  the  engagement,  and  it  has  seemed  to  me  that 
the  very  important  part  taken  by  the  Indiana  in  the  first  part  of  the  action  should 
be  laid  before  you. 

Very  respectfully, 

J.  G.  EATON, 

Commander,  Commanding.    To  tin-  Conimander-ln-Chief,  Naval  Forces, 
North  Atlantic  Station. 


LETTER  FROM  CAPTAIN  A.  T.  MAHAN. 

To  THE  EDITOR  OF  TIIK  NEW  YORK  "SuN"  —  SIR:  In  your  issue  of  July  20,  a 
correspondent  asks:  "  Why  did  Nelson,  second  in  command,  receive  the  credit  for 
Copenhagen,  if  Schley  is  not  to  have  it  for  Santiago'? " 

A  better  knowledge  of  history  would  have  shown  the  essential  differences  between 
the  two  cases,  and  have  saved  the  question.  At  Copenhagen,  Nelson  did  not  merely 
do  the  fighting,  the  entire  conception  of  the  method  of  attack  was  his,  and  by  him  was 
forced — the  word  is  not  too  strong- -upon  a  reluctant  Commander-in-Chief.  When 
the  latter  had  yielded  his  consent,  the  separate  and  decisive  attack  was  made  by  Nel 
son,  commanding  a  detachment  from  the  main  fleet,  all  the  movements  of  which 
detachment,  including  the  positions  in  the  order  of  battle,  were  prescribed  by  him. 
With  the  preliminary  dispositions  and  subsequent  conduct  of  this  detachment,  his 
Commander-in-Chief,  Parker,  had  nothing  to  do,  although  within  signal  distance,  beyond 
making  the  since  historic  signal  to  "  withdraw  from  action,"  which  Nelson  refused  to 
obey.  It  is  to  be  added  that,  although  Parker  was  not  formally  censured,  —  as  far,  at 
least,  as  I  know,  —  he  was  recalled  to  England  as  soon  as  the  accounts  of  the  battle 
were  received  there,  Nelson  being  left  in  command  in  his  place.  A  stronger  implied 
censure  than  the  recall  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  after  such  a  victory  is  difficult  to 
imagine. 

At  Santiago  all  the  dispositions  prior  to  action,  and  for  over  a  month  before, 
were  made  by  the  Commander-in-Chief.  A  number  of  orders,  issued  from  time  to  time 
by  him,  for  the  enforcement  of  the  close  watch  of  the  harbor's  mouth,  were  published  in 
the  Washington  Post  of  July  27,  and,  I  presume,  by  other  journals,  as  well.  There  is 
very  strong  ground  for  believing  that  Cervera's  attempt  to  escape  by  day  instead  of  by 
night  —  the  incident  of  his  conduct  which  has  been  most  widely  censured  and  is  most 
inexplicable  —  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  United  States  ships  kept  so  close  to  the 
harbor  mouth  at  night  that  a  dash  like  his,  desperate  at  best,  had  a  better  chance 
when  the  ships  were  at  day  distance.  This  was  so  stated,  substantially,  to  Admiral 
Sampson  by  the  Captain  of  the  Colon.  If  so,  the  merit  of  this,  forcing  the  enemy 


464  APPENDIX   OF    INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

to  action  under  disadvantageous  conditions,  —  and  it  is  one  of  the  highest  achievements 
of  military  art,  —  belongs  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.  It  was  the  great  decisive  feature 
of  the  campaign,  from  start  to  finish.  Few  naval  authorities,  I  imagine,  will  dis 
pute  this  statement. 

It  will  be  noted,  also,  by  comparing  the  report  of  Admiral  Sampson,  stating  the 
disposition  of  the  ships,  with  the  report  of  Captain  Cook,  commanding  the  Brooklyn, 
Commodore  Schley's  flagship,  that  the  United  States  ships  chased  and  fought  in  the 
order,  from  left  to  right,  established  by  Sampson.  There  is  in  this  no  particular 
merit  for  the  latter,  beyond  that  in  placing  the  two  fastest  ships,  Brooklyn  and  New 
York,  on  the  two  flanks,  he  had  made  the  best  provision  for  heading  off  the  enemy? 
which  the  Brooklyn  so  handsomely  effected.  But  the  fact  that  the  ships  chased  as 
they  stood  shows  that  it  was  unnecessary  for  Schley  to  make  a  signal;  and  in 
truth,  from  first  to  last,  the  second  in  command  needed  to  make  no  signal  of  a  tac 
tical  character,  and  made  none,  so  far  as  is  shown  by  his  own  report,  or  that  of  the 
Captain  of  the  ship.  That  is,  the  second  in  command  exercised  no  special  directive 
functions  of  a  flag  or  general  officer  while  the  fighting  lasted.  In  this,  there  was 
no  fault,  for  there  was  no  need  for  signals;  but  the  fact  utterly  does  away  with  any 
claim  to  particular  merit  as  second  in  command,  without  in  the  least  impairing  the 
Commodore's  credit  for  conduct  in  all  possible  respects  gallant  and  officer-like.  So 
far  as  plan  is  concerned,  the  battle  was  fought  on  Sampson's  lines;  and,  to  quote 
Collingwood  before  Trafalgar,  "  I  wish  Nelson  would  stop  signaling,  for  we  all  know 
what  we  have  to  do."  The  second  in  command,  and  the  Captains  before  Santiago 
all  knew  what  they  had  to  do,  and  right  nobly  they  all  did  it. 

But  the  distinctive  merit  of  the  series  of  events  which  issued  in  the  naval  battle 
of  Santiago  is  that,  so  far  as  appears,  Cervera  was  forced  to  fight  as  he  did  on  ac 
count  of  the  unrelenting  watch,  through  more  than  a  whole  moon,  including  its  dark 
nights,  maintained  by  Admiral  Sampson.  The  writer  has  been  told  by  a  naval  officer 
whose  name  he  has  no  authority  to  mention,  but  who  would  be  recognized  as  one 
of  the  most  efficient  of  his  mature  years,  and  who  had  been  off  Santiago  during 
part  of  that  eventful  month,  that  he  regarded  Sampson's  watch  of  the  harbor  as  the 
decisive  feature  in  the  great  result.  This  neither  ignores  the  merits  of  the  Captains 
nor  of  the  "man  behind  the  gun."  Captains  and  the  men  behind  the  guns  may  be 
of  the  best,  the  Colonels  of  the  regiments  and  the  privates  of  land  warfare  the  same, 
but  vain  are  their  valor  and  their  skill  if  the  Commander-in -Chief  be  wanting  in 
either.  "  Better  an  army  of  stags  led  by  a  lion  than  an  army  of  lions  led  by  a  stag." 

The  phrase  of  the  Washington  Post,  meant  for  a  sneer.  "Admiral  Sampson  wishes 
the  American  people  to  believe  that  .  .  .  things  could  not  have  happened  otherwise, 
even  if  Admiral  Sampson  had  been  seventy,  instead  of  seven,  miles  away,"  expresses 
an  exact  truth.  With  the  wise  and  stringent  methods  laid  down  and  enforced  by 
the  Admiral,  it  would  not  in  the  least  have  mattered,  as  things  happened,  with  such 
ships  and  such  Captains,  had  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  second  in  command, 
either  or  both,  been  seventy  miles  away.  It  is  exactly  with  the  fleet  as  with  the 


LETTEK    FKOM    CAPTAIN    A.  T.   MAHAN  KM 

single  ships.  The  merit  of  each  Captain  was  not  only,  nor  chiefly,  that  ho  handled 
and  fought  his  ship  admirably  on  the  day  of  battle.  His  greatest  merit  was  that, 
when  he  took  his  ship  into  action,  she  was  so  organized  and  trained  that,  had  ho 
himself  been  absent  or  struck  dead  by  the  first  shot,  the  ship  would  none  the  less 
have  played  her  full  part  efficiently  in  the  fight,  under  her  second  in  command. 

Few  things  in  the  observation  of  the  writer  have  been  more  painful  than  the 
attempt  of  a  portion  of  the  Press  and  of  the  public  to  rob  Sampson  of  his  just 
and  painfully  won  dues.  During  the  night  hours  of  July  2-3,  when  there  is  strong 
reason  to  believe  that  Cervera,  despite  the  full  moon,  wished  to  come  out,  the 
Comniander-in-Chief,  with  the  whole  of  his  force,  lay  close  to  the  harbor's  mouth, 
and  the  Spanish  attempt  was  deferred  till  day,  when  it  might  be  supposed  from 
their  usual  practice  that  the  besieging  vessels  would  be  more  distant,  and,  perhaps, 
off  their  guard.  At  4  A.  M.,  when  day  began  to  break,  the  Massachusetts,  com 
manded  by  one  of  the  most  spirited  officers  in  the  service,  silently  withdrew  to 
coal  at  Guantanamo,  forty  miles  away.  Half  an  hour  before  the  enemy  was  dis 
covered  coming  out,  the  flagship  N&UO  York  also  proceeded  east.  In  doing  this 
the  Comiiiander-in-Ghief,  Admiral  Sampson,  was  obeying  a  specific  and  direct  order 
of  the  Navy  Department,  to  confer  personally  with  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
army.  To  this  was  owing  that,  to  use  the  words  of  Sampson's  dispatch,  the  flag 
ship  "  was  not  at  any  time  within  range  of  the  heavy  Spanish  ships."  Upon  this 
circumstance,  mortifying  as  a  mere  disappointment,  that  the  ship,  though  pushed  to 
her  utmost  speed,  could  not  retrieve  her  original  disadvantage  of  position, —  incurred 
in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  Navy  Department, —  has  been  raised  the  shameful 
outcry,  designed  to  deprive  an  eminent  officer  of  the  just  rewards  of  his  toils. 

The  injustice  is,  with  many,  doubtless  unintentional  and  unwitting.  The  same 
excuse  can  scarcely  be  made  for  the  charge  that  the  Admiral  has  grudged  praise 
to  his  subordinates.  Some  Washington  papers  have  been  particularly  vicious  in 
this  matter,  and  the  Post  of  that  city,  in  an  editorial  of  July  31  to  that  effect,  is 
guilty,  in  quoting  from  one  paragraph  of  Sampson's  dispatch,  of  suppressing  these 
following  words  in  the  succeeding  paragraph:  "The  commanding  officers  merit  the 
greatest  praise  for  the  perfect  manner  in  which  they  entered  into  this  plan  [of 
blockade]  and  put  it  into  execution.  The  Massachusetts,  which,  according  to 
routine,  was  sent  that  morning  to  coal  at  Guantanamo,  like  the  others,  had  spent 
weary  nights  upon  this  work,  and  deserved  a  better  fate  than  to  be  absent  that 
morning."  Again,  as  regards  the  action:  "When  all  the  work  was  done  so  well  it 
is  difficult  to  discriminate.  The  object  of  the  blockade  of  Cervera's  squadron  was 
fully  accomplished,  and  each  individual  bore  well  his  part  in  it  —  the  Commodore 
in  command  of  the  second  division,  the  Captains  of  ships,  their  officers  and  men. 
The  fire  of  the  battleships  was  powerful  and  destructive,  and  the  resistance  of  the 
Spanish  squadron  was,  in  great  part,  broken  almost  before  they  had  got  beyond 
the  range  of  their  own  forts."  If  higher  praise  is  expected,  the  only  reply  that 
can  be  made  is  that  it  is,  historically,  rarely  given.  When  individual  men  are 
30 


466  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

named,  unless  some  conspicuous  and  unusual  deed  compels  it,  those  passed  over 
feel  slighted;  while,  if  each  who  has  done  his  duty  is  individually  named,  all  dis 
tinctive  effect  is  lost.  Those  who  doubt  may  examine  the  dispatches  of  men  like 
Nelson  and  Farragut. 

It  would  be  improper  to  conclude  without  saying  that  there  is  not  the  slightest 
proof  that  Commodore  Schley  is,  in  the  least,  responsible  for  the  malicious  attempts  made 
to  depress  Admiral  Sampson  with  a  view  to  exalt  the  second  in  command.  On  the 
contrary,  when  they  came  to  his  ears  he  telegraphed  to  the  Navy  Department  (on  July 
10)  his  "  mortification "  at  the  fact,  handsomely  attributing  the  victory  to  the  force 
under  the  command  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  North  Atlantic  station;  "to  him 
the  honor  is  due."  More  than  this,  there  is  no  occasion  for  him  to  say,  nor  need  he  have 
said  anything  but  for  the  obligation  forced  upon  him  by  the  indiscreet  and  ungener 
ous  clamor  of  those  posing  as  his  friends,  from  whom  he  might  well  pray  to  be  saved. 

So  far  as  precedents  may  properly  influence  opinion  in  a  matter  of  this  kind,  it 
is  interesting  as  well  as  instructive  to  notice  two  other  instances  in  the  career  of  Nelson, 
for  he  was  usually  a  second  in  command  and  was  prone  to  come  to  the  front,  as  at 
Copenhagen,  not  by  the  absence  of  his  superior,  but  by  his  own  initiative.  At  Cape  St. 
Vincent,  Nelson, — not  being  second,  but  third  or  fourth,  — of  his  own  motion,  without 
orders,  took  a  step  during  the  course  of  the  battle  which  was  a  leading  cause  of  its 
success,  and  threw  upon  his  own  ship  the  largest  single  share  in  the  whole  fighting. 
Nevertheless,  although  for  this  he  received  ample  recognition,  official  as  well  as  public, 
the  greater  reward  by  far  was  rightly  adjudged  to  his  chief,  whose  ship  was  much  less 
exposed,  but  to  whose  previous  dispositions  and  action  it  was  owing  that  Nelson  had 
the  opportunity  he  so  well  improved. 

At  the  Nile,  Nelson,  in  seniority  of  flag  rank  upon  the  station,  was  again  only  third 
or  fourth,  but  he  was  in  sole  command  of  a  large  detachment,  2,000  miles  away  from  his 
nearest  superior.  The  battle,  therefore,  was  fought  solely  "off  his  own  bat ;"  the  deci 
sion  to  fight,  the  methods,  and  the  actual  righting,  were  all  his  own.  Nevertheless, 
although  the  Commander-in-Chief  was  absent,  in  a  very  full  sense  of  the  word,  the 
fact  that  Nelson  was  not  a  Commander-in-Chief  was  held,  unjustly,  I  think,  to  diminish 
his  claim  to  reward.  The  reward,  quite  inadequate  to  the  achievement,  was  "the 
highest,"  wrote  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  "  that  has  ever  been  conferred  upon 
an  officer  of  your  standing  who  was  not  a  Commander-in-Chief."  This  decision, 
therefore,  was  based  on  precedent,  and  throws  light  on  British  practice  and  opinion  — 
and  in  naval  matters  no  nation  has  had  a  wider  experience  —  as  to  the  relative  responsi 
bilities  and  claims  of  Commanders-in-Chief  and  flag  officers  junior  to  them. 

A.  T.  MAHAN, 

Captain    (Retired)  United   States  Navy. 
WASHINGTON,  August  5. 


LETTER  OF  SECRETARY  LONG  4(',7 


LETTER  OF  SECRETARY  LONG. 

THE  Secretary  of  the  Navy  received  several  letters  violently  attack 
ing  Admiral  Sampson.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  his  reply  to  one  of 
them:  — 

NAVY   DKI-AUTMKNT,  J 

WASHINGTON,  August  5,  1898.  \ 

MY  UEAK  Silt:  I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter,  and  hasten  to  assure  you  that 
what  you  say  about  Admiral  Sampson  is  so  unjust  that  it  can  only  be  pardoned  on 
the  ground  of  your  ignorance  of  the  whole  matter.  You  have  no  appreciation  of 
the  responsibilities  that  have  been  upon  Admiral  Sampson,  of  his  very  superior 
attainments  as  an  officer,  and  the  splendid  work  he  has  done  in  preparing  for  the 
naval  victory  which  was  the  crowning  accomplishment  of  his  efforts  for  weeks  and 
weeks  before  Santiago.  Justice  is  always  done  in  the  long  run.  But  when  you 
indulge  in  such  unfounded  criticism  I  cannot  forbear  to  protest,  as  1  should  feel 
bound  to  do  if  you  had  referred  in  similar  terms  to  any  other  of  our  deserving 
officers. 

Admiral  Sampson  was  selected  for  the  command  of  the  North  Atlantic  squadron 
because  the  department,  in  the  exercise  of  its  best  judgment,  with  an  eye  single  to 
the  public  interest,  believed  that  he  was  specially  fitted  for  the  place.  Admiral 
Sicard,  who  held  the  command,  having  become  incapaciated  for  duty,  by  reason  of 
sickness,  was  necessarily  withdrawn  by  order  of  the  department,  and  Sampson  was 
next  in  command.  These  two  are  especially  accomplished  ordnance  officers,  having 
been  each  at  the  head  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau  and  having  devoted  themselves  to 
that  branch  of  naval  science.  Sampson  is  a  man  of  the  very  highest  professional 
attainments,  solely  devoted  to  his  duty.  He  never  pushes  himself  forward,  and 
when  you  accuse  him  of  anything1  on  that  score  you  do  most  cruel  injustice  to  a 
man  who  has  never  sought  favor  or  applause  in  any  other  way  than  by  the  simple 
discharge  of  his  dutv. 

Second — -  The  movement  on  Porto  Rico  was  not  a  movement  for  its  capture.  The 
department,  which  has  very  rarely  interfered  with  the  movements  of  Admirals  com 
manding  squadrons,  did,  however,  make  one  express  order,  and  that  was  that  our  bat 
tleships  should  not  be  exposed  to  the  risk  of  serious  injury  from  the  fire  of  any  fort. 
At  that  time  the  Spanish  fleet  was  strong;  its  whereabouts  and  destination  were  un 
known.  The  primal  necessity  was  to  meet  and  crush  its  ships,  and  to  secure  for  us  the 
domination  of  the  sea.  The  Oregon  had  not  arrived,  the  Maine  was  destroyed,  and  no 
naval  authority  would  justify  the  unnecessary  risk  of  the  destruction  of  any  of  our 
battleships,  except  in  battle  with  the  enemy's  ships.  The  movement  to  Porto  Rico 
was  to  meet,  if  possible,  the  fleet  of  Cervera,  which  was  then  expected.  Cervera. 
undoubtedly,  learning  that  our  fleet  was  at  San  Juan,  changed  his  destination  to 


468  APPENDIX   OF    INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

Santiago.  Our  movement  to  Porto  Rico  thus  became  a  reconnoissance  and  fulfilled 
its  purpose.  There  was  no  intention  at  this  time  of  taking  Porto  Rico,  as  the  army 
was  not  then  ready  to  cooperate. 

Third — With  regard  to  sending  our  ships  into  the  harbor  of  Santiago,  Admiral 
Sampson  was  acting  under  the  explicit  orders  of  the  department,  not  to  expose  his 
armored  ships  to  the  risk  of  sinking  by  mines;  and  the  wisdom  of  this  course,  I 
believe,  is  universally  acknowledged  by  naval  authorities.  He  waited,  as  he  should 
have  done,  the  cooperation  of  the  army.  How  effectually  under  this  cooperation  the 
result  was  accomplished  is  now  matter  of  history.  There  are  few  more  graphic 
scenes  than  must  have  been  presented  at  4  o'clock,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  of 
July,  when  Shafter,  with  his  troops,  ready  to  assault  Santiago,  awaited  the  reply  of 
the  Spanish  commander  to  the  demand  for  surrender.  Sampson's  fleet  was  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor,  drawn  up  in  line  and  ready  to  bombard,  as  it  had  been  for 
days  previous,  and  the  signal  officer  stood  on  the  heights  ready  to  wigwag  the  sig 
nal  for  firing.  Happily,  instead  of  this  signal,  came  the  good  word  that  the  Spanisli 
had  surrendered  to  this  combined  readiness  for  attack. 

Fourth—  Please  bear  in  mind  the  variety  and  weight  of  the  responsibilities 
which  were  upon  Admiral  Sampson  for  the  month  prior  to  the  great  battle  which 
destroyed  Cervera's  fleet.  He  was  commanding  officer  of  the  whole  squadron,  charged 
with  the  blockade  of  the  whole  Cuban  coast,  charged  with  the  detail  of  all  the  move 
ments  of  ships,  charged  with  clerical  correspondence  with  the  department  and  other 
officers,  and  specially  charged  with  preventing  the  escape  of  Cervera.  Remember 
that  this  man,  whom  you  so  sweepingly  accuse,  was  devoting  his  days  and  nights  to 
these  duties.  If  you  will  read  the  orders  issued  by  him,  beginning  with  June  1, 
you  will  find  that  the  most  thorough  precautions  had  been  taken  to  prevent  the 
escape  of  Cervera;  that  our  fleet  was  kept  constantly  in  line,  so  far  from  the  entrance 
at  night  and  so  far  by  day;  that  the  most  rigid  care  with  searchlights  and  every 
other  appliance  was  taken  every  night;  that  the  commanding  officer  of  every  vessel 
knew  his  post  and  his  duty  in  case  of  an  attempt  to  escape,  so  that,  when  that  at 
tempt  came,  the  movement  to  prevent  it,  by  the  attack  of  our  vessels  upon  the  out- 
coming  Spaniards,  went  on  like  clockwork  ;  as  at  Chattanooga,  every  movement  of 
that  great  battle  was  carried  out,  although  General  Grant  was  neither  at  Missionary 
Ridge  nor  Lookout  Mountain. 

I  can  well  understand  why  the  friends  of  other  officers  should  be  so  enthusi 
astic  and  earnest,  as  I  am,  in  giving  them  the  credit  they  so  richly,  every  one  of 
them,  deserve,  for  their  glorious  work.  I  cannot  conceive  of  anybody  so  mean  as  to 
detract,  by  a  single  hair,  from  their  merit.  But  I  cannot  understand  why  such  a  bit 
ter  feeling  is  manifested,  in  many  quarters,  toward  Admiral  Sampson,  when  all  these 
officers,  subordinate  to  him,  in  their  reports,  clearly  and  cordially  recognize  the  fact 
that,  although  at  the  beginning  he  was,  by  orders  from  Washington,  going  to  con 
fer  with  General  Shafter,  yet  the  battle  was  fought  under  his  orders,  and  that  the 
victory  was  the  consummation  of  his  thorough  preparation.  For  myself.  I  know  no 


LETTER   OF   SECRETARY    LONG  Hi'.l 

predilection  for  any  one  of  these  gallant  men.  I  would  crown  every  one  of  them 
with  laurels.  I  want  them  all  to  have  their  just  deserts.  Every  one  of  them  de 
serves  unstinted  praise;  not  one  of  them  deserves  anything  less  than  full  measure 
for  that  day's  work.  And,  therefore,  I  can  think  of  nothing  more  cruel  than  a 
depreciation  of  the  merit  of  the  faithful,  devoted,  patriotic  Commander-in-Chief, 
physic-ally  frail,  worn  with  sleepless  vigilance,  weighed  with  measureless  responsi 
bilities  and  details,  letting  no  duty  go  undone;  for  weeks  with  ceaseless  precautions 
blockading  the  Spanish  squadron;  at  last,  by  the  unerring  fulfillment  of  his  plans, 
crushing  it  under  the  fleet  which  executed  his  commands;  yet  now  compelled  in 
dignified  silence  to  be  assailed  as  vindictively  as  if  he  were  an  enemy  to  his  coun 
try.  1  am  sure  that  no  one  more  deprecates  such  an  attack  than  the  officers  of  the 
fleet  —  Commodore,  Captains,  and  all.  Among  them  all  is  peace;  whatever  disquiet 
there  may  be  elsewhere,  the  navy  is  serene.  I  am  reminded  of  Mrs.  Beecher  Stowe's 
beautiful  verse  :  — 

"  Far.  far  lx>neuth.  the  noise  of  tempests  clleth. 

And  silver  waves  chime  over  peacefully. 
And  no  rude  storm,  how  fierce  soe'er  It  flieth, 
Disturbs  the  Sabhnth  of  that  deeper  Ren." 

Yours  truly. 

JOHN   I).  LONG. 


470  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

CRUISE   OF  THE   BATTLESHIP   "OREGON." 

ACCOUNT  WRITTEN  BY  HER  CHIEF  ENGINEER. 

UNITED  STATES  SHIP  " OREGON," 

BLOCKADING  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA, 
June  22,  1898. 

KNOWING  the  great  interest  you  take  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  our  navy,  and 
the  especial  interest  with  which  you  have  followed  our  remarkable  race  for  the  scene  of 
war,  I  am  sure  you  will  be  pleased  to  have  a  more  or  less  full  account  of  our  recent 
voyage,  together  with  some  general  data.  I  will,  therefore,  start  this  account,  making  it 
from  time  to  time  as  opportunity  offers. 

The  Oregon,  you  know,  is  a  first-class  coast  defense  battleship  of  about  10,000  tons 
displacement  at  the  so-called  normal  draught.  In  this  condition,  however,  she  has  only 
a  certain  limited  amount  of  stores  on  board  and  only  four  hundred  tons  of  coal.  When 
she  goes  to  sea,  with  her  bunkers  full  of  coal,  all  stores  and  all  ammunition  on  board, 
her  actual  displacement  is  something  over  12,000  tons,  and  her  draught  of  water  is  then 
over  twenty-seven  feet,  and  she  was,  of  course,  in  this  latter  condition  when  we 
started  out  from  San  Francisco,  having  on  board  at  that  time  about  1,500  tons  of 
coal,  all  bunkers  being  practically  full. 

The  ship  is  driven  by  twin  screws,  worked  by  triple  expansion  engines,  the  engines 
being  placed  in  separate  water-tight  compartments,  and  the  tops  of  the  cylinders 
come  well  below  the  protective  deck.  There  are  four  large  main  boilers,  double- 
ended  cylindrical,  each  boiler  in  a  separate  water-tight  compartment,,  and,  of  course, 
also  well  below  the  protective  deck.  These  boilers  are  each  fifteen  feet  in  diame 
ter,  eighteen  feet  long,  and  have  eight  furnaces,  four  in  each  end.  The  dimensions 
of  each  furnace  are  three  feet  diameter,  and  length  of  grate  five  feet  six  inches, 
giving  a  grate  surface  for  each  furnace  of  seventeen  and  a  quarter  square  feet,  or 
552  for  all  main  boilers. 

We  all  knew,  of  course,  that  we  had  a  remarkably  fine  ship,  but  before  starting 
out  we  felt  some  little  anxiety  as  to  our  ability  to  keep  the  machinery  fully  up  to 
its  work  during  such  a  long  cruise.  Nothing  approaching  it  had  ever  before  been 
attempted  by  a  heavy  battleship.  Fortunately,  we  had  just  come  out  of  dry  dock 
in  Bremerton  (and  our  trip  should  really  be  considered  as  starting  from  that  point 
rather  than  from  San  Francisco)  and  were  only  nine  or  ten  days  in  San  Francisco 
before  starting  for  Callao — just  long  enough  to  fill  our  bunkers  and  magazines. 
Our  machinery,  both  engines  and  boilers,  were  then  in  excellent  condition,  every 
thing  having  been  thoroughly  overhauled  by  our  own  people  while  in  dry  dock, 
so  it  was  not  necessary  to  do  any  great  amount  of  work  in  San  Francisco. 

Having  finally  filled  up  with  coal,  ammunition,  and  stores  we  left  on  March  10. 
and  proceeded  under  three  boilers  direct  for  Callao,  which  port  we  reached  on  the 


CRUISE   OF    THE   BATTLESHIP   -OREGON"  471 

morning  of  April  4,  having  expended,  during  this  run  of  sixteen  days,  nine  hundred 
tons  of  coal,  leaving  six  hundred  tons  still  in  our  bunkers.  This  we  consider  a 
remarkably  efficient  performance,  having  averaged  4.24  knots  per  ton  of  coal.  The 
revolutions  of  the  engines  during  this  run  were  remarkably  steady,  averaging 
seventy-five  revolutions  per  minute  for  day  after  day  without  a  variation  of  a  tenth 
of  a  revolution. 

On  two  different  occasions  one  of  the  boilers  in  use  began  to  leak  slightly 
around  the  back  ends  of  some  of  the  tubes.  On  both  occasions  we  immediately 
started  fires  in  the  idle  boiler,  and  allowed  those  in  the  leaking  boiler  to  die  out, 
and  as  soon  as  possible  the  boilermaker  was  sent  in  to  reexpand  the  tubes.  Dur 
ing  all  this  time  the  water  in  the  boilers  was  perfectly  fresh,  our  evaporators  and 
distillers  having  a  capacity  of  r>.(XX)  gallons  a  day,  which  was  sufficient  for  all  pur 
poses,  including  the  necessary  make-up  feed  for  the  boilers. 

On  the  afternoon  of  March  27  smoke  and  gas  were  discovered  to  be  coming 
out  of  one  of  the  coal  bunkers.  This  bunker  was  over  half  full  at  the  time,  hav 
ing  probably  between  sixty-five  and  seventy  tons  in  it.  There  was  nothing  to  do 
but  dig  for  the  fire,  as  it  was  evidently  down  somewhere  in  the  body  of  the  pile. 
So  we  started  in,  working  a  couple  of  men  in  the  bunker  for  about  ten  minutes  at 
a  time,  and  then  sending  in  a  couple  more  to  relieve  the  first.  After  about  two 
hours'  work  the  fire  was  reached,  only  about  a  shovelful  of  live  coal  being  found, 
but  probably  a  couple  of  tons  so  hot  that  it  was  giving  off  smoke  and  gas.  After 
about  four  hours'  steady  work  all  the  dangerous  coal  had  been  removed,  and  no 
further  trouble  was  encountered.  We  had  to  call  for  assistance  from  the  deck 
force  to  help  us  out  in  carrying  the  coal  away,  as  we  kept  up  the  speed  of  the 
ship  the  whole  time;  but  our  own  men  did  all  the  work  in  the  bunker  itself. 
Naval  Cadet  Jenson,  one  of  our  engineer  cadets,  was  temporarily  relieved  from  watch 
duty  and  put  in  charge  of  the  fire  gang,  and  the  way  he  went  at  it,  never  paying 
the  least  attention  to  the  excessive  heat  and  foul  air  and  gas  in  which  he  was 
working,  was  wonderful  to  see. 

On  arriving  at  Callao  we  found  that  our  coal  had  been  ordered  for  us  by  the 
Marietta.  The  lighters  had  all  been  loaded,  and  were  brought  alongside  as  soon 
as  we  let  go  the  anchor. 

Then  began  some  real  work.  I  started  in  on  the  starboard  engine  and  Reeves 
on  the  port  engine,  and  we  overhauled  connections,  scraped  in  brasses  where  nec 
essary,  examined,  cleaned,  and  repaired  air  pumps,  circulating  pumps,  wiped  out  and 
oiled  all  the  main  cylinders  and  valve  chests.  Fortunately  for  me,  my  engine  was 
in  pretty  good  shape,  needing  only  a  slight  amount  of  keying  up  here  and  there. 
Reeves,  however,  found  one  of  his  main  cross-head  slippers  so  badly  cut  and  scored 
that  it  was  deemed  best  to  remove  it  and  put  in  place  a  spare  one,  which  we  car 
ried  on  board.  This  sounds  easy,  but  it  required  twenty-four  hours'  continuous 
work,  as  it  had  to  be  fitted  exactly,  the  face  carefully  scraped  to  a  true  surface; 
and,  finally,  the  guides  nicely  adjusted. 


472  APPENDIX   OF   INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 

In  the  meantime  the  firemen  and  coal  passers  were  engaged  in  trimming  the 
bunkers,  under  the  supervision  of  our  two  cadet  engineers,  who  took  twenty-four 
hours'  watch  at  a  time. 

When  we  arrived  here  it  was  evident  that  war  with  Spain  was  inevitable,  but 
war  had  not  yet  broken  out.  However,  every  precaution  was  taken  to  guard 
against  any  treachery  on  the  part  of  Spanish  sympathizers.  The  ordinary  number 
of  sentries  was  doubled  and  these  men  were  armed  with  ball  cartridges,  ammunition 
was  gotten  up  for  the  rapid-fire  guns,  and  the  steam  launches  were  manned  with 
armed  crews  and  kept  patrolling  around  the  ship  all  night,  to  warn  off  and  prevent 
any  strange  boats  from  approaching.  These  precautions  were  observed  whenever  we 
were  at  anchor  in  any  port  during  the  whole  trip. 

All  our  coal  was  finally  on  board  by  the  afternoon  of  April  7,  and  out  we 
started  again,  using  three  boilers  and  averaging  something  over  eleven  knots  per 
hour  until  the  evening  of  the  9th,  when  the  fourth  boiler  was  put  on  and  the 
average  speed  increased  to  about  thirteen  knots,  and  this  was  kept  up  uiitil  the 
evening  of  the  16th,  when  we  reached  Port  Tamar,  just  inside  the  entrance  of  the 
Straits  of  Magellan.  We  had  a  few  leaky  tubes  in  one  boiler  a  day  or  so  after 
leaving  Callao,  and,  of  course,  stopped  them  as  soon  as  possible.  Soon  after  this,  in 
some  way  which  we  have  never  been  able  to  determine,  a  small  amount  of  salt 
water  got  into  our  boilers,  just  enough  to  cause  the  density  of  the  water  to  become 
about  what  it  would  be  if  one-quarter  of  it  were  sea  water.  This,  of  course,  meant 
a  certain  amount  of  scale,  but  fortunately  the  amount  was  so  small  that  it  merely 
served  to  make  our  tube  ends  tight,  without  being  enough  to  cause  any  bad  effects 
on  the  boilers.  At  all  events,  from  that  time  until  long  after  our  arrival  off  Santiago 
we  did  not  have  another  leaky  tube. 

We  spent  the  night  at  anchor  in  Port  Tamar,  and  the  next  morning  started  out 
with  the  intention  of  making  Sandy  Point  by  dark.  This,  of  course,  required  a 
semi-forced  draught  run,  what  is  known  technically  as  "assisted  draught";  that  is  to 
say,  the  forced  draught  blowers  are  run,  but  the  firerooms  are  not  closed  up 
air-tight,  as  under  full  forced  draught.  We  ran  our  blowers  at  such  a  speed  as  to 
give  an  air  pressure  of  one-quarter  of  an  inch  of  water,  and  were  thus  able  to  run 
the  engines  at  a  speed  of  107-3  revolutions  per  minute,  giving  the  ship  a  speed 
through  the  water  of  14.6  knots  per  hour.  As  a  matter  of  fact  our  speed  from 
point  to  point  along  the  shore  was  much  greater,  as  there  was  a  very  strong 
current  running  through  the  straits  in  our  favor. 

While  at  Callao  we  kad  heard  that  a  Spanish  torpedo  boat  was  at  Montevideo, 
and  we  thought  it  just  possible  that  she  might  attempt  to  intercept  us  in  the 
straits,  lying  behind  one  of  the  numerous  high  points  and  darting  out  on  us.  So 
the  rapid-fire  gun  crews  were  kept  at  their  guns,  ready  for  instant  work.  However, 
we  saw  nothing  of  her. 

Sandy  Point  was  reached  in  the  evening,  and  the  next  morning  (April  18)  be 
gan  our  usual  work  - —  coaling  ship,  cleaning,  repairing,  and  overhauling  machinery. 


CRUISE   OF    THE    BATTLESHIP   "OREGON"  47^ 

Of  course,  the  only  way  to  keep  the  ship  going,  was  to  turn  to  at  every  opportunity 
and  do  everything  possible  in  the  time  allowed;  but  it  was  beginning  to  tell  on 
all  of  us.  We  all  had  to  stand  watch  at  sea,  and  as  soon  as  port  was  reached,  all 
hands  of  the  engineer's  force  had  to  go  at  the  work  and  keep  it  up,  going  for  every 
little  thing  that  showed  the  least  sign  of  wear,  and  not  waiting  even  for  it  to  show, 
but  hunting  for  things  of  which  there  was  the  least  probability  of  their  becoming 
out  of  order.  But  all  hands  stood  the  strain  well. 

We  remained  at  Sandy  Point  until  the  morning  of  April  21.  leaving  with  about 
1.200  tons  of  coal  in  our  bunkers.  The  Marietta  accompanied  us  from  Sandy  Point  to 
Rio.  or  rather  until  the  morning  of  the  30th,  when  we  increased  our  speed  to  about  four 
teen  and  a  half  knots  an  hour,  in  order  to  arrive  in  port  during  the  afternoon,  leaving 
the  Marietta  to  follow  in  later.  The  run  from  Sandy  Point  to  Rio  was  without  incident, 
and  was  at  a  slower  speed  than  our  previous  runs,  on  account  of  the  Marietta. 

It  was  at  Rio  that  we  received  the  news  that  war  was  on  with  Spain,  and  at  the 
same  time  a  rumor  of  Dewey's  victory  at  Manila  reached  us.  We  also  received  a 
long  cablegram  from  Washington,  informing  us  that  Admiral  Cewvera's  squadron  of 
four  heavy  armored  cruisers  and  four  seagoing  torpedo  boats  had  left  for  Cuban  waters, 
and  we  were  advised  to  avoid  them  if  possible.  We  remained  at  Rio  until  May  4. 
doing  what  repairing  we  could  and  filling  up  with  coal,  taking  something  over  a 
thousand  tons.  During  our  stay  in  this  port  we  were  not  allowed  to  visit  the  shore. 
Here,  too,  we  found  the  N~ic/ttcroi/,  which  had  been  bought  by  an  American  firm 
and  was  flying  our  flag,  and  which  was  to  be  convoyed  by  us  to  the  United  States. 
However,  she  was  not  allowed  to  leave  port  with  us,  so  we  stood  up  the  coast  a  few 
miles  to  wait  for  her.  She  joined  us  the  following  evening,  but  her  boilers  wore  in 
such  bad  condition  that  it  was  decided  not  to  waste  time  with  her,  so  she  was  left 
in  charge  of  the  Marietta,  and  we  went  ahead,  arriving  at  Bahia  on  the  evening  of 
the  8th.  Here  we  put  on  our  war  paint  and  made  arrangements  for  refilling  our 
bunkers,  but  on  the  evening  of  the  9th  a  cablegram  was  received  from  Washington, 
ordering  us  to  leave,  so  out  we  went  immediately,  heading  for  Barbadoes.  which  was 
reached  at  about  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  May  18.  Here  we  took  240  tons  of 
coal  and  left  the  same  evening,  standing  well  to  the  eastward,  and  finally  reached 
the  Florida  coast  at  Jupiter  Light  on  the  evening  of  the  24th,  reporting  our  arrival 
to  Washington.  Orders  came  back  to  proceed  to  Hampton  Roads  if  in  need  of 
repairs,  otherwise  to  Key  West.  There  was  no  hesitation  as  to  which  direction  to 
take  under  these  orders,  and,  finally.  Key  West  was  reached  on  the  morning  of  the 
26th.  thus  completing  the  most  remarkable  and  successful  performance  ever  under 
taken  by  a  battleship. 

I  have  since  heard  that  there  was  great  anxiety  among  our  own  people  at  home 
on  account  of  this  ship  and  that  foreign  nations  were  watching  our  run  with  great 
interest,  while  many  doubted  our  ability  to  successfully  accomplish  it. 

In  the  first  place  the  machinery  of  this  ship  was  beautifully  and  strongly  built, 
iind.  above  all.  was  erected  in  the  ship  with  the  greatest  care  arid  thoroughness.  Great 


474 


APPENDIX   OF    INTERESTING    DOCUMENTS 


credit  is  therefore  due  to  her  builders  and  to  the  inspectors  who  supervised  the  work. 
From  the  day  she  went  into  commission  the  greatest  care  has  been  taken  to  keep 
everything  up  as  nearly  to  perfection  as  possible.  On  the  discovery  of  the  least 
defect  in  any  part,  it  has  been  remedied  immediately.  Whenever  a  run  has  been  made, 
no  matter  how  short  it  may  have  been,  on  reaching  port  again  the  cylinders  and 
valve  chests,  air  pump  valves,  etc.,  have  been  carefully  examined,  cleaned,  and  oiled. 
The  most  careful  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  condition  of  the  boilers,  and  every 
endeavor  has  been  made  to  avoid  the  use  of  salt  water  in  them;  that,  indeed,  is  the 
point  to  which  our  success  is  largely  due.  Every  leak,  however  small,  in  the 
boilers  themselves,  in  the  steam  pipes,  in  the  engines  or  in  the  condensers  has  been 
stopped  just  as  soon  as  possible,  and  thus  only  has  it  been  possible  to  keep  down 
the  amount  of  water  necessary  for  make-up  feed  to  such  a  point  that  our  evapora 
tors  have  been  able  to  furnish  it,  in  addition  to  the  water  required  for  all  other 
purposes. 

The  following  is  a  summary,  in  tabular  form,  of  our  runs,  showing  at  a  glance 
the  number  of  knots  run,  the  speed  of  the  ship  in  knots  per  hour,  the  consumption 
of  coal,  and  the  knots  run  per  ton  of  coal.  The  data  in  this  table  are  taken  from 
the  time  of  getting  fairly  under  way,  the  time  while  entering  and  leaving  port  be 
ing  eliminated.  The  coal,  of  course,  does  not  include  that  used  while  lying  in  port, 
but  includes  coal  consumed  for  all  purposes  while  at  sea. 


Distance.            Time, 
Knots.             Hours. 

Speed, 
Knots  per 
Hour. 

Coal. 
Tons. 

Knots  Run 
per  Ton 
of  Coal. 

Bremerton  to  San  Francisco     . 

827.7                    72 

11.49 

221.0 

3.74 

San  Francisco  to  Callao. 

4,076.5                371 

10.99 

962.0 

4.24 

Callao  to  Port  Tamar  2,529.9                212 

11.93 

785.0 

3.22 

Port  Tamar  to  Sandy  Point  

132.0                    9 

14.55 

66.0 

2.00 

Sandy  Point  to  Rio  de  Janeiro   . 

2,247.7  ;              223 

10.08 

657.0 

3.42 

Rio  to  Bahia  

700.0  !     * 

* 

288.0 

i 

Bahia  to  Barbadoes  

2,229.0  i              193 

11.55 

620.0 

3.59 

Barbadoes  to  Jupiter  

1,683.9  i              142 

11.86 

478.5 

3.3 

Jupiter  to  Key  West  

280.0  i                27 

10.37 

77.9 

3.6 

Totals... 

14,706.7  ! 

4,155.4 

*Speeds  variable.     Data  unreliable. 


C.  N.  OFPLEY. 


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